Pesachim 62b — the Talmud in English

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with the impurity of the flesh,

it is difficult:

where was it permitted?

For although impurity was permitted in the community, this permission applies only with regard to a impure priest being able to offer a communal offering [and this is the impurity of persons].

But if the flesh of a communal offering became impure, it was not permitted to eat it.

Rather, obviously,

the case in the latter clause is

with the impurity of persons.

And where

where

was it permitted as an exception to the general rule?

In the community—

when the majority of the community became impure, an impure priest could offer communal offerings.

And now it is difficult:

the first clause is with the impurity of the flesh,

whereas

the latter clause is with the impurity of persons?!

What difference does it make that the impurity of persons was permitted as an exception to the general rule? We are coming to learn from the impurity of the flesh, and that was not permitted as an exception to the general rule!

And we answer:

Yes,

indeed the first clause is with the impurity of the flesh, and the latter clause is with the impurity of persons,

but nevertheless

it objects on the basis of the category “impurity,”

both the impurity of persons and the impurity of the flesh are invalid because they are called by the name “impurity.” And since we find that the category “impurity” was permitted as an exception to the general rule with regard to the impurity of persons, there is a leniency concerning the entire category of impurity.

And if you wish, say:

the beraita

is entirely with the impurity of the flesh,

and even the latter clause, in which it is stated that impurity was permitted as an exception to the general rule, is also speaking of the impurity of the flesh.

And where

where

was

the impurity of the flesh

permitted?

With the impurity of the Passover offering, although it is forbidden to eat other communal offerings that come in impurity in a state of impurity. Nevertheless, with the Passover offering it is permitted.

As we learned:

[below, 76]

a Passover offering that comes in impurity,

when the majority of the community is impure,

is eaten in impurity.

And although eating in impurity was not permitted with communal offerings, the Passover offering is different, since

it comes from the outset only for eating.

For the principal purpose of bringing the Passover offering is in order to eat it, as it is stated, “according to his eating,” and since the Torah permitted the community that became impure

to bring the Passover offering in impurity, it permitted it with the intention of eating it.

We learned in the preceding passage that Rav Hisda holds that in a stringent direction we say, “Since.”

Rav Huna son of Rav Yehoshua objected:

They taught in a beraita: A year-old lamb that one designated for

the Passover offering, whose year passed,

meaning that after he designated it, its year passed and it became invalid, as it is stated concerning the Passover offering, “a male, a year old.”

And the law of a Passover offering whose year passed is that it is offered as a peace-offering.

And he slaughtered it at its time,

on the fourteenth of Nisan,

for its sake,

for the sake of the Passover offering. And he acted contrary to the law, since its law now is that of a peace-offering.

And likewise, one who slaughters

other offerings

for the sake of the Passover offering at its time,

on the fourteenth of Nisan.

Rabbi Eliezer invalidates,

for Rabbi Eliezer holds: Just as a Passover offering at its time that one slaughtered not for its sake is invalid, so too other offerings that one slaughtered for the sake of the Passover offering on the fourteenth of Nisan are invalid.

And Rabbi Yehoshua validates.

For all offerings that were slaughtered not for their sake are valid, except for a Passover offering and a sin-offering [Zevahim 2a]. And there is no distinction between whether he slaughtered them for the sake of a Passover offering or for the sake of any other offering.

And we infer from Rabbi Eliezer’s words, who said that one who slaughters other offerings for the sake of a Passover offering “at its time” is invalid:

The reason

for Rabbi Eliezer’s reason for invalidating is that he slaughtered it

at its time,

at the time of the Passover offering [when it is then possible to offer the Passover offering itself for the sake of the Passover offering].

And it follows from this—

here,

if he slaughtered it

not at its time—

it is valid [for this is as though he slaughtered it for the sake of a peace-offering, since a Passover offering not at its time does not have the status of a Passover offering, but rather the status of a peace-offering].

For this is like slaughtering it for the sake of a peace offering, since a Paschal offering slaughtered not at its proper time does not have the status of a Paschal offering; rather, it has the status of a peace offering.

And now Rav Huna son of Rav Yehoshua concludes the tiyuva:

And why?

Why is one who slaughters other offerings for the sake of a Passover offering when it is not its time valid?

For Rav Hisda holds that we say “since” in a stringent direction, and if so

let us say

let us say:

Since at its time it invalidates—

when it is not its time also it invalidates,

since he can wait until its time arrives and slaughter it, and it will become invalid!

Rav Pappa said

there is a resolution:

The case there is different,

the case of one who slaughters other offerings for the sake of a Passover offering is different, for the Torah taught concerning it that we do not say “since”:

For the verse says

[in Exodus 12]

“And you shall say, It is a Passover sacrifice.”

And the Sages expounded:

“It”—in its present state it shall be,

as it is! That is,

not it

the Passover offering

for the sake of

other offerings,

and not other offerings for its sake.

And the invalidity of one who slaughters it for the sake of other offerings was equated with the invalidity of one who slaughters other offerings for its sake.

Therefore, only

at its time, when it is

the Passover offering

invalid

if he slaughtered it

for the sake of other offerings,

also

other offerings are invalid

if he slaughtered them

for its sake.

But

when it is not its time, when it is valid

if he slaughtered it then

for the sake of other offerings [

for its law is that of a peace-offering, and peace-offerings that one slaughtered not for their sake are valid], also

other offerings are valid

if he slaughtered them

for its sake,

for the sake of the Passover offering.

Here the Gemara brings an incident, at the end of which they explained the words of our Mishna.

Rabbi Shemaya came before Rabbi Yohanan.

An incident in which Rabbi Shemaya came before Rabbi Yohanan.

He said to him,

Rabbi Shemaya to Rabbi Yohanan:

“Let my master teach me the Book of Genealogies,”

let my master teach me the beraita that was written on the book of Chronicles, whose name is “The Book of Genealogies.”

He said to him,

Rabbi Yohanan:

“From where are you?”

you.

He said to him,

Rabbi Shemaya:

“From Lod.”

Rabbi Yohanan asked:

“And where is your residence?”

Where do you live now?

Rabbi Shemaya answered:

“In Nehardea.”

Rabbi Yohanan did not wish to teach him the Book of Genealogies.

And he said to him,

to Rabbi Shemaya:

“One does not teach

the Book of Genealogies

to the people of Lod, nor to the people of Nehardea; and all the more so, you are from Lod and your residence is in Nehardea.”

All the more so, you, who were born in Lod and now live in Nehardea [and with this Rabbi Yohanan intended to dismiss him. And some say that the Book of Genealogies is not taught to the people of Lod and Nehardea because they are not of established lineage Rashi].

He pressured him

Rabbi Shemaya pressured Rabbi Yohanan with words [he persisted with many pleas].

And he appeased him

and he won Rabbi Yohanan over.

He said to him,

Rabbi Shemaya to Rabbi Yohanan:

“Let him teach it to me in three months,”

let our master teach me the entire Book of Genealogies in three months.

He took a clod

Rabbi Yohanan took a clod of earth,

threw it at him

and cast it toward Rabbi Shemaya [to show that he was angry with him].

And

he said to him,

Rabbi Yohanan:

“And Beruriah, the wife of Rabbi Meir,

the wife of Rabbi Meir, who was

the daughter

of

Rabbi Hanina ben Teradion, who learned three hundred teachings in one day,

who learned three hundred teachings [passages] in a single day,

from three hundred rabbis,

from three hundred rabbis,

and even so,

although she was so wise,

she did not fulfill her obligation in three years,

she could not learn the Book of Genealogies in three years.

And you say

you wished to learn it

in three months

in three months?!

As he took leave and went

when Rabbi Shemaya turned to leave,

he said to him,

Rabbi Shemaya to Rabbi Yohanan:

“What is the difference between ‘for its sake’ and ‘not for its sake,’

which we learned in the earlier Mishna [59b], that it is invalid, and slaughtering it

for those who may eat it and for those who may not eat it,”

which we learned in our Mishna, that it is valid?

He said to him,

Rabbi Yohanan answered Rabbi Shemaya:

“Since you are a Torah scholar,

since you are a Torah scholar,

come and I will tell you:

come and I will tell you that invalidity through not for its sake is more serious than invalidity through those who may not eat it. Therefore, although the Torah validated it with regard to those who may eat it and those who may not eat it, nevertheless it is impossible to learn from here to be lenient also with regard to not for its sake .

1.

“For its sake” and “not for its sake”

is more serious, since

its invalidity

is

in its substance,

for the thought of not for its sake is a thought concerning the substance of the offering, that it should be for the sake of another offering.

Whereas the thought of

“for those who may eat it and for those who may not eat it”

is a lesser invalidity, since the thought of those who may not eat it

does not render its substance invalid,

since he did not think that the substance of the offering should be something else, but rather it is an incidental thought, to feed it afterward to those who may not eat it.

2.

“For its sake” and “not for its sake”

is more serious, for with the thought of not for its sake

it is impossible to clarify

to change

its prohibition.

For after he slaughtered the offering with the intention that the slaughter be for another offering, it is impossible retroactively to change the status of the offering that he established at the time of slaughter.

Whereas

“for those who may eat it and for those who may not eat it”

is more lenient, for with the thought of those who may not eat it

it is possible to clarify its prohibition.

For afterward he can clarify retroactively whether his thought was true. If in the end he feeds it only to those fit to eat it, it turns out that his thought is nullified retroactively.

3.

“For its sake” and “not for its sake”

is more serious, for the thought of not for its sake

exists in the four services

involving the blood: slaughtering, receiving, conveying, and sprinkling; and in each of them, if he thought not for its sake, it is invalid.

Whereas

“for those who may eat it and for those who may not eat it”

is more lenient, for the thought of those who may not eat it

does not

invalidate

in the four services,

but only in slaughtering. [For “there is no thought concerning eaters in sprinkling,” as above.]

4.

“For its sake” and “not for its sake”

is more serious, for the invalidity of not for its sake

exists in

an offering

of the community as in

an offering

of an individual.

Whereas

“for those who may eat it and for those who may not eat it”

is more lenient, for the thought of those who may not eat it

does not exist in

an offering

of the community as in

an offering

of an individual.

For specifically with regard to the Passover offering, which is an individual offering, eating is indispensable, as it is stated, “according to his eating shall you assign him”; but with communal offerings eating is not indispensable.

Rav Ashi said: “Its invalidity being in its substance” and “it is impossible to clarify its prohibition”—

they are one matter.

They are both one matter.

Why did he say

that not for its sake

has its invalidity in its substance,

whereas not for those who may eat it does not affect its substance?

Because

not for its sake

cannot have its prohibition clarified

afterward and be nullified. [For the substance of the offering has already changed and become for the sake of another offering. This is not so with not for those who may eat it, since the time of its eating has not yet arrived. He can clarify its prohibition afterward by feeding it to those fit to eat it, and it turns out to be nullified; therefore it is not considered that the substance of the offering changed.] Incidentally, since the Book of Genealogies was mentioned in the incident involving Rabbi Shemaya, the Gemara adds and speaks about it.

Rami bar Rav Yuda said: From the day that the Book of Genealogies was concealed, the strength of the Sages weakened, and the light of their eyes grew dim .

Mar Zutra said

that in Chronicles I [8–9] it is stated: “And Atzal had six sons.” And it enumerates the descendants of the sons. And at the end of the passage it is stated: “These are the sons of Atzal.”

And between “Atzal” and “Atzal”

they expounded many expositions in the Book of Genealogies, to such an extent that

we loaded four hundred camels with expositions,

for these expositions could fill the load of four hundred camels.

The passage before us is explained according to the words of Tosafot and Rabbenu Hananel .

We learned in the Mishna: One who slaughters the Passover offering for circumcised and uncircumcised people—it is valid.

The Gemara discusses a case in which one slaughters the Passover offering, and at the time that he slaughtered he said: “I am slaughtering the Passover offering in order to feed it to Reuben and Simeon, who are uncircumcised, and to Levi and Judah, who are circumcised.” Does the invalidity of uncircumcised people take effect in the Passover offering when he first said, “for Reuben and Simeon, who are uncircumcised,” so that what he added afterward, “and for Levi and Judah, who are circumcised,” is of no avail?

Or perhaps all his speech is considered one utterance, and he said that he was slaughtering the Passover offering for uncircumcised people and for circumcised people. And this is valid.

It was taught: Others say:

Rabbi Meir, who is called “Others,” says:

If he mentioned the circumcised before the uncircumcised—

for example, he said: “I am slaughtering the Passover offering with the intention of feeding it to Reuben and Simeon, who are circumcised, and to Levi and Judah, who are uncircumcised”—

it is valid.

But if

he put the uncircumcised before the circumcised, it is invalid.

And we raised it:

what is different

in the case of putting

the circumcised before the uncircumcised, that it is valid,

for the reason

that we require the whole [offering] to be foreskin [צריכים שכל הקרבן יהיה לערלים בשביל לפסלו]that the entire offering be for the uncircumcised in order to invalidate it],

and there is no such case here,

and there is not,

for here there is not a case of the whole [offering] being foreskin.

If so, if he put the uncircumcised before the circumcised as well, we require the whole [offering] to be foreskin —

the uncircumcised before the circumcised, we likewise require the entire animal to be foreskin—

and there is not,

for here too there is not a case of the whole [offering] being foreskin! And why did we learn in the baraita that it is invalid?

And in order to discuss the matter of putting the uncircumcised before the circumcised, the Gemara had to discuss several matters:

A. In tractate Zevahim 30a, Rabbi Meir and Rabbi Yose disputed whether we say, “seize the first expression” [concerning temura], as follows.

One who says concerning an unconsecrated animal, “This is the substitute of a consecrated animal”—both animals are consecrated. And as it is stated, “And it and its substitute shall be holy.”

And if he said, “This is the substitute of an burnt offering,” the sanctity of an burnt offering takes effect upon the animal; and if he then said concerning it that it is the substitute of a peace offering, the sanctity of a peace offering does not take effect upon it, since it is already an burnt offering.

He said, “This is the substitute of an burnt offering, the substitute of a peace offering.” \-

Rabbi Meir says: seize the first expression; and since at the outset he said “the substitute of an burnt offering,” the law of an burnt offering took effect upon it, and it is no longer possible to remove it.

And Rabbi Yose says: If from the outset he intended both of them, since it is impossible to utter both of them at once, his words stand [and it is sold, and with the money of half of it he brings an burnt offering, and with the money of its other half a peace offering].

B. One who says concerning an unconsecrated animal: “This shall, after some time—for example, at midday—be the substitute of an burnt offering, the substitute of a peace offering.”

The amoraim disputed whether here too Rabbi Meir said: seize the first expression.

Abaye said: When did Rabbi Meir say, “seize the first expression”? When he says that now the animal shall be “the substitute of an burnt offering, the substitute of a peace offering,” because as soon as he said “the substitute of an burnt offering,” the substitute of an burnt offering had already taken effect, and he cannot alter it and make it the substitute of a peace offering.

But when he said that the substitution should take effect at midday, in this case even Rabbi Meir concedes that we do not say, “seize the first expression,” because at the time that the person said, “This is the substitute of an burnt offering,” nothing had yet taken effect. And when midday arrived, this was already after he had had time to finish his words, and he had already said, “the substitute of an burnt offering, the substitute of a peace offering,” and both took effect.

And Rava said: “It remains a dispute”—for here too, according to Rabbi Meir, seize the first expression, and at midday what he said at the outset takes effect. And this is the substitute of an burnt offering. But according to Rabbi Yose, this is the substitute of both.

C. Just as Rabbi Meir and Rabbi Yose disputed whether we say, “seize the first expression,” concerning temura, so we find that Rabbi Yehuda and the Sages disputed concerning pigul, as follows:

With the four services involving the blood [slaughter, receiving, conveying, sprinkling], if he formulated an intention during them to eat outside its designated time, the offering becomes pigul. And one who eats it is liable for karet.

And it was already explained above [61b] that if one of the services was performed with the intention of eating it outside its designated place, the offering is invalid, but the designation of pigul does not take effect upon it, even if he intended during another service to eat it outside its designated time; therefore there is no karet for it.

And they also disputed concerning this matter [in Zevahim 29b] whether we say, “seize the first expression.” For example, he slaughtered with the intention of [eating it] outside its designated time, and received [the blood] with the intention of [eating it] outside its designated place.

Rabbi Yehuda holds: Since the intention concerning outside its designated time preceded the intention concerning outside its designated place, “seize the first expression,” and the designation of pigul takes effect upon it, and it does not subsequently depart.

And the Sages hold that since in the end there was also here an intention concerning outside its designated place, it is not pigul, and there is no karet for it.

And likewise, when he slaughters with the intention of eating “an olive-bulk outside its designated time, and an olive-bulk outside its designated place”—according to Rabbi Yehuda, seize the first expression, and the offering is pigul. But according to the Sages, seize both expressions, and it is not pigul.

D. Concerning slaughter, the amoraim disputed when the designation of slaughter takes effect. Rava holds: slaughter exists only at the end—that is, only at the completion of the slaughter, when he finished slaughtering the majority of the two סימנים in the animal’s neck, does the designation of slaughter take effect. Consequently, if he formulated an invalidating intention during the slaughter, the invalidity takes effect only at the end.

And Abaye holds: slaughter exists from the beginning until the end; that is, already at the beginning of cutting the סימנים in the animal’s neck, the designation of slaughter begins to take effect. Consequently, the invalidations of slaughter also take effect immediately at the time that he formulated an invalidating intention, even before he finished slaughtering.

It emerges that Abaye and Rava disputed two matters:

A. One who says, “This is the substitute of an burnt offering, the substitute of a peace offering,” after some time—for Rava, it is appropriate to say in this case, “seize the first expression,” but for Abaye it is not.

B. According to Abaye, slaughter exists from the beginning until the end. But according to Rava, slaughter exists only at the end.

And these two matters are dependent upon one another:

For in the Mishna in Zevahim 29b, they disputed concerning one who slaughters the offering with the intention of eating an olive-bulk outside its designated time and an olive-bulk outside its designated place, and Rabbi Yehuda holds: seize the first expression.

And according to Rava’s position, that slaughter exists only at the end, it emerges that at the time he formulated the intention concerning outside its designated time and outside its designated place, the designation of pigul had not yet taken effect upon the offering until the completion of the slaughter. And this is similar to one who says, “This animal shall after some time be the substitute of an burnt offering, the substitute of a peace offering.”

And since we find that Rabbi Yehuda says, “seize the first expression,” in the case of one who slaughters with the intention of eating an olive-bulk outside its designated time and an olive-bulk outside its designated place, it necessarily follows that also one who says, “After some time this animal shall be the substitute of an burnt offering, the substitute of a peace offering,” [the rule is] seize the first expression.

And according to Abaye’s position, that when one says, “This animal shall at midday be the substitute of an burnt offering, the substitute of a peace offering,” everyone agrees that we do not say, “seize the first expression.” It necessarily follows that slaughter exists from the beginning until the end. And immediately when he said “outside its designated time,” the designation of pigul took effect upon it; therefore Rabbi Yehuda said that one who slaughters an olive-bulk outside its designated time and an olive-bulk outside its designated place [is subject to] “seize the first expression.”

And now let us return to discuss our matter, the intention concerning the uncircumcised. For it is written in the baraita: “He put the circumcised before the uncircumcised—it is valid; the uncircumcised before the circumcised—it is invalid,” and we ask: Why is it invalid when he put the uncircumcised before the circumcised? After all, part of the foreskin does not invalidate!

And seemingly it would have been possible to answer that the baraita was stated with the expression “Others say,” which is Rabbi Meir. And according to Rabbi Meir, we say, “seize the first expression.” Therefore, if he said “for the uncircumcised and for the circumcised,” the designation of invalidity had already taken effect upon the offering, and it did not subsequently depart.

But in truth there is a great difference between “the substitute of an burnt offering, the substitute of a peace offering” [concerning which Rabbi Meir said, “seize the first expression”] and “for the uncircumcised and for the circumcised.”

For concerning temura, even if he imposed the substitution upon half of the animal, the substitute of an burnt offering extends over all of it, and the substitute of a peace offering cannot take effect upon an burnt offering; therefore, “seize the first expression,” and it is an burnt offering.

. This is not so concerning the uncircumcised and the circumcised. Even after he intended to feed half to the uncircumcised, he can still intend to feed its other half to the circumcised. Therefore, even Rabbi Meir, who holds “seize the first expression,” will concede here. For it is as though he slaughtered it for the circumcised and the uncircumcised together, and it is valid.

And if so, the question returns to its place: Why is it written in the baraita, “He put the uncircumcised before the circumcised—it is invalid”?

And in order to answer this question, we say: