Pesachim 6a (ו.) — the Talmud in English

This is necessary

for the verse

“there shall not be found”

to include leaven for which he has assumed liability, since in essence it is not considered his property.

But according to the one who says

“an item that causes a monetary liability

is considered property,” “there shall not be found”

why do I need it?

After all, liability for the leaven rests upon him, and therefore it is considered his property for all the laws of the Torah; it is obvious that he violates the prohibition concerning it on Passover.

And we answer:

It is necessary

to have the verse “there shall not be found,” because

it might enter your mind

that Rabbi Shimon said that an item that causes a monetary liability is considered property only when the item is no longer extant—for example, when a consecrated animal is stolen from the owner’s house. It is considered his property because it actually causes him to become liable to pay money. But here, in the case of a deposit,

since when it exists

as long as it is present in the world and has not been lost,

it returns to its original state,

as the custodian returns it to the owner as it is, and at present it causes the owner no monetary liability,

it is not in his possession;

it is not considered his property such that he would violate “there shall not be found” concerning it.

This teaches us

that the verse “there shall not be found” teaches that nevertheless he violates the prohibition concerning it, since if it were stolen or lost, he would become liable to pay for it.

Partnership with a gentile in an animal belonging to a Jew completely exempts the animal from the obligation of the firstborn, as it is stated: “For every firstborn among the Children of Israel is Mine.” This implies that the law of the firstborn was stated only with regard to Jews, and not with regard to others.

They asked Rava: An animal of arnona,

that is, a person who owns a herd of animals and is obligated to give one-tenth of it as a tax to a gentile king—does it

have the firstborn obligation,

so that he must give the firstborn animals from that herd to a koen, without taking into consideration the obligation to give the gentile king his tenth, which rests upon the herd?

Or

perhaps

it does not have the firstborn obligation,

because as long as the king’s portion has not been separated, it is considered as though he has a partnership share in the entire herd?

And we explain:

Whenever

the Jew

can remove

him,

meaning that they can pay the king the arnona

with money,

in cash rather than with animals,

there is no question for us that it has the firstborn obligation.

For this is not considered a partnership of the king in the herd, since the Jew can give him no animal from the herd at all, but rather money.

The question arises only where he cannot

the Jew

remove him

from the king

with money,

but is specifically obligated to give him animals.

What is the law?

Rava said to them:

Since he cannot remove him with money, the king is considered a partner in the herd, and therefore it is

exempt

from the firstborn obligation.

And we challenge this:

But was it not taught

that an animal of arnona

has

the firstborn obligation? And we answer:

There,

the case is one in which

he can

the Jew

remove him

with money, in which case, as stated, the king is certainly not considered a partner in the herd.

There are those who say: Rava said: An animal subject to an arnona obligation is exempt from the בכורה, even though he can remove him

with money, since as long as he has not removed him, it is considered as though he has a partnership in the herd. But

an arnona dough

[which the king takes a portion of]

is obligated in challa.

And even though he cannot

the Israelite

remove him

from the king with money.

This is so even though dough belonging to a gentile is exempt from challa, and an Israelite may eat from it without separating challa. For it is stated concerning challa, “your kneading bowls”—specifically, yours, and not those of a gentile. [Likewise, with dough jointly owned with a gentile, if the Israelite’s share alone is not large enough to constitute the required measure for challa, it is exempt from challa. But arnona dough is obligated in challa even in such a case].

And we pondered this:

What is the reason?

Why does the law differ for dough from the law for an animal?

And we answered: According to Torah law, both are exempt. But

in the case of an animal, it has publicity

that it is subject to an arnona obligation, and there is no concern that people will suspect him of failing to observe sanctity with regard to his firstborn animals. Therefore, the Sages did not enact a decree concerning it. But

in the case of dough, it has no publicity

that it is subject to an arnona obligation, and therefore the Sages required that challa be separated from it. For someone who sees him eating from it without separating challa does not know that it is arnona dough; rather, he thinks that it is entirely his, and nevertheless he is not separating challa from it.

And the beraita that states, “Arnona is obligated,” likewise refers to dough that is obligated in challa, and not to an animal.

The Sages taught: If a gentile entered

during Pesach

the courtyard of an Israelite, with his dough

[his hametz]

in his hand, there is no

obligation upon the Israelite

to remove it.

That is, the Israelite is not required to remove the gentile from his house, for we said: “But you may see the hametz of others.”

