Pesachim 61b — the Talmud in English

They slaughtered it

in order to feed it

to circumcised persons,

And the Griz explains that a law of designated members was newly established with regard to the Passover offering: there must be ownership of the right to eat, and a law of thought was also newly established through this. Just as there is the thought of the owners with regard to atonement, and it pertains to the sprinkling, so too one must think at the time of slaughter who is the “owner of the eating”.

And he also thought at the time of slaughter

in order that uncircumcised persons be atoned for through its sprinkling

of the blood, whether they were designated members or whether they were not designated members.

Rav Hisda said: It is invalid; Rabba said: It is valid.

And now the Gemara explains their dispute:

Rav Hisda said: It is invalid:

because there

is

an invalidation of

the thought concerning uncircumcised persons

[a thought for the sake of uncircumcised persons]

in the sprinkling.

That is, if he thought at the time of slaughter to sprinkle the blood for the sake of uncircumcised persons, it is invalid.

Rabba said: It is valid: There is no

invalidation of

the thought concerning uncircumcised persons in the sprinkling.

Rabba said: From where do I say this,

from where do I know that a thought at the time of slaughter to sprinkle the blood for the sake of uncircumcised persons does not invalidate?

For it was taught:

It is stated [Exodus 12] concerning the Passover offering: “And no uncircumcised person shall eat of it.” And it is explained in the Mishna that if he slaughtered the Passover offering for an uncircumcised person, it is invalid.

If so, one who slaughters the Passover offering in order to feed it to circumcised persons and uncircumcised persons

might invalidate

the

members of the group who come with him,

and the offering would become invalid?

It is a logical inference,

one can derive from the law of an “av” that he should not invalidate it.

For the invalidation of one who slaughters for the sake of uncircumcised persons can be derived from one who slaughters for the sake of impure persons

since uncircumcision

[one who slaughters for uncircumcised persons]

invalidates, and impurity

[one who slaughters for impure persons]

invalidates.

Just as with impurity, when he did not make a part of the impurity

when he slaughtered part of it for impure persons and part of it for pure persons

like all the impurity,

as though he had slaughtered all of it solely for the sake of impure persons.

Rather, the law is that when there is a part of impurity, it is valid; only when there is all impurity is it invalid.

So too with uncircumcision—

he did not make a part of the uncircumcision

[when some of the eaters are uncircumcised]

like all the uncircumcision.

And therefore one who slaughters for the sake of circumcised persons and uncircumcised persons, it is valid.

And the Gemara below explains why it is obvious to us that a part of impurity is valid, whereas with a part of uncircumcision we are uncertain and derive it from impurity.

And the tanna asks:

Or perhaps you should go

perhaps you should go

by this path,

to derive the opposite: that one who slaughters the Passover offering for circumcised persons and uncircumcised persons is invalid. And say as follows:

Since uncircumcision invalidates

if he slaughtered for uncircumcised persons,

and time invalidates,

for if he slaughtered the offering with the thought of piggul, intending to eat it after its time of eating, it is invalid [and is called “piggul”]. Therefore we should derive the invalidation of uncircumcision by an av from the invalidation of time:

just as

the thought of piggul concerning

time,

if he slaughtered the offering intending to eat only an olive-sized portion of it outside its time,

the verse made in it

the

part of the time

[when he thought the thought of piggul only with regard to part of the offering]

like all the time

[as though he had slaughtered the offering with the thought of eating all of it outside its time], and it is invalid.

So too with uncircumcision—

it made a part of the uncircumcision like all the uncircumcision.

And if so, one who slaughters the Passover offering for circumcised persons and uncircumcised persons will be invalid!

And since it is possible to derive uncircumcision from impurity, that a part does not invalidate, and it is possible to derive it from time, that a part does invalidate,

let us see to whom

uncircumcision

is similar:

The invalidations of uncircumcision and impurity apply only to the Passover offering, for only one who slaughters the Passover offering for uncircumcised persons and impure persons is invalid. But with other offerings, although an uncircumcised person and an impure person are forbidden to eat sacred offerings, nevertheless they can send their offering by means of another,

because eating the offering does not prevent its validity with other offerings, but only with the Passover offering.

And therefore:

we derive

[we learn] the law of uncircumcision, which is

something that does not apply to all the offerings,

but only to the Passover offering,

from

the law of impurity, which is also

something that does not apply to all the offerings,

but only to the Passover offering.

And just as with impurity its part does not invalidate, so too with uncircumcision its part does not invalidate.

And do not prove [anything] from time,

which a part invalidates, because time is more stringent than uncircumcision,

as

it

applies to all the offerings

[for all the offerings, if he slaughtered them to eat them not in their time, are invalid]. Whereas uncircumcision applies only to the Passover offering.

And therefore, with regard to a part, one may say that specifically a part of time invalidates because it is stringent, and it is impossible to derive from it that a part of uncircumcision, which is less stringent and resembles impurity, invalidates.

And the tanna continues:

Or perhaps you should go

perhaps you should go

by this path,

to say the opposite—that uncircumcision resembles time more than it resembles impurity:

For concerning the invalidation of uncircumcision and time, we find no circumstance in which the Torah permitted eating an offering with these disqualifications. An uncircumcised person is forbidden to eat all sacred offerings, and likewise an offering that was slaughtered with the intention of eating it outside its time is always invalid and forbidden to eat.

But concerning impurity, we find a circumstance in which the Torah permitted eating the offering in impurity, such as the Passover offering when the majority of the public is impure, when the offering is brought in impurity and is also eaten in impurity.

And therefore

we derive

[we learn] uncircumcision, which is

something that was not permitted in its exceptional case

with any offering,

from

time, which is also

something that was not permitted in its exceptional case

with any offering.

And just as with time a part invalidates, so too with uncircumcision a part will invalidate.

And do not prove [anything] from impurity,

where a part is valid, because impurity is less stringent than uncircumcision.

As

impurity

was permitted in its exceptional case,

and therefore the Torah was lenient with impurity, so that it does not invalidate in part. But uncircumcision, which is stringent because it was not permitted in its exceptional case, perhaps even a part will invalidate, as with time.

And it emerges that we have two sides regarding one who slaughtered the Passover offering for the sake of circumcised persons and uncircumcised persons—

whether to derive from impurity that it is valid, since uncircumcision and impurity resemble one another, as both were not made invalid with all the offerings but only with the Passover offering;

or whether we should derive from time that it is invalid, since uncircumcision and time resemble one another, as neither was permitted in its exceptional case.

And if so, the question returns: from where do we know that one who slaughters the Passover offering for circumcised persons and uncircumcised persons is valid?

And the beraita concludes:

The verse states

[Exodus 12:43]

“This

is the statute of the Passover.” And it is stated further in the passage [verse 48]: “And no uncircumcised person shall eat of it.”

And the tanna in the beraita did not explain what is learned from the word “This.”

And we raised a difficulty concerning it:

What is “This”?

What is learned from the word “This”?

If you say

if you interpret the beraita as teaching from “This”

that all of the uncircumcision invalidates,

that specifically if he slaughtered the Passover offering to eat all of it with the disqualification of uncircumcision, it is invalid, but

part of it does not invalidate.

It is impossible to interpret it in this way.

For how is it implied from “This” that the uncircumcised person does not invalidate the members of the group who come with him?

Rather, necessarily,

this,

this matter—that a part of uncircumcision does not invalidate—was not learned from “This.” Rather,

it follows from “every uncircumcised person.”

For it implies that specifically if “all” of the Passover offering was made for an uncircumcised person, it is invalidated. But if only part of it was made for an uncircumcised person, it is valid.

Rather, no; this is what it teaches.

Necessarily, we must say that several words are missing from the words of the beraita, and this is what it must say:

First the tanna asked: from where is it known that a part of uncircumcision does not invalidate?

And concerning this the beraita answers—

the verse states, “And every uncircumcised person,”

to teach us that only

all of the uncircumcision invalidates.

But

part of it does not invalidate.

And uncircumcision invalidates only with slaughter—that he slaughtered the Passover offering intending to feed it to uncircumcised persons.

But if he slaughtered the Passover offering intending to sprinkle its blood so that uncircumcised persons would be atoned for through it, it is valid.

And the beraita continues:

And if you would say

[and if you would say] that

the same law applies to sprinkling, that all of the uncircumcision, in any event

[nevertheless]

invalidates.

And from where do you learn that there is no invalidation of uncircumcision at all if he thought at the time of slaughter to sprinkle its blood only for uncircumcised persons?

The verse states, “This”.

For “This” implies that only a thought during one service invalidates, but not a thought at the time of slaughter concerning another service.

And therefore only

with slaughter,

which is the beginning of the services and with regard to which the matter of eaters and designated members is stated [as will be explained below],

is it that all of the uncircumcision, in any event, invalidates

[specifically with slaughter does uncircumcision invalidate, and when the thought was only for uncircumcised persons].

But

with a thought at the time of slaughter concerning

sprinkling—

even all of the uncircumcision does not invalidate.

