Pesachim 5b — the Talmud in English

This proves from the teaching of Rabbi Akiva,

who proves that “on the first day” means the eve of the festival from the fact that kindling is forbidden on the festival

—three,

three matters:

a.

This proves: the removal of leaven is only by burning,

and this is like the view of Rabbi Judah below [21a], who derived it from notar. For if Rabbi Akiva held like the Rabbis, that it is possible to remove leaven in any manner, then it would also be possible to remove it on the festival itself in a permitted manner, for example, by throwing it into the sea or

feeding it to dogs, and what is the proof that “on the first day” means the eve of Passover ? b.

And this proves: “kindling was singled out.”

The Sages of the Mishnaic period disagreed concerning the meaning of the verse, “You shall not kindle a fire in any of your dwelling places on the day of Shabbat.” Since kindling a fire is a primary category of labor, and the Torah had already stated, “You shall not perform any labor,” why did the Torah need to repeat the prohibition against kindling a fire separately?

The tannaim disagreed concerning what is stated: “You shall not kindle fire in all your dwelling places on the day of Shabbat.” For kindling is a primary labor, and the Torah already said, “You shall not perform any labor”; why then did the Torah need to repeat and write the prohibition of kindling separately?

Rabbi Yosei holds: kindling was singled out for a prohibition. That is, the Torah separated kindling from all the other labors to say that there is no liability of stoning for it, as there is for the other labors, but only the punishment of lashes for transgressing a mere negative prohibition.

And Rabbi Natan holds: kindling was singled out to divide. Lest you say that a person who unknowingly performed several primary labors on Shabbat in one state of unawareness [in one forgetfulness] is liable only for one sin-offering, since concerning all the labors only one negative prohibition and one liability of excision were stated, the verse therefore came and specified a separate negative prohibition for the labor of kindling, to teach concerning all the labors: Just as kindling is divided from the other labors and one is liable for a separate sin-offering for it, so all the primary labors are divided from one another, and one is liable for a sin-offering for each primary labor separately.

And from the fact that Rabbi Akiva calls kindling “a primary labor,” it is proven that he holds like Rabbi Natan, and not like Rabbi Yosei, who holds that kindling is not a primary labor, but only a mere negative prohibition. c.

And this proves: We do not say, since kindling was permitted

on the festival

for the sake of

food for a person,

it was also permitted when not for the sake of

food for a person.

The matter is the subject of a disagreement between Beit Shammai and Beit Hillel in tractate Beitza [12a]. According to Beit Shammai, we do not say “since,” and only labor for food for a person is permitted on the festival. Beit Hillel hold that all labors relevant to food for a person [such as kindling, carrying out, slaughtering, baking, and cooking] were entirely permitted on the festival, even when not for the sake of food for a person, because since they were permitted for the sake of food, they were also permitted when not for the sake of food.

And since Rabbi Akiva holds that burning leaven is forbidden on the festival, it is proven that he holds like Beit Shammai. For according to Beit Hillel it is permitted to burn leaven on the festival, although this does not serve the need of food for a person.

The Sages taught:

Concerning that which the verse says [Exodus 12:19

], “For seven days leaven shall not be found in your houses,” what does it come to teach?

Is it not already stated [there 13:7]

Because, if it had been

“No leaven shall be seen for you, and no leavening shall be seen for you, in all your borders,”

and houses are also included in “your borders”? If so, why was “shall not be found in your houses” written again?

Because, if

it had been

said

only

“No leavening shall be seen for you,”

I would say: Just as we expound from the fact that “for you” is stated that only leaven

belonging to you may you not see, but you may see

leaven

belonging to others,

that is, it is permitted for an Israelite to keep an alien’s leaven in his house,

and belonging to the Most High,

leaven that one dedicated for the maintenance of the Temple, which you may keep within your borders, so too

it is possible

that we should learn from this verse that he may

conceal

his leaven in a place where he will not see it, and this is sufficient for him, since it says “shall not be seen.”

And

so I would also say that he may

accept deposits

of leaven

from an alien,

and would not transgress concerning it because it is not his

?

The verse teaches “For seven days leaven

shall not be found.”

This teaches that it is forbidden to conceal leaven, for although it is not seen, it is found. Likewise, we learn from here that it is forbidden to accept deposits of leaven from an alien, for in this verse “for you” was not stated, to exclude what belongs to others.

And below the Gemara will explain the contradiction between the expositions, whether to exclude the leaven of others or not.

And still,

I know only

that it is forbidden to accept leaven as a deposit from an alien

who has not been subdued by you

under your control

and is not

do we know

residing with you in the courtyard.

But

an alien whom you have subdued

under your control, whose property is like your property, or even an alien whom you have not subdued under your control but who is

residing with you in the courtyard—from where

do we know that even concerning his leaven that he deposited with you you transgress?

And below the Gemara will ask that the opposite is more logical: in such a case, all the more so he transgresses.

The verse teaches

“shall not be found in your houses.”

And this will be explained below.

And if only “leavening shall not be found in your houses” had been written,

I know only

that it is forbidden to keep

only

leaven

that is in your houses,

because it is always found with him. But leaven that is

in pits

and

in hollows and caves,

from where

do we know that it is forbidden to keep it?

The verse teaches “No leavening shall be seen for you

only

in all your borders,”

even if it is not in the house.

And

even though these two verses have been stated,

I still say

that only

in houses

does he

transgress because of

“it shall not be seen”

and “it shall not be found,”

and

because of

“it shall not be concealed,”

for the verse “it shall not be found,” from which we learn that it is forbidden even to conceal it, was stated only “in your houses.” Likewise, only in houses does one transgress

“he shall not accept deposits from an alien,”

which too is learned from the verse “leavening shall not be found in your houses,” because “for you” was not stated in it.

But

in the borders,

that is, in pits, hollows, and caves, there is no prohibition against accepting deposits from an alien, for in the verse “in all your borders” “for you” is stated. And we expound from it that only leaven

belonging to you may you not see, but you may see what belongs to others and what belongs to the Most High

in your borders. Likewise, it should not be forbidden to conceal it in the borders, for concerning the borders “it shall not be seen” was stated, implying only leaven visible to the eye, and not concealed leaven.

From where is it derived to apply what is stated concerning one of these to the other,

so that the stringency stated concerning houses will also apply in the borders,

and that of the one to the other,

so that the leniency stated concerning the borders—that only what belongs to you may you not see, but you may see what belongs to others and what belongs to the Most High—will also apply in houses?

The verse teaches

“leavening, leavening”

for a gzera shava.

“Leavening” was stated

“leavening”

concerning houses, “For seven days

leavening

shall not be found in your houses.”

And “leavening” was stated

“leavening”

concerning the borders,

“No leavening shall be seen for you

in all your borders.”

I therefore reason:

Just as concerning the leavening stated in houses, he transgresses

concerning it

because of “it shall not be seen,” “it shall not be found,” “it shall not be concealed,” and “he shall not accept deposits from an alien,”

so too concerning the leavening stated in the borders, he transgresses

concerning it

because of “it shall not be seen,” “it shall not be found,” “it shall not be concealed,” and “he shall not accept deposits from an alien.”

And just as concerning the leavening stated in the borders

we expound concerning it that only leaven

belonging to you may you not see, but you may see what belongs to others and what belongs to the Most High

in your borders,

so too concerning the leavening stated in houses,

specifically

belonging to you may you not see, but you may see what belongs to others and what belongs to the Most High. [

And, as stated, the Gemara will immediately explain the contradiction: the beraita stated the law of leaven belonging to others once as a prohibition and once as a permission.]

And the Gemara explains the words of the beraita:

The Master said:

“Perhaps he may conceal and accept deposits from an alien? The verse teaches: ‘It shall not be found.’”

I know only concerning an alien whom he has not subdued and who is not residing with him in the courtyard.

An alien whom he has subdued and who is residing with him in the courtyard—from where?

The verse teaches

“It shall not be found

in your houses.”

And we raise an objection:

“Where is this tending?”

[Where does this statement tend?] For the opposite is more logical: a deposit of an alien whom he has subdued under his control or who is residing with him in the courtyard is more logically forbidden, because it resembles his own leaven more closely

! And we answer:

Abaye said: Reverse

the words of the beraita, and it should be taught as follows: I know only that he may not accept deposits from an alien concerning an alien whom he has subdued and who is residing with him in the courtyard, since he resembles his own leaven; but concerning an alien whom he has not subdued and who is not residing with him in the courtyard, from where do we know that his deposit too is forbidden? The verse teaches: “It shall not be found in your houses.” And from the fact that it did not say “you shall not find,” but “it shall not be found,” it is implied that it shall not be found at all, even if it belongs to an alien whom he has not subdued and who is not residing with him in the courtyard.

Rava said: Actually, do not reverse

the words of the beraita.

And

this clause

stands upon the beginning

of the beraita

and depends on it.

For it teaches that leaven belonging to an alien is permitted [in the manner that will be explained below in the Gemara], because we expound from “No leavening shall be seen for you” that only leaven

belonging to you may you not see, but you may see

leaven

belonging to others and what belongs to the Most High.

And concerning this the beraita now continues:

I know only

that it is permitted

in

leaven belonging to

an alien whom he has not subdued

under his control

and

who is not

residing with you in the courtyard.

But leaven belonging to

an alien whom he has subdued

and who is residing with you in the courtyard,

which resembles your leaven,

from where

do we know that it too is permitted

?

The verse teaches

“it shall not be found.”

And we raise an objection:

And

but according to your words,

this tanna

of the beraita

is returning to the permission;

he seeks to prove that leaven belonging to an alien whom he has subdued is also permitted.

And

if at the end

he brought a verse,

he cites the verse “it shall not be found,” which implies

a prohibition!?

And we answer: The beraita derives from here for permissibility,

because it is stated

“to you”

“to you”

twice.

The word “to you” is stated twice in the Torah as a limitation with regard to the prohibition of seeing se'or in the provinces: besides “and no se'or of yours shall be seen throughout all your borders,” stated at the end of the portion of Bo, it is stated once more in the portion of Re'eh [Deuteronomy 16:4]: “and no se'or of yours shall be seen throughout all your borders for seven days.” And the second “to you,” since it “has no relevance” to “shall be seen,” for “to you” has already been stated there, apply it to “shall be found,” as though “it shall not be found to you” had been written. And derive from it that even with regard to hametz found with you, that is, belonging to a gentile whom you have subjugated and who resides with you, it is not prohibited; for only your own you may not find, but you may find the hametz of others.

The Master said: “Perhaps he may conceal it and accept deposits from gentiles?”

The verse says

“it shall not be found.”

And we raise an objection concerning it:

But did you say at the beginning

“Your own you may not see, but you may see that of others and of the Most High,”

whereas here the beraita says that it is prohibited to accept deposits from gentiles, even though it is hametz that is not his?

And we answer:

It is not difficult: This

which one transgresses with regard to a deposit of a gentile is specifically where he

accepted responsibility

for guarding the hametz. Since responsibility for it is upon you, it is like your own.

But

this

which it teaches, “but you may see that of others,” is in a case

where he did not accept responsibility

for the hametz.

As in that which Rava said to the sons of

his city [whose name was

Mehoza]:

[Burn] before Passover

the hamira of the soldiers

the hametz of the gentile soldiers who encamped in the city,

from your houses,

and they handed it over to the people of the city and imposed upon them the burden of repairing and preparing their provisions, so that you would not transgress with regard to it under “it shall not be found,” despite the fact that it was not yours.

Since, if it were stolen

the hametz

or if it were lost

[lost],

in your domain

under your responsibility

it would stand, and they would demand its payment from you,

and you would become obligated to pay its value to the soldiers, therefore

it is considered like yours,

it is as though it were yours,

and it is prohibited,

and you transgress with regard to it under “it shall not be found.”

It is established law: One who steals consecrated property from the possession of its owners is exempt from paying double, because it is stated, “He shall pay double to his fellow”—but not to consecrated property. And Rabbi Shimon holds that if one stole a consecrated animal for which its owners bear responsibility—that is, the owners would have been obligated to bring another offering had this animal died or been stolen [for example, the owners vowed and said, “Behold, upon me is a burnt offering”]—the thief is liable to pay double to the one who consecrated it. For although this animal is not literally his property, since it “causes him monetary benefit,” in that he will not become obligated to bring another animal in its place, a thing that causes monetary benefit is considered like property, and it is as though it were his, and we apply to it “to his fellow.”

And we raise an objection concerning it:

This works well according to the one who says

[Rabbi Shimon]

“a thing that causes monetary benefit is considered like property,”

and it is understandable that one transgresses with regard to hametz for which he bears responsibility, for it “causes monetary benefit” to the depositary: if it were lost, he would have to pay its value, and therefore it is considered his.

But according to the one who says

[the first tannay of Rabbi Shimon] that a thing that causes monetary benefit

is not considered like property—

what can be said?

For the hametz is not his, so why does he transgress with regard to it?

And we answer:

Here it is different, for the verse says

the verse

“it shall not be found,”

to include hametz for which he bears responsibility, even though it is not his.

There are those who say

the opposite:

This works well according to the one who says

“a thing that causes monetary benefit is not considered like property,”