Pesachim 6a — the Talmud in English

This is necessary

the verse of

“it shall not be found”

to include leaven for which he bears responsibility, for in essence it is not considered his property.

But according to the one who says “

a thing that causes monetary liability

is considered property,” “it shall not be found”

why do I need it?

After all, the responsibility for the leaven rests upon him, and therefore it is like his property for all the laws of the Torah; and obviously he transgresses concerning it on Passover?

And we answer:

it is necessary

the verse “it shall not be found,” because

it might enter your mind to say

Rabbi Shimon said that a thing that causes monetary liability is considered property only when the thing is no longer present, as, for example, a sacrificial animal that was stolen from the owners’ house, which is considered his property since it in practice causes him to become liable for money. But here, in the case of a deposit,

since when it exists

as long as it is present in the world and has not been lost,

it returns to its state before him

the guardian returns it to the owner as it is, and now it causes him no monetary liability,

it does not stand in his domain

it is not like his property, so that he would transgress concerning it by “it shall not be found.”

This teaches us

the verse “it shall not be found”: nevertheless, he transgresses concerning it, since if it were stolen or lost, he would become liable for money concerning it.

A gentile’s partnership in a Jew’s animal exempts it entirely from the obligation of the firstborn, as it is stated, “For every firstborn among the Children of Israel is Mine,” implying that the law of the firstborn was stated only with regard to a Jew, and not with regard to others. They asked Rava: An animal of arnona,

meaning, one who has a herd of animals and is obligated to give a tenth of it as a tax to a gentile king—does it

have an obligation of the firstborn,

so that he must give the firstborn animals from that herd to a priest, without taking into account the obligation to give the tithe to the gentile king imposed upon the herd?

Or

perhaps

it does not have an obligation of the firstborn,

because as long as the king’s portion has not been separated, it is considered as though he has a share of partnership in the entire herd?

And we explain:

wherever the Jew is able

to

remove him

[the king],

from it

by paying the arnona

with coins,

with money instead of the animals,

we have no question that it is liable

for the firstborn. For this is not considered that the king is a partner in the herd, since he can give him no animal at all from the herd, but only money.

Our question is where the Jew is unable

to

remove him

the king

with coins,

but is specifically obligated to give him animals,

what

did Rava say to them: Since he cannot remove him with coins, the king is considered a partner in the herd, and therefore it is

exempt

from the firstborn.

And we raise an objection:

but was it not taught: An animal of arnona

is liable

for the firstborn? And we answer:

there,

it is speaking of a case

where the Jew is able

to

remove him

with coins; in that case, as stated, the king is certainly not considered a partner in the herd.

remove him

with money, in which case, as stated, the king is certainly not considered a partner in the herd.

There are those who say: Rava said: An animal of arnona is exempt from the firstborn offering, even though he can remove him

with money, for as long as he has not removed him, it is considered as though he has a partnership in the herd. But

the dough of arnona

[which the king takes a share of]

is obligated in challa.

And even though he cannot

the Israelite

remove him

from the king with money.

This is so even though the dough of a gentile is exempt from challa, and the Israelite may eat from it without separating challa. For concerning challa it is stated, “your kneading bowls”—specifically yours, and not that of a gentile. [And likewise, with dough jointly owned with a gentile, if the Israelite’s share alone is not sufficient for the measure of challa, it is exempt from challa. Yet the dough of arnona is obligated in challa even in such a case].

And we were occupied with it:

What is the reason?

What is the reason that the law differs with dough from the law with an animal?

And we answer: By Torah law, both of them are exempt. However,

an animal has publicity

that there is arnona upon it, and there is no concern that people will suspect him on account of his not conducting sanctity with his firstborn animals. Therefore, the Sages did not decree concerning it. But

dough has no publicity

that there is arnona in it, and therefore the Sages obligated him to separate challa from it. For one who sees him eating from it without separating challa does not know that it is dough of arnona; rather, he thinks that it is entirely his, and nevertheless he does not separate challa from it.

And the beraita in which it was stated, “arnona is obligated,” is also speaking of dough that is obligated in challa, and not of an animal.

The Sages taught: A gentile who entered

on Pesach

the courtyard of an Israelite, with his dough

[his hametz]

in his hand, there is no

the Israelite

obligation to remove it.

That is, the Israelite is not obligated to remove the gentile from his house, for we said, “But you may see that of others.”

But if

he deposited it

the gentile deposited the hametz

with him,

even though he did not explicitly accept responsibility for it, but merely accepted it into his domain without specification, it is as though he accepted responsibility for the hametz, and

has an obligation to remove it

.

And if

he designated for him

for the gentile

his

house, saying to him, “Here is my house before you; put the hametz wherever you wish,” this language does not constitute acceptance of responsibility; rather, it is as though he said to him, “Bring the hametz into your domain.” And therefore

there is no

Israelite

obligation to remove

this hametz. Because

it is stated,

“It shall not be found.”

And we were occupied with it:

What is he saying?

How do we learn from “It shall not be found” to permit it in this manner?

And we answer:

Rav Pappa said:

The exposition of “It shall not be found”

stands on the first part

of the beraita

and applies.

And this is what it is saying:

If

he deposited it

the gentile deposited the hametz

with him, he has an obligation to remove it.

As it is stated,

“It shall not be found,”

from which we learned concerning the hametz of a gentile for which the Israelite accepted responsibility, that one is obligated to remove it.

Rav Ashi said: It always stands on the final part

of the beraita

and applies.

And this is what it is saying: If he designated a house for him, he has no obligation to remove it, as it is stated,

“It shall not be found in your houses.”

And it implies specifically hametz that is found in your hand for all your needs, meaning that it is his. And through accepting responsibility for the matter as well, it is like his.

And

this,

this hametz for which he designated his house for the gentile,

is not his,

there is no acceptance of responsibility for it on the part of the Israelite, for

when a gentile brings it in,

when he brings in the hametz,

he is bringing it into his own house!

He is bringing it into his own house. For as stated, it is as though the Israelite said to him, “Bring your hametz into your own domain.” Certainly this does not constitute acceptance of responsibility.

And we object: If so, it must be said that the gentile is considered the owner of the place designated for him, because it is rented to him, and not to the Israelite. [For if the Israelite is considered the owner of the place, it is as though he said to the gentile, “Bring the hametz into my domain,” which, as stated, constitutes acceptance of responsibility for the hametz].

And it is difficult: Is it your intention

to say that renting effects acquisition,

and the renter is considered the owner?

And did we not learn

in tractate Avodah Zarah [20b]: One may not rent houses to gentiles in the Land of Israel [as a preventive decree on account of sale, which is prohibited by Torah law because of “You shall not show them favor,” which the Sages expounded: “You shall not give them a resting place in the land”]. But outside the Land of Israel it is permitted to rent houses to them. And

even in a place where they said

that it is permitted

to rent

to them,

they did not say for a dwelling house,

in which the gentile would live,

because

the gentiles

bring idolatry into it,

and the Israelite transgresses, “You shall not bring an abomination into your house.” Rather, they rent a house to them only for the purpose of placing animals and wood.

And if it enters your mind that renting effects acquisition,

and the renter is considered the master of the house, if so, what does it matter to us that the gentile renter brings idolatry into this house? After all,

when he brings it in

the idolatry,

he is bringing it into his own house,

and the Israelite does not transgress, “You shall not bring an abomination into your house,” for this is not his house!?

Rather, necessarily, renting does not effect acquisition. If so, what benefit is there in the Israelite designating and renting a place to the gentile in his house? After all, it still is considered the Israelite’s house, and the hametz placed there is under his responsibility.

And we answer: Renting never effects acquisition, and the house is still considered the house of the renter. Therefore, it is forbidden for him to cause idolatry to be brought into it.

And

here it is different,

with hametz,

for the Merciful One excluded it

from its prohibition

in the language of

“It shall not be found,”

to tell you: only such hametz

that is found in your hand

does one transgress on account of.

Excluded

is

this hametz, which is not found in your hand.

For that corner in which the hametz is placed is given over to the gentile. Therefore, the Israelite does not transgress on account of it [see the note ].

Rav Judah said in the name of Rav: One who finds hametz in his house on the festival of Pesach— covers it with a vessel. For he cannot remove it from his house, because the hametz is muktzeh on the festival and is forbidden through handling. And nevertheless he does not violate it through “there shall not be seen,” since he already nullified it yesterday, [as they said below on page b, that one who searches must also nullify the chametz in his heart], and he again does not violate it by Torah law. Rather, so that he will not forget and eat it, they required him to place a vessel over it.

of Passover

covers it

with a vessel.

For he cannot remove it from his house, because leavened bread is muktzeh on a Festival day and is prohibited.

through handling. Nevertheless, he does not violate the prohibition of “it shall not be seen,” since he already nullified it the previous day, [as they say below on page 6b, that one who searches must also nullify the leaven in his heart], and he therefore no longer violates the prohibition on a Torah level. Rather, so that he will not forget and eat it, the Sages required him to cover it with a utensil.

Rava said: If

the chametz

is consecrated,

even placing a vessel over it

is not required.

And we raised a difficulty concerning it:

What is the reason

that we are not concerned regarding it that perhaps he will forget and eat it, as with all chametz? And we answer: Since in any event

people are separated

from it

from it

all year, because there is a prohibition of misuse of consecrated property upon it, there is therefore no concern that he will come to eat it on Passover.

And Rav Yehuda said in the name of Rav: The chametz of a gentile

that is found in a Jew’s house as a deposit [for which he did not accept responsibility, and it is permitted for him to leave it there is]

he makes for it

on the eve of Passover

a partition

of

ten

handbreadths around it,

as a reminder

so that he will not forget and come to eat it. It is not sufficient to place a vessel over it for the entire Passover, lest he take the vessel when he needs it. Only above, when he found chametz on the Festival itself, placing a vessel over it is sufficient, since he has no possibility of making a partition on the Festival. And the vessel is also only until the conclusion of the Festival, at which time he removes it.

And if it is consecrated, he does not need

to make a partition of ten handbreadths.

What is the reason? —

Because

people are separated from it,

and they will not come to eat it.

And Rav Yehuda said in the name of Rav: One who sets sail [

departs from the mainland to the sea],

and one who goes out in a caravan

to a distant place—if he departed

before thirty days

before Passover,

he is not

does not

required to remove

the chametz in the house before his departure.

But if he set out on his way

within thirty days

before Passover, he is

required to remove

it. Since they inquire into the laws of Passover thirty days before Passover, from then the obligation to take care concerning the needs of Passover takes effect upon him, and he is not permitted to leave his house until he removes the chametz from it.

Abaye said: That which you said

that

within thirty days he is required to remove it—we said

so

only

when

he intends to return

to his house during the days of Passover, in which case he will violate “there shall not be seen” concerning it.

But

if

he does not intend to return

during the days of Passover,

he is not

does not

required to remove

the chametz, even within thirty days.

Rava said to him: But

if

he intends to return

during the days of Passover, why specifically when one leaves within thirty days is he required to remove it? Surely

even

one who leaves

from Rosh Hashanah as well

is required to remove it. For when he returns to his house on Passover and finds chametz in it, he will violate it immediately when he sees it through “there shall not be seen.” And then he will no longer be able to nullify it, for it is impossible to nullify chametz after the time of its prohibition, since it is forbidden for benefit and considered as not his, as explained below [on page b].

Rather, Rava said: That which you said

that

before thirty days he is not required to remove it—we said

so

only

when

he does not intend to return

during the days of Passover.

But

if

he intends to return

on Passover,

even

if he leaves

from Rosh Hashanah,

also

he is required to remove

the chametz, so that he will not violate it when he returns to his house and sees it.

And Rava follows his own reasoning.

For Rava said: One who makes

from

his house a storehouse

of grain, and beneath the grain there is chametz—if he made it a storehouse

before thirty days

before Passover,

he is not

does not

required to remove

the chametz before making the storehouse over it. For before thirty days the obligation of removal has not yet taken effect upon him. And when the time of the obligation arrives, it is considered removed, like chametz upon which a collapse fell, which is explained in the Mishna below [31b] as considered removed from the world.

But if he made it a storehouse

within thirty days

before Passover, he is

required to remove

the chametz from it before making the storehouse. And although in any event it will ultimately be removed through the storehouse, nevertheless this is not removal in the first place. And since it is within thirty days, when the obligation of removal has already taken effect, he must perform removal in the first place.

And before thirty

days

we also said nothing

that he is not required to remove it,

except

when

he does not intend to clear it

the storehouse of the grain during the days of Passover.

But

if

he intends to clear it

on Passover,

even

if he made it a storehouse

before thirty days

before Passover,

he is also required to remove it.

For immediately when he clears the storehouse, the chametz will no longer be considered removed, and he will violate it.

And this is as Rava said above concerning one who sets sail and one who goes out in a caravan: if he intends to return during the days of Passover, he is obligated to remove the chametz even before thirty days, so that he will not violate it on Passover when he returns to his house.

And we raised a difficulty concerning it:

These thirty days—what is their function?

Why specifically from this time does the obligation of removing the chametz take effect?

And we answer: The reason for this is that from then they inquire into the laws of Passover.

As it was taught: One inquires and expounds the laws of Passover before Passover, thirty days.

И Гемара задает вопрос: какова причина мнения первого танная

Rabbi Shimon ben Gamaliel says: Two weeks

before Passover one inquires and expounds its laws.

And we raised a difficulty concerning it:

What is the reason of the first tanna

that the time for inquiring and expounding the laws of Passover is from thirty days before Passover?