Pesachim 73b (עג:) — the Talmud in English

And it was taught concerning it:

the statement of our Mishna was taught in a beraita: “And if it occurred

on a weekday,

that after the slaughter it became known that the owners had withdrawn from it or had died [even before the slaughter]—

it shall be burned

the disqualified Paschal offering

immediately,

since the disqualification of a Paschal offering slaughtered not for its registered owners is a disqualification intrinsic to the offering, and every offering whose disqualification is intrinsic, as will be explained below, is not left to be burned later

.

The disqualifications of offerings are divided into lenient and severe ones.

The severe disqualifications are those in which the disqualification is intrinsic to the offering itself, such as piggul, notar, or impurity.

The lenient disqualifications are those in which the disqualification is not in the offering itself but in its blood or its owners, such as when the blood was spilled, or when the owners of a Paschal offering died or became impure after the sprinkling of the blood. The offering itself was not disqualified, since at the time of the sprinkling it had been slaughtered for its registered owners in accordance with the law; rather, it now has no one who may eat it, because it may be eaten only by its registered owners, and they cannot eat it.

The severe disqualifications, in which the disqualification is intrinsic, are burned immediately; but offerings with lenient disqualifications are burned only after their form has changed, meaning that the form of the meat has changed and it no longer appears as it did at the time of slaughter.

The reason is that burning is a degradation of consecrated offerings. Therefore, with regard to offerings whose disqualification is lenient, the Sages were stringent that they not be burned until the form of the meat had changed. This change is brought about by leaving them overnight and burning them only on the following day [and since leaving them overnight creates the disqualification of linah, which is an intrinsic disqualification, from this perspective they should be burned immediately on the following day

.

Rav Ḥisda infers from here that when an offering’s status changes, it is not fit to bear its new designation unless its former designation is removed from it.

For this Paschal offering, whose owners died before the slaughter, can no longer be sacrificed as a Paschal offering; it may be sacrificed only as a peace offering.

Had this offering been slaughtered for the sake of a peace offering, the designation “Paschal offering” would have been removed from it, and it would have been sacrificed as a peace offering. But now, since its designation as a Paschal offering was not removed, although it is no longer designated for Passover but for a peace offering, it is disqualified with an intrinsic disqualification: a Paschal offering slaughtered not for its registered owners. Because of this disqualification, it is burned immediately.

And this is how Rav Ḥisda challenged the statement

:

Granted, if you say that although, by default, it is now destined to be sacrificed as a peace offering, it nevertheless

requires removal

of the designation “Paschal offering,” then

this one is still a Paschal offering.

And since

it is a Paschal offering

that has no owners,

it is an offering whose disqualification is intrinsic; and therefore

it is entirely proper that it

be burned immediately,

without needing to wait overnight for its form to change.

But if you say that it does not require removal,

and from the moment its owners died, when it could no longer be sacrificed as a Paschal offering, it was by default already destined to be sacrificed as a peace offering without requiring removal—

from the outset,

from the time its owners died,

it became

an offering of

peace offerings.

If so,

what is

the disqualification

of

this offering? It is not an intrinsic disqualification, since it was slaughtered as a peace offering, and it no longer has the disqualification of a Paschal offering whose owners died.

Rather,

its disqualification is due to another factor,

not an intrinsic disqualification,

because he slaughtered it

as a peace offering

after the daily offering between the evenings

[which is the time for sacrificing the Paschal offering, whereas other offerings must be brought before the daily offering].

And if so, since its disqualification is not intrinsic,

it requires waiting for its form to change!

It must be left overnight so that the form of the meat changes; once it has been left overnight, it has the intrinsic disqualification of leaving overnight.

As it was taught in a beraita: This is the principle: Any offering whose disqualification is intrinsic—

it shall be burned immediately.

But if its disqualification is

in the blood,

such as when the blood was spilled, or

in the owners,

such as when the owners of a Paschal offering died [or became impure] after its slaughter—

its form shall be allowed to change, and it shall be taken to the place of burning.

Here, if you say that it does not require removal, its disqualification is not intrinsic. Why, then, is it burned immediately, before its form has changed?

Rather,

on the basis of this challenge, it must be demonstrated that Rav stated his ruling differently.

Therefore,

do not say that Rav said: “An guilt offering that was designated for grazing and

that Rav said: “An offering of guilt that was released for grazing and

was slaughtered without a specified intent—

is valid as an offering brought for the sake of a burnt offering.”

Rather, say

that Rav said as follows: An guilt offering that was designated for grazing, if it

was slaughtered for the sake of a burnt offering—

is valid,

because by slaughtering it for the sake of a burnt offering, he removed its designation as an guilt offering.

From here, one may infer the opposite of what we inferred according to the previous version

:

Apparently, it is established that an offering whose status has changed

requires removal,

and does not by default assume its new designation.

