Pesachim 61a — the Talmud in English

And it remains after death.

For if the father was liable for an offering and died, and left property, the property is liened for bringing from it the father’s liability, and whoever inherits the property offers from it the offering for which the father was liable. And if they slaughtered the offering for the sake of another offering, it is thereby disqualified, and the property remains under its lien until he brings from it another offering and offers it properly.

And it applies to a

offering

of the community as to an

offering

of an individual,

because a change of sacred designation disqualifies even offerings of the community.

Can you say this regarding a change of owners,

which is less severe than a change of sacred designation—

for its disqualification is not

by virtue of thought

in its body,

of the offering, but by virtue of thought concerning the owners.

And it

disqualifies

in

all

four

of the

services

of the blood, but only in the sprinkling. For ownership of the offering exists only with regard to atonement, and atonement exists only through sprinkling; consequently, a change of owners is considered a change only if he changes the name of the owners during sprinkling. This is not so with the other services, over which the name of owners is not stated: if he thinks during them for the sake of other owners, this is not a change.

And it

is not

disqualified after death,

because after death there is no name of owners upon it; therefore, if he thinks for the sake of another, he does not disqualify it.

And it

does not

disqualify in an

offering

of the community as in an

offering

of an individual.

For a change of owners does not apply to the community, since all Israel are the owners of the offering. And if he slaughters it for the sake of gentiles, it does not disqualify it, because a change of owners disqualifies only if he changes it for the sake of another who is likewise liable for atonement. But if he changes it for the sake of one who is not liable for atonement, it does not disqualify it. [For a change of owners is derived from “to make atonement for him,” and not for his fellow; therefore, we require that his fellow be liable for atonement like him.] And a gentile is not liable for atonement.

And we explain further:

And although two

of the refutations above

are not specifically so [

in truth, they are not refutations],

at least two are specifically so.

And we explain which of the refutations are not specifically so:

For what difference is there between a change of owners, whose disqualification is not in its body, since its disqualification

is through

merely thought,

and thought is not a disqualification in the body of the offering [and a disqualification in the body of the offering is, for example, when the flesh became impure or went outside its designated boundary]?

A change of sacred designation likewise has its disqualification

through

merely thought,

and it is not a disqualification in the body of the offering.

And furthermore—

this statement that a change of owners does not apply after death.

This is not according to everyone, for the amoraim disputed this in tractate Zevachim [4b and 7b].

And according to Rav Pinhas, son of Rav Ami, who says that there is a change of owners after death [

for the heir is an owner and one must slaughter it for his sake, and if they slaughtered it for the sake of another person, it did not count for the obligation, and the heir must bring another offering]—

what can be said [

how can one state a refutation: “What is the case with a change of sacred designation, which applies after death,” when a change of owners also applies after death]?

And we conclude:

at least two

of the refutations

are indeed specifically so,

and the words of Rav Pappa are rejected, since he sought to declare a Paschal offering fit during the rest of the year when slaughtered not for the sake of its owners, by an analogy from a change of sacred designation.

And we conclude:

Rather, Rava said: A Paschal offering that they slaughtered during the rest of the year with a change of owners becomes like one that has no owners in its proper time [

that is, like one slaughtered in its proper time not for the sake of its owners],

and it is disqualified.

Mishna:

There is a novelty regarding the Paschal offering that does not apply to all offerings: the obligation to eat is a principal purpose in bringing it. Therefore, the Paschal offering must have “owners for its eating,” just as every offering has “owners for its atonement.”

This ownership is expressed in that the Paschal offering is slaughtered only for its appointed people, and its meaning is that the Paschal offering must be slaughtered for the sake of the “owners for its eating,” in addition to the need to slaughter it for one who is “an owner for its atonement.”

A. The Paschal offering that they

slaughtered

with the intention of feeding its flesh

to those who are not fit to eat it,

such as elderly people or sick people who are unable to eat an olive-sized portion.

And

likewise, if they slaughtered it with the intention of feeding it

to those not appointed to it,

but to members of another group.

And likewise, if they slaughtered it to feed it

to the uncircumcised and the impure—

it is disqualified.

Because all these are unfit to eat the Paschal offering, and the Paschal offering must be slaughtered for those fit to eat it.

But if they slaughtered it with the intention of feeding part of it

to those fit to eat it and

part of it

to those not fit to eat it,

and likewise if they slaughtered it in the same manner

for those appointed to it and those not appointed to it, for the circumcised and the uncircumcised, for the impure and the pure—

it is fit.

Since some of them are fit to eat it, the offering is not disqualified; and the Gemara explains the reason.

B. The Paschal offering that they

slaughtered before midday

of the day

is disqualified, because it is stated [

Exodus 12]: “And they shall slaughter it, the entire congregation of the assembly of Israel,

between the evenings,”

which means after midday.

C. And if

they slaughtered it before the daily offering

of the afternoon,

it is fit.

Although ideally the slaughter of the Paschal offering should be delayed until after the slaughter of the daily offering,

provided

that he does not sprinkle its blood immediately, but rather

another person shall keep stirring [

mixing]

its blood,

so that it does not congeal,

until he sprinkles

the blood of

the daily offering,

and only after they have sprinkled the blood of the daily offering shall he sprinkle the blood of the Paschal offering.

And if the blood

of the Paschal offering was sprinkled before the daily offering,

it is fit.

And although the Sages expounded [above, 59a] that the daily offering precedes the Paschal offering, because regarding the Paschal offering it is stated “in the evening” and “between the evenings,” whereas regarding the daily offering only “between the evenings” is stated [which indicates that the Paschal offering must be later than the daily offering], nevertheless, this law applies only ideally; but after the fact it is fit.

Gemara:

The Sages taught: How

is the thought of

“those who are not fit to eat it”?

One who slaughters

for the sake of [

for the sake of] the eating of

a sick person, or for the sake of

the eating of

an elderly person,

who are unable to eat an olive-sized portion.

How does “those not appointed to it” apply?

The members of

this

group were appointed to it, and they slaughtered it for the sake of

the eating of the members of

another group.

And we raise an objection:

From where are these matters,

from where did they learn this law, that a Paschal offering that they slaughtered for those not fit to eat it and for those not appointed to it is disqualified?

And we answer:

For the Sages taught:

It is stated concerning the Paschal offering [Exodus 12]: “And he shall take it, and his neighbor who is close to his house,

according to the number

of persons.” And “number” means a count.

And later in the passage it is stated: “And they shall slaughter it.”

This teaches—

that the Paschal offering is slaughtered only for those appointed to it.

“And they shall slaughter it” is expounded with reference to “according to the number of persons,” to say that they shall slaughter it for the sake of those appointed to it.

One might have thought that if they slaughtered it not for those appointed to it, it would be

merely considered

as transgressing the mitzva

of “according to the number of persons,” but

and

nevertheless, the offering would be

fit

after the fact?

The verse states

twice:

A.

“According to the number of persons.”

B. “Each man according to his eating,

you shall count yourselves

for the lamb”—“you shall count yourselves,” in the language of counting.

The verse repeated it,

repeating this law—that the Paschal offering is slaughtered only for those appointed to it—twice, in order to teach that this law is

essential to validity,

so that if they slaughtered it not for those appointed to it, it is disqualified. [

This is a general principle regarding all sacred offerings: every mitzva that was repeated twice—“the verse repeated it as essential to validity.”]

Rabbi says:

How do we know that the law of “according to the number” [for those appointed to it] is stated with regard to the service of slaughtering, so that if they slaughtered it with the intention of feeding it to those not appointed to it, it is disqualified? Perhaps the verse refers to another service among the other services, such as sprinkling, since it is written in the Torah, “Each man according to his eating, you shall count yourselves for the lamb.” And “you shall count yourselves”

is the language of Suristani

in the Aramaic language [which is called Dorsai]

it is.

And its meaning is

like a person saying to his fellow: Slaughter

a lamb

for me, this lamb!

And we learn that the law concerning those appointed to it was stated at the time of slaughter. One must have the intention at the time of slaughter that it be for those appointed to it.

And according to Rabbi, it is unnecessary to expound “and they shall slaughter it” as referring to the time of slaughter.

And we raise an objection:

We have found [

we have found] that one who slaughters

not for those appointed to it

is disqualified.

One who slaughters

for those not fit to eat it—

from where do we know

that it is disqualified?

And we answer:

The verse says:

It is stated [there]:

“Each man according to his eating, you shall count yourselves.”

“According to his eating”—this indicates one fit to eat; it excludes a sick person and an elderly person [even if they are appointed to it].

“You shall count yourselves”—we have already heard above that this specifically refers to those appointed to it.

And through this,

those fit to eat are equated with those appointed to it.

And we learn from the equivalence that just as slaughtering with the intention of feeding it to those not appointed to it disqualifies even after the fact, so too, slaughtering with the intention of feeding it to those not fit to eat it disqualifies even after the fact.

We learned in the Mishna that a Paschal offering that they slaughtered for the uncircumcised and the impure is disqualified.