And if you would say,

and if you ask,

what

is the

leniency of sprinkling

that is not present with slaughter, through the force of which leniency we establish the invalidation of uncircumcision with slaughter, which is more stringent, and exclude it from sprinkling, which is more lenient? Your answer is: sprinkling is lenient because

there is no thought concerning eaters with sprinkling!

For the Torah did not write the invalidation of “the thought concerning eaters” [the thought to feed it to those who may not eat it] with regard to sprinkling, but rather with regard to slaughter, as it is stated: “Each man according to his eating shall you count yourselves” [according to Rabbi, “you shall count yourselves” means slaughter; and according to the first tanna, the verse speaks of slaughter because it is stated in the passage, “And they shall slaughter it”].

And therefore it is reasonable that the invalidation of uncircumcision, concerning which “This” was stated, refers to slaughter, and excludes sprinkling.

And from here Rabba learned that there is no thought concerning uncircumcised persons in the sprinkling, as explained in the beraita according to how we interpreted it.

And from here there is an objection to the words of Rav Hisda, who said that there is a thought concerning uncircumcised persons in the sprinkling.

And Rav Hisda

rejects Rabba’s proof:

On the contrary,

the words of the beraita should be interpreted

to the other side,

opposite to what we explained above, and it should be said that the sprinkling is more stringent than the slaughtering, and in the sprinkling even part of the uncircumcision renders it unfit.

And this is the explanation of the beraita:

The beraita asked: From where is it derived that one who slaughters the Passover offering for circumcised persons and uncircumcised persons does not render it unfit?

And concerning this the beraita answered:

The verse says, “And every

uncircumcised person” —

all of it being uncircumcision renders it unfit,

but

part of it does not render it unfit.

But the sprinkling —

even part of it also renders it unfit,

for if he slaughtered the Passover offering with the intention that circumcised persons and uncircumcised persons should achieve atonement through it, it is unfit.

And the beraita asked:

And if you would say [

and if you say]

the same law applies to the sprinkling,

that its law should be like the law of slaughtering,

that it does not render it unfit until there is complete uncircumcision.

And the beraita answered:

The verse says “this.” For it implies limitation, that specifically this, namely

slaughtering—

slaughtering —

is the case in which part of it does not render it unfit.

But the sprinkling —

even part of it renders it unfit.

And the beraita continues:

And if you would say [and if you say: From where do you know that the Torah’s intention in “this” is to limit slaughtering, and to say that part of it does not render it unfit, whereas the sprinkling is more stringent, so that even part of it renders it unfit? On the contrary, it is possible to interpret it oppositely: that the Torah’s intention in “this” is the sprinkling, so that part of it does not render it unfit, while slaughtering is more stringent than it, so that even part of it renders it unfit]!

and if you were to say: From where do you know that the Torah’s intention in saying “this” is to limit the rule to slaughtering, and to say that part of it does not invalidate it, whereas sprinkling is more stringent, so that even part of it invalidates it? On the contrary, the opposite can be interpreted: the Torah’s intention in saying “this” is to refer to sprinkling, in which part of it does not invalidate it, while slaughtering is more stringent than sprinkling, so that even part of it invalidates it]!

And there is a stringency in the sprinkling, that it is more stringent than slaughtering, and therefore it is logical to say that the Torah made it more stringent in it, so that even part renders it unfit.

And

what is the stringency of the sprinkling? [

what is the stringency in the sprinkling?] —

that “piggul” is established only through the sprinkling!

Four services are performed with the blood of the offering:

Slaughtering, receiving, conveying, and sprinkling.

In each one of them, if he intended, at the time he performed it, to eat an olive-sized portion of the offering outside its appointed time, the offering is rendered unfit with the disqualification of piggul, and he is liable to karet for eating an olive-sized portion of the flesh that has been rendered piggul.

This is so even if he ate the offering within its appointed time.

And the Sages expounded [Zevahim 28b, Menahot 16b]:

It is stated concerning piggul: “It is piggul; it shall not be accepted” [Leviticus 19].

And it is stated concerning a fit offering: “It shall be accepted as an offering made by fire” [Leviticus 22].

Just as the acceptance of a fit offering [about which it is stated, “it shall be accepted”] is so, so is the acceptance of an unfit offering [about which it is stated, “it shall not be accepted”].

The verse equated the acceptance of a fit offering with the “acceptance” of an offering that has been rendered piggul.

Just as the acceptance of a fit offering is not a valid acceptance until all the offering’s permitters have been brought [until all four services of the blood have been performed validly, without any thought of disqualification].

So too, with the “acceptance” of piggul, the offering is not established with the disqualification of piggul when he intended in one of the services to eat it outside its appointed time, until all its other permitters have been brought validly, namely with the intention to eat it within its appointed time, or with a similar thought of piggul.

But if, after he conceived a thought of piggul concerning the offering, he performed another service among the services of the blood with another disqualification, such as with the thought of outside its place, the offering is not established with the disqualification of piggul, and one is not liable to karet for eating it.

Therefore, if he slaughtered the offering with the thought of outside its appointed time, the designation of piggul has certainly not yet been established upon it, for it is possible that afterward he will perform one of the services with a disqualifying thought of eating it outside its place, in which case it will not be established as piggul, but merely as an unfit offering, and there will be no liability to karet for eating it.

And when is the designation of piggul certainly established upon it? Only from the time that the blood is sprinkled, and we see that the other services were performed validly or with a thought of piggul. For then it is certainly piggul.

And with this the beraita answered that the sprinkling is more stringent than slaughtering, for piggul is established only through the sprinkling.

And just as we find that the sprinkling is more stringent than slaughtering, in that the designation of piggul is established only through the sprinkling and not through slaughtering, so we say that the sprinkling is more stringent than slaughtering in that only through it does part of the uncircumcision render it unfit.

And this is in accordance with the view of Rav Hisda, that there is a thought concerning uncircumcised persons in the sprinkling.

And from now on, Rabba and Rav Hisda both hold that several words are missing from the beraita, and that from what is stated, “And every uncircumcised person,” we learn that all of it being uncircumcision renders it unfit, while part of it does not render it unfit. But from what is stated, “this,” we learn that there is a distinction between slaughtering and sprinkling.

However, Rabba and Rav Hisda disagree as to what the distinction between slaughtering and sprinkling is:

According to Rabba — even if all of it is uncircumcision, it is fit.

And according to Rav Hisda — even part of the uncircumcision renders it unfit.

Rav Ashi raised an objection against it,

both according to Rabba and according to Rav Hisda:

From where is it established that this “and every uncircumcised person” —

implies all of it!?

From where is it established that the meaning of the verse “and every uncircumcised person” is that the entire offering is performed with the disqualification of an uncircumcised person, and that it is necessary to expound “this” to limit the disqualification of an uncircumcised person in another service, the sprinkling, either leniently or stringently?

Perhaps this “and every uncircumcised person” —

implies any amount!?

Perhaps the meaning of the verse “and every uncircumcised person” is any amount of uncircumcision: if any part of the offering was performed with a thought concerning an uncircumcised person, it is unfit.

And therefore

the Merciful One wrote “this,”

for it implies an entire service, to teach you that

until there is complete uncircumcision,

whether in slaughtering or in sprinkling —

it does not render it unfit,

but only until the entire offering is performed with the disqualification of uncircumcision.

And is it not preferable to say this?

For if we say that from the verse “and every uncircumcised person” we learn that specifically when the entire offering has the disqualification of uncircumcision it renders it unfit, it is necessary to expound from “this” that part of the uncircumcision renders it unfit. And then it is necessary to force the interpretation and say that words are missing from the beraita, and to expound “this” as limiting the sprinkling.

Whereas according to the words of Rav Ashi, that it is possible to interpret “and every uncircumcised person” as any amount of uncircumcision, the beraita should be interpreted according to its plain meaning: “this” teaches that specifically a service that was performed entirely with uncircumcision renders it unfit, but not part of the uncircumcision.

And according to this,

it makes no difference whether in slaughtering or whether in sprinkling [

there is no difference between slaughtering and sprinkling], and in both of them complete uncircumcision renders it unfit, for the verse “this” is not superfluous, but comes to teach that only complete uncircumcision renders it unfit. If so, there is no exposition at all to distinguish between slaughtering and sprinkling!

Rather, Rav Ashi said:

In truth, according to everyone there is no distinction between slaughtering and sprinkling, and if he slaughtered the Passover offering with the intention that uncircumcised persons who had been registered for it should achieve atonement through it, according to everyone it is unfit. And if some of them are circumcised and some of them are uncircumcised, according to everyone it is fit.

And in what do Rav Hisda and Rabba disagree?

They disagree concerning one who slaughters the Passover offering with the intention of sprinkling its blood so that people who had not been registered for it should achieve atonement through it, and they are uncircumcised.

Had he slaughtered it with the intention of sprinkling its blood for the sake of fit persons who had not been registered for it, it would certainly be unfit. But here, since he intended to sprinkle its blood for the sake of uncircumcised persons who were not registered, they disagree as follows: