Pesachim 63a — the Talmud in English

Shall we say that Others hold: the slaughter exists only at the end?

For Abaye and Rava disagreed as to when the designation of slaughter takes effect. And according to Abaye’s method, that the slaughter exists from beginning to end, it is not understood why he stated first “uncircumcised” and then “circumcised”—it is disqualified; for even after he has already begun to slaughter for the sake of the uncircumcised, he can continue to slaughter also for the sake of the circumcised.

But according to Rava’s method, that the slaughter exists only at the end, if so, the thought concerning the circumcised and the uncircumcised can also take effect only at the end. And the beraita is understood: since there is only an extremely brief time [“something”] at the end of the slaughter, it follows that there is not enough time for two thoughts to take effect at the same time. And the first thought that he thought, for the sake of the uncircumcised, only it can take effect, for we seize the first expression.

And therefore, if he stated uncircumcised before circumcised, it is disqualified.

Yet it is still difficult: if we hold that one who says, “Behold, this animal, at midday [after the appointed time], is an offering in place of an elevation-offering, an offering in place of a peace-offering”—in this Rabbi Meir concedes that both take effect, and according to Abaye’s method above, that when he said “an offering in place of an elevation-offering,” nothing had yet taken effect until midday. And at the time of the taking effect he had already finished saying his words; both took effect simultaneously.

If so, also in the case of one who slaughters for the uncircumcised and for the circumcised, since we hold that the slaughter exists only at the end, when he said “for the uncircumcised and for the circumcised,” nothing took effect until he completed the slaughter; and in this too Rabbi Meir should concede that we do not say, “seize the first expression”! [And the question returns: why is it disqualified when he stated uncircumcised before circumcised?]

And in order to answer this, we say:

And

by necessity, the beraita holds

according to Rava.

For Rava said:

with regard to one who says, “Behold, this, at midday, is an offering in place of an elevation-offering, an offering in place of a peace-offering”—

it is still a dispute.

Also in this case Rabbi Meir and Rabbi Yose disputed, and according to Rabbi Meir’s method, we seize the first expression even when his words do not take effect immediately but only after a time.

Therefore

also concerning the circumcised and the uncircumcised, we seize the first expression, even though his words do not take effect immediately but only at the end of the slaughter.

And since at the end of the slaughter the time is extremely brief [“something”], it is impossible for two thoughts to take effect in it one after the other. Therefore, if he

stated circumcised before uncircumcised—

the circumcised take effect.

For the thought of feeding the circumcised takes effect.

But the thought concerning

the uncircumcised does not take effect.

Whereas if he

stated uncircumcised before circumcised—

the uncircumcised take effect.

The circumcised do not take effect.

For we say, “seize the first expression,” and the offering is disqualified.

We have learned two things from the words of the beraita: a. The slaughter exists only at the end. b. Even if he said an utterance that does not take effect now but only after a time, Rabbi Meir says, “seize the first expression.” And this is according to Rava’s method.

And from here there is a question against Abaye!

Rabba said

to explain Abaye’s method:

No.

There is no proof from here for Rava’s view that the slaughter exists only at the end.

And

in truth, Others hold that the slaughter exists from beginning to end

according to Abaye’s method.

And concerning what we asked according to Abaye’s method—why is it disqualified when he stated uncircumcised before circumcised?—this can be answered:

And here, with what are we dealing

—in what case does the latter clause of the beraita deal, when it says, “he stated uncircumcised before circumcised”?

For example, when he resolved in his heart concerning both

both of them—

both concerning the circumcised and concerning the uncircumcised, but he expressed with his mouth “for the uncircumcised,” and did not manage to say “for the circumcised” before the slaughter was completed for the uncircumcised.

And concerning consecrated matters, everywhere that thought is mentioned, the intention is not thought alone but speech. Therefore, even one who slaughters the Passover-offering for the uncircumcised is not disqualified through thought. And likewise, for the circumcised does not take effect through thought. If so, since he said only “for the uncircumcised,” ostensibly the offering is disqualified.

And in this they disputed

—in this Others [Rabbi Meir] and the Sages disputed [as is implied by the language of the beraita, that Rabbi Meir came to dispute the words of the Sages].

For Rabbi Meir holds: we do not require that his mouth and his heart be the same.

There is no need for a person’s mouth to correspond to his thought. And since he said “for the uncircumcised,” the offering is disqualified, even though in his heart he had only the thought concerning some of the uncircumcised.

And the Rabbis hold: we require

that they need

his mouth and his heart to be the same.

And here, since he thought for the sake of some of the uncircumcised, even though he said only “for the uncircumcised,” his speech cannot take effect, since it does not correspond to his thought.

And we raise an objection:

And

if

Rabbi Meir holds

that

we do not require his mouth and his heart to be the same?!

And we raise a contradiction:

from the following Mishna against the beraita above, to object that they contradict one another.

We learned in tractate Terumot [chapter 3, Mishna 1]:

One who intends to say

about produce that it should be

teruma, but says “tithe,”

or who intended to say

“tithe,” but said “teruma.”

Or

who intended to say, “konam [a vow]

that I shall not enter this house,”

but erred in his speech

and said “this one,”

meaning another house.

And likewise, if he intended to say, “konam

that I shall not derive benefit from

a person

this one, but said “this one,”

meaning another person—

he has said nothing—

until his mouth and his heart are the same.

But it is an anonymous Mishna, and it is Rabbi Meir. And we learned that his mouth and his heart must be the same!

Rather, Abaye said

another answer, to explain the words of the beraita according to his method. [And it is unnecessary to establish that the beraita holds according to Rava, that the slaughter exists only at the end.]

The first clause

of the beraita, which states that when he stated circumcised before uncircumcised it is valid, is speaking in the following manner:

One who slaughters an animal must cut through the greater part of both of the signs [the trachea and the esophagus] in its neck. And it is, for example,

that he said

at the time he slaughtered

the first sign—

And

“for the circumcised.” And

at the time he slaughtered

the second sign

he added to his first thought and said, “Also for the uncircumcised.”

It follows that when he slaughtered the first sign, he slaughtered validly for the sake of the circumcised. And also at the time of slaughter

of the second sign,

even though he also thought of the uncircumcised, nevertheless

the circumcised are also mixed into it,

they are mixed into it as well, and one who slaughters for the uncircumcised and the circumcised is valid.

Whereas the

latter clause,

which states that when he stated uncircumcised before circumcised it is disqualified, is speaking in the following manner:

That he said

at the time he slaughtered

the first sign—

“for the uncircumcised,” and at the time he slaughtered

the second sign

he said—

“For the circumcised.”

It follows

that in

the slaughter of

the first sign, the circumcised are not mixed into it.

They are not included in his intention to slaughter also for the circumcised, but only for the uncircumcised.

And even though he did not have the thought concerning the uncircumcised during the entire slaughter, but only during the slaughter of one sign, which is half of the slaughter that renders the offering permitted, Rabbi Meir holds that with one sign, which is part of the slaughter, it is like a complete slaughter, and the thought concerning the uncircumcised disqualifies it.

And Rabbi Meir follows his own reasoning

according to his method,

for he said:

“One can render forbidden through half of the permitting act.”

If he had the thought of pigul during half of one of the sacrificial procedures, the designation of pigul takes effect upon the offering. And therefore here too, concerning the thought of the uncircumcised at the time of slaughtering one sign, the disqualification of the uncircumcised takes effect upon the offering.

And the Rabbis,

who disagree with Rabbi Meir and validate an offering that was performed for the uncircumcised and the circumcised,

follow their own reasoning

according to their method,

for they say: one cannot render forbidden through half of the permitting act.

And therefore also one who slaughters one sign, which is half of the permitting act, with the thought of the uncircumcised does not disqualify it.

Mishna:

It is written in Exodus [chapter 34]: “You shall not slaughter over leavened bread the blood of My sacrifice.”

And its meaning is: You shall not slaughter My sacrifice while leavened bread still exists [according to Rashi there]. But it is not explicitly explained in the Torah concerning which sacrifice this prohibition was said.

And the tannaim disputed in our Mishna concerning which sacrifice the verse is speaking.

According to the words of the Sages:

One who slaughters the Passover-offering over leavened bread

violates this prohibition,

for according to them, the verse “You shall not slaughter over leavened bread the blood of My sacrifice” speaks only of the Passover-offering.

Rabbi Judah says: Even the daily-offering

of the afternoon of Passover eve—if one slaughtered it over leavened bread, he violates the prohibition. And its reason is derived in the Gemara.

Rabbi Shimon says:

Also concerning other offerings, if one slaughtered them during the time when leavened bread is forbidden, he violates the prohibition. But there is a distinction between the Passover-offering and other offerings, and likewise there is a distinction between one who slaughters on the fourteenth of Nisan and one who slaughters during the days of the Passover Festival—

The Passover-offering

that he slaughtered

on the fourteenth,

if he slaughtered it

for its sake,

the offering is valid. Therefore, if he slaughtered it over leavened bread, he is

liable.

And

if he slaughtered it

not for its sake,

the offering is disqualified, as we learned at the beginning of tractate Zevahim: “All sacrifices that were slaughtered not for their sake are valid, except that they have not accrued for their owners for the sake of their obligation, except for the Passover-offering and the sin-offering.”

Therefore, if he slaughtered it over leavened bread,

he is exempt,

for it is an unfit slaughter, and its name is not slaughter [since the verse “You shall not slaughter over leavened bread the blood of My sacrifice” speaks of one who performs a valid slaughter].

And

whereas

all the other sacrifices

that he slaughtered on the fourteenth over leavened bread,

whether for their sake or not for their sake,

even though they are valid—

he is exempt.

And this is for the reason explained in the Gemara: that at the time of the slaughter of the Passover-offering [on the fourteenth of Nisan], Rabbi Shimon holds that one who slaughters other sacrifices over leavened bread is not liable.

And during the Festival,

within the Passover Festival:

The Passover-offering that he slaughtered

for its sake

is disqualified, for the time of the Passover-offering is on the fourteenth. Therefore, if he slaughtered it over leavened bread,

he is exempt,

for it is an unfit slaughter.

And

if he slaughtered it

not for its sake,

but for the sake of a valid peace-offering—for it is established for us in Zevahim 7b that during the rest of the year the Passover-offering is a peace-offering, and all its law is like that of a peace-offering—therefore, if he slaughtered it over leavened bread during the Festival, when one then violates the prohibition concerning leavened bread, “it shall not be seen and it shall not be found”—

he is liable

also on account of “You shall not slaughter over leavened bread the blood of My sacrifice,” for this is a fit slaughter.

And

whereas

all the other sacrifices

that he slaughtered during the Festival over leavened bread,

whether

he slaughtered them

for their sake or not for their sake—

he is liable.

For they are valid, and this is a fit slaughter.

For specifically during a time when the Passover-offering is not in effect, Rabbi Shimon holds that the prohibition “You shall not slaughter over leavened bread the blood of My sacrifice” applies to other offerings.

Except for the sin-offering that he slaughtered not for its sake,

which is disqualified, as we learned at the beginning of Zevahim. Therefore, if he slaughtered it over leavened bread, he is exempt, for it is an unfit slaughter.

Gemara:

Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish said:

Even though it is written in the Torah without qualification, “You shall not slaughter over leavened bread the blood of My sacrifice,” and it was not explained concerning which leavened bread the verse is speaking,

nevertheless,

he is never liable

if the leavened bread belonged to a stranger who was not one of the group. Even if the leavened bread was in the Temple courtyard, and those slaughtering their Passover-offerings saw it, and they warned them not to slaughter upon seeing it,

until the leavened bread is

owned

by the slaughterer.

For the meaning of the verse “You shall not slaughter over leavened bread” is leavened bread belonging to the slaughterer,

or

the leavened bread belongs

to the one who throws.

For it is written, “You shall not sacrifice over leavened bread the blood of My sacrifice,” and from the word “blood” we derive the inclusion of the one who throws.