Pesachim 62a — the Talmud in English

And Rav Hisda and Rabba ![](pamud.bmp "

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disagree concerning this verse:

Leviticus 1

“And it shall be accepted for him to make atonement for him.”

And we expound:

“for him”—

and not for his fellow.

Rabba holds:

A change of owners invalidates only when he thinks to sprinkle on behalf of

his fellow

who is

similar to him—

just as he is “a person of atonement,”

who is obligated in this offering and fit to offer it,

so too his fellow is “a person of atonement.”

But if he thinks to sprinkle on behalf of a fellow who is not a person of atonement, it does not invalidate.

And this principle is not a novelty of Rabba; rather, it is agreed upon by everyone.

Rather, Rabba holds that this principle applies here as well,

to exclude this uncircumcised person, who is not a person of atonement,

since he is not fit to offer the Passover offering. Therefore, the thought to sprinkle on his behalf does not invalidate by virtue of a change of owners.

And Rav Hisda holds: This uncircumcised person too, since he is obligated

to bring the Passover offering

—he

and he is not exempt from the Passover offering; rather, he is prevented by circumstances because of his uncircumcision—

is a person of atonement,

he is considered so,

since if he wishes,

if he wants, he

can rectify

himself by circumcising

himself.

The concept of “since” is a principle concerning something that is not actually fit, but it is possible to rectify it so that it will be fit, that it should be considered as though it is already fit now.

And they disagreed concerning this principle in several places.

And it is demonstrated from here that Rav Hisda holds “since.”

And we challenge this:

Does Rav Hisda indeed hold

“since”?

But it was stated: One who bakes on a Festival

something that is not needed for the meal of that day, since he does not intend to eat it that day, but rather he bakes it

for

the needs of a

weekday.

Rav Hisda said: He receives lashes

because of the labor of cooking on a Festival. And even though baking is labor for the sake of food, and labor for the sake of food is permitted on a Festival, it was permitted only for the needs of the Festival; but for the needs of a weekday it is prohibited.

Rabba said: He does not receive lashes.

And the Gemara explains their dispute:

Rabba said: He does not receive lashes,

because

we say: Since, if

guests were to lodge with him,

it would be fit for him,

what he baked would be fit for him for the needs of the Festival, to feed it to the guests—

now too,

even though guests did not lodge with him,

it is fit for him!

This baking is considered to be for the needs of that day.

And

therefore

he does not receive lashes.

Rav Hisda said: He receives lashes,

because

we do not say

“since,”

and his baking is not considered something fit for the Festival, and such baking is not permitted on account of food preparation.

But this contradicts what Rav Hisda said, that an uncircumcised person is considered a person of atonement with regard to the Passover offering because of “since”!

And apparently there is also a contradiction in Rabba’s words: regarding a Festival he holds “since,” whereas regarding an uncircumcised person with regard to the Passover offering he does not hold “since.”

Indeed, in truth the contradiction exists only in the words of Rav Hisda.

For

as for Rabba, on the contrary, there is no difficulty,

because one can distinguish:

Here,

with regard to an uncircumcised person, he is

lacking an act,

he must perform an act—to circumcise himself—in order for him to become fit. And something that is fit only through an act is not considered fit.

But this is not so

there,

with regard to baking on a Festival, where it is considered fit because

it is not lacking an act.

He does not need to perform an act in order for it to be fit for the guests; it is only necessary for the guests to come.

Rather, with regard to Rav Hisda, in relation to Rav Hisda—

certainly

there is a difficulty.

For if he does not hold “since” regarding baking on a Festival, even though it is not lacking an act, all the more so he should not have said “since” regarding an uncircumcised person with regard to the Passover offering, since he is lacking an act!

And we answer:

They said: When Rav Hisda does not hold “since,”

that is

for leniency,

such as to exempt him from lashes for baking on a Festival for the needs of a weekday.

But

for stringency,

such as to consider the uncircumcised person a person of atonement with regard to the Passover offering, and to invalidate the offering that was slaughtered with the thought that its blood would be sprinkled on his behalf—

he does hold

“since.”

And now the Gemara returns to explain the words of the earlier beraita [folio 61b]:

Mar Zutra, son of Rav Mari, said to Ravina: It teaches

in the beraita:

Since uncircumcision invalidates and impurity invalidates.

Just as with impurity, a partial impurity was not made like complete impurity,

so too with uncircumcision, partial uncircumcision was not made like complete uncircumcision.

And we consider the matter:

This impurity

about which the tannai spoke—

what are the circumstances?

If you say it refers to the impurity of people,

that impure people were counted with him,

then

according to this,

what

is the meaning of the words of the tannai who said

“a partial impurity was not made like complete impurity”?

For if there are

among the group who were counted with him

four or five impure people, and four or five pure people,

and he slaughtered it on behalf of all of them—

the impure people do not invalidate it

the Passover offering

with regard to

the

pure people

for whom he also had the intention.

And the intention of the tannai is to derive the law of partial uncircumcision from partial impurity of people.

If so, it is difficult: Why does the tannai need to derive partial uncircumcision from partial impurity?

But

with regard to uncircumcision as well—

does it not invalidate

partial uncircumcision?

As we learned:

One who slaughters the Passover offering

on behalf of circumcised and uncircumcised people—it is valid!

And one cannot say that this is known only because uncircumcision is derived from impurity. For the two invalidations are derived from the same verse, as it is written: “Each person according to his eating,” to exclude one who is not fit to eat, whether because of impurity or because of uncircumcision.

And if so,

what is different about impurity, that it is obvious to him,

the tannai,

and what is different about uncircumcision, that it is uncertain to him?

Rather,

necessarily, the beraita is speaking

of the impurity of meat.

And

according to this,

what is

“a partial impurity was not made like complete impurity”?

For if

it became impure

one of the limbs,

and that is partial impurity—that only part of the meat became impure—its law is:

That which became impure

that limb alone

we burn, and the other

the rest of the meat that remains pure

we eat.

This is not so with “complete impurity,” when all of it became impure, for then we burn all of it.

And Mar Zutra continues to challenge:

On what basis have you established it—

as referring to the impurity of meat?

Consider the latter clause,

as it teaches:

We derive a matter

uncircumcision

that does not apply to all the offerings, from a matter

impurity

that does not apply to all the offerings.

And do not prove from time, which applies to all the offerings.

And what impurity

is being discussed in the latter clause?

If you say it is the impurity of meat—

why does it not apply to all the offerings?

For all offerings whose meat became impure require burning!

Rather, it is obvious

that the latter clause is speaking

of the impurity of people.

And

according to this,

what is “it does not apply to all the offerings”?

For if it were all the offerings,

the impurity of people would not invalidate them. For

an uncircumcised person and an impure person send their offerings

to the Courtyard, and they offer them on their behalf, because with all offerings it is not necessary that the owners be fit to eat.

Whereas with the Passover offering,

the impurity of people does invalidate, for

an uncircumcised person and an impure person do not send their Passover offerings,

because it is necessary that the owners be fit to eat, as it is written: “According to his eating shall you register.”

And Mar Zutra concludes his challenge: Is it possible that

the first clause refers to the impurity of meat and the latter clause to the impurity of people?

Since in the first clause they are uncertain whether to derive uncircumcision from time or from the impurity of meat, how does it conclude in the latter clause that it is derived from impurity because uncircumcision resembles the impurity of people?

But initially we wanted to derive it not from the impurity of people, but from the impurity of meat?!

He said to him,

Ravina said to Mar Zutra:

Yes!

The tannai properly proved that since uncircumcision resembles the impurity of people, it is consequently possible to derive it from the impurity of meat, since both are invalidations of impurity.

And from

the designation “impurity” he raises the challenge,

to prove that uncircumcision more closely resembles the designation “impurity” than the designation “time.”

For since uncircumcision resembles one of the invalidations included under the designation “impurity”—the impurity of people—and does not resemble any invalidation under the designation “time,” partial uncircumcision is derived from impurity—from the impurity of meat, which is also included under the designation “impurity”—and not from time, because uncircumcision does not resemble any invalidation included under the designation “time.”

And if you wish, say

another answer:

the latter clause too

is speaking

of the impurity of meat.

And what does “it does not apply to all the offerings” mean

and we challenged this above, for all offerings whose meat became impure require burning?

This is what it is saying: Its law is not as stringent with all offerings as it is stringent with the Passover offering.

For with all offerings, whether the fat became impure

before the sprinkling of the blood

and

the

meat remains, whether the meat became impure

before the sprinkling

and the fat remains—

he sprinkles the blood.

Whereas with the Passover offering,

only if

the fat became impure

before the sprinkling

and the meat remains—

he sprinkles the blood.

Whereas with the Passover offering,

only if

the fat became impure

before the sprinkling

and the meat remains—

he sprinkles the blood.

But if

only

the

meat became impure and the fat remains—

he does not sprinkle the blood.

And we challenge this:

On what basis have you established

the latter clause, according to the second answer—

as referring to the impurity of meat?

Consider the latter clause,

as it teaches:

We derive a matter

uncircumcision

that was not permitted in its general category, from a matter

time

that was not permitted in its general category; and do not prove from impurity, for it was permitted in its general category.

On what basis?