Pesachim 72b — the Talmud in English

But

the latter clause

deals with a case in which he circumcised none of them on the eve of Shabbat, and it turns out that

Shabbat was given over to be deferred for him.

Therefore, even if he circumcised the infant who was after Shabbat on Shabbat, which means that he did not perform a mitzva, nevertheless he is exempt according to Rabbi Meir, by the rule of one who errs concerning a mitzva [even though he did not perform a mitzva

!]

And also

here,

in one who slaughters for the sake of the communal sacrificial portions

, Shabbat was indeed given over to be deferred for a communal offering!

For the same law applies to one who slaughters for the sake of the communal sacrificial portions: since Shabbat was given over to be deferred for the communal sacrificial portions, even if the communal sacrificial portions had already been slaughtered on Shabbat, and he erred and slaughtered the offering for the sake of the communal sacrificial portions, he is exempt. For he was preoccupied with a mitzva matter, despite the fact that he did not perform a mitzva. "

And because he was preoccupied with this offering on the preceding days, and knew that this offering was destined to be sacrificed, he became alarmed and forgot that the communal sacrificial portions had already been slaughtered, and slaughtered it for their sake" [the wording of Rashi ].

Rav Ashi said to Rav Kahana:

Since even if he did not fulfill a mitzva he is exempt, because Shabbat was given over to be deferred,

if so,

here too,

in the first clause, when he circumcised the one belonging to Shabbat on the eve of Shabbat,

Shabbat was given over to be deferred for ordinary infants,

and on this basis we should exempt him according to the law of one preoccupied with a mitzva.

He said to him,

Rav Kahana:

With regard to this man,

with regard to this particular person, who was not preoccupied with ordinary infants,

at any rate,

in any event,

it was not given,

Shabbat was not given over to be deferred. Therefore it is impossible to exempt him by the law of one who errs concerning a mitzva.

We learned in the Mishna:

And with regard to all the other offerings that one slaughtered for the sake of the Paschal offering, if they are not fit

to be sacrificed as a Paschal offering

, he is liable.

And if they are fit—

Rabbi Eliezer obligates him to bring a sin-offering, and Rabbi Yehoshua exempts him.

And the Gemara explains:

Who

is the

tanna who distinguishes,

who differentiates

between those that are fit and those that are not fit—

it is Rabbi Shimon.

As it was taught: One

who slaughters the

offerings that are fit

for a Paschal offering,

and one

who slaughters those

that are not fit—

he is exempt. "Since he has been preoccupied in his heart with them since they were set aside, and knows that he must sacrifice them, he errs and slaughters them for the sake of the Paschal offering" [Rashi

]. And similarly, one who slaughters for the sake of the communal sacrificial portions—

he is exempt; this is the statement of Rabbi Meir.

Rabbi Shimon said: Rabbi Eliezer and Rabbi Yehoshua did not disagree concerning those that are not fit, that he is liable,

since with regard to them he does not err.

With regard to what did they disagree? With regard to those that are fit

for the Paschal offering.

For Rabbi Eliezer obligates him to bring a sin-offering, and Rabbi Yehoshua exempts him.

Rav Bibi said that Rabbi Elazar said: Rabbi Meir would exempt

even

one who slaughters

a calf of peace-offerings, which he slaughtered for the sake of the Paschal offering.

And the novelty is that even with regard to a calf, concerning which everyone knows that it is not fit for a Paschal offering, he is nevertheless called one who errs concerning a mitzva.

Rabbi Zeira said to Rav Bibi: But Rabbi Yohanan said: Rabbi Meir conceded with regard to blemished animals

that he is not considered one who errs concerning a mitzva, since everyone knows that blemished animals are not sacrificed, and the thought of sacrificing them does not preoccupy him. And the same applies to a calf, concerning which everyone knows that it is not destined to be sacrificed as a Paschal offering.

He said to him: With regard to blemished animals,

which are not fit for sacrifice at all,

he is not preoccupied with them.

