Pesachim 71b — the Talmud in English

Taught

the verse

concerning the fourteenth-day chagigah, which is eaten for two days and one night.

That is, the morning mentioned here is the morning of the sixteenth day, and from here we have learned that the fourteenth-day chagigah is eaten for two days and one night.

Or is it not

that the intention of the verse is not the morning of the sixteenth day, but rather the morning of the fifteenth?

And to say that the fourteenth-day chagigah is not eaten

except for a day

one

and a night

following it alone, and on the morning of the fifteenth it is already disqualified through remaining overnight.

It is impossible to say this.

For

when it says

[Deuteronomy 16]

“On the first day,”

it implies that it is eaten also on the first festival day.

And from here one must learn that it is not disqualified through remaining overnight on the first morning after the fourteenth, but only on the following morning—

the second morning is stated

in the verse.

And the tanna returns and discusses:

Or is it not

that the chagigah

except

until

the first morning

[and the Gemara will explain how he returns and discusses this after having proved that it should not be discussed in this way]?

And what,

and how

do I establish

what we learn from another verse, that there is a

chagigah eaten for two days and one night?

By saying that this law—that a chagigah is eaten for two days and one night—applies to all the chagigah offerings of the pilgrimage festivals—

except for

the chagigah

this,

which comes on the fourteenth, before the festival, which alone is eaten for a day and a night.

It is impossible to say so. For

when it says

[Leviticus 7, in the passage concerning the eating of a peace-offering brought as a vow or a freewill offering, which are eaten for two days and one night]:

“If it is a vow or a freewill offering

of sacrifice of his offering, on the day of his offering it shall be eaten, and on the next day”—the verse wrote here an extra word, “if” [for the verse could have written “a vow or a freewill offering,” and the verse added the word “if”].

And from the extra word “if” in the verse we learn concerning obligatory peace-offerings, that they too are eaten like a freewill peace-offering, for two days and one night.

Taught

[as will be explained below, how it taught this]

concerning the fourteenth-day chagigah, which

it

is eaten for two days and one night.

And now Rava first explains the words of the tanna, and afterward will explain Rav Yosef’s difficulty against Rav Kahana from this beraita, from which it is demonstrated that with regard to the disqualification of the meat—“the morning” is the first morning, even when “first” was not written adjacent to it; and this is a difficulty against Rav Kahana, who needed to learn from the adjacency of “first” to “morning” that it is the first morning:

The Master said

in the beraita:

Or is it not rather the first morning.

And Rava wondered: How did the tanna entertain the possibility of saying that it would be disqualified on the first morning? But

you said: When it says

that the meat is eaten

“on the first day”

of the festival—

behold,

necessarily the morning written after “the first day”

is the second morning stated

here!

And Rava explains that necessarily—

this is what he is saying

the tanna:

Or is it not

that the meat of the Passover chagigah is eaten for two days and one night [as I said and proved from what is stated in the verse, “on the first day,” whose meaning is that the meat of the fourteenth-day chagigah is eaten also on the first festival day], but rather it is eaten for a day and a night alone.

And what the verse said, “on the first day,” has another meaning: it does not refer to the fourteenth-day chagigah, to say that it is eaten also on the first festival day of Passover; rather, it concerns the fifteenth-day chagigah, which is offered on the first day of the Passover festival.

Rather, the verse speaks of two chagigah offerings

this

speaks,

the

one, the fourteenth-day chagigah, and

the

one, the fifteenth-day chagigah.

And “the morning” stated in the verse refers not only to the fourteenth-day chagigah, but also to the fifteenth-day chagigah.

And so the verse said:

a. “None of the meat that you slaughter in the evening of the festival”—that is, the meat of the fourteenth-day chagigah—“shall remain overnight until morning.”

b. “None of the meat that you slaughter on the first day”—that is, the meat of the fifteenth-day chagigah, which is offered on the first day of the Passover festival—“shall remain overnight until morning.”

For unspecified “remaining overnight” implies until the first morning.

This one until its morning, and this one until its morning.

For with regard to the fourteenth-day chagigah, this morning is the morning of the fifteenth day; and with regard to the fifteenth-day chagigah, this morning is the morning of the sixteenth day.

He returned

the tanna returned and

said

that it is impossible to say so: For if we equate the laws of the two chagigah offerings, and say that both of them are eaten only for a day and a night, the following difficulty arises:

Rather, it is established for us

that there is a

chagigah eaten for two days and one night,

and we learn this from the extra word “if” in the verse, “If it is a vow or a freewill offering.”

If so,

the verse

“If it is a vow or a freewill offering,”

from which we learn that there is a chagigah eaten for two days and one night—

with what

shall we establish it?

If

with the

fourteenth-day chagigah

behold, it is written concerning it

that it is eaten for a

day and a night

alone.

If

with the

fifteenth-day chagigah

behold, it is written concerning it

that it is eaten for a

day and a night

alone.

For we derived from the verse, “None of the meat that you slaughter in the evening on the first day until morning,” that both of them are disqualified on the first morning after the day on which they were brought.

Rather

necessarily, even if we establish

this

verse, “If it is a vow,” which comes to say that there is a chagigah eaten for two days and one night,

with the fifteenth-day chagigah

[since it does not come together with the Passover offering, and we have no reason to give it the stringency of the Passover offering, which is disqualified on the first morning], it is nevertheless still demonstrated that the fourteenth-day chagigah is eaten for two days and one night.

For after we established the verse, “If it is a vow,” with the fourteenth-day chagigah, there remains

the entire verse

“None of the meat that you slaughter in the evening on the first day until morning”—

for the fourteenth-day chagigah.

And

it taught concerning the fourteenth-day chagigah, which is eaten for two days and one night.

For it is written in this verse, “on the first day,” and we learned from it that the eating of the fourteenth-day chagigah is also on the fifteenth day, which is the first day of the Passover festival. Therefore we are compelled to say that the morning written there, at which the offering is disqualified through remaining overnight, is “the second morning,” which follows it.

And now, after Rava explained the beraita, Rava explains his difficulty against Rav Kahana from it:

Behold, this verse concerns the meat and not the sacrificial portions, whose law is more stringent than that of the meat.

And Rava infers:

The reason

that we learned that the meat is eaten for two days and one night, and established that the morning at which the meat is disqualified through remaining overnight is the second morning and not the first, is only because

it is written

“on the first day”

as an addition

to “morning,”

and from this we learned

that what is meant by

“morning”

is the second morning.

But wherever it is written

“morning”

without qualification,

without the addition of “first day”—

it is the first morning

itself!

And even though “first” was not written concerning it,

“first,”

it is the first morning.

And from here is my difficulty against Rav Kahana, who learned to disqualify the sacrificial portions of the fifteenth-day chagigah on the first morning [of the sixteenth] from the adjacency of “first.” There is no need for this teaching, for the disqualification of the sacrificial portions is more stringent than the disqualification of the meat; and if an unspecified morning stated with regard to the meat means the first morning, all the more so an unspecified morning stated with regard to the sacrificial portions means the first morning.

Mishna:

a. A

Passover offering that they slaughtered

on Shabbat inadvertently, with the intention

not for its sake,

such as when they slaughtered it for the sake of a burnt-offering, because he thought that it was permitted to slaughter a Passover offering for the sake of another offering, since he did this

on Shabbat

he is liable for it

an offering of

a sin-offering,

since he desecrated Shabbat through its slaughter, as a Passover offering slaughtered for the sake of another offering is disqualified and is not fit to be offered.

And

if

all the other offerings that they slaughtered

inadvertently on the eve of Passover that occurred on Shabbat

for the sake of the Passover offering,

such as when he thought that it was permitted to slaughter them for the sake of the Passover offering, or Shabbat escaped him and he thought that today was a weekday—the matter depends on the law of one who “errs regarding a mitzva.”

Therefore:

If

those offerings

are not fit

to be offered as a Passover offering, such as if they were female, which is not fit to be offered as a Passover offering [or if they were a calf or a two-year-old ram], there is no dispute that he is not considered one who “errs regarding a mitzva,” since everyone knows that they are not fit to be offered as a Passover offering. Therefore, he

is liable

for slaughtering them on Shabbat for an offering of

a sin-offering.

But,

and if they are fit

for a Passover offering, such as if it was an unblemished one-year-old sheep of a peace-offering, and he erred and slaughtered it for the sake of the Passover offering because he was preoccupied, and on a weekday he was going to slaughter his Passover offering, this is considered one who “errs regarding a mitzva and performs a mitzva,” for offerings that one slaughters for the sake of the Passover offering are valid, and it follows that he performed at least some mitzva through the slaughtering of his offering.

And the tannaim disputed whether one who errs regarding a mitzva and performs a mitzva is liable for a sin-offering when, at the time that he performed the mitzva, he performed an act that renders one liable for a sin-offering:

Rabbi Eliezer obligates a sin-offering

even though he erred regarding a mitzva, thinking that these offerings were a Passover offering, and wishing to fulfill through them the mitzva of the Passover offering.

And Rabbi Yehoshua exempts

because he is one who errs regarding a mitzva.

For even if he did not fulfill the mitzva of the Passover offering, and his offerings also did not count for him toward fulfilling his obligation, nevertheless he fulfilled at least some mitzva of offering an offering.

Rabbi Eliezer said to him

to Rabbi Yehoshua: Behold, the matter follows a kal va-chomer:

If

the

Passover offering, which is permitted

to slaughter

for its sake

on Shabbat, nevertheless

when he changed its designation

and slaughtered it on Shabbat for the sake of another offering, which is forbidden to slaughter on Shabbat—even according to your words he

is liable

for a sin-offering.

Other offerings,

which are not Passover offerings,

which are forbidden

to slaughter on Shabbat

even

when he slaughters them

for their sake.

When he changed their designation,

and slaughtered them for the sake of the Passover offering on Shabbat—

is it not logical that he should be liable

for a sin-offering for them, since it was altogether forbidden for him to slaughter them?

Rabbi Yehoshua said to him

to Rabbi Eliezer:

No,

do not reason this kal va-chomer.

For

if you say with regard to the Passover offering,

which he slaughtered on Shabbat for the sake of another offering, it is proper that he be liable for a sin-offering, since

he changed it

on Shabbat to slaughter it

for something

[for the sake of an offering]

that is forbidden

to slaughter on Shabbat, and since his intention was for a forbidden matter, he is liable for an offering.

Will you say with regard to other offerings

other

that he changed

to slaughter them on Shabbat

for a permitted matter,

as he intended to slaughter them for the sake of a Passover offering, that he should be exempt by the law of one who errs regarding a mitzva and performs a mitzva?

Rabbi Eliezer said to him

to Rabbi Yehoshua:

The sacrificial portions

[of the offerings]

of the community will prove it: They are permitted

to slaughter on Shabbat

for their sake, and

nevertheless

one who slaughters

other offerings

for their sake

of the offerings of the community, such as for the sake of the daily offering or for the sake of the additional offering,

is liable

for a sin-offering.

And despite the fact that the slaughterer erred regarding a mitzva and performed a mitzva, he is liable for a sin-offering.

Rabbi Yehoshua said to him: No.

This is not proof of your words.

For

if you say with regard to the sacrificial portions of the community,

that one who slaughters other offerings for the sake of the offerings of the community is not exempt on account of one who errs regarding a mitzva, this is because

they have

the offerings of the community

a fixed number.

For many people do not engage in their slaughter, and once the daily offering or the additional offering has been slaughtered, there is no further need to slaughter it. Therefore, he should not have erred and slaughtered for the sake of the offerings of the community; consequently, if he did this, he is merely one who acted inadvertently, who is liable for an offering, and not one who errs regarding a mitzva, who is exempt from an offering.

Will you say with regard to

one who slaughters other offerings for the sake of the

Passover offering, which has no fixed number?

Rather, everyone is engaged in its slaughter. Therefore, if he erred and slaughtered another offering for the sake of the Passover offering, he is one who errs regarding a mitzva, since he did this because he saw many other people engaged in slaughtering the Passover offering for the sake of the Passover offering.

And even if he had already offered his Passover offering, there is room for him to err if he found an offering standing in the Temple courtyard and slaughtered it for the sake of whoever its owner was, because he thought that it was a Passover offering, and it turned out that it was not a Passover offering. It is properly called one who errs regarding a mitzva, for when he saw everyone slaughtering a Passover offering, he thought that this offering too was a Passover offering, and therefore he erred concerning it.

Rabbi Meir says: Even one who slaughters

throughout all the Shabbatot of the year the offerings of an individual

for the sake of the sacrificial portions of the community

is one who errs regarding a mitzva and performs a mitzva, and he

is exempt

from a sin-offering.

b.

He slaughtered

the Passover offering on Shabbat inadvertently [Shabbat escaped him, or the halakha escaped him], with the thought that he would feed the offering

to those unfit to eat it,

such as an elderly or ill person who cannot eat a Passover offering,

and

that he would feed it

to those not registered for it,

and the Passover offering may be eaten only by those registered for it, or he slaughtered it with the thought that he would feed it

to the uncircumcised and to the impure—

he is liable

for a sin-offering. For Shabbat was not permitted to be overridden for this invalid slaughter, and he is not one who errs regarding a mitzva.

c. But if he slaughtered it on Shabbat with the thought that he would feed it both

to those fit to eat it and

both

to those unfit to eat it,

or that he would feed it both

to those registered for it and

both

to those not registered for it,

or

to the circumcised and to the uncircumcised,

or

to the impure and to the pure—

he is exempt.

For a Passover offering slaughtered with such an intention is valid.

d.

He slaughtered it

on Shabbat

and it was found to have a blemish,

and it became clear that he had not performed a mitzva through the slaughter, this is one who inadvertently desecrated Shabbat, and he

is liable

for an offering. And he is not called coerced, because he should have inspected the offering and seen whether it had a blemish.

e.

He slaughtered it and it was found to be an animal with a fatal defect in

a place

hidden,

so that he could not inspect it and ascertain this before the slaughter—

he is exempt

from an offering, for he is coerced, since there was no possibility of knowing that the offering was an animal with a fatal defect.

f.

He slaughtered it and it became known that the owners had withdrawn their designation from it

before the slaughter,

or they had died

its owners,

or had become impure,

then, although at the time of the slaughter Shabbat was not permitted to be overridden, nevertheless

he is exempt

from an offering,

because he slaughtered with permission,

as it had been permitted for him to slaughter, and concerning his lack of knowledge he is coerced, since he was not required to check whether the owners had withdrawn from it, or had died, or had become impure.