But if

he deposited it

the hametz

with him,

even though he did not explicitly accept responsibility for it, but merely accepted it into his domain without qualification, it is as though he accepted responsibility for the hametz, and

he is required to remove it

.

And if

he designated for him

for the gentile his

house,

saying to him, “Here, my house is before you; place the hametz wherever you wish,” this wording does not constitute acceptance of responsibility. Rather, it is as though he said to him, “Bring the hametz into your domain.” Therefore,

the

Israelite

is not required to remove

this hametz, because

it is stated:

“It shall not be found.”

And we pondered this:

What is he saying?

How do we derive from “It shall not be found” that this case is permitted?

And we answered:

Rav Pappa said:

The exposition of “It shall not be found”

refers to the beginning

of the beraita

and applies.

And this is what it is saying:

If

he deposited it

the gentile’s hametz

with him, he is required to remove it.

As it is stated:

“It shall not be found,”

from which we learn that hametz belonging to a gentile for which the Israelite accepted responsibility must be removed.

Rav Ashi said: Actually, it refers to the latter part

of the beraita

and applies.

And this is what it is saying: If he designated a house for him, he is not required to remove it, as it is stated:

“It shall not be found in your houses.”

This implies that the reference is specifically to hametz that is available to you for all your needs—that is, that belongs to you. Acceptance of responsibility for an item also makes it like one’s own.

And

this,

this hametz for which he designated his house for the gentile,

is not his,

and there is no acceptance of responsibility on the part of the Israelite, for

when the gentile brings it in,

when he brings in the hametz,

he is bringing it into his own house!

He is bringing it into his own house. As stated, it is as though the Israelite said to him: Bring your hametz into your own domain. Certainly this does not constitute acceptance of responsibility.

And we objected: If so, we must say that the gentile is considered the owner of the place designated for him, because it is rented to him, and not to the Israelite. [For if the Israelite is considered the owner of the place, it is as though he said to the gentile, “Bring the hametz into my domain,” which, as stated, constitutes acceptance of responsibility for the hametz].

And this is difficult: Do you intend

to say that renting effects acquisition,

and that the renter is considered the owner?

But we learned

in tractate Avoda Zara [20b]: One may not rent houses to gentiles in Eretz Yisrael [as a preventive measure lest one come to sell them, which is prohibited by Torah law because of “You shall not show them favor,” which the Sages expounded: “You shall not give them a resting place in the land”]. But outside Eretz Yisrael it is permitted to rent houses to them. And

even in a place where they said

that it is permitted

to rent

to them,

they did not say that this applies to a dwelling house,

in which the gentile will live,

because

gentiles

bring idols into it,

and the Israelite thereby transgresses, “You shall not bring an abomination into your house.” Rather, one may rent to them a house only for the purpose of housing animals or storing wood.

And if it enters your mind that renting effects acquisition,

and the renter is considered the owner of the house, then what difference does it make to us that the gentile renter brings an idol into this house? After all,

when he brings it in,

the idol

he is bringing it into his own house,

and the Israelite is not transgressing, “You shall not bring an abomination into your house,” since this is not his house!?

Rather, it is necessarily the case that renting does not effect acquisition. If so, what benefit is there in the Israelite designating and renting a place in his house for the gentile? It is still considered the Israelite’s house, and the hametz placed there is his responsibility.

And we answered: Actually, renting does not effect acquisition, and the house is still considered the owner’s house. Therefore, he may not cause an idol to be brought into it.

But

here it is different,

with regard to hametz,

for the Merciful One removed

it from its prohibition

through the expression

“It shall not be found,”

to teach you that only such hametz

that is available to you

is subject to the prohibition.

Excluded

is this

hametz, which is not available to you.

For the corner in which the hametz is placed has been placed at the gentile’s disposal. Therefore, the Israelite does not transgress for possessing it [see the note ].

Rav Yehuda said that Rav said: One who finds hametz in his house on a Festival day

of Pesach—

covers it

with a vessel.

For he cannot remove it from his house, since the hametz is muktze on a Festival day and is prohibited.

through handling. Nevertheless, he does not violate the prohibition of “it shall not be seen,” since he already nullified it the previous day, [as they say below on page 6b, that one who searches must also nullify the leaven in his heart], and he therefore no longer violates the prohibition on a Torah level. Rather, so that he will not forget and eat it, the Sages required him to cover it with a utensil.

Rava said: If

the leaven

belongs to the Temple treasury,

even covering it with a utensil

is unnecessary.

And we raised a difficulty concerning this:

What is the reason

that we are not concerned that he might forget and eat it, as with all leaven? And we answered: Since, in any event,

people keep away

from

it

throughout the entire year, because there is a prohibition of misuse of consecrated property involving it, there is no concern that he will come to eat it on Passover.

And Rav Yehuda said in the name of Rav: The leaven of a gentile

that is found in a Jew’s house as a deposit [for which he has not accepted responsibility, and which he is permitted to leave in his possession is

he makes for it

on the eve of Passover

a partition

of

ten

handbreadths around it,

as a reminder

so that he will not forget and come to eat it. It is not sufficient to cover it with a utensil for the entire Passover, lest he remove the utensil when he needs it. Only above, when he found leaven on the Festival itself, is covering it with a utensil sufficient, since he has no possibility of making a partition on the Festival. Moreover, the utensil is needed only until the conclusion of the Festival, at which point he removes it.

And if it belongs to the Temple treasury, he need not

make a partition of ten handbreadths.

What is the reason? —

Because

people keep away from it,

and they will not come to eat it.

And Rav Yehuda said in the name of Rav: One who sets sail

[from the mainland to the sea]

and one who departs with a caravan

to a distant place—if he departed

before thirty days

before Passover,

he

does not

need to remove

the leaven in his house before his departure.

But if he set out on his journey

within thirty days

before Passover, he

needs to remove it.

Since the laws of Passover are expounded and studied thirty days before Passover, from that time the obligation falls upon him to take care of the needs of Passover, and he may not leave his house until he removes the leaven from it.

Abaye said: That which you said

that

within thirty days he needs to remove it, we said

this

only

when

he intends to return

to his house during the days of Passover, in which case he will violate “it shall not be seen.”

But

if

he does not intend to return

during the days of Passover,

he

does not

need to remove it

even within thirty days.

Rava said to him: But

if

he intends to return

during the days of Passover, why is it specifically when he departs within thirty days that he needs to remove it? Surely

even

if he departs

from Rosh HaShana, as well,

he needs to remove it. For when he returns home on Passover and finds leaven there, he will immediately violate “it shall not be seen” when he sees it. And by then he will no longer be able to nullify it, since leaven cannot be nullified after the time of its prohibition, because it is forbidden to derive benefit from it and is considered not to be his, as explained below [on page 6b].

Rather, Rava said: That which you said

that

before thirty days he does not need to remove it, they said

this

only

when

he does not intend to return

during the days of Passover.

But

if

he intends to return

on Passover,

even

if he departs

from Rosh HaShana,

as well, he

needs to remove

the leaven, so that he will not violate the prohibition when he returns home and sees it.

And Rava follows his own reasoning.

For Rava said: One who makes

his

house a storehouse

for grain, while leaven is found beneath the grain—if he made it a storehouse

before thirty days

before Passover,

he

does not

need to remove

the leaven before making the storehouse over it. For before thirty days, the obligation to remove it has not yet taken effect. When the time of obligation arrives, it is considered removed, in accordance with the law of leaven buried under a landslide, which the Mishna below [31b] states is considered removed from the world.

But if he made it a storehouse

within thirty days

before Passover, he

needs to remove

the leaven from it before making the storehouse. Although in any event it will ultimately be removed by the storehouse, this is nevertheless not removal in the proper initial manner. Since it is within thirty days, when the obligation to remove it has already taken effect, he must perform removal in the proper initial manner.

And before thirty

days,

we likewise said

that he does not need to remove it

only

when

he does not intend to clear away

the storehouse of grain during the days of Passover.

But

if

he intends to clear it away

on Passover,

even

if he made it a storehouse

before thirty days

before Passover,

he likewise needs to remove it.

For as soon as he clears away the storehouse, the leaven will no longer be considered removed, and he will violate the prohibition concerning it.

And this is analogous to what Rava said above concerning one who sets sail or departs with a caravan: if he intends to return during the days of Passover, he is obligated to remove the leaven even before thirty days, so that he will not violate the prohibition on Passover when he returns home.

And we raised a difficulty:

What is the function of these thirty days?

Why specifically from this time does the obligation to remove leaven take effect?

And we answered: The reason is that from then onward, the laws of Passover are sought and studied.

As it was taught in a beraita: One seeks and expounds the laws of Passover thirty days before Passover.

Rabbi Shimon ben Gamliel says: Two weeks

before Passover one seeks and expounds its laws.

And we raised a difficulty:

What is the reason of the first tanna

who says that the time for seeking and expounding the laws of Passover is thirty days before Passover?