Pesachim 92b — the Talmud in English

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that they inspect for those who make the Passover offering,

who wish to go to Jerusalem in order to offer their Passover offerings, and have no other way except through a field of beit ha-peres—they inspect the field for them, and if no bone is found there, they are permitted to pass through there.

But they do not inspect for those who eat teruma,

rather, he should wait and go around the field for a day or two, until he reaches his teruma and eats it.

We have learned that the Sages were lenient in permitting passage through a field of beit ha-peres by means of inspection, and did not uphold their words in a place involving karet.

And we raised it:

What is meant by “they inspect”?

How do they inspect the field, to know that there is no bone in it?

Rav Yehuda said in the name of Shmuel: He blows

with his mouth

in the beit ha-peres and proceeds.

And if there is a bone the size of a barley grain, it is pushed aside by his blowing; and if there is a larger bone, they did not worry that he might shift it, because he will see it and take care.

Rav Yehuda bar Avaye said in the name of Rav Yehuda: A beit ha-peres that has been trodden down

by the feet of people who regularly pass there

is pure.

And one who comes to make his Passover offering should inspect whether it has been trodden down, and pass through; and because the impurity of a beit ha-peres is by rabbinic enactment, they were lenient to rely on this inspection in a place involving karet, but for eating teruma they do not rely on this inspection.

We have completed, upon you, chapter, chapter The Woman

Mishna:

One who was impure or on a distant road

from Jerusalem on the fourteenth of Nisan,

and did not perform the

Pesach

first—

shall perform the

Pesach

second

on the fourteenth of Iyar.

And likewise if he

was inadvertent,

forgot that today the Pesach offering is sacrificed,

or was coerced

on the fourteenth of Nisan.

And

likewise one who

did not perform the

Pesach

first

intentionally—

shall perform the second.

Lest you say: Since we said that everyone who did not perform the first Pesach, whether inadvertently or under coercion, and even intentionally, is obligated to perform a second Pesach,

if so, why is it stated

in the Torah, concerning the obligation of the second Pesach: “When there will be

an impure person or one who was on a distant road”?

For it is obvious that the Torah did not come to instruct him not to perform the first Pesach, because one who is on a distant road is incapable of sacrificing the Pesach offering himself, and obviously he will not sacrifice it [this is explained according to Rashi’s explanation of the beraita on the following page, s.v. “Rather, why is ‘a distant road’ stated”].

And why did the Torah choose one who was on a distant road to make known to us an example of one who did not sacrifice his Pesach, more than any other coercion that prevented him from sacrificing it? [See Rashi here].

And one cannot say that the verse came to say that he cannot send to have his Pesach sacrificed through an agent, because there is an authority in the Gemara who holds that if he sent his Pesach through an agent, he fulfilled his obligation. Rashi

Your answer is: This verse did not come to say that one who did not perform the first Pesach shall perform a second Pesach, such that you should ask why the verse mentioned one who was on a distant road, when it is clear that he did not perform the Pesach himself.

Rather, the verse came in relation to the punishment of karet, to distinguish between one who acts intentionally, on the one hand, and one who did not perform the Pesach because he was impure or because he was on a distant road; and the same law applies to other people under coercion or acting inadvertently who were unable to perform the Pesach. And to say:

Those,

the impure person and one who was on a distant road, and likewise all those acting inadvertently or under coercion,

are exempt from karet.

And these,

that is, there are others, who act intentionally, and they

are liable for karet.

And in this there is a novelty concerning one who was on a distant road, more than concerning other cases of coercion, in exempting him from karet.

For he could have brought himself there beforehand and been in a place from which he could reach the Temple courtyard on the eve of Pesach. And likewise, he could have sent his Pesach through an agent.

And it is impossible to explain that one acting inadvertently or under coercion is liable for karet, for one acting inadvertently or under coercion is exempt from all punishments in the Torah. Therefore, the Gemara explains that there are others who are neither under coercion nor acting inadvertently, who, although they are obligated to perform the second Pesach, are liable for karet for not performing the first Pesach. This will be explained below.

Gemara:

It was stated: One was on a distant road

on the fourteenth of Nisan, and cannot reach the Temple courtyard by the time of the slaughtering of the Pesach during the day, but will reach Jerusalem at night, which is the time for eating the Pesach.

And they slaughtered

others [the] Pesach offering

and sprinkled

its blood

for him

on his behalf, with the understanding that he would arrive in the evening and eat from it.

Rav Naḥman said: It was accepted.

He fulfilled his obligation through this offering, and is exempt from performing a second Pesach.

Rav Sheshet said: It was not accepted.

He did not fulfill his obligation and is obligated to sacrifice a second Pesach.

Now the Gemara explains the reasoning of Rav Naḥman and Rav Sheshet:

Rav Naḥman said: It was accepted,

because

the Merciful One took pity on him.

That is, although the Torah said concerning one who was on a distant road that he is obligated in a second Pesach, do not learn from this that the Torah disqualified him from performing the first Pesach. Rather, the Torah took pity on him, so as not to trouble him to send agents who would sacrifice the Pesach on his behalf before he arrived in Jerusalem, and allowed him to perform a second Pesach in its place.

And

nevertheless,

if he performed

the first Pesach through others, he fulfilled his obligation,

and a blessing shall come upon him

for having performed the Pesach at its appointed time.

And Rav Sheshet said: It was not accepted,

because

the Merciful One rejected him.

He rejected and disqualified him from performing the Pesach,

like an impure person!

That is, just as an impure person, who is mentioned in the verse, is disqualified from performing the Pesach, so too he is disqualified from performing the Pesach. And if he sacrificed it, he accomplished nothing, and is obligated in a second Pesach.

Rav Naḥman said: From where do I say this,

from where did I learn my statement, that one who was on a distant road, and they slaughtered [the offering] for him, it was accepted?

For we learned

in our Mishna:

One who was impure or

on a distant road, and did not perform the first, shall perform the second.

By inference, if he wished—

he performed.

For from the wording of the Mishna, “and did not perform the first,” it follows that the performance or non-performance depended upon him. For had he wished, he could have performed the first, but he did not perform it.

And certainly this cannot be said concerning an impure person, for even if he performed it, he would not fulfill his obligation. Necessarily, the Mishna is speaking of one who was on a distant road.

For if you say according to Rav Sheshet, that he cannot perform it even through an agent, it should have said: “and he is unable to perform the first,” which would mean that even if he performed it, he would not fulfill his obligation!

And Rav Sheshet can say to you

that Rav Naḥman’s proof must be rejected:

For

if so,

if it is according to Rav Naḥman, that “and did not perform the first” means that the matter depended upon him, there is a difficulty from the

end:

For it teaches

in it

“he was inadvertent or was coerced and did not perform the first—

shall perform the second.”

But according to Rav Naḥman, here too one should infer:

from the fact that it teaches

“and did not perform,” by inference, if he wished—

he performed,

for had he wished, he could have performed the Pesach! But this is impossible. For

he was inadvertent, and he was coerced,

and how could he perform the Pesach if he was acting inadvertently and did not know that today was Pesach, or if he was under coercion?

Rather,

necessarily one must say that what is written in the Mishna at the end, “and did not perform the first,” does not refer to one acting inadvertently or under coercion, whom the Mishna mentioned previously, but

it teaches it together with one acting intentionally.

That is, the tannai taught and added the law of one who intentionally did not perform the first Pesach together with one acting inadvertently and one under coercion, to teach you that even one who did not perform the first Pesach intentionally is obligated in a second Pesach.

And this is the explanation of the words of the Mishna: He was inadvertent, or was coerced, or acted intentionally and did not perform the first—he shall perform the second.

And since this is so,

here too,

also in the first clause we must say that “and did not perform the first” does not refer to one who was impure or on a distant road, but the tannai came to add

an onen,

who also

is taught together with them.

And this is the explanation of the words of the Mishna: One who was impure, or on a distant road, or was an onen and did not perform the first—he shall perform the second.

And the law of an onen is like that of one acting intentionally, for he could have performed the Pesach, as we learned above, 91b: An onen immerses and eats his Pesach in the evening.

Rav Ashi said

a proof for the words of Rav Sheshet, that the Mishna speaks both of an onen and of one acting intentionally:

The Mishna also indicates this

from our Mishna as well one should infer according to Rav Sheshet, from the fact that

it teaches

that we learned at the end of the Mishna: “

If so, why is ‘an impure person or one who was on a distant road’ stated?

Those are exempt from karet, and these are liable for karet.”

And one must ask concerning what we learned, “and these are liable for karet”:

With regard to whom

is it speaking here, who are liable for karet?

If you say

that it is speaking

of one acting inadvertently and one under coercion,

who were explicitly mentioned in the Mishna, then this is difficult: Are

one acting inadvertently and one under coercion liable for karet?

[Are they?] For one acting inadvertently and one under coercion are exempt from all punishments in the Torah!

Rather, is it not necessarily speaking here

of

one acting intentionally and an onen!

And thus one must explain the words of the Mishna:

These—one who was impure or on a distant road, and one acting inadvertently or under coercion—are exempt from karet.

And these—an onen and one acting intentionally—are liable for karet.

And it is proven that the Mishna spoke of one acting intentionally and an onen. And where did it speak of them? Necessarily, what is written, “and did not perform the first,” refers to them.

And from here there is a difficulty with the words of Rav Naḥman, who explained that what is written in the first clause, “and did not perform the first,” refers to one who was on a distant road. According to him, the Mishna did not speak of one acting intentionally or an onen at all!

The Gemara answers:

And Rav Naḥman can say to you:

Although in the first clause, “one who was impure or on a distant road and did not perform the first,” it speaks only of one who was impure or on a distant road, and not of an onen, and the meaning of “and did not perform the first” is that the matter depended upon his will,

nevertheless, in the final clause it certainly must be explained that “and did not perform the first” refers to one acting intentionally. For one under coercion and one acting inadvertently certainly cannot perform the Pesach.

And according to this,

in every case, what is written in the final clause, “and these are liable for karet,”

is

of one acting intentionally alone,

it is said only of one acting intentionally, and not of one acting inadvertently or under coercion who were mentioned previously.

And if you say: If so, why does the Mishna use the plural expression, “and these are liable for karet,” when it is speaking only of one acting intentionally?

Rav Naḥman answered this:

And this that it teaches “are liable”

in the plural—

since the tannai taught

the

first clause, “are exempt,”

in the plural,

he taught

also in the

final clause, “are liable,”

in the plural.

Rav Sheshet said

a proof for his position, that concerning one who was on a distant road, and they slaughtered and sprinkled [the blood] for him, it was not accepted:

From where do I say this

?

For it was taught: Rabbi Akiva says: It is stated

[in the verse: “Any person who will be impure through a dead person, or on a distant road, for you or for your generations, and he shall perform a Pesach for Hashem”]

“impure.” And it is stated

also concerning it

“on a distant road.”