Pesachim 92b (צב:) — the Talmud in English

And Beit Shammai and Beit Hillel agree

that they inspect the field for those preparing to offer the Paschal offering,

who wish to go to Jerusalem in order to offer their Paschal offerings, and have no route other than through a field of beit ha-peras—they inspect the field for them, and if no bone is found there, they are permitted to pass through it.

But they do not inspect it for those eating teruma,

rather, he must wait and go around the field for a day or two, until he reaches his teruma and eats it.

We learn that the Sages were lenient regarding passage through a field of beit ha-peras by means of inspection, and did not uphold their enactment where doing so would entail karet.

And we raise a question concerning this:

What does “they inspect” mean?

How do they inspect the field to ascertain that there is no bone in it?

Rav Yehuda said that Shmuel said: One blows

with his mouth

through the field of beit ha-peras and proceeds.

If there is a bone the size of a barley grain, it will be displaced by his blowing; and if there is a larger bone, we are not concerned that he might move it, because he will see it and take care.

Rav Yehuda bar Abaye said in the name of Rav Yehuda: A field of beit ha-peras that has been trampled

by the feet of people who regularly pass through it

is pure.

One who comes to offer his Paschal offering should check whether it has been trampled and then pass through it. Since the impurity of a field of beit ha-peras is rabbinic, they were lenient in relying on this inspection in a case involving karet; but they do not rely on this inspection for eating teruma.

We have completed the eighth chapter, “The Woman.”

Mishna:

One who was impure or on a distant journey

from Jerusalem on the fourteenth of Nisan,

and did not perform the

Paschal offering

first—

shall perform the

Paschal offering

second

on the fourteenth of Iyyar.

And likewise if he

was unwitting,

having forgotten that the Paschal offering was being sacrificed that day,

or was prevented by circumstances beyond his control

on the fourteenth of Nisan.

And

likewise, one who

did not perform the

Paschal offering

first

intentionally—

shall perform the second.

You might say: Since we have stated that anyone who did not perform the first Paschal offering, whether unwittingly or due to circumstances beyond his control, and even intentionally, is obligated to perform the second Paschal offering,

if so, why is it stated

in the Torah, concerning the obligation of the second Paschal offering, “If he shall be

impure or on a distant journey”?

For it is obvious that the Torah did not come to instruct him not to perform the first Paschal offering, since one who is on a distant journey is unable to sacrifice a Paschal offering himself, and it is clear that he will not sacrifice it [as explained according to Rashi’s interpretation of the beraita on the next page, s.v. “Rather, why is ‘distant journey’ stated”].

And why did the Torah choose one who was on a distant journey to provide an example of one who did not sacrifice his Paschal offering, rather than any other circumstance beyond his control that prevented him from sacrificing it? [See Rashi here].

[And one cannot say that the verse came to state that he cannot send someone to sacrifice his Paschal offering as his agent, because there is an opinion in the Gemara that if he sent his Paschal offering by means of an agent, he has fulfilled his obligation. Rashi]

The answer is: This verse did not come to state that one who did not perform the first Paschal offering shall perform the second, such that you should ask why the verse mentions one who was on a distant journey, when it is obvious that he did not perform the first offering himself.

Rather, the verse addresses the punishment of karet, distinguishing between one who intentionally failed to perform it, on the one hand, and one who did not perform the Paschal offering because he was impure or on a distant journey, which is likewise the law for other people prevented by circumstances beyond their control or acting unwittingly who were unable to perform the Paschal offering. And it states:

Those

who were impure or on a distant journey, and likewise all those who acted unwittingly or were prevented by circumstances beyond their control—

are exempt from karet.

But those

that is, others, namely those who acted intentionally,

are liable to karet.

And in this there is a novel point concerning one who was on a distant journey, beyond that concerning other circumstances beyond one’s control: He is exempt from karet.

For he could have arranged matters beforehand and been in a place from which he could reach the Temple courtyard on the eve of Passover. And he could likewise have sent his Paschal offering by an agent.

