Pesachim 62b (סב:) — the Talmud in English

If you say

with regard to the impurity of the flesh,

this is difficult:

Where was it permitted?

For although impurity was permitted with regard to the community, this permission applies only in that a טמא priest may offer a communal offering [that is, impurity of persons].

But if the flesh of a communal offering became impure, it was not permitted to eat it.

Rather, obviously,

the latter clause is referring

to impurity of persons.

And where

was it

permitted in a manner that deviates from its general rule?

With regard to the community—

when the majority of the community became impure, a טמא priest may offer communal offerings.

And the difficulty now is:

the first clause concerns impurity of the flesh,

whereas

the latter clause concerns impurity of persons?!

What difference does it make that impurity of persons was permitted in a manner that deviates from its general rule? We are attempting to derive the law from impurity of the flesh, and that was not permitted in a manner that deviates from its general rule!

And we answer:

Yes,

indeed, the first clause concerns impurity of the flesh, and the latter clause concerns impurity of persons,

but nevertheless,

the category of “impurity” is being challenged:

both impurity of persons and impurity of the flesh disqualify because they are designated by the name “impurity.” Since we find that the category of impurity was permitted in a manner that deviates from its general rule with regard to impurity of persons, there is consequently a leniency with regard to the entire category of impurity.

Alternatively,

the beraita

entirely concerns impurity of the flesh,

and even the latter clause, which states that impurity was permitted in a manner that deviates from its general rule, is also referring to impurity of the flesh.

And where

was

permitted

the impurity of the flesh?

With regard to the impurity of the Pesaḥ offering,

for although it is forbidden to eat other communal offerings that are brought in a state of impurity while in a state of impurity, nevertheless, with regard to the Pesaḥ offering it is permitted.

As we learned:

[below, 76a]

A Pesaḥ offering that comes in a state of impurity,

when the majority of the community is impure,

is eaten in a state of impurity.

Although eating in a state of impurity was not permitted with regard to communal offerings, the Pesaḥ offering is different, since

it is brought from the outset only for eating.

The primary purpose of bringing the Pesaḥ offering is to eat it, as it is stated: “According to his eating.” Since the Torah permitted the community that became impure to bring the Pesaḥ offering in a state of impurity, it permitted it with the intention that it be eaten.

to bring the Passover offering in impurity, it permitted it with the intention of eating it.

We learned earlier in the sugya that Rav Ḥisda maintains that “since” is invoked stringently.

Rav Huna, son of Rav Yehoshua, raised an objection:

They taught in a beraita: A one-year-old lamb that one designated for

the Pesaḥ offering, whose year passed,

meaning that after it was designated, its year passed and it became disqualified, as it is stated concerning the Pesaḥ offering: “A male, a year old.”

The law of a Pesaḥ offering whose year passed is that it is offered as a shelamim offering.

And one slaughtered it at its proper time,

on the fourteenth of Nisan,

with its designation in mind,

for the sake of a Pesaḥ offering. He acted improperly, since it now has the status of a shelamim offering.

And similarly, one who slaughters

other offerings

with the designation of a Pesaḥ offering at its proper time,

on the fourteenth of Nisan.

Rabbi Eliezer disqualifies,

as Rabbi Eliezer maintains: Just as a Pesaḥ offering slaughtered not for its own sake at its proper time is disqualified, so too, other offerings slaughtered with the designation of a Pesaḥ offering on the fourteenth of Nisan are disqualified.

And Rabbi Yehoshua deems it fit.

All offerings that were slaughtered not for their own sake are fit, except for the Pesaḥ offering and a sin offering [Zevahim 2b]. There is no distinction between slaughtering them with the designation of a Pesaḥ offering or with the designation of any other offering.

And we infer from Rabbi Eliezer’s statement, which says that one who slaughters other offerings with the designation of a Pesaḥ offering “at its proper time” is disqualified:

The reason

for Rabbi Eliezer’s disqualification is that he slaughtered it

at its proper time,

during the time of the Pesaḥ offering [when the Pesaḥ offering itself can be offered with the designation of a Pesaḥ offering].

And it follows from this—

that

if he slaughtered it

not at its proper time,

it is fit

[since this is as though he slaughtered it with the designation of a shelamim offering, as a Pesaḥ offering not at its proper time does not have the status of a Pesaḥ offering; rather, it has the status of a shelamim offering].

Rav Huna, son of Rav Yehoshua, now concludes the refutation:

But why?

Why is one who slaughters other offerings with the designation of a Pesaḥ offering when it is not its proper time deemed fit?

Rav Ḥisda maintains that “since” is invoked stringently. If so,

let us say

that

since it disqualifies at its proper time, it

also disqualifies when it is not its proper time,

since he could wait until its proper time arrives, slaughter it then, and thereby disqualify it!

Rav Pappa said

there is a way to resolve this:

That case is different,

the case of one who slaughters other offerings with the designation of a Pesaḥ offering, for the Torah teaches with regard to it that “since” is not invoked:

As the verse says

[Exodus 12]

“And you shall say: It is a Pesaḥ sacrifice.”

And the Sages derived:

“It”—it shall remain as it is,

as it is; that is,

not it,

the Pesaḥ offering,

with the designation of

other offerings,

and not other offerings with its designation.

The disqualification of one who slaughters it with the designation of other offerings was equated with the disqualification of one who slaughters other offerings with its designation.

Therefore, only

at its proper time, when it

[the Pesaḥ offering]

is disqualified

if he slaughters it

with the designation of other offerings,

also

other offerings are disqualified

if he slaughters them

with its designation.

But

when it is not its proper time, when it is fit,

if he slaughters it then

with the designation of other offerings

[since it has the status of a shelamim offering, and a shelamim offering slaughtered not for its own sake is fit], also

other offerings are fit

if he slaughters them

with its designation,

the designation of the Pesaḥ offering.

Here the Gemara relates an incident, at the conclusion of which the meaning of our Mishna was explained.

Rabbi Simlai came before Rabbi Yoḥanan.

It happened that Rabbi Simlai came before Rabbi Yoḥanan.

He said to him,

Rabbi Simlai said to Rabbi Yoḥanan:

“Let my master teach me the Book of Genealogies,”

meaning, let my master teach me the beraita written about the Book of Chronicles, whose name is “The Book of Genealogies.”

He said to him,

Rabbi Yoḥanan said:

“From where are you”

[you]?

He said to him,

Rabbi Simlai replied:

“From Lod.”

Rabbi Yoḥanan asked:

“And where is your residence?”

Where do you live now?

Rabbi Simlai answered:

“In Nehardea.”

Rabbi Yoḥanan did not want to teach him the Book of Genealogies.

And he said to him,

to Rabbi Simlai:

“The Book of Genealogies is not taught

to the residents of Lod,

nor to the residents of Nehardea; and all the more so, you are from Lod and your residence is in Nehardea.”

All the more so in your case, since you were born in Lod and now live in Nehardea [and with this Rabbi Yoḥanan intended to dismiss him. Some say that the Book of Genealogies is not taught to the residents of Lod and Nehardea because they are not of established lineage]. Rashi.

He pressured him

Rabbi Simlai pressured Rabbi Yoḥanan with words [he persisted with many entreaties].

And he appeased him

and won Rabbi Yoḥanan over.

He said to him,

Rabbi Simlai said to Rabbi Yoḥanan:

“Teach it to me in three months,”

let our master teach me the entire Book of Genealogies in three months.

He picked up a clod of earth,

Rabbi Yoḥanan took a clod of earth,

threw it at him

and cast it toward Rabbi Simlai [to show that he was angry with him].

And

he said to him,

Rabbi Yoḥanan said:

“Even Beruriah, the wife of Rabbi Meir,

the wife of Rabbi Meir, who was

the daughter

[daughter]

of Rabbi Ḥanina ben Teradion, who learned three hundred teachings in a single day,

who learned three hundred teachings [sugyot] in one day,

from three hundred rabbis,

from three hundred rabbis,

and even so,

although she was so wise,

she did not complete it in three years,

she was unable to study the Book of Genealogies in three years.

And you say

you wish to study it

in three months

[in three months]?!

As he took leave and went,

when Rabbi Simlai turned to leave,

he said to him,

Rabbi Simlai said to Rabbi Yoḥanan:

“What is the difference between ‘with its designation’ and ‘not with its designation,’

which we learned earlier in the Mishna [59b] is disqualifying, and slaughtering it

for those who may eat it and for those who may not eat it,”

which we learned in our Mishna is valid .

He said to him,

Rabbi Yoḥanan answered Rabbi Simlai:

“Since you are a Torah scholar,

since you are a Torah scholar,

come and I will tell you

come and I will tell you that disqualification due to an improper designation is more severe than disqualification due to those for whom it may not be eaten. Therefore, although the Torah rendered the case of those for whom it may and may not be eaten valid, nevertheless, one cannot derive from here a leniency with regard to the case of an improper designation .

1.

“With its designation and not with its designation”

is more severe, since

its disqualification

is

in its substance,

as the thought of an improper designation concerns the substance of the offering, intending it to be for the sake of another offering.

By contrast, the thought of

for those who may eat it and for those who may not eat it

is a less severe disqualification, because the thought that it is not for those who may eat it

does not disqualify its substance,

since he did not intend that the substance of the offering become something else; rather, it is an ancillary thought, concerning feeding it afterward to those who may not eat it.

2.

“With its designation and not with its designation”

is more severe, for with the thought of an improper designation

it is impossible to clarify

[alter]

its prohibition.

Once he slaughtered the offering with the intention that the slaughter be for another offering, it is impossible retroactively to alter the status of the offering that he established at the time of slaughter.

By contrast,

“for those who may eat it and for those who may not eat it”

is less severe, because with the thought that it is not for those who may eat it,

it is possible to clarify its prohibition.

Afterward, one can determine retroactively whether his thought was realized. If ultimately he feeds it only to those fit to eat it, his thought is retroactively nullified.

3.

“With its designation and not with its designation”

is more severe, because the thought of an improper designation

applies to the four services

involving the blood: slaughtering, receiving, conveying, and sprinkling; and in each of them, if he thought not for its proper designation, the offering is disqualified.

By contrast,

“for those who may eat it and for those who may not eat it”

is less severe, because the thought that it is not for those who may eat it

does not

disqualify it

in the four services,

but only in slaughtering. [For “there is no thought concerning those who eat it in the sprinkling,” as stated above.]

4.

“With its designation and not with its designation”

is more severe, because the disqualification due to an improper designation

applies to

an offering

of the community as it does to

an offering

of an individual.

By contrast,

“for those who may eat it and for those who may not eat it”

is less severe, because the thought that it is not for those who may eat it

does not apply to

an offering

of the community as it does to

an offering

of an individual.

For it is specifically with regard to the Pesaḥ offering, which is an individual offering, that eating is indispensable, as it is stated: “Each person according to his eating shall you register”; but with communal offerings, eating is not indispensable.

Rav Ashi said: “‘Its disqualification is in its substance’ and ‘it is impossible to clarify its prohibition’—

they are one matter.”

They are one and the same idea.

Why did he say

that an improper designation

disqualifies its substance,

whereas the thought that it is not for those who may eat it does not affect its substance?

Because

an improper designation

cannot have its prohibition clarified

afterward and be nullified. [For the substance of the offering has already changed and become an offering of another type. This is not so with regard to the case of those who may not eat it: the time for eating it has not yet arrived, and one can clarify its prohibition afterward by feeding it to those fit to eat it, in which case it is found to have been nullified. Therefore, it is not considered that the substance of the offering has changed.] Since the incident involving Rabbi Simlai and the Book of Genealogies was mentioned, the Gemara adds and discusses the matter.

Rami bar Rav Yuda said: From the day the Book of Genealogies was concealed, the strength of the Sages weakened, and the radiance of their eyes dimmed .

Mar Zutra said

that in I Chronicles [8–9] it is stated: “And Atzel had six sons.” It lists the descendants of the sons, and at the end of the passage it states: “These are the sons of Atzel.”

And between “Atzel” and “Atzel”

many homiletical interpretations were expounded in the Book of Genealogies, to such an extent that

we loaded four hundred camels with homiletical interpretations,

a load that could fill four hundred camels with these interpretations.

[The sugya before us is explained in accordance with the words of Tosafot and Rabbenu Ḥananel ].

We learned in the Mishna: One who slaughters the Pesaḥ offering for circumcised and uncircumcised people, it is fit.

The Gemara discusses a case in which one slaughters the Pesaḥ offering and, at the time of slaughter, says: “I am slaughtering the Pesaḥ offering in order to feed it to Reuven and Shimon, who are uncircumcised, and to Levi and Judah, who are circumcised.” Does the disqualification of uncircumcised people take effect upon the Pesaḥ offering when he first said, “For Reuven and Shimon, who are uncircumcised,” so that what he subsequently added, “and for Levi and Judah, who are circumcised,” is ineffective?

Or perhaps all his speech is considered a single statement, and he said that he was slaughtering the Pesaḥ offering for uncircumcised and circumcised people. In that case, it is fit.

It was taught in a beraita: Others say:

[Rabbi Meir, who is called “Others,” says]

If he mentioned the circumcised before the uncircumcised—

for example, he said: “I am slaughtering the Pesaḥ offering in order to feed it to Reuven and Shimon, who are circumcised, and to Levi and Judah, who are uncircumcised”—

it is fit.

However, if he placed the uncircumcised before the circumcised,

it is invalid.

And we raised a question about this:

What is different

about placing the circumcised first,

which is valid,

on the grounds

that we require the entire animal to be foreskin, [that the entire offering must be for uncircumcised people in order to invalidate it],

and there is no such case here,

but there is not,

as it is not entirely foreskin here.

If so, when he placed

the uncircumcised before the circumcised, we likewise require the entire animal to be foreskin—

but there is no such case here,

as here too it is not entirely foreskin! Why, then, does the beraita state that it is invalid?

In order to discuss the matter of placing the uncircumcised before the circumcised, the Gemara had to consider several issues:

A. In tractate Zevachim 30a, Rabbi Meir and Rabbi Yosei disputed whether we say “we seize the first expression” [in the matter of temura], as follows.

One who says concerning an unconsecrated animal, “This is a substitute for a consecrated animal”—both animals become consecrated. As it is stated: “It and its substitute shall be holy.”

And if he said, “This is a substitute for an ola,” the sanctity of an ola takes effect upon the animal; and if he then said concerning it that it is a substitute for a shelamim, the sanctity of a shelamim does not take effect upon it, since it is already an ola.

If he said, “This is a substitute for an ola, a substitute for a shelamim”— -

Rabbi Meir says: We seize the first expression. Since at the outset he said “a substitute for an ola,” the status of an ola takes effect upon it, and it can no longer be removed from that status.

And Rabbi Yosei says: If from the outset he intended both designations, since he cannot utter both of them simultaneously, his statement takes effect [and the animal is sold; with the proceeds from half of it he brings an ola, and with the proceeds from the other half he brings a shelamim].

B. If one says concerning an unconsecrated animal: “This animal will, at a later time—for example, at midday—be a substitute for an ola, a substitute for a shelamim,”

the amoraim disputed whether in this case as well Rabbi Meir said: We seize the first expression.

Abaye said: When did Rabbi Meir say that we seize the first expression? When he says that now the animal will be “a substitute for an ola, a substitute for a shelamim.” For as soon as he says “a substitute for an ola,” the substitute for an ola has already taken effect, and he cannot change it and make it a substitute for a shelamim.

But when he said that the substitution will take effect at midday, even Rabbi Meir concedes that we do not say that we seize the first expression, because at the time the person said, “This is a substitute for an ola,” nothing had yet taken effect. And when midday arrived, this was already after he had completed his statement, and he had already said, “a substitute for an ola, a substitute for a shelamim,” so both designations took effect.

And Rava said: “It is still a dispute”—that even in this case, according to Rabbi Meir, we seize the first expression, and at midday what he said at the outset takes effect. It is therefore a substitute for an ola. But according to Rabbi Yosei, it is a substitute for both.

C. Just as Rabbi Meir and Rabbi Yosei disputed whether we say that we seize the first expression with regard to temura, so too we find that Rabbi Yehuda and the Sages disputed the matter of pigul, as follows:

With regard to the four services involving the blood [slaughter, receiving, conveyance, and sprinkling], if he formed the intention during them to eat the offering outside its designated time, the offering becomes pigul. One who eats it is liable to karet.

And it was already explained above [61b] that if one of the services was performed with the intention of eating it outside its designated place, the offering is invalid, but the status of pigul does not take effect upon it, even if during another service he intended to eat it outside its designated time. Therefore, there is no liability of karet for eating it.

They also disputed this matter [in Zevachim 29b], whether we say “we seize the first expression.” For example, he slaughtered with the intention of eating it outside its designated time, and received the blood with the intention of eating it outside its designated place.

Rabbi Yehuda holds: Since the intention to eat it outside its designated time preceded the intention to eat it outside its designated place, “we seize the first expression,” and the status of pigul takes effect upon it and can no longer be removed.

And the Rabbis hold: Since in the end there was also an intention to eat it outside its designated place, it is not pigul, and there is no liability of karet for eating it.

Similarly, when one slaughters with the intention of eating “an olive-bulk outside its designated time, and an olive-bulk outside its designated place”—according to Rabbi Yehuda, we seize the first expression, and the offering is pigul. But according to the Rabbis, we seize both expressions, and it is not pigul.

D. With regard to slaughter, the amoraim disputed when the status of slaughter takes effect. Rava holds: Slaughter takes effect only at the end—that is, the status of slaughter takes effect only at the completion of the slaughter, when he has finished cutting through the majority of each of the animal’s two סימנים in its neck. Consequently, if he formed an invalidating intention during the slaughter, the invalidity takes effect only at the end.

And Abaye holds: Slaughter takes effect from beginning to end; that is, the status of slaughter begins to take effect at the beginning of the cutting of the animal’s סימנים in its neck. Consequently, the invalidities of slaughter also take effect immediately, at the moment he formed the invalidating intention, even before he completed the slaughter.

It follows that Abaye and Rava disputed two matters:

A. One who says, “This is a substitute for an ola, a substitute for a shelamim, at a later time”—according to Rava, it is possible to say in this case that we seize the first expression, but according to Abaye it is not.

B. According to Abaye, slaughter takes effect from beginning to end; and according to Rava, slaughter takes effect only at the end.

And these two matters are interdependent:

For in the Mishna in Zevachim 29b, the Sages disputed the case of one who slaughters the offering with the intention of eating an olive-bulk outside its designated time and an olive-bulk outside its designated place, and Rabbi Yehuda holds that we seize the first expression.

And according to Rava, who holds that slaughter takes effect only at the end, it follows that at the moment he formed the intention to eat it outside its designated time and outside its designated place, the status of pigul had not yet taken effect upon the offering, until the completion of the slaughter. This is similar to one who says, “This animal will, at a later time, be a substitute for an ola, a substitute for a shelamim.”

And since we find that Rabbi Yehuda says that we seize the first expression when one slaughters with the intention of eating an olive-bulk outside its designated time and an olive-bulk outside its designated place, it necessarily follows that even one who says, “At a later time this animal will be a substitute for an ola, a substitute for a shelamim,” is subject to the principle that we seize the first expression.

But according to Abaye, when one says, “At midday this animal will be a substitute for an ola, a substitute for a shelamim,” everyone agrees that we do not say that we seize the first expression. It necessarily follows that slaughter takes effect from beginning to end. As soon as he said “outside its designated time,” the status of pigul took effect upon it; therefore Rabbi Yehuda said that when one slaughters with the intention of eating an olive-bulk outside its designated time and an olive-bulk outside its designated place, we seize the first expression.

And now let us return to our matter, the intention concerning the uncircumcised. It is written in the beraita: If he placed the circumcised before the uncircumcised, it is valid; if he placed the uncircumcised before the circumcised, it is invalid. And we ask: Why is it invalid when he placed the uncircumcised before the circumcised? After all, a partial foreskin does not invalidate it!

And seemingly, it would have been possible to answer that the beraita was stated in the formulation “Others say,” referring to Rabbi Meir. And according to Rabbi Meir, we say that we seize the first expression. Therefore, if he said “for the uncircumcised and for the circumcised,” the status of invalidity had already taken effect upon the offering, and could no longer be removed.

But in truth there is a major difference between “a substitute for an ola, a substitute for a shelamim” [in which case Rabbi Meir said that we seize the first expression] and “for the uncircumcised and for the circumcised”:

For with regard to temura, even if he caused the substitution to take effect upon half the animal, the substitution of the ola extends over the entire animal, and a substitution for a shelamim cannot take effect upon an ola. We therefore seize the first expression, and it is an ola.

In contrast, with regard to the uncircumcised and the circumcised, even after he formed the intention to have half of it eaten by uncircumcised people, he can still intend to have its other half eaten by circumcised people. Therefore, even Rabbi Meir, who holds that we seize the first expression, will concede here, since this is as though he slaughtered it for circumcised and uncircumcised people together, which is valid.

If so, the question returns to its place: Why does the beraita state that if he placed the uncircumcised before the circumcised, it is invalid?

And in order to answer this question, we say: