Pesachim 73a — the Talmud in English

He said to him: For it says: [במדבר יח]

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“a service of a gift

the priestly gifts that I gave you are like a service], [for thus]

I shall give

I gave

your priesthood.

“and the non-priest who approaches shall be put to death.”

They made

the

eating of teruma outside the Land of Israel,

not in the Temple and even outside Jerusalem—

like the service of the Temple!

We learned in the Mishna:

If one slaughtered it

the Paschal offering on Shabbat with the intention

“not for those who may eat it”—

he is liable for a sin-offering.

And we raised this against it: What is the novelty of the Mishna? But

it is obvious,

for

since there, earlier, in the chapter The Daily Offering Was Slaughtered [61a],

we learned that one who slaughters the Paschal offering with the intention “not for those who may eat it” is

invalid—

then

here, with regard to desecrating Shabbat, it is obvious that he is

with regard to desecrating Shabbat, it is obvious that he is

liable,

for he performed no mitzva through his invalid slaughter, because of his incorrect intention!?

And we answer: The tanna taught “liable” here

because he taught in the latter clause: “[השוחט את הפסח לאוכליו ושלא לאוכליו]]one who slaughters the Paschal offering for those who may eat it and for those who may not eat it

is exempt.”

And therefore,

he taught

also

the first clause,

in contrast to the exemption of the latter clause: one who slaughters it not for those who may eat it is

liable.

And we challenge this:

But the latter clause

also

is also obvious,

and the tanna did not need to teach it.

For

because there, in the chapter The Daily Offering Was Slaughtered,

we learned that one who slaughters the Paschal offering with the intention for those who may eat it and for those who may not eat it is

valid,

and if so, it is obvious that one who slaughters the Paschal offering on Shabbat with such an intention is

exempt

from a sin-offering, for he slaughtered a valid Paschal offering, which overrides Shabbat.

Rather,

the Gemara gives another answer:

Since,

because

the tanna taught,

as the tanna taught in our Mishna

“if one slaughtered it not for its sake on Shabbat,

he is liable”—

he also taught “[שחטו]]if one slaughtered it

не для тех, кто будет ее есть,

not for those who may eat it

he is liable.”

And we raised this against it:

And this matter itself,

the fact that the tanna taught that one who slaughters the Paschal offering not for its sake is liable—

why do I need

to teach it?

But it is obvious: since the offering is invalid, he is liable for a sin-offering for its slaughter?!

And we answer: The tanna taught this here

because he wanted to present the dispute.

For the tanna wanted to teach the dispute between

Rabbi Eliezer and Rabbi Yehoshua

concerning one who errs regarding a matter of mitzva.

Rav Huna bar Hinena said to his son,

to his son:

When you go,

when you go

before Rabbi Zerika—

ask him

this question:

According to the one who says

that one who slaughters on Shabbat, or makes a wound in an animal on Shabbat, is not liable on account of “taking a life” unless he improved the animal through his slaughter, or benefited from wounding the animal, such as when he needs blood in order to feed his dog.

But if through his slaughter or his wounding he only damaged, he is not liable for taking a life, since the

one who damages in

making a

wound

on Shabbat

is exempt.

According to him, this that we learned in our Mishna,

“if one slaughtered it not for those who may eat it, he is liable”,

why should he be liable?

What

improvement

did he make

through his slaughter? But the offering is invalid, and why is he liable for taking its life, when according to his view “one who damages through a wound is exempt”?!

Rabbi Zerika said to him: Indeed, it is so: he

made an improvement

through his slaughter, even though the offering did not count for him as a Paschal offering.

For the halakha was stated regarding all offerings that became invalid in the Temple courtyard, that

if their sacrificial portions ascended

after the fact upon the altar in order to burn them—then

they shall not descend,

but they burn them despite the fact that the sacrifice is invalid.

It follows that the slaughter was effective in that, if the sacrificial portions ascend after the fact upon the altar, they are burned despite their invalidity. It follows that he improved this matter through his slaughter, and therefore he is liable for a sin-offering.

And we challenge this: This works for one who slaughters an unblemished animal not for the sake of the Paschal offering, for its sacrificial portions are burned if they ascended [after the fact] upon the altar, and therefore he improves through his slaughter.

But this that we learned,

“if one slaughtered it and it was found to have a blemish

he is liable”,

for the sacrificial portions of blemished animals are not burned upon the altar even if they ascended it [for only offerings that became invalid in the sacred area, in the Temple courtyard, have their sacrificial portions burned if they ascended the altar, but not offerings whose invalidity is intrinsic, such as blemished animals]—

why is he liable?

