Pesachim 72a — the Talmud in English

Gemara:

We learned in the Mishna: If one slaughtered the Pesach not for its sake on Shabbat, he is liable to bring a sin-offering.

And we raised the matter:

In what case are we dealing?

What was his error that made him liable for a sacrifice?

If you say

that he was mistaken concerning the identification of the sacrifice—for example, he thought that this was not a Pesach sacrifice but an olah sacrifice, and therefore slaughtered it for the sake of an olah—then the uprooting of the designation of the sacrifice from Pesach to olah was done in error, and it is a dispute between tannaim whether “uprooting in error” is considered uprooting or not.

And if so, shall we infer

from this

from our Mishna that

uprooting in error is considered uprooting,

as when one uproots intentionally?!

And we answer:

Rather,

there is no proof from here concerning uprooting in error. For here we are dealing

with one who uproots

the designation of the sacrifice intentionally; his error is only that he does not know that today is Shabbat, or does not know that one who uproots is liable because of desecrating Shabbat.

If so,

say the latter clause: And all the other sacrifices that one slaughtered for the sake of the Pesach—

if they are unfit, he is liable.

And

if they are fit, Rabbi Eliezer makes him liable for a sin-offering,

and Rabbi Yehoshua exempts him.

And if

the matter is

one who uproots

the designation of the sacrifice intentionally and makes it for the sake of the Pesach—

what difference is there whether they are fit

for a Pesach sacrifice,

and what difference is there whether they are unfit?!

For it is obvious that he is not mistaken concerning a mitzva, since he knows that this is another sacrifice and intends knowingly to uproot its designation; how is it possible that Rabbi Yehoshua would exempt him if it was fit for a Pesach, on the grounds that he is mistaken concerning a mitzva?!

Rather, it is obvious

that the latter clause is dealing

with one who is mistaken,

who does not know that it is another sacrifice, but thinks that this is a Pesach sacrifice; and he is considered mistaken concerning a mitzva because everyone is occupied on the eve of Pesach with slaughtering the Pesach sacrifice.

And if so, it is difficult: shall we establish the

first clause

of the Mishna

as dealing with one who uproots, and

whereas the

latter clause

shall we establish

as dealing with one who is mistaken?!

Rabbi Avin said:

There is no difficulty with this.

Rather,

yes!

Indeed, we shall establish the

first clause

of the Mishna

as dealing with one who uproots, and the latter clause as dealing with one who is mistaken.

He found

Rabbi Abbahu

Rav Yitzḥak bar Yosef Rabbi Abbahu, who was standing among a crowd of people,

who was within a very large group of people.

He said to him

Rav Yitzḥak to Rabbi Abbahu:

Our Mishna,

this Mishna of ours—

how

shall we establish it, as dealing with one who uproots or with one who is mistaken?!

He said to him

Rabbi Abbahu:

The first clause,

“the Pesach that one slaughtered not for its sake,” is dealing

with one who uproots

knowingly.

And

whereas the

latter clause,

concerning the other sacrifices that one slaughtered for the sake of the Pesach, is dealing

with one who is mistaken.

He learned it from him

Rav Yitzḥak learned this establishment from Rabbi Abbahu

forty times, and

then

it seemed to him,

the matter was completely clear to him, and it appeared to him

as though it were placed in his pocket,

just as something placed in his pocket.

And the Gemara raises an objection:

We learned

in our Mishna:

Rabbi Eliezer said: If the Pesach, which is permitted

to slaughter

for its sake, when one changed its designation he is liable; other sacrifices

that are

forbidden

to slaughter

for their sake—

when one changed their designation, is it not logical that he should be liable?

And if it is so,

as we established it, that he knowingly uproots the designation of the Pesach, whereas he slaughters the other sacrifices for the sake of the Pesach in error—

this is not comparable

the slaughtering of the Pesach to the slaughtering of the other sacrifices, and it is impossible to derive them by a kal va-chomer from the Pesach.

Because the

first clause

deals with one who slaughters the Pesach

as one who uproots, and

whereas the

latter clause,

which deals with one who slaughters sacrifices for the sake of the Pesach,

deals with one who is mistaken?!

And the Gemara answers:

For Rabbi Eliezer,

who makes this kal va-chomer argument,

it is not different to him;

he does not distinguish between one who uproots and one who is mistaken.

And we raise a difficulty: Even if, according to Rabbi Eliezer, there is no distinction between one who uproots and one who is mistaken, and therefore he makes the kal va-chomer argument, nevertheless,

for Rabbi Yehoshua, who does distinguish between them,

who distinguishes between one who uproots and one who is mistaken—

let him distinguish for him,

so that he should reject the kal va-chomer on the basis of the distinction that he makes between one who uproots and one who is mistaken.

And we answer: Indeed,

this is what he said to him,

Rabbi Yehoshua to Rabbi Eliezer:

For my part,

I personally hold that

it is not comparable

the Pesach to the other sacrifices. Rather,

the first clause

deals

with one who uproots, and the latter clause with one who is mistaken.

But

for your part,

since you do not distinguish between one who uproots and one who is mistaken, and you expound the kal va-chomer, I will make another distinction for you:

No. If you have said this concerning the Pesach, where one changed its designation to something forbidden, can you say this concerning sacrifices, where one changed their designation to something permitted?

We further learned in the Mishna:

Rabbi Eliezer said to him: The communal portions will prove it, for they are permitted

to slaughter on Shabbat

for their sake, and one who slaughters

other sacrifices

for their sake is liable.

Rabbi Yehoshua said to him: No. If you have said this concerning

one who slaughters for the sake of

the communal portions,

who is not considered mistaken concerning a mitzva,

for they have a fixed measure, can you say this concerning

one who slaughters for the sake of the sacrifice

of the Pesach, which has no fixed measure,

and one who is mistaken concerning it is mistaken concerning a mitzva.

And we raised the matter:

Does this mean,

according to the words of the Mishna it emerges,

that wherever it has a fixed measure,

he is not considered mistaken concerning a mitzva, and therefore

Rabbi Yehoshua makes him liable

for a sin-offering.

But

if there were

two infants,

one whose time was to be circumcised on Shabbat and the other whose time was to be circumcised after Shabbat,

who have a fixed measure,

since it is known that only one infant needs to be circumcised on Shabbat,

and

nevertheless

we learned

in tractate Shabbat 137a and Keritot 19a:

One who had two infants

to circumcise,

one to circumcise after Shabbat and one to circumcise on Shabbat, and he forgot and circumcised the

infant

of after Shabbat on Shabbat—

he is liable

for a sin-offering.

For Rabbi Yehoshua concedes that one who is mistaken concerning a mitzva is exempt only if he performed a mitzva; but here he did not perform a mitzva, since the time for him to be circumcised had not yet arrived.

And if he had two infants,

one to circumcise on the eve of Shabbat and one to circumcise on Shabbat, and he forgot and circumcised the one of the eve of Shabbat on Shabbat—

Rabbi Eliezer makes him liable for a sin-offering,

because according to his view, one who is mistaken concerning a mitzva and performs a mitzva is not exempt from a sin-offering.

And Rabbi Yehoshua exempts him,

because one who is mistaken concerning a mitzva and performs a mitzva is exempt.

And it is proved that even in a matter that has a fixed measure, such as with two infants, where only one infant is destined to be circumcised on Shabbat, Rabbi Yehoshua nevertheless exempts him.

And if so, it is difficult: Why does he not exempt one who slaughters an individual’s sacrifice for the sake of communal sacrifices? For one who is mistaken concerning a mitzva and performs a mitzva is exempt. And he did perform a mitzva, because when one slaughters a sacrifice not for its sake, the sacrifice is valid, and he performed a mitzva.

Rav Ami said: Here, with what are we dealing? For example,

the two infants were standing at the time of the circumcision, one belonging to Shabbat and one belonging to the eve of Shabbat, and he had not yet circumcised them.

And it happened

that he went ahead and circumcised the one of the eve of Shabbat on Shabbat.

And it emerges

that there is

at the time of his circumcising

this

infant

of Shabbat, with which he was preoccupied,

for since he knows that he has to circumcise one infant on Shabbat, he is preoccupied with a mitzva matter.

This is not so with one who slaughters sacrifices for the sake of communal sacrifices. Since

here

we are dealing

with a case where he went ahead and slaughtered the communal portions first.

Thus, when he slaughtered other sacrifices for the sake of the communal sacrifices, he was no longer preoccupied with offering them.

And we refute Rav Ami:

If so,

that we established the Mishna as dealing with a case where he had already offered the communal sacrifices and was no longer preoccupied with them—this that we learned later in the Mishna,

“Rabbi Meir says: Even one who slaughters for the sake of the communal portions is exempt,”

does this mean

even though he had gone ahead and slaughtered the communal portions first,

Rabbi Meir exempts him, despite the fact that he is not preoccupied with the communal sacrifices?

This cannot be. For—

And it was taught: Rabbi Ḥiyya of Avel-Erev

[a place name]

said

in the name of

Rabbi Meir:

Rabbi Eliezer and Rabbi Yehoshua did not disagree concerning

one

who had two infants, one to circumcise on the eve of Shabbat and one to circumcise on Shabbat, and he forgot and circumcised the one of the eve of Shabbat on Shabbat—

that he is liable,

even though he performed a mitzva.

And it was initially understood that he circumcised both of them: first the infant whose time was on Shabbat, and afterward the infant whose time was from the eve of Shabbat. It follows that when he circumcised the infant whose time was from the eve of Shabbat, he was no longer preoccupied with circumcising the infant whose time was on Shabbat.

Concerning what did they disagree,

Rabbi Eliezer and Rabbi Yehoshua?

Concerning one who had

to circumcise

two infants, one to circumcise after Shabbat and one to circumcise on Shabbat.

And he forgot,

and circumcised

the one of after Shabbat on Shabbat,

and did not circumcise the other one at all. It follows that he was preoccupied with circumcising the one whose time was to be circumcised on Shabbat, but he erred and confused it with the one whose time was after Shabbat.

And it follows that he was mistaken concerning a mitzva and performed a mitzva;

for Rabbi Eliezer makes him liable

for it

a sin-offering, and Rabbi Yehoshua exempts him

from it.

And it is proved from this beraita that Rabbi Meir holds that if at present there is no mitzva before him that overrides Shabbat, he is not considered mistaken concerning a mitzva.

And if so, how did we say that according to Rabbi Meir, if one slaughters sacrifices for the sake of the communal portions, he is exempt, even if he had already offered the communal portions?!

And we answer:

But can you understand it?

Do you really think that it is possible to say as we established Rabbi Meir’s statement: that Rabbi Yehoshua concedes that if he had two infants to circumcise, one of the eve of Shabbat and one of Shabbat, and he went ahead and circumcised the one of Shabbat first, and afterward circumcised the one of the eve of Shabbat, he is liable, because at that point he was not mistaken concerning a matter of mitzva?

But this is impossible! For:

There,

in the case in which we established the dispute between Rabbi Eliezer and Rabbi Yehoshua—where he had two infants, one for Shabbat and one after Shabbat, and forgot and circumcised only the one after Shabbat—

where he did not perform a mitzva,

for the time for him to be circumcised had not arrived, and nevertheless

Rabbi Yehoshua exempted

him

from the law of

one mistaken concerning a mitzva.

Where he is performing a mitzva,

in the case where he had two infants, one from the eve of Shabbat and one of Shabbat, and circumcised both of them on Shabbat, thereby fulfilling the mitzva of circumcision with both of them—is it possible that thereby

Rabbi Yehoshua makes

him liable?!

Rather,

the school of Rabbi Yannai said,

in order to resolve the difficulty from the beraita:

The first clause

of the beraita is dealing

with a case where he went ahead and circumcised

the infant

of Shabbat on the eve of Shabbat,

and on Shabbat he still remained in his error, thinking that the second infant whom he had left to circumcise was the infant whose mitzva was to be circumcised on Shabbat.

And therefore everyone agrees that he is liable, even though he is preoccupied with it [according to his thought that this is the infant whose mitzva is to circumcise on Shabbat], because he is a single infant,

for Shabbat was not given to be overridden

by him.