Pesachim 62a (סב.) — the Talmud in English

And Rav Ḥisda and Rabba

disagree with regard to this verse:

Leviticus 1

“And it shall be accepted for him to make atonement for him”.

And we expound:

“for him”—

but not for another.

Rabba holds:

A change of owners renders the offering unfit only when he intends to sprinkle the blood for the sake of

another

who is

similar to him—

just as he is “a person subject to atonement”

who is obligated to bring this offering and fit to offer it,

so too, the other must be “a person subject to atonement.”

But if he intends to sprinkle the blood for the sake of another who is not subject to atonement, this does not render the offering unfit.

And this principle is not a novel teaching of Rabba; rather, it is agreed upon by everyone.

Rather, Rabba holds that this principle applies here as well,

excluding this uncircumcised person, who is not subject to atonement,

since he is not fit to offer a Paschal offering. Therefore, the intention to sprinkle the blood for him does not render the offering unfit on account of a change of owners.

And Rav Ḥisda holds: This uncircumcised person too, since he is subject to the obligation

to bring a Paschal offering

—he

who is not exempt from a Paschal offering, but is prevented from offering it because he is uncircumcised—

is subject to atonement,

he is considered so,

since, if he wishes,

if he wants, he can

rectify

himself by circumcising

himself.

The concept of “since” (ho’il) is a principle applied to something that is not actually fit at present, but can be rectified so that it becomes fit; it is consequently considered as though it were already fit now.

And the Sages disagreed concerning this principle in several places.

And it is demonstrated from here that Rav Ḥisda holds by the principle of “since.”

And we challenge this:

Does Rav Ḥisda indeed hold by

the principle of “since”?

For it was stated: One who bakes on a Festival

something not needed for the Festival meal—that is, he does not intend to eat it that day—but bakes it

for

the needs of a

weekday.

Rav Ḥisda said: He is flogged

for violating the labor of cooking on a Festival. And although baking is a labor involving food preparation, and labor involving food preparation is permitted on a Festival, it was permitted only for the needs of the Festival; baking for the needs of a weekday is prohibited.

Rabba said: He is not flogged.

The Gemara explains their dispute:

Rabba said that he is not flogged,

because

we say: Since, if

guests were to stay with him,

it would be fit for him

what he baked would be fit for the needs of the Festival, to feed it to the guests—

now too,

even though no guests stayed with him,

it is fit for him!

This baking is considered to have been done for the needs of the day.

And

therefore

he is not flogged.

Rav Ḥisda said that he is flogged,

because

we do not say

“since,”

and his baking is not considered something fit for the Festival; such baking is therefore not permitted under the category of food preparation.

But this contradicts what Rav Ḥisda said: An uncircumcised person is considered subject to atonement with regard to the Paschal offering on account of “since”!

And apparently there is also a contradiction in Rabba’s statements: With regard to a Festival he holds by the principle of “since,” whereas with regard to an uncircumcised person and the Paschal offering he does not hold by it.

Indeed, in truth, the contradiction exists only in the statements of Rav Ḥisda.

For

granted, the contradiction between Rabba and himself is not difficult,

as one can distinguish between the cases:

Here,

with regard to an uncircumcised person, he

lacks an act

he must perform an act—circumcision—in order to become fit. And something that is fit only through an act is not considered fit.

In contrast,

there,

with regard to baking on a Festival, it is considered fit because

it does not lack an act.

He need not perform any act in order for it to become fit for the guests; it is necessary only for the guests to arrive.

Rather, the contradiction between Rav Ḥisda and Rav Ḥisda—

certainly

is difficult.

For if he does not hold by “since” with regard to baking on a Festival, even though it does not lack an act, all the more so he should not have said “since” with regard to an uncircumcised person and the Paschal offering, where an act is lacking!

And we answer:

They said: When Rav Ḥisda does not hold by “since”

that is

in a lenient direction,

for example, to exempt him from flogging for baking on a Festival for the needs of a weekday.

But

in a stringent direction,

for example, to consider the uncircumcised person subject to atonement with regard to the Paschal offering, and to render unfit the offering slaughtered with the intention that its blood be sprinkled for him—

he does hold by

the principle of “since.”

And now the Gemara returns to explain the statement of the earlier beraita [page 61b]:

Mar Zutra, son of Rav Mari, said to Ravina: It teaches

in the beraita:

“Since uncircumcision renders unfit and impurity renders unfit.”

“Just as with impurity, a partial state of impurity was not made equivalent to complete impurity—

so too, with uncircumcision, partial uncircumcision was not made equivalent to complete uncircumcision.”

And we inquire:

This impurity

about which the tanna spoke—

what are the circumstances?

If we say it is the impurity of people,

that impure people were included among those registered for it,

then

according to this,

what

is the meaning of the tanna’s statement

“a partial state of impurity was not made equivalent to complete impurity”?

For if there are

among the group registered for it

four or five impure people and four or five pure people,

and he slaughtered it for the sake of all of them,

the impure people do not render it unfit

the Paschal offering

with regard to

the

pure people

for whom he also had the intention.

And the tanna’s intention is to derive the law of partial uncircumcision from the law of partial impurity of people.

If so, it is difficult: Why does the tanna need to derive partial uncircumcision from partial impurity?

For

with regard to uncircumcision as well,

does it not render unfit

some of the uncircumcised participants.

As we learned:

One who slaughters the Paschal offering

for circumcised and uncircumcised people—it is valid!

And one cannot say that this is known only because uncircumcision is derived from impurity. For the two disqualifications are derived from the same verse, as it is written: “Each person according to his eating shall you register,” excluding one who is not fit to eat, whether because of impurity or because of uncircumcision.

And if so,

what is different about impurity, which is obvious

to the tanna,

and what is different about uncircumcision, concerning which he is uncertain?

Rather, necessarily, the beraita is speaking

of the impurity of the flesh.

And

according to this,

what is the meaning of

“a partial state of impurity was not made equivalent to complete impurity”?

For if one limb became impure

became impure,

one of the limbs,

and this is a partial state of impurity—that is, only part of the flesh became impure—its law is:

This impure part

that limb alone which became impure

we burn, while the other

the rest of the flesh that remained pure

we eat.

In contrast, in the case of “complete impurity,” when the entire offering became impure, we burn all of it.

And Mar Zutra continues to challenge:

On what basis did you establish it—

as referring to the impurity of the flesh?

Come and hear the latter clause,

as it teaches:

“We derive a matter

uncircumcision

that does not apply to all offerings, from a matter

impurity

that does not apply to all offerings.

And do not refute this with the case of time, which applies to all offerings.”

And what impurity

is being discussed in the latter clause?

If we say it is the impurity of the flesh—

why does it not apply to all offerings?

After all, with regard to every offering whose flesh became impure, it must be burned!

Rather, it is obvious that the latter clause is speaking

of the impurity of people.

And

according to this,

what is the meaning of “it does not apply to all offerings”?

For with regard to all offerings,

the impurity of people does not render the offering unfit. For

an uncircumcised person and an impure person may send their offerings,

to the Temple courtyard, and they are offered on their behalf, because with all offerings it is not necessary for the owners to be fit to eat.

Whereas with regard to the Paschal offering,

the impurity of people renders it unfit, for

an uncircumcised person and an impure person may not send their Paschal offerings,

because the owners must be fit to eat, as it is written: “According to his eating shall you register.”

And Mar Zutra concludes his challenge: Is it possible that

the first clause refers to the impurity of the flesh, while the latter clause refers to the impurity of people?

Since in the first clause the question is whether to derive uncircumcision from time or from the impurity of the flesh, how can the latter clause conclude that it is derived from impurity because uncircumcision resembles the impurity of people?

After all, at the outset we sought to derive it not from the impurity of people, but from the impurity of the flesh?!

He said to him,

Ravina said to Mar Zutra:

Yes!

The tanna properly demonstrated that since uncircumcision resembles the impurity of people, it can consequently be derived from the impurity of the flesh, since both are disqualifications involving impurity.

And

from the category of impurity he raises the challenge,

to demonstrate that uncircumcision more closely resembles the category of impurity than the category of time.

Since uncircumcision resembles one of the disqualifications included in the category of impurity—the impurity of people—and does not resemble any disqualification in the category of time, the law of partial uncircumcision is derived from impurity—from the impurity of the flesh, which is also included in the category of impurity—and not from time, because uncircumcision does not resemble any disqualification included in the category of time.

And if you wish, say instead

another answer:

The latter clause as well

speaks

of the impurity of the flesh.

And what is the meaning of “it does not apply to all offerings”

which we challenged above, since every offering whose flesh became impure must be burned?

This is what it is saying: Its law is not as stringent with regard to all offerings as it is with regard to the Paschal offering.

For with regard to all offerings, whether the sacrificial fats became impure

before the sprinkling of the blood

and

the

flesh remained,

before the sprinkling,

or whether the flesh became impure and the fats remained—

he sprinkles the blood.

Whereas with regard to the Paschal offering,

only if

the fats became impure

before the sprinkling

and the flesh remained—

he sprinkles the blood.

Whereas with regard to the Paschal offering,

only if

the fats became impure

before the sprinkling

and the flesh remained—

he sprinkles the blood.

But if

only

the

flesh became impure and the fats remained—

he does not sprinkle the blood.

And we challenge this:

On what basis did you establish

the latter clause, according to the alternative answer,

as referring to the impurity of the flesh?

Come and hear the latter clause,

as it teaches:

“We derive a matter

uncircumcision

that was not permitted in its entirety, from a matter

time

that was not permitted in its entirety; but do not refute this with impurity, for it was permitted in its entirety.”

In what case?