[And it is impossible to interpret the passage as saying that one who acted unwittingly or was prevented by circumstances beyond his control is liable to karet, since one who acts unwittingly or is prevented by circumstances beyond his control is exempt from all punishments in the Torah. Therefore, the Gemara explains that there are others who are neither prevented by circumstances beyond their control nor acting unwittingly, who, although they are obligated to perform the second Paschal offering, are liable to karet for failing to perform the first Paschal offering. This will be explained below].

Gemara:

It was stated: One who was on a distant journey

on the fourteenth of Nisan, and cannot reach the Temple courtyard by the time of the slaughtering of the Paschal offering during the day, but will reach Jerusalem at night, when the Paschal offering is eaten.

And others slaughtered

a Paschal offering

and sprinkled

its blood

for him

on his behalf, with the understanding that he would arrive in the evening and eat from it.

Rav Naḥman said: It is acceptable.

He has fulfilled his obligation through this offering and is exempt from performing the second Paschal offering.

Rav Sheshet said: It is not acceptable.

He has not fulfilled his obligation and is obligated to sacrifice the second Paschal offering.

The Gemara now explains the reasoning of Rav Naḥman and Rav Sheshet:

Rav Naḥman said: It is acceptable,

because

the Merciful One took pity on him.

That is, although the Torah stated that one who was on a distant journey is obligated to perform the second Paschal offering, do not infer from this that the Torah disqualified him from performing the first Paschal offering. Rather, the Torah took pity on him by not requiring him to trouble himself to send agents to sacrifice the offering for him before he reached Jerusalem, and allowed him to perform the second Paschal offering in its place.

And

nevertheless,

if he performed

the first Paschal offering through others, he fulfilled his obligation,

and a blessing will come upon him

for having performed the Paschal offering at its appointed time.

And Rav Sheshet said: It is not acceptable,

because

the Merciful One rejected him.

He rejected and disqualified him from performing the Paschal offering,

like one who is impure!

That is, just as one who is impure, who is mentioned in the verse, is disqualified from performing the Paschal offering, so too he is disqualified from performing the Paschal offering. And if he sacrificed it, he accomplished nothing and is obligated to perform the second Paschal offering.

Rav Naḥman said: From where do I derive this?

From where did I learn my statement that when one who was on a distant journey had an offering slaughtered for him, it is acceptable?

As we learned

in our Mishna:

One who was impure or

on a distant journey, and did not perform the first, shall perform the second.

By inference, if he wanted—

he could perform it.

For from the wording of the Mishna, “and did not perform the first,” it appears that performing or not performing it depended on him. Had he wished, he could have performed the first, but he did not.

[And it is certainly impossible to say this with regard to one who was impure, since even if he performed it, he would not fulfill his obligation. Necessarily, the Mishna is speaking of one who was on a distant journey].

For if you say in accordance with Rav Sheshet, that he cannot perform it even through an agent, the Mishna should have stated, “and is unable to perform the first,” which would mean that even if he performed it, he would not fulfill his obligation!

And Rav Sheshet could say to you

that Rav Naḥman’s proof must be rejected:

For

if so,

if Rav Naḥman is correct that “and did not perform the first” means that the matter depended on him, the latter clause presents a difficulty:

The latter clause,

as it teaches

in it:

“If he acted unwittingly or was prevented by circumstances beyond his control and did not perform the first—

he shall perform the second.”

But according to Rav Naḥman, here too one should infer:

From the fact that it teaches

“and did not perform,” by inference, if he wanted—

he could perform it,

meaning that had he wished, he could have performed the Paschal offering! But this is impossible.

For he acted unwittingly, and he was prevented by circumstances beyond his control

—how could he perform the Paschal offering if he acted unwittingly and did not know that it was Passover, or if he was prevented by circumstances beyond his control?

Rather,

it is necessarily the case that the wording in the latter clause of the Mishna, “and did not perform the first,” does not refer to one who acted unwittingly or was prevented by circumstances beyond his control, about whom the Mishna spoke earlier. Rather,

it teaches intentional failure alongside them.

