Pesachim 71b (עא:) — the Talmud in English

It taught

the verse

about the festival offering of the fourteenth, which is eaten for two days and one night.

That is, the morning mentioned here is the morning of the sixteenth, and from here we learn that the festival offering of the fourteenth is eaten for two days and one night.

Or perhaps

the verse does not refer to the morning of the sixteenth, but rather to the morning of the fifteenth.

And it means that the festival offering of the fourteenth is eaten

only for one day

and

one night

following it, and on the morning of the fifteenth it has already become disqualified through overnight retention.

This cannot be said.

For

when it says [Deuteronomy 16]

“on the first day,”

it indicates that it is eaten also on the first Festival day.

From this we learn that it does not become disqualified through overnight retention on the first morning following the fourteenth, but only on the following morning—

the second morning is stated

in the verse.

The tanna then returns and considers the matter:

Or perhaps

the festival offering is eaten

only

until the

first morning [and the Gemara will explain how he returns to consider this possibility after having demonstrated that it cannot be considered so]?

And how,

then,

do I establish

what we learn from another verse: that there is a

festival offering eaten for two days and one night?

By saying that this rule—that a festival offering is eaten for two days and one night—applies to all festival offerings

except for

the festival offering

this,

which is brought on the fourteenth, before the Festival, and alone is eaten for one day and one night.

This cannot be said. For

when it says [Leviticus 7], in the passage concerning the eating of a peace-offering brought as a vow or a freewill offering, which is eaten for two days and one night:

“If it is a vow or a freewill offering

of sacrifice, it shall be eaten on the day of his sacrifice, and on the next day”—the verse contains the redundant word “if” [for the verse could have said, “a vow or a freewill offering,” and it added the word “if”].

From the redundancy of the word “if” in the verse, we learn with regard to obligatory peace-offerings that they too are eaten like a freewill peace-offering, for two days and one night.

It taught [as will be explained below how it taught this]

about the festival offering of the fourteenth, which

is

eaten for two days and one night.

Rava now first explains the words of the beraita, and afterward will explain Rav Yosef’s objection to Rav Kahana from this beraita. It proves that with regard to the disqualification of the meat, “the morning” means the first morning, even when “first” is not written adjacent to it; this presents a difficulty for Rav Kahana, who had to derive from the juxtaposition of “first” and “morning” that it means the first morning:

The Master said

in the beraita:

“Or perhaps it means the first morning.”

Rava wondered: How could the tanna have entertained the possibility that it becomes disqualified on the first morning? After all,

you said: When it says

that the meat is eaten

“on the first day”

of the Festival—

it follows

that the morning written after “the first day”

must mean the second morning

here!

Rava explains that the tanna necessarily meant as follows:

This is what he is saying

:

Or perhaps

the meat of the festival offering of the Passover is not eaten for two days and one night [as I said and demonstrated from the phrase “on the first day” in the verse, whose meaning is that the meat of the festival offering of the fourteenth is eaten also on the first Festival day], but is eaten only for one day and one night.

And what the verse says, “on the first day,” has a different meaning: it does not refer to the festival offering of the fourteenth, indicating that it is eaten also on the first Festival day of Passover. Rather, it concerns the festival offering of the fifteenth, which is sacrificed on the first day of the Passover Festival.

Rather, this verse speaks of two festival offerings,

this

verse:

the

one, the festival offering of the fourteenth, and

the

other, the festival offering of the fifteenth.

And “the morning” mentioned in the verse refers not only to the festival offering of the fourteenth, but also to the festival offering of the fifteenth.

And the verse says as follows:

a. None of the meat that you slaughter on the eve of the Festival—that is, the meat of the festival offering of the fourteenth—shall remain overnight until morning.

b. None of the meat that you slaughter on the first day—that is, the meat of the festival offering of the fifteenth, which is sacrificed on the first day of the Passover Festival—shall remain overnight until morning.

For the unqualified use of “overnight retention” indicates the first morning.

This one until its morning, and that one until its morning.

With regard to the festival offering of the fourteenth, this morning is the morning of the fifteenth; and with regard to the festival offering of the fifteenth, this morning is the morning of the sixteenth.

Then

the tanna returns and

says

that this cannot be said: For if we equate the laws of the two offerings and say that neither may be eaten beyond one day and one night, the following difficulty arises:

But it is established for us

that there is a

festival offering eaten for two days and one night,

and we learn this from the redundancy of the word “if” in the verse, “If it is a vow or a freewill offering.”

If so,

the verse

“If it is a vow or a freewill offering,”

from which we learn that there is a festival offering eaten for two days and one night—

where

shall we establish it?

If

it is

the festival offering of the fourteenth—

it is written with regard to it

that it is eaten for

one day and one night

only.

If

it is

the festival offering of the fifteenth—

it is written with regard to it

that it is eaten for

one day and one night

only.

For we derived from the verse, “None of the meat that you slaughter on the eve, on the first day, shall remain overnight until morning,” that both offerings become disqualified on the first morning after the day on which they were brought.

Rather,

necessarily, even if we establish

this

verse, “If it is a vow,” which indicates that there is a festival offering eaten for two days and one night,

with regard to the festival offering of the fifteenth [since it is not brought together with the Passover offering, and we have no reason to apply to it the stringency of the Passover offering, which becomes disqualified on the first morning], it nevertheless follows that the festival offering of the fourteenth is also eaten for two days and one night.

For after we establish the verse, “If it is a vow,” with regard to the festival offering of the fourteenth, there remains

the entire verse: “None of the meat that you slaughter on the eve, on the first day, shall remain overnight until morning”—

with regard to the festival offering of the fourteenth.

And

it taught about the festival offering of the fourteenth, which is eaten for two days and one night.

For this verse says “on the first day,” and we learn from it that the festival offering of the fourteenth is eaten also on the fifteenth, which is the first day of the Passover Festival. Therefore, we are compelled to say that the morning written there, at which the offering becomes disqualified through overnight retention, is the “second morning,” the one following it.

Now, after Rava has explained the beraita, he explains his objection to Rav Kahana based on it:

This verse concerns meat, and not the sacrificial portions, whose law is more stringent than that of the meat.

Rava infers:

The reason

that we learned that the meat is eaten for two days and one night, and established that the morning at which the meat becomes disqualified through overnight retention is the second morning and not the first, is only

because it is written

“on the first day”

as an addition

to “morning,”

and from this we learned

what

“morning”

means: the second morning.

But wherever it is written

“morning”

without qualification,

without the addition of “the first day”—it means

the first morning,

itself!

And although “first”

is not written with it,

it is nevertheless the first morning.

And this is my objection to Rav Kahana, who derived that the sacrificial portions of the festival offering of the fifteenth become disqualified on the first morning [of the sixteenth] from the juxtaposition of “first.” There is no need for this derivation, since the disqualification of the sacrificial portions is more stringent than the disqualification of the meat. If the unqualified “morning” stated with regard to the meat means the first morning, all the more so the unqualified “morning” stated with regard to the sacrificial portions means the first morning.

Mishna:

a. The

Passover offering that one slaughtered

on Shabbat inadvertently, with the intention

not for its own sake,

for example, he slaughtered it for the sake of a burnt-offering, because he mistakenly thought that it was permitted to slaughter a Passover offering for the sake of another offering; since he did so

on Shabbat—

he is liable

for a

sin-offering,

because through its slaughter he desecrated Shabbat, since a Passover offering slaughtered for the sake of another offering is disqualified and unfit to be sacrificed.

And

if

all other offerings that one slaughtered

inadvertently on the eve of Passover that occurred on Shabbat

for the sake of the Passover offering,

for example, he thought that it was permitted to slaughter them for the sake of the Passover offering, or he forgot that it was Shabbat and thought that the day was an ordinary weekday—the matter depends on the law of one who “errs with regard to a mitzva.”

Therefore:

If

those offerings

are not fit

to be sacrificed as a Passover offering—for example, they were female animals, which are unfit to be sacrificed as a Passover offering [or they were a calf or a two-year-old ram]—there is no dispute that this person is not considered one who “errs with regard to a mitzva,” since everyone knows that they are unfit to be sacrificed as a Passover offering. Therefore, he is

liable

for a sin-offering

for

slaughtering them on Shabbat.

But if they are fit

for a Passover offering—for example, it was an unblemished one-year-old sheep designated as a peace-offering, and he mistakenly slaughtered it for the sake of the Passover offering because he was preoccupied with slaughtering his Passover offering on the weekday—he is considered one who “errs with regard to a mitzva and performs a mitzva,” since offerings slaughtered for the sake of the Passover offering are valid, and it follows that he performed at least some mitzva through the slaughter of his offering.

The tannaim disagreed whether one who errs with regard to a mitzva and performs a mitzva is liable for a sin-offering when, while performing the mitzva, he performed an act that would ordinarily make him liable for a sin-offering:

Rabbi Eliezer obligates him to bring a sin-offering,

even though he erred with regard to a mitzva, thinking that these offerings were Passover offerings and wishing to fulfill the mitzva of the Passover offering through them.

And Rabbi Yehoshua exempts him,

because he is one who errs with regard to a mitzva.

For even if he did not fulfill the mitzva of the Passover offering, and his offerings did not fulfill his obligation, he nevertheless performed at least some mitzva by offering an offering.

Rabbi Eliezer said to him,

to Rabbi Yehoshua: The matter follows by means of a kal va-chomer:

If

the

Passover offering, which is permitted

to slaughter

for its own sake

on Shabbat, nevertheless

when one changed its designation

and slaughtered it on Shabbat for the sake of another offering, which is prohibited to slaughter on Shabbat—even according to your view, he is

liable

for a sin-offering.

Other offerings,

which are not Passover offerings,

which are prohibited

to slaughter on Shabbat

even

when one slaughters them

for their own sake—

when one changed their designation,

and slaughtered them for the sake of the Passover offering on Shabbat—

is it not logical that he should be liable

for a sin-offering for them, since it was altogether prohibited for him to slaughter them?

Rabbi Yehoshua said to him,

to Rabbi Eliezer:

No,

you cannot reason by this kal va-chomer.

For

if you say with regard to the Passover offering,

that one slaughtered on Shabbat for the sake of another offering, it is indeed proper that he be liable for a sin-offering, since

he changed it

on Shabbat by slaughtering it

for something [for the sake of an offering] that is

prohibited

to slaughter on Shabbat; and since his intention was directed toward something prohibited, he is liable for a sin-offering.

Can you say this with regard to other offerings,

which

he changed

by slaughtering them on Shabbat

for something permitted,

as he intended to slaughter them for the sake of a Passover offering, in which case he should be exempt under the law of one who errs with regard to a mitzva and performs a mitzva?

Rabbi Eliezer said to him,

to Rabbi Yehoshua:

The sacrificial portions of

[communal offerings]

communal offerings prove the point: They are permitted

to slaughter on Shabbat

for their own sake, and

nevertheless

one who slaughters

other offerings

for their sake,

for the sake of communal offerings, such as for the sake of the daily offering or the additional offering,

is liable

for a sin-offering.

And despite the fact that the slaughterer erred with regard to a mitzva and performed a mitzva, he is liable for a sin-offering.

Rabbi Yehoshua said to him: No.

This is not proof of your contention.

For

if you say with regard to the sacrificial portions of communal offerings,

that one who slaughters other offerings for the sake of communal offerings is not exempt under the category of one who errs with regard to a mitzva, this is because

they have

the communal offerings

a fixed quota.

For many people do not engage in slaughtering them, and once the daily offering or the additional offering has been slaughtered, there is no further need to slaughter it. Therefore, he should not have erred and slaughtered an offering for the sake of a communal offering. Consequently, if he did so, he is merely one who acted inadvertently, and is liable for a sin-offering, rather than one who errs with regard to a mitzva, who is exempt from a sin-offering.

Can you say this with regard to

one who slaughters other offerings for the sake of the

Passover offering, which has no fixed quota?

Rather, everyone engages in slaughtering it. Therefore, if he erred and slaughtered another offering for the sake of the Passover offering, he is one who errs with regard to a mitzva, since he did so because he saw many other people engaged in slaughtering their Passover offerings for the sake of the Passover offering.

And even if he had already sacrificed his own Passover offering, there is still room for him to err if he found an offering standing in the Temple courtyard and slaughtered it for the sake of its owner, because he thought that it was a Passover offering, and it turned out not to be a Passover offering. He is properly called one who errs with regard to a mitzva, because when he saw everyone slaughtering Passover offerings, he assumed that this offering too was a Passover offering, and therefore he erred with regard to it.

Rabbi Meir says: Even one who slaughters

private offerings throughout all the Shabbatot of the year

for the sake of the sacrificial portions of communal offerings

is one who errs with regard to a mitzva and performs a mitzva, and he is

exempt

from a sin-offering.

b.

If one slaughtered

the Passover offering on Shabbat inadvertently [because he forgot that it was Shabbat, or forgot the halakha], with the intention of feeding the offering

to those unfit to eat it,

such as an elderly or ill person who cannot eat a Passover offering,

and

of feeding it

to those not registered for it,

whereas the Passover offering may be eaten only by those registered for it, or he slaughtered it with the intention of feeding it

to uncircumcised and impure people—

he is liable

for a sin-offering, because Shabbat was not set aside for this invalid slaughter, and he is not one who errs with regard to a mitzva.

c. But if he slaughtered it on Shabbat with the intention of feeding it both

to those fit to eat it and

those

unfit to eat it, or of feeding it both

to those registered

for it and

those

not registered for it, or

of feeding it

to the circumcised and the uncircumcised, or

to

the impure and the pure—

he is exempt.

For a Passover offering slaughtered with such an intention is valid.

d.

If one slaughtered it

on Shabbat

and it was found to have a blemish,

and it became clear that he had not performed a mitzva through the slaughter, he inadvertently desecrated Shabbat, and

he is liable

for a sin-offering. He is not considered coerced, because he should have inspected the offering to determine whether it had a blemish.

e.

If one slaughtered it and it was found to be an animal with a fatal defect in

a

concealed place,

which he could not have inspected and discovered before the slaughter—

he is exempt

from a sin-offering, since he was coerced, as there was no way to know that the offering had a fatal defect.

f.

If one slaughtered it and it became known that its owners had withdrawn

from it before the slaughter,

or had died,

its owners,

or had become impure,

then although at the time of the slaughter Shabbat was not to be set aside, nevertheless

he is exempt

from a sin-offering,

because he slaughtered with permission

—he was permitted to slaughter it, and with regard to his lack of knowledge he is considered coerced, since he was not required to check whether the owners had withdrawn from it, had died, or had become impure.