And we challenge this

:

But according to Rabbi Ḥiyya bar Gamda, who said above, in the chapter “The Daily Offering Was Slaughtered”

“It was cast from the mouth of the group”

[meaning, everyone agrees on this matter],

and they said:

The fact established from the Mishna there—that a Paschal offering during the rest of the year requires removal, and that we do not say that during the rest of the year it is by default destined to be a peace offering even without removal—is not proof that a Paschal offering requires removal. For the Mishna is dealing with

a case in which the owners were

of the Paschal offering

impure through contact with the dead,

and therefore they did not sacrifice it at its appointed time,

and they were deferred

together with their offering

to the Second Passover.

In that case, the Paschal offering is not by default destined for peace offerings; it is destined for the Second Passover. Therefore, it requires removal if one wishes to change it into a peace offering.

According to this interpretation of the Mishna, it is established that only

this

Paschal offering destined for the Second Passover

requires removal

in order to change it into a peace offering.

But in general,

when it is not destined for the Second Passover,

it does not require

the Paschal offering during the rest of the year

removal

from the designation “Paschal offering,” since during the rest of the year it is by default destined for peace offerings, and its designation as a Paschal offering is removed even without an explicit act of removal.

And according to him—

what can be said?

That is, his words are refuted by the earlier beraita, which says that a Paschal offering whose owners died has an intrinsic disqualification and is therefore burned immediately. This applies only if a Paschal offering requires removal. If it does not require removal, it has no intrinsic disqualification, since by default it is destined for a peace offering; its sole defect is due to another factor, namely, that it was sacrificed after the daily offering and not before it.

On the basis of this challenge, the Gemara returns to the initial approach and maintains that a Paschal offering does not require removal, and that the fact that it is burned immediately is not proof that it requires removal.

Rather, Rav Huna, son of Rabbi Yehoshua, said:

Rav really did say as we interpreted him at the beginning of the discussion: An guilt offering whose owners died and which was slaughtered without specified intent is valid as a burnt offering, since after its owners’ death it is destined to be a burnt offering, even if its designation as an guilt offering was not removed, because removal is unnecessary.

The fact that we learned that a Paschal offering whose owners died is burned immediately, implying that removal is required, is not proof.

For

what are we dealing with here?—

a case in which its owners designated it

as a Paschal offering

before midday

of the eve of Passover

and the owners died after midday,

so that the Paschal offering became fixed as a Paschal offering at midday on the eve of Passover, its proper time.

And since the owners were alive at midday, and the offering was fit to be sacrificed as a Paschal offering,

it became

an offering that “was fit and then rejected”: it was fit at its proper time, and was rejected from the Paschal offering once its owners died after midday.

And anything that was fit and then rejected—

can never again become fit!

Since it was rejected at its proper time from being sacrificed as a Paschal offering, it cannot again become fit to be sacrificed as a peace offering. Thus its disqualification is intrinsic, and it is therefore burned immediately.

As for the case in which we find that the remainder of a Paschal offering is sacrificed as a peace offering, this refers to a Paschal offering that was lost before midday and found only after the Paschal offering had been slaughtered. Midday did not fix it, and it had never been fit for the slaughter of the Paschal offering.

And we refute this

:

Is that the reason? All this explanation applies

only to Rav,

who said: “An guilt offering that was designated for grazing and slaughtered without specified intent is valid.”

According to his words, it is impossible to explain the matter on the basis of the principle that anything that was fit and then rejected can never again become fit.

For

Rav himself said: A living animal cannot be rejected!

Every law of rejection that applies permanently applies only to blood or to the owners [see Rashi]: if they were once rejected, they remain rejected forever, even if they later become fit again.

But a living offering is never disqualified permanently because of rejection; rather, it becomes fit again when the cause of the rejection passes. Here, when the owners died, the offering was still alive, and it again became fit to be sacrificed as a peace offering.

Rather, Rav Pappa said:

Indeed, it does not require removal, and by default it is destined to be a peace offering; nevertheless, if its owners died on a weekday, it is burned immediately.

For

whose opinion is this?—

It is Rabbi Eliezer’s, who said: “And similarly, one who slaughters other offerings

[peace offerings]

for the sake of a Paschal offering—

it is disqualified.”

If so, although removal is unnecessary, the offering is disqualified, since after its owners died it is by default destined to be a peace offering, and slaughtering it for the sake of a Paschal offering disqualifies it

as an offering whose disqualification is intrinsic,

and it is therefore burned immediately.

And we challenge this

:

If our Mishna is

Rabbi Eliezer’s, then it is difficult: a

offering of

a sin offering is also subject to liability

for slaughtering it for the sake of a Paschal offering, since he disqualified the offering, and he cannot be exempted on the grounds that he erred while performing a mitzva

for Rabbi Eliezer does not hold

that

“one who errs while performing a mitzva is exempt.”

Rather, Rav Yosef, son of Rav Sala Ḥasida, explained before Rav Pappa: Whose opinion is this?—

It is Yosef ben Ḥonai’s!

As we learned: Yosef ben Ḥonai says:

Other sacrifices

that are slaughtered for the sake of a Paschal offering or for the sake of a sin offering—

are disqualified!

Apparently,

peace offerings slaughtered for the sake of a Paschal offering

have an intrinsic disqualification,

and since, after their owners died, this offering is a peace offering, and he slaughtered it for the sake of a Paschal offering,

it is therefore burned immediately.

And with

regard to the matter of

the exemptions

of one who errs while performing a mitzva,

he held

Yosef ben Ḥonai

like Rabbi Yehoshua,

who exempts one who errs while performing a mitzva.

Rav Ashi said

another answer in order to establish Rav’s statement:

Rav, who said

above that removal is unnecessary, does not follow the tanna of the beraita who taught, as an addition to our Mishna, “On a weekday, in such a case it is burned immediately” [according to whom removal is required, and it is therefore burned immediately under the law governing an intrinsically disqualified offering, because as long as its designation as a Paschal offering has not been removed, it retains that designation, and it is found to have been slaughtered not for its registered owners and disqualified intrinsically].

Rather, Rav

who said

that removal is unnecessary, follows

Rabbi Yishmael, son of Rabbi Yoḥanan ben Beroka,

who taught in a beraita a different version of the law of our Mishna: it is not burned immediately; rather, its form must be allowed to change. According to him, removal is unnecessary.

As it was taught in a beraita: Rabbi Yishmael, son of Rabbi Yoḥanan ben Beroka, says:

That which we learned in our Mishna, that one who slaughters the Paschal offering on Shabbat and learns that its owners died before the slaughter is exempt under the law of one who errs while performing a mitzva, does not apply in every circumstance.

For

if there is time remaining in the day,

and the slaughterer could investigate and

learn whether the owners had withdrawn

from the offering,

or had died,

the owners,

or had become impure,

he was required to investigate this; and if he did not ask and investigate, he is not one who erred while performing a mitzva. Rather, he is

liable

to bring a sin offering for inadvertently desecrating Shabbat,

and

the meat of the offering

must have its form changed

through being left overnight,

and

afterward it

is taken to the place of burning.

The law of our Mishna, that the slaughterer is exempt, applies only when there was not enough time during the day to investigate whether the owners had in fact withdrawn from the offering and whether they were alive and pure.

Rav Ashi infers

:

What is the reason that Rabbi Yishmael, son of Rabbi Yoḥanan ben Beroka, holds that the meat requires its form to change and is not burned immediately, as is meat whose disqualification is intrinsic?

What,

is it not because he does not require

the Paschal offering

removal

when its owners withdraw from it, but it automatically becomes by default destined for a peace offering; and when it is slaughtered, it is not disqualified with the intrinsic disqualification [of a Paschal offering without registered owners], but only with another disqualification, because it was slaughtered as a peace offering after the daily offering between the evenings?

And Rav agrees with his view.

The Gemara rejects Rav Ashi’s answer:

From where

do we know that Rabbi Yishmael’s reason is that removal is unnecessary?

Perhaps his reason is

because he agrees with the tanna of the school of Rabba bar Avuha, who said that even

an offering whose disqualification is intrinsic, such as the disqualification of

pigul,

also requires its form to change, as he derives

by a gzera shava from the expression

“iniquity

—iniquity” from

the disqualification of

notar,

since in the case of the disqualification of notar its form is allowed to change.

The Gemara proves that it is indeed necessary to say that Rabbi Yishmael, who holds that the offering requires its form to change, does so because in his view even an intrinsic disqualification requires this, and not for the reason stated by Rav Ashi, namely, that removal is unnecessary.

For

if the owners became impure,

what can be said?

Here,

in this case,

removal is certainly required!

For everyone agrees that without removal, the designation “Paschal offering” still applies to it.

The proof is as follows

:

Rabbi Ḥiyya bar Gamda said: “It was cast from the mouth of the group” [meaning, everyone agrees on this matter]: the law stated in the beraita [in the chapter “The Daily Offering Was Slaughtered”] that a Paschal offering requires removal applies

to a case in which the owners were

of the offering

impure through contact with the dead and were deferred to the Second Passover,

for then the offering is destined for Passover and the designation of a peace offering has not taken effect upon it. Therefore, according to everyone, removal is required, and by default it remains a Paschal offering.

If so, it is difficult: Why, when the owners became impure and it was slaughtered for the sake of a Paschal offering, is it not burned immediately, since its disqualification is intrinsic? Rather, it is established that according to Rabbi Yishmael, son of Rabbi Yoḥanan ben Beroka, even an intrinsic disqualification requires the form to change.

Rather, it is clear

that the matter is clear and it cannot be explained as Rav Ashi did; rather, Rabbi Yishmael’s reason is that he holds that an intrinsic disqualification requires the form to change. The tanna who teaches that it is burned immediately disagrees with him and holds that it does not require its form to change.

To explain Rav’s statement, we must explain it

as we explained it initially,

as in the earlier answer: since a Paschal offering does not require removal, when its owners die or withdraw, its designation as a Paschal offering is removed from it automatically, and by default it is destined for a peace offering. Its intrinsic disqualification is that one slaughtered the peace offering for the sake of a Paschal offering.

And

it is Yosef ben Ḥonai’s opinion,

who holds that even peace offerings slaughtered for the sake of a Paschal offering are disqualified with an intrinsic disqualification; therefore, on a weekday they are burned immediately.

We have completed the chapter “These Matters.”