That is, the tanna taught and added the law of one who intentionally failed to perform the first Paschal offering together with those who acted unwittingly or were prevented by circumstances beyond their control, to teach you that even one who intentionally did not perform the first Paschal offering is obligated to perform the second.

And this is the interpretation of the Mishna: If he acted unwittingly, or was prevented by circumstances beyond his control, or intentionally did not perform the first—he shall perform the second.

And since this is so,

here too,

we must say in the first clause that “and did not perform the first” does not refer to one who was impure or on a distant journey. Rather, the tanna came to add

a mourner

who also

is taught alongside them.

And this is the interpretation of the Mishna: One who was impure, or on a distant journey, or was a mourner and did not perform the first—shall perform the second.

The law of a mourner is like that of one who acted intentionally, since he could have performed the Paschal offering, as we learned above, on 91b: A mourner immerses and eats his Paschal offering in the evening.

Rav Ashi said

there is proof for Rav Sheshet’s position, that the Mishna speaks both of a mourner and of one who acted intentionally:

The Mishna also provides precise support,

as our Mishna too can be interpreted in accordance with Rav Sheshet, from the fact

that it teaches

at the end of the Mishna: “

If so, why is it stated, ‘One who is impure or was on a distant journey’?

Those are exempt from karet, but these are liable to karet.”

And one must ask concerning what we learned: “But these are liable to karet”:

With regard to whom

does this refer, who is liable to karet?

If you say

that it refers

to one who acted unwittingly or was prevented by circumstances beyond his control,

who were explicitly mentioned in the Mishna, this is difficult: Are

one who acted unwittingly and one who was prevented by circumstances beyond his control subject to karet

at all? Surely one who acts unwittingly or is prevented by circumstances beyond his control is exempt from all punishments in the Torah!

Rather, is it not

necessarily referring

to one who acted intentionally and to a mourner!

And this is how the Mishna must be interpreted:

“Those”—one who was impure or on a distant journey, and one who acted unwittingly or was prevented by circumstances beyond his control—are exempt from karet.

“But these”—a mourner and one who acted intentionally—are liable to karet.”

It is thus proven that the Mishna spoke of one who acted intentionally and of a mourner. And where did it speak of them? Necessarily, the words “and did not perform the first” refer to them.

And this is a difficulty for Rav Naḥman, who explained that the words in the first clause, “and did not perform the first,” refer to one who was on a distant journey. According to him, the Mishna did not speak of one who acted intentionally or of a mourner at all!

The Gemara answers:

And Rav Naḥman could say to you:

Although in the first clause, “One who was impure or on a distant journey and did not perform the first,” the reference is only to one who was impure or on a distant journey, and not to a mourner, and the meaning of “and did not perform the first” is that the matter depended on his will,

nevertheless, in the latter clause it is certainly necessary to interpret “and did not perform the first” as referring to one who acted intentionally. For one who acted unwittingly or was prevented by circumstances beyond his control certainly cannot perform the Paschal offering.

And accordingly,

in any event, the words in the latter clause, “but these are liable to karet,”

refer

only to one who acted intentionally,

and not to one who acted unwittingly or was prevented by circumstances beyond his control, who were mentioned earlier.

And if you would say: If so, why does the Mishna use the plural expression, “but these are liable to karet,” when it refers only to one who acted intentionally?

Rav Naḥman answered this:

And the fact that it teaches, “are liable,”

in the plural

is because, since it taught

in the first clause

“are exempt”

in the plural,

it taught

also in the

latter clause, “are liable,”

in the plural.

Rav Sheshet said

there is proof for his position that when one was on a distant journey and an offering was slaughtered and its blood sprinkled for him, it was not acceptable:

From where do I derive it

?

As it is taught in a beraita: Rabbi Akiva says: It is stated

[in the verse, “If any person shall be impure through contact with the dead, or on a distant journey, among you or your generations, and he shall perform the Paschal offering for the Lord”]

“Impure.” And it is stated

also concerning it

“On a distant journey.”