Pesachim 72b (עב:) — the Talmud in English

But

the latter clause

deals with a case in which neither of them was circumcised on the eve of

Shabbat was thereby rendered subject to postponement for him.

Therefore, even if he circumcised the infant who was after Shabbat on Shabbat, which means that he did not perform a mitzva, nevertheless he is exempt according to Rabbi Meir, by the rule of one who errs concerning a mitzva [even though he did not perform a mitzva

Therefore, even if he circumcised the infant whose circumcision was after

Shabbat on

this case too,

when slaughtering for the sake of the communal sacrificial portions,

Shabbat was thereby rendered subject to postponement in the case of a communal offering!

The same law applies to one who slaughtered for the sake of the communal sacrificial portions: Since Shabbat was rendered subject to postponement in the case of those portions, even if the communal portions had already been slaughtered on Shabbat, and he mistakenly slaughtered the offering for their sake, he is exempt. For he was preoccupied with a mitzva, although he did not perform a mitzva. "

And because he had been preoccupied with this offering during the preceding days, and knew that this offering was destined to be sacrificed, he became agitated and forgot that the communal sacrificial portions had already been slaughtered, and slaughtered it for their sake" [the wording of Rashi].

Rav Ashi said to Rav Kahana:

Since even if he did not perform a mitzva he is exempt, because Shabbat was rendered subject to postponement,

if so,

here too,

in the first clause, when he circumcised the one whose circumcision was on Shabbat on the eve of

Shabbat was rendered subject to postponement in the case of ordinary infants,

and on this basis we should exempt him under the law of one preoccupied with a mitzva.

He said to him,

Rav Kahana:

With regard to this man,

as for this particular person, who was not preoccupied with ordinary infants,

at any rate,

Shabbat

was not given,

was not rendered subject to postponement. Therefore, he cannot be exempted under the law of one who errs while engaged in a mitzva.

We learned in the Mishna:

And with regard to all other offerings that one slaughtered for the sake of the Paschal offering, if they are not fit

to be sacrificed as a Paschal offering,

he is liable.

And if they are fit—

Rabbi Eliezer obligates him to bring a sin offering, and Rabbi Yehoshua exempts him.

The Gemara explains:

Who

is the

tanna who distinguishes,

who differentiates

between those that are fit and those that are unfit?

It is Rabbi Shimon.

As it was taught in a beraita: Whether

one who slaughters

offerings that are fit

for a Paschal offering,

or

one who slaughters

those that are unfit—

he is exempt. "Since he has been preoccupied with the thought of them ever since they were consecrated, and knows that he must sacrifice them, he errs and slaughters them for the sake of the Paschal offering" [Rashi].

And similarly, one who slaughters for the sake of the communal sacrificial portions—

he is exempt; this is the statement of Rabbi Meir.

Rabbi Shimon said: Rabbi Eliezer and Rabbi Yehoshua did not disagree with regard to those that are unfit, for which he is liable,

since in their case he does not err.

With regard to what did they disagree? With regard to those that are fit

for a Paschal offering.

Rabbi Eliezer obligates him to bring a sin offering, and Rabbi Yehoshua exempts him.

Rav Bibi said that Rabbi Elazar said: Rabbi Meir would exempt

even

one who slaughters

a calf of peace offerings for the sake of the Paschal offering.

The novelty is that even in the case of a calf, which everyone knows is unfit for a Paschal offering, he is nevertheless considered one who errs while engaged in a mitzva.

Rabbi Zeira said to Rav Bibi: But Rabbi Yoḥanan said: Rabbi Meir conceded with regard to blemished animals

that he is not considered one who errs while engaged in a mitzva, since everyone knows that blemished animals are not sacrificed, and the thought of sacrificing them does not preoccupy him. The same applies to a calf, since everyone knows that it is not destined to be sacrificed as a Paschal offering.

He said to him: With regard to blemished animals,

which are entirely unfit for sacrifice,

he is not preoccupied with them.

But this one,

a calf of peace offerings,

does preoccupy him,

since the thought of sacrificing it preoccupies him from the time it was consecrated, and therefore he is considered one who errs while engaged in a mitzva.

Rava asked Rav Naḥman:

If one slaughters unconsecrated animals

on

Shabbat for the sake of the Paschal offering—

what did Rabbi Meir say to me?

What does Rabbi Meir say about this? Does he also exempt him under the law of one who errs while engaged in a mitzva?

He said to him,

Rav Naḥman:

Rabbi Meir would exempt even

one who slaughters on Shabbat

unconsecrated animals for the sake of the Paschal offering.

Rava was astonished:

But Rabbi Yoḥanan said: Rabbi Meir conceded with regard to blemished animals,

which are not fit to be offerings, that he is not considered to have erred with regard to them while engaged in a mitzva; and the same applies to unconsecrated animals, which are not fit to be offerings before they have been consecrated.

Rav Naḥman replied to him:

Blemished animals are not confused

with unblemished animals. A person does not confuse them with unblemished animals, nor does he err and sacrifice them; and if he does so, he is not considered one who errs while engaged in a mitzva.

But

these,

unconsecrated animals that he slaughtered for the sake of the Paschal offering,

can be confused

with consecrated animals, and he can err concerning them. Therefore, he is considered one who errs while engaged in a mitzva and is exempt.

Rava said to him:

And

is

Rabbi Meir’s reason

for exempting or obligating him

because of whether or not they can be confused?

But Rav Bibi said that Rabbi Elazar said: Rabbi Meir would exempt

him

even in the case of a calf of peace offerings that he slaughtered for the sake of the Paschal offering!

Apparently, Rabbi Meir’s reason is that he is preoccupied,

with sacrificing an offering, and not that the animals can be confused.

If so, since he is not preoccupied with the sacrifice of unconsecrated animals, why would Rabbi Meir exempt him?

He said to him,

Rav Naḥman: Both being preoccupied and being subject to confusion are reasons for exemption.

Therefore,

if he is preoccupied even though the animals cannot be confused,

or

if they can be confused even though he is not preoccupied,

he is exempt.

This excludes blemished animals, which are neither subject to confusion nor preoccupying,

and therefore one who slaughters blemished animals for the sake of the Paschal offering is liable.

Rabbi Zeira and Rabbi Shmuel bar Rav Yitzḥak were sitting at the lodging,

at the entrance [something like a gatehouse]

of Rav Shmuel bar Rav Yitzḥak.

And they were sitting and saying: Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish said:

If

his spit of

meat

left over [

for eating which one is liable to receive karet if he eats it intentionally]

was exchanged for a spit of roasted

sacrificial meat that is fit [which there is a mitzva to eat, by virtue of the eating of sacrificial meat],

and he ate

the leftover meat by mistake in place of the roasted meat—

he is liable,

for although he erred while engaged in a mitzva, nevertheless he did not perform a mitzva, and he is liable to bring a sin offering for it.

And

if

Rabbi Yoḥanan said: If

his

wife was a menstruating woman [

and there was no mitzva in having relations with her because she was pregnant, as will be explained],

and he had relations with her

without knowing that she was menstruating,

he is liable

to bring a sin offering.

But if his brother died and his brother’s wife came before him for levirate marriage, and his

yevama was a menstruating woman,

and he had relations with her while she was menstruating,

he is exempt

from a sin offering, because he erred with regard to the mitzva of levirate marriage, and through intercourse he performed the mitzva of levirate marriage.

The Gemara explains: Did Rabbi Yoḥanan come to disagree with Reish Lakish, or to add to his statement?

Some say

that Rabbi Yoḥanan came to add to the words of Reish Lakish, saying:

If when he had relations with his menstruating wife while she was pregnant, when his intercourse contained some element of the mitzva of bringing his wife joy, he is nevertheless liable to bring a sin offering and is not exempt on the grounds that he erred while engaged in a mitzva—

all the more so in that case

where his leftover meat was exchanged for roasted meat, and he performed no mitzva at all by eating the leftover meat,

he is liable,

since

he did not perform even the slightest

of a

mitzva

by eating the leftover meat.

However,

there are those who say

that Rabbi Yoḥanan disagrees with Reish Lakish, and maintains

that in that case,

where his leftover meat was exchanged for roasted meat and he ate it,

he is exempt.

The Gemara explains:

What is the reason

that Rabbi Yoḥanan disagrees [according to this interpretation] and exempts one who eats leftover meat that was exchanged for roasted meat?

Because

there,

in the case of one who has relations with his menstruating wife, he is liable to bring a sin offering;

he

is liable

because he ought

to have asked his wife,

to inquire, before having relations with her, whether she was pure. Since he did not ask her [although he could have asked her], he is not considered one who errs while engaged in a mitzva.

to ask his wife before having intercourse with her whether she was ritually pure. Since he did not ask her [although he could have asked her], he is not considered one who errs while engaged in a mitzva.

But

here,

in the case where his meat was exchanged for other meat,

he did not have to inquire—

he is not

liable, because he erred while engaged in the mitzva of eating sacrificial meat and is exempt, although he did not perform a mitzva.

We raise a difficulty concerning Rabbi Yoḥanan’s statement:

And Rabbi Yoḥanan, what is different

about one who has relations with

his yevama

who is menstruating, whom Rabbi Yoḥanan exempts even though he ought to have asked her whether she was pure, because

he performs a mitzva

of levirate marriage through his first intercourse, and is considered one who errs while engaged in a mitzva?

If so, one who has relations with

his wife

who is menstruating should also be exempt, because even through intercourse with his wife

he performs a mitzva

of the mitzva of procreation.

And we answer: Here we are dealing

with a pregnant wife,

with whom he does not fulfill the mitzva of procreation through intercourse.

The difficulty remains:

But there is the joy of marital relations,

as it is a mitzva for the husband to bring his wife joy through intercourse, each according to his obligation [see Rashi].

And we answer: Here we are dealing with one who had relations with her

not at the time of her conjugal obligation,

so that he did not perform a mitzva.

The Gemara rejects this answer:

But Rava said: A man is obligated to bring his wife joy through a mitzva

of intercourse, even when it is not the time of the conjugal obligation incumbent upon him?

Rather, the Gemara answers: Here we are dealing with one who had relations with her

close

to the time

of her expected period,

when there is no mitzva to have relations with her; rather, they are obligated to separate from her, lest he have relations with her while she is menstruating.

The Gemara asks:

If so,

if Rabbi Yoḥanan’s statement concerns one who had relations with her close to the time of her expected period, when he was obligated to separate from her and was not erring while engaged in a mitzva—

even

one who has relations with

his yevama

who is menstruating

also

should be liable, since close to the time of her expected period he is obligated to separate from her [because the mitzva of levirate marriage does not override the prohibition against relations with a menstruating woman], and since he is not commanded at that time to have relations with her, he should not be considered one who errs while engaged in a mitzva.

And we answer: He does not know that she is close to the time of her expected period, and he is not required to ask her whether she is close to that time, because

his yevama

is embarrassing to him—he is ashamed to ask her about it. Therefore, he is exempt for having relations with her, since in his view he is obligated at that time to perform the mitzva of levirate marriage.

he is ashamed to ask her about this, and therefore he is exempt for having intercourse with her, since in his view he is then obligated by the mitzva of levirate marriage.

But

his wife—

he is not embarrassed before her,

and he should have asked her whether she was close to the time of her expected period. Therefore, if he did not ask her, he does not have the exemption of one who errs while engaged in a mitzva.

The Gemara clarifies according to whose opinion Rabbi Yoḥanan holds:

And Rabbi Yoḥanan,

who exempts one who has relations with his menstruating yevama—

in accordance with whom

does he hold?

If you say,

if you wish to say,

in accordance with Rabbi Yose.

As we learned in the Mishna: Rabbi Yose says: The first day of the Festival of Sukkot

when

it occurs on Shabbat,

and he forgot that it was Shabbat,

and he carried the lulav out into the public domain—

he is exempt, because he carried it out with permission!

That is, he was preoccupied with a mitzva, and involvement in a mitzva gives him, as it were, “permission” to err.

The same applies to anyone preoccupied with a mitzva who performs a mitzva, such as one who has relations with his yevama.

There is a distinction:

That case is different,

in the case of one who carries a lulav into the public domain,

because its time is pressing,

as he is preoccupied with hurrying to perform his mitzva, whose opportunity passes at the end of the day, and he is preoccupied with hurrying to go to someone proficient in the laws of the lulav who will teach him how to take the lulav.

Rather, Rabbi Yoḥanan holds like

perhaps Rabbi Yohanan holds like

Rabbi Yehoshua of the tractate Zevaḥim,

as explained in the Mishna, that one who slaughters offerings for the sake of a Paschal offering is exempt because he erred while engaged in a mitzva and performed a mitzva.

The Gemara rejects this:

Perhaps there too

the reason Rabbi Yehoshua exempts him is because

its time is pressing,

lest the time for the Paschal offering pass, since he thinks that the offering before him is a Paschal offering. But in the case of one who has relations with his yevama, the time is not pressing, and there is no reason to exempt him from bringing an offering.

Rather, he holds like Rabbi Yehoshua with regard to infants,

who exempts one who errs while engaged in a mitzva and performs a mitzva.

The Gemara rejects this:

There too—

its time is pressing,

to circumcise the infant that very day.

Rather, he holds like Rabbi Yehoshua with regard to teruma:

As we learned in the Mishna:

A priest who

was eating teruma, and it became known to him that he was the son of a divorced woman,

and he is therefore a disqualified priest, whose status is that of a non-priest who eats teruma;

or it became known to him that he was

it became known to him that he was

the son of a woman who underwent ḥalitza,

who is disqualified from the priesthood by rabbinic decree—

Rabbi Eliezer obligates

him to pay a priest

the principal and an additional fifth,

as required of a non-priest who inadvertently eats teruma.

Whereas

Rabbi Yehoshua exempts

him, since he erred while engaged in a mitzva, and the payments for teruma have the status of atonement, just as a sin offering atones; one who errs while engaged in a mitzva is exempt from atonement.

The Gemara rejects this:

Perhaps

Rabbi Yehoshua’s statement applies only in the manner in which

Rav Bibi bar Abaye

said that Rav Bibi bar Abaye said: Rabbi Yehoshua exempts one who eats teruma because he mistakenly believes that he is a fit priest only when he eats

Rabbi Yehoshua exempts one who eats teruma because of the mistaken belief that he is a qualified kohein only when he eats

a

portion of

teruma

that is leavened

on the eve of Passover,

before the time for its removal,

because its time is pressing,

as it must be removed.

But not in a case where there is no pressure of time, such as one who has relations with his yevama.

Alternatively, no proof can be brought from the law of teruma, because

a distinction applies to teruma:

teruma is different, for

its eating

is called “

service” of the priests,

and the service

performed by a disqualified priest in error, without knowing that he was disqualified,

the Torah rendered fit

by scriptural decree.

As we learned in the Mishna: A priest who

a kohein who

was standing and sacrificing

offerings,

and it became known that he was the son of a divorced woman or the son of a woman who underwent ḥalitza—

all the offerings that he sacrificed upon the altar are disqualified.

And Rabbi Yehoshua declares them fit.

And we say: What is the reason of Rabbi Yehoshua?

As it is written

in Moses’ blessing to the tribe of Levi [Deuteronomy 33]: “Bless, O Lord, his strength, and favor the work of his hands.”

And we interpret that this verse speaks of priests, for it first says: “They shall place incense before You,” which is service performed by priests, and afterward it says: “Bless, O Lord, his strength,” using an expression associated with “disqualified priests,” to teach you that even the service of the disqualified priests among them, if performed without knowing that they were disqualified, is valid!

The same applies to eating teruma: Since it is considered a service, it is valid when performed by disqualified priests who did not know that they were disqualified.

The Gemara explains:

And where is teruma called

that which is

“service”?

As it was taught in a beraita: There was an incident involving Rabbi Tarfon, who did not come to the beit midrash the previous evening.

In the morning Rabban Gamliel found him. He said to him: Why did you not come to the beit midrash last night?

He said to him,

Rabbi Tarfon, who was a priest:

I was performing service!

He said to him: All your words are nothing but words of wonder.

For

is there service nowadays,

when the Temple has been destroyed—

from where?