Pesachim 61b (סא:) — the Talmud in English

They slaughtered it

to feed it

to circumcised men, [(

And Rabbi Yosef Dov Soloveitchik explains that a new law was established with regard to the Paschal offering: the law of registered participants, meaning that one must have ownership of the right to eat it. A new law of intention was also established through this: Just as there is the owner’s intention for atonement, which is relevant to the sprinkling, so too one must have in mind at the time of slaughter who is the “owner of the eating” ).]

And he also had in mind at the time of slaughter

that the uncircumcised should achieve atonement through it at the sprinkling

of the blood, whether they were registered participants or not.

Rav Ḥisda said: It is invalid; Rabba said: It is valid.

The Gemara now explains their dispute:

Rav Ḥisda said: It is invalid:

because

there is

an invalidating

intention concerning the uncircumcised [(

an intention on behalf of the uncircumcised )]

at the sprinkling.

That is, if at the time of slaughter he intended to sprinkle the blood on behalf of the uncircumcised, it is invalid.

Rabba said: It is valid; there is no

invalidating

intention concerning the uncircumcised at the sprinkling.

Rabba said: From where do I say this,

from where do I know that an intention at the time of slaughter to sprinkle the blood on behalf of the uncircumcised does not invalidate the offering?

As it was taught:

It is stated in the context of the Paschal offering [Exodus 12]: “And no uncircumcised man may eat of it.” The Mishna explains that if one slaughtered the Paschal offering on behalf of an uncircumcised man, it is invalid.

If so, one who slaughters the Paschal offering with the intention of feeding it to circumcised and uncircumcised men—

might one say that the uncircumcised man will invalidate

the

members of the group who are coming with him,

and that the offering will be invalid?

It is a matter of logical inference,

as one can derive through a binyan av that he does not invalidate it.

For the disqualification of one who slaughters on behalf of the uncircumcised can be derived from one who slaughters on behalf of ritually impure people—

since uncircumcision [(

one who slaughters on behalf of the uncircumcised

)] invalidates, and ritual impurity [(

one who slaughters on behalf of the ritually impure )]

invalidates.

Just as with ritual impurity, a partial ritual impurity is not treated

as complete ritual impurity, when he slaughtered part of it on behalf of the ritually impure and part on behalf of the ritually pure,

as complete ritual impurity,

as though he had slaughtered all of it solely on behalf of the ritually impure.

Rather, the law is that when there is partial ritual impurity, it is valid; only when there is complete ritual impurity is it invalid.

So too, uncircumcision—

a partial uncircumcision is not treated [(

when some of those who eat it are uncircumcised )]

as complete uncircumcision.

Therefore, one who slaughters on behalf of circumcised and uncircumcised men has performed a valid act. [(

The Gemara below explains why it is obvious to us that partial ritual impurity is valid, whereas in the case of partial uncircumcision we are uncertain and derive its law from ritual impurity ).]

The tanna asks:

Or perhaps go

and perhaps follow

this line of reasoning,

to derive the opposite: one who slaughters the Paschal offering on behalf of circumcised and uncircumcised men has rendered it invalid. Say as follows:

Since uncircumcision invalidates

when one slaughtered on behalf of the uncircumcised,

and improper time invalidates,

for if one slaughtered the offering with the piggul intention, intending to eat it after the time allotted for its eating, it is invalid [and is called piggul]. Therefore, the disqualification due to uncircumcision can be derived through a binyan av from the disqualification due to improper time:

Just as

the piggul intention concerning

improper time,

if one slaughtered the offering with the intention of eating only an olive-bulk of it after its prescribed time,

the Torah treated

it as

a partial improper-time [(

when he had a piggul intention only with regard to part of the offering

)] as complete improper time [(

as though he had slaughtered the offering with the intention of eating all of it after its prescribed time

)], and it is invalid. So too, uncircumcision—

a partial uncircumcision is treated as complete uncircumcision.

If so, one who slaughters the Paschal offering on behalf of circumcised and uncircumcised men will have rendered it invalid!

And since uncircumcision can be derived from ritual impurity, according to which a partial case does not invalidate, while it can also be derived from improper time, according to which a partial case does invalidate—

let us see to whom

uncircumcision

is similar:

The disqualifications of uncircumcision and ritual impurity apply only to the Paschal offering, for only one who slaughters the Paschal offering on behalf of the uncircumcised or ritually impure has rendered it invalid. But with regard to other offerings, although an uncircumcised or ritually impure person is forbidden to eat sacred food, he may nevertheless send his offering through another person,

because eating the offering is not indispensable for other offerings; it is indispensable only for the Paschal offering.

Therefore:

we derive [(

we learn )] the law of uncircumcision, which is

a matter that does not apply to all offerings,

but only to the Paschal offering,

from

the law of ritual impurity, which is also

a matter that does not apply to all offerings,

but only to the Paschal offering.

And just as with ritual impurity a partial case does not invalidate, so too with uncircumcision a partial case does not invalidate.

And do not refute this with improper time,

according to which a partial case invalidates, because improper time is more stringent than uncircumcision,

as

it

applies to all offerings [(

for if any offering is slaughtered with the intention of eating it outside its prescribed time, it is invalid

)]. Whereas uncircumcision applies only to the Paschal offering. Therefore, with regard to a partial case, one may say that specifically a partial improper-time intention invalidates because it is stringent; it is impossible to derive from it that a partial uncircumcision invalidates, since uncircumcision is more lenient and resembles ritual impurity.

The tanna continues:

Or perhaps go

and perhaps follow

this line of reasoning,

to say the opposite—that uncircumcision resembles improper time more than it resembles ritual impurity:

For with regard to the disqualifications of uncircumcision and improper time, we find no circumstance in which the Torah permitted eating the offering despite these factors. An uncircumcised person is forbidden to eat all sacred food, and likewise an offering slaughtered with the intention of eating it after its prescribed time is always invalid and forbidden to be eaten.

But with regard to ritual impurity, we find a circumstance in which the Torah permitted eating the offering in a state of ritual impurity: for example, a Paschal offering when the majority of the public is ritually impure, in which case the offering is brought in impurity and is also eaten in impurity.

Therefore,

we derive [(

we learn )] uncircumcision, which is

a matter whose exception was not permitted

with regard to any offering,

from

improper time, which is also

a matter whose exception was not permitted

with regard to any offering.

And just as with improper time a partial case invalidates, so too with uncircumcision a partial case will invalidate.

And do not refute this with ritual impurity,

according to which a partial case is valid, because ritual impurity is more lenient than uncircumcision.

As

ritual impurity

was permitted as an exception,

and therefore the Torah was lenient with regard to ritual impurity, so that it does not invalidate in a partial case. But uncircumcision is stringent, as it was not permitted as an exception; therefore, one may say that even a partial case invalidates with regard to it, as with improper time.

It follows that there are two possible approaches when one slaughters the Paschal offering on behalf of circumcised and uncircumcised men:

Should we derive the law from ritual impurity and rule that it is valid, since uncircumcision and ritual impurity resemble one another in that neither invalidates all offerings, but only the Paschal offering?

Or should we derive it from improper time and rule that it is invalid, since uncircumcision and improper time resemble one another in that neither was permitted as an exception?

If so, the question returns: From where do we know that one who slaughters the Paschal offering on behalf of circumcised and uncircumcised men has performed a valid act?

The beraita concludes:

The verse states [(

Exodus 12:43 )]

“This

is the statute of the Paschal offering.” And it is stated later in the passage [verse 48]: “And no uncircumcised man may eat of it.”

The tanna in the beraita did not explain what is derived from the verse “This.”

And we raised the question:

What is meant by “This”?

What is derived from the verse “This”?

If you say,

if you explain the beraita as deriving from “This”

that the entire uncircumcision invalidates,

meaning that only if one slaughtered the Paschal offering to eat all of it in a state of the disqualification of uncircumcision is it invalid, but

a partial case does not invalidate.

It is impossible to explain it in this manner.

For how can it be inferred from “This” that the uncircumcised man does not invalidate the members of the group who are coming with him?

Rather, it must be that

this,

the principle that a partial case of uncircumcision does not invalidate, was not learned from “This.” Rather,

it is derived from “every uncircumcised man.”

This indicates that specifically when “all” of the Paschal offering is performed on behalf of an uncircumcised man, it is invalid; but if only part of it is performed on behalf of an uncircumcised man, it is valid.

Rather, this is what it teaches.

It is necessarily the case that several words are missing from the wording of the beraita, and it should be read as follows:

The tanna first asked: From where do we know that a partial case of uncircumcision does not invalidate?

The beraita answers this:

The verse states, “And every uncircumcised man,”

teaching us that only

the entire uncircumcision invalidates.

But

a partial case does not invalidate.

Uncircumcision invalidates only at slaughter, when one slaughters the Paschal offering with the intention of feeding it to uncircumcised men.

But if one slaughters the Paschal offering with the intention of sprinkling its blood so that uncircumcised men will achieve atonement through it, it is valid.

The beraita continues:

And if you would say [(

and if you would say

)] that the same law applies to the sprinkling, that the entire uncircumcision, at any rate, [(

nevertheless )]

invalidates.

From where do you derive that there is no disqualification due to uncircumcision at all when, at the time of slaughter, one intended to sprinkle its blood solely on behalf of uncircumcised men?

The verse states, “This.”

“This” indicates that only an intention concerning a single ritual service invalidates, but not an intention at the time of slaughter concerning another service.

Therefore, only

at slaughter,

which is the first of the ritual services and with regard to which the matter of those who eat and the registered participants is stated [as will be explained below

], does the entire uncircumcision, at any rate, invalidate [(

specifically at slaughter, uncircumcision invalidates when the intention was solely on behalf of uncircumcised men )].

But

with an intention at the time of slaughter concerning

the sprinkling—

even a complete case of uncircumcision does not invalidate.

And if you would say,

and if you ask,

what

is the

leniency of the sprinkling

that is absent from slaughter, such that on account of this leniency we establish the disqualification due to uncircumcision with regard to the more stringent slaughter and exclude it from the more lenient sprinkling? The answer is: the sprinkling is more lenient because

there is no intention concerning the eaters at the sprinkling!

For the Torah did not state the disqualification of an “intention concerning the eaters” [an intention to feed it to those who may not eat it] with regard to the sprinkling, but only with regard to slaughter, as it is stated: “You shall take it according to the eating of each man” [according to Rabbi, “you shall take it” refers to slaughter; according to the first tanna, the verse speaks of slaughter because the passage states, “And they shall slaughter it

”]. Therefore, it stands to reason that the disqualification due to uncircumcision, with regard to which “This” is stated, refers to slaughter and excludes the sprinkling.

Mar Zutra, son of Rav Mari, said to Ravina: It teaches in the beraita: Since uncircumcision invalidates and ritual impurity invalidates. Just as with ritual impurity, a partial ritual impurity was not treated as complete ritual impurity, so too uncircumcision was not treated as a partial uncircumcision as complete uncircumcision. And we raised the question: This ritual impurity about which the tanna spoke— what are the circumstances? If you say it concerns the ritual impurity of people, meaning that ritually impure people were registered for it, and according to this, what is the meaning of the tanna’s statement: “It was not treated as a partial ritual impurity as complete ritual impurity”? For if there are among the group registered for it four or five ritually impure men, and four or five men who are ritually pure, and he slaughtered it on behalf of all of them— the ritually impure men do not invalidate it for the Paschal offering for the ritually pure on whose behalf he also had the intention. The tanna’s intention would be to derive the law of a partial case of uncircumcision from a partial case of the ritual impurity of people. If so, it is difficult: Why does the tanna need to derive a partial case of uncircumcision from a partial case of ritual impurity? With regard to uncircumcision too— does it not invalidate a partial group of uncircumcised men? As we learned: One who slaughters the Paschal offering on behalf of circumcised and uncircumcised men has performed a valid act! And one cannot say that this is known only because uncircumcision is derived from ritual impurity, since the two disqualifications are derived from the same verse. For it is written, “Each man according to his eating,” excluding one who is unfit to eat, whether because of ritual impurity or because of uncircumcision. If so, what is different about ritual impurity, that it is obvious to him the tanna, and what is different about uncircumcision, that he is uncertain about it? Rather, it is necessarily the case that the beraita is speaking of the ritual impurity of the meat. And according to this, what is the meaning of “it was not treated as a partial ritual impurity as complete ritual impurity”? For if one limb became impure [( became ritually impure )], one of the limbs, which is a partial ritual impurity, meaning that only part of the meat became impure, its law is: that which became impure [( that limb alone that became impure )] we burn, whereas the other [( the remaining meat, which remains ritually pure )] we eat. This is unlike “complete ritual impurity” [when all of it became impure], in which case all of it is burned. Mar Zutra continues to challenge this: On what basis did you establish it— as the ritual impurity of the meat? Consider the latter clause, which teaches: We derive a matter [( uncircumcision )] that does not apply to all offerings from a matter [( ritual impurity )] From here, Rabba learned that there is no machshevet arelim—a thought concerning uncircumcised people—in the sprinkling, as explained in the beraita according to the way we interpreted it.