But this one,

a calf of peace-offerings,

he is preoccupied with it,

for the thought of sacrificing it has disturbed his heart since it was set aside for an offering, and therefore he is considered like one who errs concerning a mitzva.

Rava asked Rav Naḥman:

One who slaughters unconsecrated animals

on Shabbat

for the sake of the Paschal offering—

what did Rabbi Meir say to me?

What does Rabbi Meir say about this? Does he also exempt this person by the rule of one who errs concerning a mitzva?

He said to him,

Rav Naḥman:

Rabbi Meir would exempt even

one who slaughters on Shabbat

unconsecrated animals for the sake of the Paschal offering.

And Rava wondered:

But Rabbi Yohanan said: Rabbi Meir conceded with regard to blemished animals,

which are not fit to be an offering, that he is not considered one who errs concerning a mitzva with regard to them; and the same applies to unconsecrated animals, which are not fit to be an offering before they have been consecrated.

And Rav Naḥman answered him:

Blemished animals are not interchangeable.

A person does not exchange them for unblemished animals, and he does not err with regard to them by sacrificing them; and if he did so, he is not considered one who errs concerning a mitzva.

But

these,

unconsecrated animals that he slaughtered for the sake of the Paschal offering,

are interchangeable

with consecrated animals, and he can err with regard to them; therefore he is one who errs concerning a mitzva, and he is exempt.

Rava said to him:

And

is

the reason of Rabbi Meir

for exempting or obligating

because of interchangeability and lack of interchangeability?

But Rav Bibi said that Rabbi Elazar said: Rabbi Meir would exempt

even

a calf of peace-offerings that he slaughtered for the sake of the Paschal offering!

Apparently, the reason of Rabbi Meir is because he is preoccupied

with sacrificing an offering, and not because of interchangeability.

And if so, since he is not preoccupied with the sacrifice of unconsecrated animals, why does Rabbi Meir exempt him?

He said to him,

Rav Naḥman: Both "preoccupied" and "interchangeable"; both are reasons for exemption.

And therefore,

if he is preoccupied, even though they are not interchangeable,

or

they are interchangeable, even though he is not preoccupied,

he is exempt.

To exclude blemished animals, which are neither interchangeable nor preoccupying,

and therefore he is liable when slaughtering blemished animals for the sake of the Paschal offering.

Rabbi Zeira and Rabbi Shmuel bar Rav Yitzḥak were sitting at the lodging-place

at the entrance [something like a "gatehouse

"] of Rav Shmuel bar Rav Yitzḥak.

And they were sitting and saying: Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish said:

If

a spit of

meat

of leftover

meat [for eating which intentionally one is liable for karet

was exchanged with a spit of roasted

meat of a valid sacred offering [which it is a mitzva to eat, by the law of eating consecrated food ,

and he ate

the leftover meat by mistake in place of the roasted meat—

he is liable,

for despite the fact that he erred concerning a mitzva, nevertheless he did not perform a mitzva, and he is liable to bring a sin-offering for it.

And

if

Rabbi Yohanan said:

His

wife was menstruating

[and there was no mitzva in intercourse with her because she was pregnant, as will be explained ,

and he had intercourse with

her without knowing that she was menstruating, he is

liable

to bring a sin-offering.

But if his brother died and his wife came before him for levirate marriage, and

his yevama was menstruating,

and he had intercourse with her while she was menstruating, he is

exempt

from a sin-offering, because he erred concerning the mitzva of levirate marriage, and through his intercourse he performed the mitzva of levirate marriage.

And the Gemara explains whether Rabbi Yohanan came to disagree with Reish Lakish or to add to his words.

There are those who say

that Rabbi Yohanan came to add to the words of Reish Lakish, and to say:

If when he had intercourse with his menstruating wife while she was pregnant, when there is some mitzva in his intercourse, namely the joy of his wife, he is liable to bring a sin-offering and is not exempt on account of one who errs concerning a mitzva—

all the more so in that case

in which leftover meat was exchanged for roasted meat and he fulfilled no mitzva by eating the leftover meat,

that he is liable.

Since

he did not perform

even a trace of a

mitzva

by eating the leftover meat.

But

there are those who say

that Rabbi Yohanan disagrees with Reish Lakish, and holds

that in that case

in which leftover meat was exchanged for roasted meat and he ate it, he is

exempt.

And the Gemara explains:

What is the reason

that Rabbi Yohanan disagrees [according to this approach] and exempts one who eats leftover meat that was exchanged for roasted meat?

For

there,

in the case of one who has intercourse with his menstruating wife, he is liable to bring a sin-offering,

it

is because

it was incumbent upon him

to have intercourse with her

after inquiring,

to ask his wife before having intercourse with her whether she was pure. And since he did not ask her [although he could have asked her], he is not considered one who errs concerning a mitzva.

But

here,

in the case in which meat was exchanged for meat,

it was not incumbent upon him to inquire—

he is not

liable, because he is one who errs concerning the mitzva of eating consecrated food, and he is exempt, despite the fact that he did not perform a mitzva.

And we raise an objection concerning the words of Rabbi Yohanan:

And Rabbi Yohanan, what is different about

the one who has intercourse with

his yevama

while menstruating, whom Rabbi Yohanan exempted even though it was incumbent upon him to ask her whether she was pure, because

he was performing a mitzva

of levirate marriage through his first intercourse, and he is one who errs concerning a mitzva.

If so, one who has intercourse with

his wife

while she is menstruating should be exempt, because also through intercourse with his wife

he is performing a mitzva

of the mitzva of procreation.

And we answer: Here it is speaking

of his wife who is pregnant,

so that he does not fulfill the mitzva of procreation through intercourse with her.

And we still raise the objection:

But there is the joy of marital relations,

for it is a mitzva upon the husband to gladden his wife through intercourse, each person according to his obligation [see Rashi ].

And we answer: Here it is speaking of a case in which he had intercourse with her

not at the time of her marital obligation,

so that he did not perform a mitzva.

And the Gemara rejects the answer:

But Rava said: A person is obligated to gladden his wife through a mitzva

of intercourse, even not at the time of the marital relation to which he is obligated?

Rather, the Gemara answers: Here it is speaking of a case in which he had intercourse with her

close

to the time of

her expected menstrual period,

for then there is no mitzva to have intercourse with her; rather, they are obligated to separate from her, lest he have intercourse with her during her menstruation.

And the Gemara asks:

If so,

that the words of Rabbi Yohanan refer to one who had intercourse with her close to her expected menstrual period, when he is obligated to separate from her and is not erring concerning a mitzva—

even

one who has intercourse with

his yevama

while menstruating

also

should be liable, since when it is close to her expected menstrual period he is obligated to separate from her [because the mitzva of levirate marriage does not override the prohibition of menstruation], and since he is not commanded then to have intercourse with her, he is not considered one who errs concerning a mitzva.

And we answer: He does not know that she is close to her expected menstrual period, and he is not required to ask her whether she is close to her expected menstrual period, because

his yevama—

he is embarrassed before her,

he is ashamed to ask her about this, and therefore he is exempt for having intercourse with her, since in his view he is then obligated by the mitzva of levirate marriage.

But

his wife—

he is not embarrassed before her,

and he should have asked her whether she was close to her expected menstrual period. Therefore, if he did not ask her, he does not have the exemption of one who errs concerning a mitzva.

And the Gemara clarifies according to whose view Rabbi Yohanan holds:

And Rabbi Yohanan,

who exempts one who has intercourse with his menstruating yevama—

according to whom

does he hold?

If you say,

if you wish to say,

according to Rabbi Yosei.

As we learned: Rabbi Yosei says: The first day of the Festival of Sukkot

when it

occurs on Shabbat,

and he forgot that today was Shabbat,

and carried the lulav out into the public domain—

he is exempt, because he carried it out with permission!

And that is because he was preoccupied with a mitzva matter, for involvement with a mitzva matter gives him, as it were, "permission" to err.