What did he improve

through this slaughter?!

And we answer: Our Mishna is dealing with an animal possessing a minor blemish, whose sacrificial portions are burned if they ascended the altar after the fact.

For it is speaking of a case in which he

improved

through his slaughter an animal whose blemish is

“a film over the eye”,

which is a minor blemish, invalidating only an animal offering, but not invalidating birds.

And it is in accordance with Rabbi Akiva

.

For Rabbi Akiva said:

An animal that has a blemish called “a film over the eye,” although initially one should not slaughter it, and if one slaughtered it, he should not burn its sacrificial portions—

if

he slaughtered it and, after the fact,

its sacrificial portions ascended

upon the altar,

they shall not descend

from it!

Rabbi Akiva stated this law only with regard to this blemish, since it is a minor blemish, one that is valid in birds initially.

We further learned in the Mishna:

“if one slaughtered it and it was found to be an animal with a hidden fatal defect”—

he is exempt.

And the Gemara infers:

but if it was a fatal defect due to something that is

it was tereifa because of something that was

visible—he is

liable

for slaughtering it on Shabbat.

And this is difficult for the one who says that one who damages through a wound is exempt:

What did he improve

through his slaughter? For if the sacrificial portions of an animal with a fatal defect ascended the altar, they take them down, since their “invalidity is not in the sacred area.”

And we answer: He

improved

through the slaughter of the animal with a fatal defect

to remove

the animal

from the status of

impurity of

a carcass.

Ravina raised an objection against this: This that it was taught: One who slaughters a sin-offering on Shabbat, outside

the Temple courtyard,

for idolatry—

he is liable for it

three

sin-offerings:

for desecrating Shabbat, for slaughtering offerings outside the Temple courtyard, and for slaughtering for idolatry.

What did he improve

through this slaughter!?

But this slaughter improves nothing with regard to eating, and it does not even purify the animal from impurity, since an offering to idolatry imparts an impurity more severe than the impurity of a carcass, for idolatry imparts even impurity of a tent!

Rav Avira said:

He improved through his slaughter in that

he removes it

from the prohibition of

a limb from a living animal!

For if a gentile ate a limb from the slaughtered animal, he is not executed for it on account of the transgression of eating a limb from a living animal. But had he not slaughtered it, and a gentile had torn a limb from it while it was still alive and eaten it, he would have been executed for this.

But this slaughter does not permit the gentile to eat the sin-offering itself, since he never eats from the flesh of a sin-offering.

We learned in the Mishna:

If one slaughtered it

for the Paschal offering,

and it became known

after the slaughter that the owners had withdrawn their hands from it, or that they had died or become impure—he is exempt from a sin-offering, because he slaughtered with permission.

In the present discussion, the Gemara discusses an offering whose designation changes because of a change that occurred in its status: must its former designation be uprooted so that its new designation can take effect, or is no “uprooting” necessary, but does this happen by itself when the status of the offering changes?

The discussion concerns both a Paschal offering whose owners died or withdrew their hands from it—

whether it automatically becomes a peace-offering, or whether the designation “Paschal offering” must be uprooted from it so that the designation of a peace-offering can take effect upon it.

And also an asham-offering: if its owners died or achieved atonement through another asham-offering, the offering is destined to become a voluntary burnt-offering for the “summer of the altar” [that is, burnt-offerings that they would sacrifice upon the altar when they were not sacrificing other offerings upon it]—

whether the asham requires “uprooting” so that the designation of a burnt-offering for the summer of the altar can take effect upon it, or whether it automatically becomes so.

Initially, an asham-offering whose owners died is not sacrificed upon the altar as a voluntary burnt-offering. For the Sages decreed that it itself should not be sacrificed as a burnt-offering, lest the owner of the asham come to err and think that it is permitted to change it into a burnt-offering before he achieves atonement through another asham.

And therefore, they instituted that they should not sacrifice it itself, but should use the money of its redemption to purchase burnt-offerings for the summer of the altar.

And as long as it is unblemished, it cannot be redeemed. Therefore, they wait for it until a blemish befalls it; then they redeem it and bring burnt-offerings with its money.

Rav Huna said in the name of Rav:

An

asham-offering

whose owners died or achieved atonement through another asham-offering,

which

already

“has been designated for grazing.”

That is, it was handed over to shepherds, who will keep it until it becomes blemished [a blemish befalls it] and becomes fit for redemption, and they will bring burnt-offerings for the summer of the altar with its money.

Thus, although a blemish has not yet befallen it, but its owner merely separated it from himself by handing it over for grazing so that it would become blemished [a blemish would befall it]—

if it happened that

one slaughtered it without specification—

then it is

valid

for sacrifice

as a burnt-offering

for the summer of the altar!

Although he slaughtered it without specification and did not uproot its designation at the time of slaughter for the sake of a burnt-offering.

It follows that even without uprooting the designation of asham from it [for “separation” in itself is not uprooting], it is valid to be sacrificed as a burnt-offering, because it is already destined for this.

And the Gemara infers:

Apparently, he holds

that Rav Huna said in the name of Rav holds that an offering whose status has changed, such as an asham-offering whose owners died or achieved atonement through another and which is now destined to be sacrificed as a burnt-offering,

does not require uprooting

of its former designation in order to be valid for sacrifice under the designation of the new offering, since without specification it is already destined for this.

And we ask:

If so,

since it does not require uprooting, why did Rav say that it is valid only when it “has been designated for grazing”?

But

when it has not been designated

for grazing—

also

it is now destined [once its owners died or achieved atonement through another] for a burnt-offering. And there is no need to uproot the designation of asham from it, since without specification it is already destined to be sacrificed as a burnt-offering for the summer of the altar.

And we answer:

It is a decree:

the Sages decreed that it would not be valid for sacrifice

after atonement [דהיינו, כשהתכפרו באשם אחר] [that is, when they achieved atonement through another asham-offering], until it is separated and handed over for grazing,

—that is, after its owners obtained atonement through another guilt-offering—until it is removed from its former designation and given to graze,

because of

the concern lest the owner of an asham-offering come to err and think that it is possible to change it into a burnt-offering even

before atonement.

At that time, the offering is designated only as an asham, and it is impossible to change it into a burnt-offering.

And this error occurs only when the asham has not yet been designated for grazing, because people assume that it is still an asham-offering [they do not know that its owners died or achieved atonement through another, or they do not know that through this its designation as asham was uprooted], and they will come to say that it is permitted to change an asham-offering before atonement and make it a burnt-offering.

But once it has been designated for grazing, they will not come to err, because they will realize that only because the designation of asham was uprooted from it [for it was designated for grazing] is it destined for a burnt-offering [with the money of its redemption].

And the Gemara proves that this is the decree:

And from where do you say this

that we should say that this is what they decreed?

For we learned: An asham-offering whose owners died or whose owners achieved atonement

through another asham-offering—

it shall graze

the offering

until it becomes blemished,

a blemish befalls it, and it is redeemed,

and its money shall go to a voluntary offering,

for a burnt-offering for the summer of the altar.

Rashi [in his commentary beginning “asham”] explains that “its money shall go to a voluntary offering” means that the money is placed into the six collection boxes [chests] that were in the Temple, in which they placed all the money designated for the summer of the altar.

Rabbi Eliezer says:

The law of an asham-offering is like the law of a sin-offering: if the owners achieved atonement through another, it has no remedy except that

the offering shall die

the offering!

Rabbi Yehoshua says:

It shall graze, and a blemish shall befall it, and after it becomes blemished

it shall be sold, and he shall bring

the owner himself

with its money,

with the money of its redemption,

a burnt-offering

that shall be his own voluntary offering [and not the summer of the altar, which is the community’s voluntary offering].

There are two differences between the words of the Sages and the words of Rabbi Yehoshua: regarding the libations and the laying on of hands. According to the Sages, since the burnt-offering comes for the summer of the altar, its libations are brought from communal funds, and he does not lay his hand upon it. But according to Rabbi Yehoshua, since it comes as his voluntary burnt-offering, he brings its libations, and he lays his hand upon it.

And the Gemara infers:

With his money

of the person—

yes,

he can bring a burnt-offering.

But its body

of the asham-offering

shall not

be sacrificed as a burnt-offering [although it is now destined to be sacrificed as a burnt-offering], even though he sacrifices it for himself.

And it is proven from here

that he decreed

that he should not bring it as a burnt-offering

after atonement because of before atonement,

lest he err and bring the asham as a burnt-offering before atonement [and achieve atonement through another asham], and it is impossible to change one sacrifice into another sacrifice as long as the sacrifice retains its first designation.

And the conclusion of the Gemara:

Learn from this!

Rav Hisda raised an objection to Rav Huna: If one slaughtered it

on Shabbat,

and

afterward

it became known that the owners had withdrawn their hands

from it—or that its owners had died—he is liable for a sin-offering.