Pesachim 12a (יב.) — the Talmud in English

It follows that

one of them was mistaken

by an hour and something

at

an hour and something:

if the event took place at the end of the third hour, the one who said five was mistaken by an hour and something. And if the event took place at the beginning of the fifth hour, then the one who said three was mistaken by an hour and something.

Rav Huna, son of Rav Yehuda, went and recited this teaching

of Abaye

before Rava.

Rava said

regarding this: How can one say that according to Rabbi Meir a person errs only by something, while according to Rabbi Yehuda he errs only by an hour and something [according to the ikkha de-amrei]? If so, we should not have upheld their testimony, for how do we know that the earlier witness intended the end of the hour and the later witness the beginning of the hour, such that the difference between them is no more than the amount by which a person may err?

And

what

would

be

if

we were to

be precise about these witnesses

—one of them said three and the other five—and say

that the one who said

“three”

intended

the beginning of the third hour, while the one who said

“five”

intended

the end of the fifth hour?

It would then follow that the difference between them was nearly three hours, which is more than the amount of time a person is ordinarily liable to err, according to all opinions.

And

then certainly

the testimony would be contradictory, and we would not execute

the person about whom they testified.

And should we stand

and reconcile their testimony

and execute

a man

on the basis of uncertainty

[according to Rabbi Yehuda]?

And

does

the Torah say

in the section concerning a murderer [Numbers 35:24]

“The assembly shall judge,” and “the assembly shall rescue”

—that they search for every merit on behalf of the accused in order to save him from execution by the court!

Rather, certainly this is why we uphold the testimony: even if we distance their testimony from one another as much as possible, saying that the earlier witness intended the beginning of the hour and the later witness its end, it still falls within the amount of time in which a person may err, and this is not contradictory testimony.

Rather, Rava said: According to Rabbi Meir

indeed

a person errs

by

slightly less than two hours.

And according to Rabbi Yehuda, a person errs

by

slightly less than three hours.

Rava explains:

According to Rabbi Meir, a person errs

by

slightly less than two hours.

If one says two and the other says three, even if we say that the one who said two intended the beginning of the second hour and the one who said three intended the end of the third hour, it is obvious that if the event took place at the end of the second hour or the beginning of the third, each one was mistaken by only one hour. But even if the

event, as it actually occurred, was either at the beginning of the second hour or at the end of the third, and

it follows that

one of them was mistaken

by

slightly less than two hours,

even so, we do not have the power to invalidate the testimony, because a person is ordinarily liable to err by such an amount of time.

And

according to Rabbi Yehuda, a person errs

by

slightly less than three hours.

And if one said three and the other five, even if we distance them from one another, saying that this one intended the beginning of three and that one the end of five, and we also say that the

event, as it actually occurred, was either at the beginning of the third hour or at the end of the fifth, and

it follows that

one of them was mistaken

by

slightly less than three hours,

nevertheless their testimony stands, because a person is liable to err even by such an amount of time.

The Gemara raises an objection to Rava:

We learned

there, in tractate Sanhedrin:

They would examine them

—the witnesses in capital cases—

with seven interrogations:

a.

In which sabbatical cycle

—in which of the seven-year cycles within the Jubilee—did the event take place?

b.

In which year

of the seven-year sabbatical cycle?

c.

In which month?

d.

On which day

of the

month?

e.

On which day

of the week? f.

At what hour?

g.

In which place

did the event take place?

And we learned

there, later in the Mishna, that in addition to these seven interrogations, they would ask them additional questions, called “examinations.” For example: Did you recognize the slain person, lest he was a gentile? What clothing was he wearing? With what did they kill him? And did you issue a warning to the murderer? And any court that increases its examinations is praiseworthy.

The Mishna continues:

What is the difference between interrogations

and examinations

—what is the difference between them in terms of the law?

With regard to interrogations, if

one of them says: “I do not know”

how to answer one of the questions,

their testimony is invalid.

But with regard to

examinations, even if both say: “We do not know”

how to answer the questions,

their testimony stands.

Unless they contradict one another, in which case their testimony is invalid.

And we raised a difficulty concerning this: What is different about interrogations, and what is different about examinations

—why does “I do not know” disqualify testimony in one case but not in the other?

And we said:

“Interrogations”—

if one of them says, “I do not know,” their testimony is invalid

because

it is testimony that cannot be rendered subject to hazama!

For the disqualification of witnesses is accomplished when other witnesses come and say: On that day and at that hour when you say that you saw this testimony in such-and-such a place, you were with us elsewhere. But when one of the witnesses answers one of the interrogations that he does not know, it is no longer possible to disqualify him. Even if he says only with regard to the interrogation concerning the hour that he does not know, it will not be possible to disqualify him by saying to him, “You were with us at that hour.”

And if you say: It is possible to disqualify him through the day, for example, if other witnesses come and say, “You were with us throughout that entire day”—nevertheless, since we learn from the verses that the witnesses must be interrogated with seven interrogations, the law of hazama must be able to apply to each one of them. If they do not know the hour, it follows that the law of hazama is absent from the interrogation concerning the hour.

And any testimony that cannot be rendered subject to hazama is not testimony. For it is stated in the Torah: “The judges shall inquire diligently, and behold, the witness is a false witness; he testified falsely against his brother. And you shall do to him as he schemed to do to his brother.” This implies that only testimony to which the law of hazama can be applied is considered testimony.

But with regard to

examinations,

even if both say that they do not know, this is still

testimony that can be rendered subject to hazama.

For hazama does not depend at all on the examinations, since it is impossible to say “You were with us” with regard, for example, to the type of clothing worn by the slain person.

The Gemara concludes its difficulty to Rava:

And if you say that a person errs by all this amount

—two hours according to Rabbi Meir, and even three hours according to Rabbi Yehuda—then

the interrogation concerning “which hour”

also

does not suffice to bring about hazama through it. For even if the witnesses state the hour at which the event occurred, it is still

testimony that cannot be rendered subject to hazama

[based on the hour alone]. For if witnesses come and say, “You were with us at that hour,”

the first witnesses may say

: Indeed, we were with you at that hour, but

we made an error in calculating

and the event took place one hour later or one hour earlier than we initially said.

And we answer:

We grant them the full extent of their possible error.

Indeed, the witnesses are granted all the time during which they could have erred, and they can be disqualified only if the other witnesses say to them: “You were with us throughout that entire hour and its margin of error”—that is, even during the adjacent time before and after it, up to the amount that can be attributed to error, you were with us.

In this manner, the interrogation concerning the hour is effective, because if they had not stated the hour at all, it would be impossible to disqualify them until the other witnesses said to them: “You were with us throughout that entire day.”

And we explain:

According to Rabbi Meir,

who says that a person errs by two hours,

we grant them

—those witnesses, one of whom said “at two” and the other “at three”—

from the beginning of the first hour

of the day

until the end of the fifth

hour. That is, together they are granted this entire period:

The witness who says “at two” is granted the time from the first hour until the end of the fourth hour. For if they say to him, “You were with us during the second hour,” he can say that he erred by one hour backward and that the event took place during the first hour. [The Gemara immediately explains why he cannot claim that he erred by two hours backward.] And even if they say to him that he was with them during the first hour as well, he can claim that he erred by two hours forward and that the event took place during the third or fourth hour. [When he said “at two,” he intended the end of the second hour.] Only when they say to him, “You were with us throughout all of the first four hours,” is he rendered a conspiring witness.

And the witness who says “at three” is also granted the fifth hour.

That is, until they disqualify him with regard to all five hours, he can claim either that the event took place at the beginning of the first hour and that he intended the beginning of the third, or that the event took place at the end of the fifth hour and that he intended the end of the third.

And by rights, we should grant them

—the witness who says “at two”—

even more from the outset,

one additional hour backward; that is, he should not be disqualified until they say to him, “You were with us even during the final hour of the night.” For otherwise, he could claim that the event took place during that hour and that he erred by two hours.

Rather,

we do not say this, because

people do not err in distinguishing between daytime and nighttime.

If the event had taken place at the end of the night, he would not mistakenly say that it occurred during the second hour of the day.

And according to Rabbi Yehuda,

who says that a person errs by three hours,

we grant them

—those witnesses, one of whom said “at three” and the other “at five” [for Rabbi Yehuda validates testimony even in such a case]—the entire period

from the beginning of the first hour until the end of

the

sixth hour

[that is, together].

To the one who said “at three,” they grant the first and second hours,

and by rights they should grant him

even more from the outset

—they should have granted him another hour, namely, the final hour of the night. For according to Rabbi Yehuda, a person is liable to err even by three hours.