Pesachim 93a — the Talmud in English

And they learn one from the other:

Just as an impure person

refers to one

who has the possibility in his hands to perform,

who is in Jerusalem and is not on a distant road, and it is possible for him to perform the Pesach, but the Torah prohibited him

and

said that he

does not perform it,

so too

one who was

also on a distant road

is spoken of in a situation

where he has the possibility in his hands to perform.

For he can send an agent to sacrifice the Pesach on his behalf. And the Torah prohibited him,

and

said that he

does not perform it.

It is explicit in Rabbi Akiva’s words that one who was on a distant road is rejected and disqualified from performing the Pesach, in accordance with the words of Rav Sheshet.

And from here there is a difficulty with Rav Naḥman, who said that if one who was on a distant road had others slaughter [the offering] for him, it was accepted.

And Rav Naḥman can say to you

an answer:

Indeed, Rabbi Akiva certainly holds in accordance with Rav Sheshet. But necessarily there are other tannaim who disagree with Rabbi Akiva, and I hold in accordance with them.

For I [Rav Naḥman] explain Rabbi Akiva’s words differently:

“Just as an impure person who has the possibility in his hands to perform”—this means an impure person who can immerse and eat in the evening, and nevertheless the Torah prohibited him from sacrificing, since he has not yet immersed. [And not as Rav Sheshet explained: “Just as an impure person who has the possibility in his hands to perform”—that he is near Jerusalem, and had the Torah not prohibited him, he could have sacrificed.]

And according to this, one may say that

Rabbi Akiva follows his own reasoning,

according to his position,

for he holds that they do not slaughter or sprinkle on behalf of one impure with creeping-animal impurity

on the fourteenth of Nisan, even though one impure with creeping-animal impurity is impure only that day and can immerse and eat from the Pesach in the evening.

Therefore Rabbi Akiva said, “Just as an impure person [with creeping-animal impurity] who has the possibility in his hands to perform,” who can immerse and eat in the evening, “and he does not perform,” for he is forbidden to perform the Pesach—so too one on a distant road, who has the possibility in his hands to perform, does not perform.

And

if

I,

Rav Naḥman,

held in accordance with the one who says

“they slaughter and sprinkle on behalf of one impure with creeping-animal impurity,”

because he can immerse during the day and eat in the evening from the Pesach offering,

then according to my method, the impure person concerning whom the Torah said that he is deferred to the second Pesach is one impure for seven days [before the seventh day of his impurity has arrived], who cannot immerse that day and eat the Pesach offering in the evening.

And in this case it is not applicable to say as Rabbi Akiva said: “Just as an impure person who has the possibility in his hands to perform” [to immerse], for even if he immerses, he cannot eat from the Pesach in the evening, since he is impure for seven days.

On the contrary, an impure person who has the possibility in his hands to perform—that is, one impure with creeping-animal impurity—is not disqualified from eating the Pesach. If so, one who was on a distant road is also not disqualified.

The Sages taught:

These are those who perform the

Pesach

second: Men and women with a discharge, men and women with scale disease,

and menstruating women,

and men who have relations with menstruating women, and women after childbirth.

For all of these are impure for more than one day.

And likewise

those acting inadvertently and those under coercion.

And those acting intentionally,

who did not perform the first Pesach intentionally.

And one impure through

a dead person.

And one who was on a distant road.

All these perform a second Pesach.

And the beraita asks: Since we said that all these perform a second Pesach,

if so, why is it stated

in the Torah

“an impure person”?

And before the Gemara finishes bringing the continuation of the words of the beraita, it is astonished at the question of the beraita:

“Why is it stated”

“impure”—what question is this?! After all, the Torah needs to state “impure” to teach you

“that if he wished to perform it on the first”

that if the impure person wished to perform it on the first

“we do not allow him!”

we do not let him, for it is forbidden for him to be counted among those registered for the Paschal offering!

Rather,

it is necessarily the case that the wording of the beraita must be emended.

And this is how the beraita asked:

“If so, why is it stated ‘on a distant road’?”

And the beraita answers:

“To exempt him from karet”

whereas one who acts intentionally is liable for karet.

And this beraita cannot hold according to the one who says that if a person who was on a distant road had others slaughter the offering for him, it was not accepted, for according to him it is not difficult why “on a distant road” is stated. For it comes to teach us that it was not accepted [as Rabbi Akiva said above: Just as an impure person, who has it within his ability to perform it but does not perform it, so too one on a distant road

and

it is necessarily the case that this beraita holds

according to the one who says that it is accepted.

And now the Gemara discusses the words of the beraita that counted women with abnormal discharges [and menstruants] and women who had given birth among the other people liable for the Second Pesach.

And we raise the difficulty:

“Is a woman liable for the Second?”

Does a woman indeed have an obligation concerning the Second Pesach?!

But it was taught

and we learned in a beraita:

“One might have thought that they would not perform the

Pesach

second except an impure person through contact with a corpse and

one

who was on a distant road.”

For the Torah spoke of them.

“Men with abnormal discharges, lepers, and men who had intercourse with menstruants”—

“from where”

do we know that they perform a Second Pesach?

The verse states: “A man, a man

when he becomes impure through contact with a person”. From the repetition of the word “man,” we learn to include the other impure persons.

And from the fact that the beraita spoke of men with abnormal discharges, lepers, and men who had intercourse with menstruants, and not of women with abnormal discharges, menstruants, and women who had given birth, it follows that women do not perform a Second Pesach! Whereas in the earlier beraita we learned that women do perform a Second Pesach!

And we answer:

“It is not difficult.”

“This”

the beraita that obligates women concerning the Second Pesach is according to the view of

Rabbi Yose

who obligates women concerning the Second Pesach [above, 91a].

Whereas

“this”,

the second beraita, which did not obligate women concerning the Second Pesach, is according to the view of

Rabbi Judah,

who says that for women the Second Pesach is optional.

And

it is likewise according to the view of

Rabbi Shimon,

who says that women cannot perform a Second Pesach at all.

And the Gemara brings a beraita that discusses the karet liability of one who neglects the Paschal offering.

The Sages taught:

Anyone who intentionally neglects the mitzva of offering the Paschal offering

is liable for karet for

neglecting the

first Pesach.

And he is liable for karet

also for neglecting the

second Pesach.

That is, by reason of neglecting the First Pesach and by reason of neglecting the Second Pesach, he incurs liability for karet.

In practice, however, it is impossible to be punished with two instances of karet, which is death at the hands of Heaven; and once he has incurred the punishment of karet when he neglected the First Pesach, it is impossible actually to add a punishment of karet for neglecting the Second Pesach, for he cannot be put to death twice.

But there is a practical difference: if he inadvertently neglected the First Pesach but intentionally neglected the Second, he is liable for karet,

the words of Rabbi.

Rabbi Natan says: He is liable for karet for the first, and exempt for the second.

And if he acted inadvertently concerning the first and intentionally concerning the second, he is exempt.

Rabbi Ḥanania ben Akavia says: Even

for

the first,

if he intentionally neglected it,

he is not liable for karet unless he did

also

the second

intentionally.

But if he performed the second, or if he neglected it inadvertently, he is exempt. For the Second Pesach comes to complete and rectify the First Pesach, and he has not completed the prohibition of neglecting the First Paschal offering until he also intentionally neglects the Second Pesach.

And they followed

Rabbi and Rabbi Natan

their own positions,

their positions elsewhere.

For it was taught: A convert who converted between the two Pesach offerings,

between the fourteenth of Nisan and the fourteenth of Iyar, and it turns out that the obligation of the First Pesach never applied to him,

and likewise a minor who came of age

for example, he grew the hairs that are signs of maturity

between the two Pesach offerings,

and it turns out that the obligation of the First Pesach never applied to him.

Even so,

he is obligated to perform a Second Pesach.

For the Second Pesach is considered a festival in its own right, and it has an obligation in its own right even for one who was exempt at the time of the First Pesach,

the words of Rabbi.

Rabbi Natan says: Anyone who requires the first

anyone who became obligated concerning the First Pesach

requires

becomes obligated concerning

the second. Anyone who does not require the first does not require the second.

And we consider the matter:

“In what do they disagree?”

In what did the tannaim disagree?

And we answer:

Rabbi holds:

Pesach

second—

it is a festival in its own right,

and one is obligated concerning the second even if he was not obligated concerning the first,

whereas

Rabbi Natan holds:

Pesach

second—

it is a completion of the first,

and if he was not obligated to bring the First Pesach, he does not become obligated to bring the Second Pesach.

But in any event,

its rectification of the first,

with regard to exempting him from karet if he acted intentionally concerning the first—

it does not rectify him.

The Second Pesach does not rectify the neglect of the First Pesach.

And Rabbi Ḥanania ben Akavia holds: The second—

is the rectification of the first,

so that even if he intentionally neglected the First Pesach, the second exempts him from karet.

And all three of them—

expounded one verse:

It is stated [Numbers 9:10]: “A man, a man, if he becomes impure through contact with a person or is on a distant road, for you throughout your generations [concerning the First Pesach], and he shall perform a Pesach [Second Pesach] for the Lord.”

And afterward it is written [verse 13]:

“But the man who is pure and was not on a road

and refrained from performing the Pesach, that soul shall be cut off from among its people. For he did not bring the offering of the Lord in its appointed time; that man shall bear his sin.”

According to the plain meaning of the verse, this verse speaks of one who neglects the First Pesach. But they disagreed concerning the interpretation of the end of the verse: “For he did not bring the offering of the Lord in its appointed time; he shall bear his sin.”

Rabbi holds:

The verse is to be explained as follows: the beginning of the verse—

“And he refrained from performing the Pesach, and that soul shall be cut off from among its people”

speaks of a person

who did not perform it on the first

who did not perform the First Pesach. Whereas the end of the verse, “For he did not bring the offering of the Lord in its appointed time,” speaks of the Second Pesach.

For “for” has four meanings: [“for” can be interpreted in four ways]: a. if; b. perhaps; c. rather; d. for, indeed.

And Rabbi’s view is that in this verse “for” is used in the sense of “if.”

And this is the meaning of the verse: “For,”

“alternatively,”

even if

“he did not bring the offering of the Lord in its appointed time” concerning the second—“that man shall bear his sin”; he incurs liability for karet on account of his sin.

“that man shall bear his sin”; he incurs liability to excision for his sin.

And we challenge this:

“And from where”

and from where do we know

“that this”

whose meaning is that the verse

“he shall bear his sin”—

the punishment

is karet?