And the same law applies to anyone who is preoccupied with a mitzva matter and performs a mitzva, like one who has intercourse with his yevama.

Here it is possible to distinguish:

That case is different,

in the case of one who carries the lulav into the public domain,

for its time is pressing,

as he is preoccupied with hastening to fulfill his mitzva, whose time passes at the end of the day, and he is preoccupied with hurrying to go to one proficient in the laws of the lulav, who will teach him how to take the lulav.

Rather,

perhaps Rabbi Yohanan holds like

Rabbi Yehoshua of Zevaḥim,

as explained in the Mishna, that one who slaughters offerings for the sake of the Paschal offering is exempt because he erred concerning a mitzva and performed a mitzva.

And the Gemara rejects this:

Perhaps there too

the reason that Rabbi Yehoshua exempted him is because

its time is pressing,

lest the time of the Paschal offering pass, since in his mind the offering before him is a Paschal offering. But in the case of one who has intercourse with his yevama, its time is not pressing, and there is no reason to exempt him from an offering.

Rather, according to Rabbi Yehoshua of the infants,

who exempts one who errs concerning a mitzva and performs a mitzva.

And the Gemara rejects this:

There too—

its time is pressing

to circumcise him on that very day.

Rather, according to Rabbi Yehoshua concerning teruma:

As we learned:

A koen who

was eating teruma, and it became known to him that he was the son of a divorced woman,

and he is therefore disqualified, with the status of a non-koen who eats teruma.

Or

it became known to him that he was

the son of a ḥalutza,

who is disqualified from the kehunah by rabbinic decree—

Rabbi Eliezer obligates

him to pay the koen

the principal and the added fifth

as is the law of a non-koen who unwittingly eats teruma.

Whereas

Rabbi Yehoshua exempts

him, since he erred concerning a mitzva matter, and payments for teruma are in the category of atonement, just as a sin-offering atones, and one who errs concerning a mitzva is exempt from atonement.

And the Gemara rejects this:

Perhaps

the words of Rabbi Yehoshua are stated only as

Rav Bibi bar Abaye established them.

For Rav Bibi bar Abaye said:

Rabbi Yehoshua exempts one who eats teruma because of the error in which he thinks that he is a valid koen only

with

regard to eating

teruma

that is leaven

on the eve of Passover,

before the time of removal,

for its time is pressing,

since he must remove it.

But not in a case in which the time is not pressing, like one who has intercourse with his yevama.

Alternatively,

there is no proof from the law of teruma, because

teruma is different, for

its eating

is called "

service" of the koenim

, and service

that a disqualified koen performed unwittingly, not knowing that he was disqualified—

the Merciful One validated

his service, by a scriptural decree.

As we learned:

A koen who

was standing and sacrificing

offerings,

and it became known that he was the son of a divorced woman or the son of a ḥalutza—

all the offerings that he sacrificed upon the altar are disqualified.

And Rabbi Yehoshua declares them fit.

And we say: What is the reason of Rabbi Yehoshua?

As it is written

in Moses' blessing to the tribe of Levi [Deuteronomy 33]: "Bless, O Lord, his strength, and favor the work of his hands ."

And we expound that this verse speaks of the koenim, for first it says, "They shall place incense before You," which is a service performed by koenim, and afterward it says, "Bless, O Lord, his strength," in the sense of "ḥalalim," disqualified persons, to teach you that even the service of the disqualified among them, if it was performed without knowledge that they were disqualified, their service is valid!

And the same law applies to eating teruma: since it is considered service, it is valid when performed by disqualified persons who did not know that they were disqualified.

And the Gemara explains:

And where is teruma called

where do we find that it is called

"service"?

As it was taught: There was an incident involving Rabbi Tarfon, who did not come the previous evening to the beit-midrash.

In the morning Rabban Gamliel found him. He said to him: Why did you not come the previous evening to the beit-midrash?

He said to him,

Rabbi Tarfon, who was a koen:

I performed service!

He said to him: All your words are nothing but words of wonder.

For

is there service nowadays,

when the Temple has been destroyed—

from where?