And from here there is a difficulty with the statement of Rav Ḥisda, who said that there is a machshevet arelim in the sprinkling.

And Rav Ḥisda

rejects Rabba’s proof:

On the contrary,

the statement of the beraita should be interpreted

in the opposite manner, contrary to what we explained above, and it should be said that sprinkling is more stringent than slaughtering, and with regard to sprinkling, even a partial presence of uncircumcision invalidates.

opposite to what we explained above, and it can be said that sprinkling is more stringent than slaughtering, so that at the stage of sprinkling even part of the offering being intended for uncircumcised participants invalidates it.

And this is the explanation of the beraita:

The beraita asked: From where is it derived that one who slaughters the Pesach offering for circumcised and uncircumcised people does not invalidate it?

And the beraita answered this:

The verse states: “And every

uncircumcised person” —

the entire offering must be for the uncircumcised for it to be invalidated,

but

a partial presence of uncircumcision does not invalidate it.

But with regard to sprinkling—

even a partial presence of uncircumcision invalidates it,

as, if one slaughtered the Pesach offering with the intention that both circumcised and uncircumcised people attain atonement through it, it is invalid.

And the beraita asked:

And if you would say

[and if you would say]

the same is true with regard to sprinkling,

that its law is the same as the law of slaughtering,

and it is not invalidated until there is a complete presence of uncircumcision?

And the beraita answered:

The verse states “This,” which implies an exclusion: specifically this, namely

slaughtering—

slaughtering—

is the case in which a partial presence of uncircumcision does not invalidate it.

But with regard to sprinkling—

even a partial presence of uncircumcision invalidates it.

The beraita continues:

And if you would say

[and if you would say: From where do you know that the Torah’s intention in the word “this” is to exclude slaughtering, and to say that a partial presence of uncircumcision does not invalidate it, whereas sprinkling is more stringent, so that even a partial presence of uncircumcision invalidates it? On the contrary, it is possible to interpret the verse in the opposite manner: The Torah’s intention in the word “this” is to refer to sprinkling, indicating that a partial presence of uncircumcision does not invalidate it; whereas slaughtering is more stringent than it, so that even a partial presence of uncircumcision invalidates it!]

And there is a stringency associated with sprinkling, in that it is more stringent than slaughtering; therefore, it is reasonable to say that the Torah made its law more stringent as well, so that even a partial presence invalidates.

And

what is the stringency of sprinkling?

[What is the stringency associated with sprinkling?]—

For “piggul” is established only through sprinkling!

There are four procedures performed with the blood of the offering:

slaughtering, receiving, carrying, and sprinkling.

With regard to each of them, if, while performing it, one thought that he would eat an olive-bulk of the offering outside its designated time, the offering is invalidated with the disqualification of piggul, and one is liable to karet for eating an olive-bulk of the meat rendered piggul.

This is so even if he ate the offering within its designated time.

And the Sages expounded [Zevachim 28b; Menachot 16b]:

Concerning piggul it is stated: “It is piggul; it shall not be accepted” [Leviticus 19].

And concerning a valid offering it is stated: “It shall be accepted as an offering made by fire” [Leviticus 22].

Just as the acceptance of a valid offering [in whose regard it is stated “it shall be accepted”] is so, so is the acceptance of a disqualified offering [in whose regard it is stated “it shall not be accepted”].

The verse equated the acceptance of a valid offering with the “acceptance” of an offering rendered piggul.

Just as the acceptance of a valid offering is not a valid acceptance until all the permitting procedures of the offering have been performed properly [until all four procedures involving the blood have been performed properly, without any disqualifying intention],

so too, with regard to the “acceptance” of piggul, the offering is not established as having the disqualification of piggul when one had the intention during one of the procedures to eat it outside its designated time, until all its remaining permitting procedures have been performed properly—namely, with the intention to eat it within its designated time, or with a similar intention of piggul.

But if, after having had a thought of piggul concerning the offering, he performed a subsequent procedure among the procedures involving the blood with another disqualifying intention, such as the intention to eat it outside its designated place, the offering is not established as having the disqualification of piggul, and one is not liable to karet for eating it.

Therefore, if one slaughtered the offering with the intention to eat it outside its designated time, the name piggul has not yet certainly been established with regard to it, since it is possible that he will subsequently perform one of the procedures with the disqualifying intention to eat it outside its designated place. In that case, it will be established merely as disqualified, rather than as piggul, and there will be no liability to karet for eating it.

And when is the name piggul certainly established with regard to it? Only from the time the blood is sprinkled, when we see that the remaining procedures were performed properly or with a thought of piggul. At that point, it is certainly piggul.

And with this the beraita explained that sprinkling is more stringent than slaughtering, since piggul is established only through sprinkling.

And just as we find that sprinkling is more stringent than slaughtering, in that the name piggul is established only through sprinkling and not through slaughtering, so too it is said that sprinkling is more stringent than slaughtering in that only with regard to it does a partial presence of uncircumcision invalidate.

And this is in accordance with the opinion of Rav Ḥisda, that there is a machshevet arelim in the sprinkling.

From this point onward, Rabba and Rav Ḥisda both maintain that several words are missing from the beraita: from what is stated, “And every uncircumcised person,” we learn that a complete presence of uncircumcision invalidates, whereas a partial presence does not invalidate. And from what is stated, “This,” we learn that there is a distinction between slaughtering and sprinkling.

However, Rabba and Rav Ḥisda disagree as to what the distinction between slaughtering and sprinkling is:

According to Rabba—even when the entire offering is for uncircumcised people, it is valid.

And according to Rav Ḥisda—even a partial presence of uncircumcision renders it invalid.

Rav Ashi raised an objection to this,

both according to Rabba and according to Rav Ḥisda:

From where do you know that this phrase, “And every uncircumcised person,”

implies the entire offering?

From where is it derived that the meaning of the verse “And every uncircumcised person” is that the entire offering is performed with the disqualification of an uncircumcised person, and that it is necessary to derive from “This” an exclusion concerning the disqualification of an uncircumcised person in another procedure, namely sprinkling, whether as a leniency or as a stringency?

Perhaps this phrase, “And every uncircumcised person,”

implies any amount?

Perhaps the meaning of the verse “And every uncircumcised person” is any amount of uncircumcision: if even any part of the offering is performed with a thought concerning an uncircumcised person, it is invalid.

And therefore

the Merciful One wrote “This,”

which implies a complete procedure, to teach you that

it is not so until there is a complete presence of uncircumcision,

whether in slaughtering or in sprinkling—

it does not invalidate

until the entire offering is performed with the disqualification of uncircumcision.

And it is preferable to say this!

For if we say that from the verse “And every uncircumcised person” we learn that only when the entire offering has the disqualification of uncircumcision does it become invalid, it is necessary to derive from “This” that a partial presence of uncircumcision invalidates. In that case, it is necessary to force the interpretation and say that several words are missing from the beraita, and that “This” is expounded as excluding sprinkling.

But according to Rav Ashi, who says that “And every uncircumcised person” can be interpreted as any amount of uncircumcision, the beraita should be interpreted simply: “This” teaches that specifically a procedure performed entirely with uncircumcision invalidates, but not a partial presence of uncircumcision.

And according to this,

there is no difference whether it is slaughtering or sprinkling

[there is no difference between slaughtering and sprinkling], and in both cases a complete presence of uncircumcision invalidates, since the verse “This” is not superfluous; rather, it comes to teach that only a complete presence of uncircumcision invalidates. If so, there is no derivation establishing a distinction between slaughtering and sprinkling!

Rather, Rav Ashi said:

In fact, everyone agrees that there is no distinction between slaughtering and sprinkling, and if one slaughtered the Pesach offering with the intention that uncircumcised people who had been counted among those registered for it attain atonement through it, everyone agrees that it is invalid. And if some of those registered are circumcised and some are uncircumcised, everyone agrees that it is valid.

And what do Rav Ḥisda and Rabba disagree about?

They disagree with regard to one who slaughters the Pesach offering with the intention of sprinkling its blood so that people who were not counted among those registered for it, and who are uncircumcised, will attain atonement through it.

Had he slaughtered it with the intention of sprinkling its blood on behalf of eligible people who were not counted among those registered for it, it would certainly be invalid. But here, since he intended to sprinkle its blood on behalf of uncircumcised people who were not registered for it, they disagree as follows: