Pesachim 93b — the Talmud in English

And we answer: Rabbi learns by a gzera shava that the meaning of the verse “he shall bear his sin” is karet. For it is also stated concerning one who “blesses” Hashem [in the language of sagi nahor], “he shall bear his sin” [Leviticus 24]. And one who blesses Hashem is indeed liable for karet.

Except that concerning one who blesses the Name itself, it is not stated explicitly in the Torah that he is liable for karet; rather, it is stated in Numbers 15:30: “But the soul that acts defiantly, whether native or stranger, it blasphemes Hashem, and that soul shall be cut off from among its people.”

And the tannaim disagreed as to what “blasphemes” is. Some say that he is one who sings and chants for idolatry. Whereas Rabbi

holds: “blasphemes”

means

“one who blesses the Name.”

Thus we have learned that one who blesses the Name is liable for karet, according to Rabbi,

and it is written concerning one who blesses the Name

Leviticus 24

“and he shall bear his sin.”

And he derives

Rabbi learned by a gzera shava,

this “his sin

he shall bear”

that is here,

mentioned here concerning the second Pesaḥ,

from “his sin

he shall bear”

that is there,

concerning one who blesses the Name:

just as there,

concerning one who blesses the Name, he is liable for

karet, so here also,

concerning the second Pesaḥ,

also

he is liable for

karet.

And Rabbi Natan holds

that the verse should be interpreted

“and he refrained from making the Pesaḥ

the first

and that soul shall be cut off

from among its people, because he did not offer Hashem’s offering in its appointed time,” in another manner.

For this “because”

is an expression of “for indeed”

[the word “because” should be interpreted in the sense of “for indeed”].

And thus the verse says

the verse:

for indeed,

for

he did not offer Hashem’s offering in its appointed time

the first one, and therefore that man shall bear his sin. For the end of the verse gives the reason for its beginning: “and that soul shall be cut off” because he did not offer the Pesaḥ in its first appointed time, and therefore he shall bear his sin.

And we challenge this: And Rabbi Natan,

this

conclusion of the verse,

“he shall bear his sin”

what does he do with it?

What does Rabbi Natan learn from it?

And we answer:

he holds

Rabbi Natan that

“blasphemes,”

for which the Torah made him liable for karet,

does not mean one who blesses the Name.

Rather, “blasphemes” is one who sings for idolatry.

And from where do we know that one who blesses the Name is liable for karet?

And he derives,

Rabbi Natan learned by a gzera shava,

this “his sin” that is there

mentioned there [concerning one who blesses the Name],

from this “his sin” that is here,

mentioned here concerning the Pesaḥ:

just as here,

just as here he is liable for

karet, so there also,

there, concerning one who blesses the Name, he is liable for

karet.

It follows that “he shall bear his sin” was stated concerning the Pesaḥ in order to teach concerning one who blesses the Name that he is liable for karet.

And Rabbi Ḥananya ben Akavya holds

that the verse should be interpreted as follows:

“And he refrained from making the Pesaḥ and that soul shall be cut off,”

and afterward it says, “because he did not offer Hashem’s offering in its appointed time.”

If he did not offer Hashem’s offering in its appointed time, on the second

specifically, in this case he is punished with karet for neglecting the first. But if he offered the second Pesaḥ, he is exempt from karet for the first.

And

Rabbi Ḥananya,

this “he shall bear his sin”

mentioned at the end of the verse,

what does he do with it?

What does he learn from it?

And we answer:

as we said.

As we said according to Rabbi Natan: “he shall bear his sin” was stated concerning the Pesaḥ in order to teach concerning one who blesses the Name that he is liable for karet.

And now the Gemara summarizes the laws that emerge from the dispute of Rabbi, Rabbi Natan, and Rabbi Ḥananya ben Akavya concerning liability for karet for one who neglects the Pesaḥ:

Therefore:

a.

If he intentionally neglected both this one and that one,

that is, he intentionally neglected both the first and the second Pesaḥ—

everyone agrees that he is liable.

b.

If he was inadvertent concerning both this one and that one

everyone agrees that he is exempt. [One who acts inadvertently is exempt from all punishments of the Torah.]

[One who acts inadvertently is exempt from all punishments of the Torah.]

c.

If he intentionally neglected the first and acted inadvertently concerning the second—

according to Rabbi and Rabbi Natan, they obligate him.

For Rabbi and Rabbi Natan hold that the second is not a remedy for the first, and his liability was completed with the first. And since he intentionally neglected it, he is liable.

Whereas

according to Rabbi Ḥananya ben Akavya, he is exempt.

For he holds that the second Pesaḥ is the rectification of the first Pesaḥ, and his prohibition is completed only when he intentionally neglects the second Pesaḥ.

d.

If he acted inadvertently concerning the first and intentionally neglected the second—

according to Rabbi, he is liable,

because the second Pesaḥ is an obligation in its own right, and there is liability for karet for it.

Whereas

according to Rabbi Natan and Rabbi Ḥananya ben Akavya, he is exempt,

for the second Pesaḥ is a compensation for the first, and there is no independent liability for karet for it.

Mishna:

What is a distant way,

and one who is found there is exempt from making the first Pesaḥ?

From Modi’in

[the name of a city],

and beyond.

And its measure,

the distance by which Modi’in is distant from Jerusalem, is the measure for the distance

in every direction,

in all the directions surrounding Jerusalem, to establish what is a distant way.

The words of Rabbi Akiva.

Rabbi Eliezer says: From the threshold

the threshold

of the Temple courtyard and beyond

is a distant way.

Rabbi Yosei said to him:

For this reason it is dotted,

there is a dot in the Torah scroll

over

the letter

heh

at the end of the word “distant,”

to say [according to every dot in the Torah, it comes to diminish and subtract the word beneath it, and here it comes to say as though “distant” were not written]:

according to the principle that every punctuation mark in the Torah comes to limit or diminish the word beneath it, here it is as though “distant” were not written:

Not because he is certainly distant

to such an extent that he cannot reach the courtyard during the entire time of slaughter,

but

it is sufficient if he is found

from the threshold of the courtyard and beyond.

Gemara:

Ulla said: From Modi’in

and up to

Jerusalem

the distance

is fifteen mil.

For the tanna calls this distance “a distant way,” meaning that if he travels from the beginning of the time of slaughtering the Pesaḥ until its end, he cannot reach the courtyard.

And the Torah-defined time for slaughtering the Pesaḥ is from midday until sunset, a duration of six hours, and during this time an average person travels fifteen mil.

And we explain:

He held

Ulla

that

just as

that which Rabbah bar bar Ḥana said in the name of Rabbi Yoḥanan: How much

does he

travel

of

a person during the day

from dawn until the emergence of the stars?

Ten parasangs,

which are forty mil.

And of those forty mil, the distance traveled

from dawn until sunrise

is

five mil.

And likewise,

from sunset until the emergence of the stars

the distance traveled is

five mil.

Thirty remain,

thirty mil remain for travel from sunrise until sunset: they are

fifteen

fifteen mil

from morning to midday,

from morning until midday.

And fifteen

mil

from midday to evening.

From midday until sunset.

It follows that during the time of slaughtering the Pesaḥ, which is from midday until sunset, a person travels fifteen mil.

And Ulla

learned from here that Modi’in is fifteen mil from Jerusalem,

according to his view,

in accordance with his method.

For Ulla said: What is a distant way?

Anyone who cannot

come from his place and

enter

the courtyard

at the time of slaughter.

For if, at the time when they slaughter the Pesaḥ at midday, he was distant from Jerusalem by a distance such that he could not arrive by sunset, he is exempt from the first Pesaḥ.

And therefore Ulla held that Modi’in is fifteen mil from Jerusalem, since one standing there at midday cannot reach Jerusalem by sunset.

The master said

Rabbi Yoḥanan:

From dawn until sunrise

five mil.

And we inquire about it:

From where do we know,

from where do we know this measure?

And we answer:

For it is written [Genesis 19:15], concerning the overturning of Sodom:

“And as dawn rose, the angels hastened

“And as dawn rose, the angels hastened

to Lot, saying: Arise, take your wife and your two daughters who are found here, lest you be swept away because of the iniquity of the city.”

And it is written:

[there, verse 23]

“The sun had risen over the earth

and this means sunrise

and Lot came to Zoar.”

It follows that from dawn until sunrise is the time required to travel from Sodom to Zoar.

And Rabbi Ḥanina said: I myself saw that place,

I saw the road between Sodom and Zoar,

and it was

and it is

five mil.

We have learned from here that between dawn and sunrise a person travels five mil.

The matter itself: Ulla said: What is a distant way?

Anyone who cannot enter at the time of slaughter,

that is, from midday until sunset.

And Rav Yehuda said: Anyone who cannot enter at the time of eating.

That is, at midday, when they slaughter the Pesaḥ, he is distant from Jerusalem by a distance such that he cannot arrive by the end of the time for eating the Pesaḥ. [According to Rabbi Akiva, by Torah law the Pesaḥ may be eaten throughout the entire night, and the Sages decreed that it may be eaten only until midnight. And according to Rabbi Eliezer, by Torah law the Pesaḥ may be eaten only until midnight.]

Rabba said to him

to Ulla: Whether

according to you,

according to what you say, “at the time of slaughter,”

it is difficult.

There is a difficulty to raise.

And

whether

according to Rav Yehuda,

who says “at the time of eating,”

it is difficult.

And Rabba explains his words:

According to you, it is difficult

for you said: Anyone who cannot enter at the time of slaughter

is exempt from making the first Pesaḥ; there is a difficulty:

But what of one impure with corpse-creeping matter,

who has not yet immersed

who cannot enter at the time of slaughter?

And nevertheless

you said,

you, Ulla, yourself said [above, 90b] that

they slaughter and toss the blood on behalf of one impure with corpse-creeping matter,

since he will be fit at the time of eating, for he can immerse and eat in the evening.

And from here, one who is fit at the time of eating has the Pesaḥ slaughtered on his behalf even if he is not fit at the time of slaughter!

And according to Rav Yehuda, it is difficult

for he said: Anyone who cannot

enter at the time of eating

they do not slaughter on his behalf, but if he is fit at the time of eating, they slaughter on his behalf. And there is a difficulty against his words:

But what of one impure with corpse-creeping matter, who can

immerse during the day

and enter at the time of eating, and

nevertheless

he said

Rav Yehuda himself [above, 91b]

that they do not slaughter and toss the blood on behalf of one impure with corpse-creeping matter.

For although he is fit at the time of eating, nevertheless they do not slaughter on his behalf, since he is not fit at the time of slaughter.

And if so, why did Rav Yehuda say that if one is fit at the time of eating, they slaughter on his behalf?

He said to him

Ulla said to Rabba, in answer:

Not according to me

according to my method

is it difficult.

And according to Rav Yehuda it is not difficult; according to me it is not difficult:

For what I, Ulla, say—that the exemption of a distant way depends on the time of slaughter—is because a distant way was stated concerning making the Pesaḥ and not concerning eating it. As it is stated [Numbers 9:13]: “But the man who is pure and was not on a journey, and refrained from ‘making’ the Pesaḥ, that soul shall be cut off from among his people.”

And the exemption of

a distant way

at the time of slaughter was stated specifically

for one who is pure. And there is no

exemption of

a distant way for one who is impure.

That is, the exemption because of impurity is not similar to the exemption because of a distant way; rather, the exemption because of impurity is because of compulsion [since he is not fit to eat the Pesaḥ], and this depends on the time of eating.

For if you say that the exemption because of impurity depends on the time of slaughter and not on the time of eating, it is difficult: Why did the Torah speak specifically of one impure through a person, who is impure for seven days? It should have innovated that even one impure through corpse-creeping matter, who is impure for one day, is not fit to make the Pesaḥ! And necessarily, one impure through corpse-creeping matter is fit to make the Pesaḥ, since he will be pure at the time of eating. [Rashi in his second interpretation and Tosafot.]

And we have learned from here that the permission concerning impurity depends on the time of eating.