Pesachim 9a (ט.) — the Talmud in English

Mishna:

When a person checking for leaven finishes checking one room and comes to check the second room,

we are not concerned that

in the meantime

a weasel dragged

leaven

from

a room that has not yet been checked

into

the room that has already been checked.

And

likewise,

we are not concerned that a weasel dragged leaven

from one place to another,

from one corner to another corner in the same room during the checking, so that he would then have to place guards in the places that had already been checked, to watch that a weasel does not enter them until he finishes checking the entire house.

For if

we were concerned

in this way,

these guards would be of no use, since there would also be reason for concern that after he finished checking the entire house, a weasel might drag leaven

from

the courtyard of a neighbor who had not yet checked

into

his courtyard, which had already been checked.

And

even if all the residents of the city had already checked for leaven, there would still be reason for concern that the weasel might drag it

from

another city, which had not yet been checked,

to

this city.

There would be no end to the matter.

For it is impossible for all the Jewish people to check for leaven at the same time. Therefore, there is necessarily no concern for this possibility.

The Tosafot raise a difficulty: We already know this from the previous Mishna, which stated: “Any place into which leaven is not brought does not require checking.” That Mishna evidently teaches that we are not concerned that a weasel dragged leaven from a place into which leaven is brought to a place into which leaven is not brought. They answer that this is not a proof, because it is possible that the Mishna is referring to a place where weasels are not commonly found. Therefore, this Mishna comes to teach us that even in a place where a weasel is commonly found, we are not concerned that it dragged leaven from one place to another. Tosafot Some early authorities answer that in a place into which leaven is not brought, weasels too are not commonly found, since there is nothing there for them to eat. Therefore, there is no concern there that a weasel dragged leaven. This is not so in a place into which leaven is brought throughout the year, but which has now been checked for leaven: there may be concern that a weasel dragged leaven there, since it is always commonly found there. Tosafot of Rabbi Asher and other early authorities. And Maimonides, in the Laws of Leaven [2:7], explains that our Mishna is indeed a continuation of the previous Mishna: a place into which leaven is not brought does not require checking, and we are not concerned that a weasel dragged leaven from a place into which leaven is brought to a place into which leaven is not brought. The Kesef Mishne wrote that as a matter of law there is no difference between Rashi’s explanation and the explanation of Maimonides. According to both of them, we are not concerned that a weasel dragged leaven either from an unchecked house to a checked house or from a place into which leaven is brought to a place into which leaven is not brought. However, the wording of the Mishna is more readily explained according to Rashi. The Mishna demonstrates that we are not concerned that a weasel dragged leaven from an unchecked house to a checked house: if we were concerned about that, we would also have to be concerned that it moved leaven from an unchecked courtyard to a checked courtyard and from an unchecked city to a checked city, and there would be no end to the matter. But according to Maimonides, what proof is there from the fact that we are not concerned that during the short time of checking a weasel moved leaven from one place to another, that we should likewise not be concerned that during the course of the year a weasel moved leaven from a place into which leaven is brought to a place into which leaven is not brought? Rashi adds that the reference is not specifically to a courtyard; rather, all the houses in the courtyard are called a courtyard. The Rashash explains Rashi’s intention: this prevents the following difficulty: surely a courtyard does not require checking at all, as explained above [8a]. This is explained in the Jerusalem Talmud, which derives the proof from the fact that all the Jewish people cannot check their leaven simultaneously. The Penei Yehoshua asks: Even if they all checked simultaneously, there would still be reason for concern that after the checking a weasel dragged leaven from the houses of gentiles. The Maharam Halava indeed cites this as an additional proof that there would be no end to the matter. He writes that according to Rashi, at the beginning of the tractate, the primary purpose of checking is to prevent the violation of the prohibition “it shall not be seen.” There is no difficulty, since one does not violate “it shall not be seen” because of a gentile’s leaven. He adds that according to this it must be said that one violates the prohibition only because of a gentile’s leaven in the gentile’s possession; but one Jew violates it because of another Jew’s leaven even when it does not belong to him, since it is in his house. Otherwise, there would be a difficulty with the Mishna itself: what proof is there from one courtyard to another and from one city to another, where the leaven does not belong to him and he does not violate “it shall not be seen” because of it? Perhaps, however, within the same house there is reason to be concerned about a weasel. But according to Tosafot, who explain there that checking is intended to prevent a person from coming to eat the leaven, even the leaven of a gentile must be checked. Why, then, did the Jerusalem Talmud need to say that all the Jewish people cannot check their leaven simultaneously? The Kovetz Shiurim wrote: It is possible to explain this as the reason that there is no concern: if we were concerned about this, there would be no end to the matter, and therefore the Sages did not require it—similar to the principle that the Sages do not enact a decree for the public unless it is able to observe it. Alternatively, it may be understood as a proof that by law there is no need for concern. For otherwise, we would also have to be concerned from one city to another, and this certainly cannot be the law. Thus, this is proof that there is no need for concern here. The Sefat Emet explains that according to Torah law, nullification alone is sufficient, but the Sages required checking as an additional measure, lest one come to eat the leaven. Alternatively, it is as the Ran explains: perhaps he did not nullify it wholeheartedly. The Mishna says that the Sages did not be concerned that a weasel dragged leaven and did not enact a requirement to check in this situation [by having several people check the house simultaneously], because the Sages saw that this would not accomplish their objective: there would still be concern that leaven had been dragged from one city to another, and there would be no end to the matter. Therefore, they enacted nothing in this regard, but left the matter according to Torah law, under which no checking is required at all. Gemara:

The Gemara infers from the wording of the Mishna, “that perhaps a weasel dragged leaven”:

The reason is

that the entire reason we are not concerned is only

that we did not see it take it,

that we did not see the weasel bring leaven here.

But if we saw it take it,

if we saw that the weasel brought leaven to a place that had already been checked,

we are concerned,

since we must be concerned that it may still be here,

and it requires checking,

so they must return and check the place.

The Gemara asks:

But why!?

Let us say: “It ate it!”

Why should we not say that the weasel certainly already ate the leaven, and that there is no need to check again?

The entire Mishna has been explained according to the Meiri. The Maharsha explains it according to Tosafot below: In the same house, all the members of the household can check simultaneously, one in one corner and another in another corner. But in another house, and certainly in another city, it is impossible for everyone to check simultaneously. Did we not learn

in tractate Oholot:

The dwellings of gentiles

[the houses of gentiles]

are impure,

because they bury their miscarried fetuses in their houses, and a corpse imparts impurity through a tent.

And how long must

the gentile

remain in the dwelling for the dwelling to require checking

for a grave, after the gentile leaves it and a Jew wishes to enter and live there?

Forty days,

the amount of time in which a woman can become pregnant and miscarry a fetus that imparts impurity. And

even though he has no wife,

the dwelling of the gentile is nevertheless impure, because he is suspected of sexual immorality.

Explanation of the discussion according to Rabbi David: It should not be explained that the questioner’s position is that a single uncertainty is enough to exempt us from checking, because the checking for leaven is rabbinic, and in a rabbinic uncertainty one rules leniently. If so, there would have been no need to bring proof from the dwellings of gentiles, since we say in every case that one rules leniently in a rabbinic uncertainty, and no proof is needed for that. Furthermore, in the dwellings of gentiles an ordinary uncertainty is certainly not sufficient to declare the place pure, since an uncertainty concerning impurity in a private domain is deemed impure. Rather, the questioner certainly also held that an ordinary uncertainty would not help here to exempt one from checking. Although checking for leaven is rabbinic, the principle that one rules leniently in a rabbinic uncertainty does not apply when the uncertainty comes to remove a definite status; here the leaven is definite, while the possibility that the weasel ate it is only uncertain. The question, rather, is that since it is an established fact that a weasel generally eats what is in its mouth, one should be able to rely on such a presumption even to remove a definite status. To this the questioner brings proof from the dwellings of gentiles. He held that it is certain that miscarried fetuses were buried there, since gentiles lived there for many days. Nevertheless, the uncertainty that the weasel ate the fetus can remove the definite status, because a weasel normally eats the flesh of a fetus. He further wrote that, apparently, according to the questioner, why did the Sages institute the checking for leaven at all? Perhaps a weasel ate all the leaven in the house, just as in the dwellings of gentiles, where any place through which a weasel can walk does not require checking. Rather, a house used by a person is not considered a place through which a weasel freely walks, because the people living in the house frighten it away. In addition, people protect their food from mice. Therefore, checking is required. But in a place where weasels and mice are commonly found, the questioner holds that checking is not required, just as we find that a courtyard does not require checking because ravens are commonly found there. Rabbi Zeira answers that there is a distinction between flesh and bread: with bread, the weasel leaves some behind, whereas with flesh it leaves nothing behind. According to what was stated above, it is not necessary to say that Rabbi Zeira means that with bread it certainly leaves some behind. Rather, Rabbi Zeira comes to reject the questioner’s reasoning that a weasel’s eating is a common occurrence on which one may rely even to remove a definite status. This is true only with flesh, which cats and weasels strongly desire, and their presumption is that they eat all of it and leave nothing behind. With bread, although there is a presumption that the weasel eats from it, there is no presumption that it eats all of it, and it may leave some behind. The matter therefore becomes an ordinary uncertainty, which cannot remove a definite status, even in a rabbinic matter. Rava, who says that the reason we do not say that the weasel ate the leaven it dragged is that an uncertainty cannot remove a definite status, is not teaching us that an ordinary uncertainty cannot remove a definite status; that is obvious. Rather, he adds that even if we adopt the questioner’s view that the weasel’s eating of leaven is an uncertainty close to certainty, it nevertheless cannot remove a definite status, because even a strong uncertainty cannot remove a definite status. The questioner’s proof from the dwellings of gentiles is not a proof, because there it is not certain that there is a miscarried fetus there; it is only uncertain. Therefore, one uncertainty can remove another uncertainty. Although in a private domain we declare a person impure even in the case of a compound uncertainty, the advantage of this uncertainty—that the weasel ate the fetus—is that since it is close to certainty, it is stronger than an ordinary compound uncertainty and can render the place pure even in a private domain. But no uncertainty in the world can remove a definite status. Therefore, it is not necessary to distinguish between bread and flesh as Rabbi Zeira does. Rabbi Zeira needed to make that distinction only because he held like the questioner, that the existence of a fetus in the dwellings of gentiles was also definite, like the certainty that the weasel had dragged away the leaven. But according to Rava, the distinction between the dwellings of gentiles and leaven is simple: the former is uncertain and the latter is definite. In reality, bread and flesh are alike with regard to a weasel’s eating: it is close to certain that the weasel eats them and leaves nothing behind. The Gemara challenges Rava from the case of a scholar who died, where we see that a strong uncertainty can remove even a definite status. The fruits of such a scholar are presumed to have been tithed immediately upon his withdrawing his hands from the threshing floor, so as not to transgress by delaying fulfillment of the mitzva. The Gemara answers that in the case of such a scholar it is virtually certain that he does not release from his possession anything that is not properly prepared. This is part of his status as a reliable scholar, and he is commanded and warned concerning it; therefore, his presumption can remove even a definite status. According to the Sages, even the corpse of a gentile imparts impurity through a tent. According to Rabbi Shimon, the graves of gentiles do not impart impurity through a tent, because the verse concerning impurity through a tent says, “When a person dies in a tent,” and gentiles are not called “persons.” Nevertheless, Rabbi Shimon agrees that when a gentile dies, he imparts impurity through contact and carrying. Rashi. Accordingly, the dwellings of gentiles are impure because of concern that one might touch or move the miscarried fetus buried there. Tosafot Yom Tov, Oholot [18:7]. He concludes that this explanation is strained. The Rashash explains that the concern is that one might shelter over the grave itself, which is considered like contact, as is explained in several places. According to Tosafot in Bava Metzia [114b], the impurity of the dwellings of gentiles is only because of impurity from the corpse through a tent, and this Mishna indeed does not follow Rabbi Shimon. According to Maimonides, Laws of the Impurity of a Corpse [11:7], the Sages made the dwellings of gentiles equivalent to the land of the nations; Rabbi Shimon too agrees that the Sages decreed that they impart impurity even through a tent. Therefore, according to Rabbi Shimon as well, the dwellings of gentiles impart impurity through a tent. Mishne la-Melekh there. And any place through which a weasel and a pig can walk

in it

does not require checking

for miscarried fetuses, because even if there had been a grave of a miscarried fetus there, the pig and the weasel would already have dug there and eaten the fetus.

If so, why here, with regard to leaven, should we not likewise say that even though we saw the weasel bringing leaven here, it presumably already ate it, and there is no need to check again!?

The Gemara answers:

Rabbi Zeira said: This is not difficult: this

case in tractate Oholot, where we said that there is no concern for a miscarried fetus because the weasel certainly ate it, is referring

to

miscarried fetuses, which are

flesh.

And

whereas

that

case, our Mishna, is referring

to

leaven, which is

bread. Therefore,

leaves nothing remaining,

with flesh,

which the animal normally eats in its entirety, it

does not leave over

anything from it, and therefore checking is not required afterward. But

with bread,

since it

leaves some over

from it, checking is required, in case it left some of the leaven behind. We are not concerned that the weasel may already have been pregnant. The Sages did not impose such an extensive stringency. For all the impurity decreed concerning the dwellings of gentiles is merely an additional stringency, as Tosafot write in their commentary “And if”: Why should we assume that a miscarried fetus was buried there? Therefore, they imposed the stringency only for the length of time in which a woman could have become pregnant in that dwelling. Mishna Aharona on Oholot [18:7]. He further wrote there that apparently there is both a majority and a presumption in favor of declaring the dwellings of gentiles pure: most women do not miscarry, and pure objects should retain their presumption of purity. Why, then, did the Sages decree impurity upon them? It is possible that the Sages did not want a Jew to live with a gentile and learn from his conduct, and therefore decreed impurity upon the gentile’s dwelling, as they said concerning the laws of joining courtyards at the beginning of chapter “One who dwells.” Alternatively, since the matter can be clarified through checking, the Sages imposed this stringency.

Rava said: What is this!?

What is the question from that source in the first place? Even if we say that a weasel’s nature is to leave some flesh behind, the case there is nevertheless not comparable to this one. For

granted, there,

in the dwellings of gentiles, it is possible to be lenient, because

perhaps there was a miscarried fetus, and perhaps there was not,

that is, on the one hand, it is possible to say that there was a fetus here, but on the other hand, it is possible to say that there was no fetus here at all. Therefore, in a place where weasels are common, we take the lenient view.

And

even

if you should say that there was one

there, a miscarried fetus,

perhaps the weasel ate it,

because an uncertainty concerning whether it was eaten is sufficient to remove the uncertain possibility that a fetus was present.

This means that the weasel sometimes leaves some behind. Therefore, when we see that it dragged something, we are stringent. The novel teachings of the Ran. And this is also implied by Tosafot below, page 10b, in their commentary “With three.” According to Rabbi Zeira, it is only uncertain whether the weasel leaves some behind. But the Ba'al HaMaor explains that according to Rabbi Zeira, with bread it certainly leaves some behind. But here, where it is certain

that there is leaven here,

for

here

we saw

the weasel

take it,

bringing it here,

who can say that it ate it!?

Its eating the leaven is only an uncertainty. It follows that there is

an uncertainty

as to whether the leaven was destroyed,

and

there was

a definite

prohibition

that removes

the house

from the definite

status of prohibition!

The Gemara raises an objection:

And

in general,

does an uncertainty not remove a definite status!?

But it was taught in a beraita: A reliable scholar

[who is trusted concerning tithes]

who died and left a storehouse

[a threshing floor]

full of produce, even if the produce is from that very day,

as is evident from it that only today its processing was completed [meaning that the final stage of processing the produce was completed, such as with grain, whose final processing is the smoothing of the grain pile], and it thereby became obligated in tithes,

it has the presumption of having been properly prepared

[tithed].

But here, these fruits certainly had the status of untithed produce,

since their processing had certainly been completed, and they had also entered the house [for every “storehouse” is in a house].

And it is uncertain whether they were tithed or whether they were not tithed,

since it is not certain that the reliable scholar tithed them.

And

even so,

an uncertainty comes

as to whether the scholar tithed them,

and removes

these fruits

from the definite

status of untithed produce!

The Tosafot raise a difficulty: The dwellings of gentiles are a private domain, and impurity in a private domain is always deemed impure, even in the case of a compound uncertainty. They answer that one of the uncertainties here is a remote uncertainty: why should we be concerned that there is a miscarried fetus in the gentile’s dwelling? In the case of a remote uncertainty, one rules leniently even in a compound uncertainty in a private domain. They offer another answer: the second uncertainty—perhaps the weasel ate the fetus—is stronger than other uncertainties, because it is close to certainty. Proof of this is that the Gemara asks that even with regard to leaven, where there is only one uncertainty—perhaps the weasel ate the leaven—the uncertainty should come and remove the definite status. Therefore, Rava holds that in any event, a compound uncertainty certainly helps to declare the place pure even in a private domain. Tosafot Tosafot in their commentary “And if.” And in the novel teachings of the Ran he wrote that this is indeed Rabbi Zeira’s reasoning: with flesh, the weasel certainly does not leave any behind. For an uncertainty alone would not have been enough to declare the place pure, even though it is a compound uncertainty, since it is a private domain, where an uncertainty is always deemed impure. He further wrote that Rabbi Zeira’s reason is that the dwellings of gentiles are as though it were certain that there is a miscarried fetus there. Therefore, it was specifically because the weasel certainly leaves nothing behind from flesh that they declared a place where weasels are common to be pure. And we answer:

There,

in the case of a ḥaver who died, it is not certain tevel and doubtful tithe. Rather,

certain

tevel

and certain

tithe

it is.

For it is certain

that ḥaverim

tithe

immediately.

And this is in accordance with Rabbi Ḥanina Ḥozאה.

For Rabbi Ḥanina Ḥozאה said: It is presumed concerning a ḥaver that he does not

he

remove from his possession something that is not properly tithed.

Alternatively,

the scholar certainly did not necessarily tithe the produce before he died; rather, this too is only uncertain. Nevertheless, it is permitted to eat the produce without tithing it, because

it is a case of uncertainty compounded by uncertainty.

The prohibition of untithed produce itself is also uncertain, because

perhaps, from the outset, one may say that it was never subject to the laws of untithed produce.

Perhaps it never acquired the status of untithed produce. Although we see that the produce has been piled and leveled and is inside the house, it is nevertheless possible that the scholar acted

in accordance with Rabbi Oshaya:

he brought the grain into the house while it was still in its chaff, and it had not yet become liable for tithing. Since the prohibition of untithed produce is itself uncertain, the scholar's uncertain tithing is sufficient to remove the uncertainty concerning the untithed status.

For Rabbi Oshaya said: A person may employ a stratagem with his grain and bring it

into his house while it is

in its chaff.

He then threshes it and heaps it inside the house. In such a manner, it does not acquire the status of tevel. For the obligation to separate terumot and tithes takes effect only through the grain’s “seeing the face of the house” after its work has been completed—that is, the grain must enter specifically through the doorway of the house when it has already been heaped and its work has been completed. This grain, at the time it entered through the doorway of the house, had not yet been heaped, and therefore it did not acquire the status of tevel. Afterward, when he heaped it and completed its processing, it was already inside the house and did not again see the doorway of the house.

All this is by Torah law; but by rabbinic law it is prohibited to eat, as a fixed meal, even produce whose processing has not been completed. However, the Sages did not issue a decree regarding feeding it to an animal, and it is permitted to feed it without limitation. If so, he benefits from having brought it in with its chaff

so that his animal would eat

from the produce after it had been heaped

and it would be exempt from tithing!

And we raise the objection again:

And

is it the case that

a doubt cannot override a certainty!?

And was it not taught in a beraita: Rabbi Yehuda said: There was an incident involving the maidservant of a certain oppressor

a violent man who was an Israelite

in Rimon

a place,

who cast a stillborn fetus into a pit.