Pesachim 93a (צג.) — the Talmud in English

And each is derived from the other:

Just as one who is impure

is referring to one

who has the ability to perform it,

who is in Jerusalem and not on a distant journey, and is able to perform the Paschal offering, except that the Torah prohibited him

and

stated that he

does not perform it.

So too,

one who was

also on a distant journey

is being described as one

who has the ability to perform it.

He can send an agent to sacrifice the Paschal offering on his behalf, but the Torah prohibited him

and

stated that he

does not perform it.

It is explicit in Rabbi Akiva’s words that one who was on a distant journey is rejected and disqualified from performing the Paschal offering, in accordance with Rav Sheshet.

And this is a difficulty for Rav Naḥman, who said that when one was on a distant journey and others slaughtered an offering for him, it was acceptable.

And Rav Naḥman could say to you

the following answer:

Indeed, Rabbi Akiva certainly agrees with Rav Sheshet. But there must necessarily be other tannaim who disagree with Rabbi Akiva, and I follow their view.

For I, [Rav Naḥman,] interpret Rabbi Akiva’s words differently: “Just as one who is impure has the ability to perform it” means one who is impure who can immerse and eat in the evening, and nevertheless the Torah prohibited him from sacrificing the offering because he had not yet immersed. [And not as Rav Sheshet explained: “Just as one who is impure has the ability to perform it”—that he is near Jerusalem, and had the Torah not prohibited him, he would have been able to sacrifice the offering].

And accordingly, one can say that

And according to this, one may say that

Rabbi Akiva follows his own view,

according to his position

that the offering may not be slaughtered or its blood sprinkled on behalf of one impure with sheretz impurity

on the fourteenth of Nisan, even though one impure with sheretz impurity is impure only that day and can immerse and eat from the Paschal offering in the evening.

Therefore Rabbi Akiva said, “Just as one impure [with sheretz impurity] who has the ability to perform it,” who can immerse and eat in the evening, “and he does not perform it,” because he is prohibited from performing the Paschal offering, so too one on a distant journey, who has the ability to perform it, does not perform it.

And

if

I,

Rav Naḥman,

held the opinion of the one who says,

“The offering may be slaughtered and its blood sprinkled on behalf of one impure with sheretz impurity,”

because he can immerse during the day and eat from the Paschal offering in the evening.

According to my view, the impure person whom the Torah states is deferred to the second Paschal offering is one impure for seven days [before the seventh day of his impurity has arrived], who cannot immerse that day and eat the Paschal offering in the evening.

In this case, it is not possible to say as Rabbi Akiva did: “Just as one who is impure has the ability to perform it” [to immerse], since even if he immerses, he cannot eat from the Paschal offering in the evening, as he remains impure for seven days.

On the contrary, one who is impure and has the ability to perform it, namely, one impure with sheretz impurity, is not disqualified from eating the Paschal offering. If so, one who was on a distant journey is likewise not disqualified.

The Sages taught:

Those who perform the

Paschal offering

second are: men and women who experience a gonorrheal discharge, male and female lepers,

and menstruating women,

and men who have intercourse with menstruating women, and women who have given birth.

For all of these are impure for more than one day.

And likewise,

those who acted unwittingly and those prevented by circumstances beyond their control,

and those who acted intentionally,

who intentionally did not perform the first Paschal offering,

and one impure

through contact with the dead,

and one who was on a distant journey.

All of these perform the second Paschal offering.

And the beraita asks: Since we have stated that all of these perform the second Paschal offering,

if so, why is it stated

in the Torah

“impure”?

Before the Gemara finishes citing the continuation of the beraita, it expresses astonishment at the beraita’s question:

“Why is it stated”

“impure”? What kind of question is this?! The Torah must state that he is impure in order to teach you

that if he wished to perform it on the first

that if the impure person wished to perform it on the first

we do not allow him to!

we do not permit him to, because he is prohibited from joining the group designated for the Paschal offering!

Rather,

it is necessarily the case that the wording of the baraita must be emended.

And this is how the baraita posed the question:

“If so, why is ‘at a distant road’ stated?”

The baraita answers:

“To exempt him from karet,”

whereas one who intentionally refrains is liable for karet.

And this baraita cannot hold according to the opinion that one who was on a distant road and whose sacrifice was slaughtered by others on his behalf has not had his offering accepted, for according to that opinion there is no difficulty concerning why “at a distant road” is stated. For it comes to teach us that his offering was not accepted [as Rabbi Akiva said above: Just as an impure person, who has the ability to perform it but does not do so, so too one on a distant road].

And

it is necessarily the case that this baraita holds

according to the opinion that the offering is accepted.

And now the Gemara discusses the words of the baraita that listed women with abnormal genital discharges, menstruating women, and women who had given birth among those liable to bring the Second Pesach.

And we raise the following objection:

Is a woman liable for the Second Pesach?

Is a woman indeed liable to bring the Second Pesach?!

But it was taught

and we learned in a baraita:

One might have thought that only

the Paschal offering

second

and one

who was on a distant road

with regard to whom the Torah spoke, perform the Second Pesach.

Those with abnormal genital discharges, lepers, and men who had intercourse with menstruating women—

from where

do we know that they perform the Second Pesach?

The verse states: “Any man

who becomes impure through contact with a corpse.” From the repetition of the word “man,” we learn that the other impure persons are included as well.

And from the fact that the baraita speaks of men with abnormal genital discharges, lepers, and men who had intercourse with menstruating women, but not of women with abnormal genital discharges, menstruating women, and women who had given birth, it follows that women do not perform the Second Pesach! Whereas in the earlier baraita we learned that women do perform the Second Pesach!

And we answer:

There is no difficulty.

This

the baraita that obligates women to bring the Second Pesach follows the view of

Rabbi Yosei,

who obligates women to bring the Second Pesach [above, 91a].

Whereas

this,

the second baraita, which did not obligate women to bring the Second Pesach, follows the view of

Rabbi Yehuda,

who says that for women the Second Pesach is optional.

And

it likewise follows the view of

Rabbi Shimon,

who says that women cannot perform the Second Pesach at all.

The Gemara cites a baraita that discusses the liability for karet of one who neglects the Paschal offering.

The Sages taught:

Anyone who intentionally neglects the mitzva of offering the Paschal sacrifice

is liable for karet for

neglecting the

first Pesach.

And he is liable for karet

also for neglecting the

second Pesach.

That is, he incurs liability for karet on account of neglecting the First Pesach and on account of neglecting the Second Pesach.

In practice, however, it is impossible to be punished with two instances of karet, which is death at the hands of Heaven. Once he became liable for the punishment of karet when he neglected the First Pesach, it is impossible to add a practical punishment of karet for neglecting the Second Pesach, since a person cannot be put to death twice.

But there is a practical difference: If he inadvertently neglected the First Pesach but intentionally neglected the Second, he is liable for karet,

these are the words of Rabbi.

Rabbi Natan says: He is liable for karet for the first, but exempt for the second.

And if he acted inadvertently with regard to the first and intentionally with regard to the second, he is exempt.

Rabbi Ḥananya ben Akavya says: Even

for

the first,

if he intentionally neglected it,

he is not liable for karet unless he also failed to perform

even

the second

intentionally.

But if he performed the second, or if he inadvertently neglected it, he is exempt. For the Second Pesach comes to complete and rectify the First Pesach, and the prohibition of neglecting the First Paschal sacrifice is not fully incurred until he also intentionally neglects the Second Pesach.

And they followed

Rabbi and Rabbi Natan

their respective positions,

their views expressed elsewhere.

As it was taught: A convert who converted between the two Pesach offerings,

between the fourteenth of Nisan and the fourteenth of Iyyar, and consequently was never subject to the obligation of the First Pesach,

and likewise a minor who came of age

for example, by growing the pubic hairs that are signs of majority

between the two Pesach offerings,

and consequently was never subject to the obligation of the First Pesach.

Even so,

he is obligated to perform the Second Pesach.

For the Second Pesach is considered a festival in its own right, and carries an independent obligation even for one who was exempt at the time of the First Pesach,

these are the words of Rabbi.

Rabbi Natan says: Anyone who is subject to the first

anyone who was obligated with regard to the First Pesach

is subject

is obligated

to the second. Anyone who is not subject to the first is not subject to the second.

And we inquire:

With regard to what do they disagree

what is the basis of the tannaitic dispute?

And we answer:

Rabbi holds:

Pesach

Second—

is a festival in its own right,

and one is obligated with regard to the Second Pesach even if one was not obligated with regard to the first.

Whereas

Rabbi Natan holds:

Pesach

Second—

is a completion of the first,

and if one was not obligated to bring the First Pesach, one is not obligated to bring the Second Pesach.

Nevertheless,

its rectification of the first,

with regard to exempting him from karet if he intentionally neglected the first—

it does not rectify it for him.

The Second Pesach does not rectify the neglect of the First Pesach.

And Rabbi Ḥananya ben Akavya holds: The second—

is the rectification of the first,

such that even if he intentionally neglected the First Pesach, the second exempts him from karet.

And all three of them—

expounded one verse:

It is stated [Numbers 9:10]: “Any man who becomes impure through contact with a corpse or is on a distant road, for you throughout your generations [with regard to the First Pesach], shall perform the Pesach [the Second Pesach] for the Lord.”

And afterward it is written [verse 13]:

“But the man who is pure and was not on a road

and refrained from performing the Pesach offering—that soul shall be cut off from among its people. For he did not offer the Lord’s sacrifice at its appointed time; that man shall bear his sin.”

According to the plain meaning of the verse, this verse speaks of one who neglects the First Pesach. But the Sages disagree about the interpretation of the end of the verse: “For he did not offer the Lord’s sacrifice at its appointed time; he shall bear his sin.”

Rabbi holds:

The verse should be explained as follows: The beginning of the verse—

“and he refrained from performing the Pesach offering, and that soul shall be cut off from among its people”—

speaks of a person

who did not perform it on the first

who did not perform the First Pesach. Whereas the end of the verse, “For he did not offer the Lord’s sacrifice at its appointed time,” speaks of the Second Pesach.

For the word “for” has four meanings: [“For” can be interpreted in four ways:] a. if; b. perhaps; c. rather; d. for, meaning “since.”]

Rabbi’s view is that in this verse “for” serves in the sense of “if.”

And this is the meaning of the verse: “For,”

alternatively,

even if

“he did not offer the Lord’s sacrifice at its appointed time” with regard to the second—“that man shall bear his sin,”

he incurs liability for karet on account of his sin.

And we challenge this:

And from where

and how do we know

that this

the meaning of the verse

“he shall bear his sin”

is the punishment of

karet?