Pesachim 60b — the Talmud in English

And this proves from it:

rather, is it not that

the matter is speaking of both

in one service [the thought occurred during the slaughter itself: for those fit to eat it and for those unfit to eat it, and it is valid because the fact that some of the eaters are fit does not invalidate it] and in two services [he slaughters it for those fit to eat it with the intention of sprinkling its blood for those unfit to eat it; and even though his thought concerning the sprinkling is entirely for those unfit to eat it, it is valid because an invalidating thought concerning the eaters does not invalidate the sprinkling].

при которой во время самого заклания он намеревался, чтобы его ели пригодные для него и непригодные для него, и жертва пригодна, поскольку намерение относительно лишь части едоков не делает ее непригодной, — так и о двух службах [при которых он закалывает ее с намерением, чтобы ее ели пригодные для нее, а кровь окропить с намерением, чтобы ее ели непригодные для нее; и хотя его намерение относительно окропления целиком направлено на непригодных для нее, жертва пригодна, поскольку намерение, делающее жертву непригодной из-за едоков, не делает ее непригодной при окроплении]].

And we conclude as a proof:

and from the latter clause “

for those fit to eat it and for those unfit to eat it,” even

in one service—

the first clause also [which teaches: “for its sake and not for its sake, it is invalid”] speaks even

[где сказано: «для его имени и не для его имени — непригодно»] речь идет даже

in one service.

And it is invalid because a person is caught by the conclusion of his words, in accordance with Rabbi Yosei, and not in accordance with Rabbi Meir.

And we reject this:

is it necessarily so [and is this a proof]?!

[разве это доказательство]?!

For it is possible to establish each clause

each according to what applies to it and each according to what applies to it [each one according to what belongs to it].

[каждую — согласно подходящему для нее случаю].

The latter clause [“for those fit to eat it and for those unfit to eat it”] certainly speaks even

[«пригодным для него и непригодным для него»] несомненно идет речь даже

in one service,

as we have proved.

But the first clause [“for its sake and not for its sake”] speaks

[«для его имени и не для его имени»] речь может идти

either

both in two services and

in one service [and it is invalid because a person is caught by the conclusion of his words],

[и жертва непригодна, поскольку человек считается связанным своими заключительными словами],

or

only

in two services [but in one service it is valid, because a person is caught by the beginning of his words].

[но при одной службе жертва пригодна, поскольку человек считается связанным своими начальными словами].

And in conclusion, the uncertainty was not resolved, and it is possible to establish our Mishna either as referring to one service and in accordance with Rabbi Yosei, or to two services and in accordance with Rabbi Meir.

We learned in our Mishna that the Passover-offering is valid only if he slaughtered it for its sake.

And if he slaughtered it not for its sake, it is invalid; this applies specifically when he slaughters it at its appointed time, on the fourteenth of Nisan.

But if he consecrated it before its appointed time and slaughtered it before the fourteenth of Nisan, the law is the opposite. For a Passover-offering that he slaughtered before its appointed time is invalid.

And from now, if he slaughtered it before its appointed time for its sake, this is a Passover-offering that he slaughtered not at its appointed time, which is invalid.

But if he slaughtered it for the sake of a peace-offering, the designation “Passover-offering” is removed from it and it becomes a peace-offering. For before its appointed time, the thought for the sake of a peace-offering is effective in removing the designation “Passover-offering” from it, and peace-offerings are valid at every time.

And it emerges that, with regard to a Passover-offering during the rest of the days of the year, the thought for its sake is an invalidating thought, while the thought not for its sake is a valid thought.

And accordingly,

they raised a dilemma: A Passover-offering that he slaughtered during the rest of the days of the year for its sake [which is an invalidating thought]

[что является намерением, делающим ее непригодной]

and not for its sake [which is a valid thought]—

[что является намерением, делающим ее пригодной] —

what is the law?

And the sides of the uncertainty are:

Does the thought

намерение

not for its sake [which is valid]

[которое делает жертву пригодной]

come

and remove

it from

the thought

for its sake [which invalidates it],

[делающего ее непригодной] и

and render it valid?

Or not?

When Rav Dimi came, he said: I stated the following teaching

of below

before Rabbi Yirmeya,

that it is possible to resolve the uncertainty by means of an a fortiori derivation:

Since

the thought

for its sake renders it valid at its appointed time, and

the thought

not for its sake renders it valid not at its appointed time—

just as with for its sake, which renders it valid at its appointed time, it does not remove it from not for its sake [and “not for its sake and for its sake” is invalid],

[и если было намерение не ради его имени, а затем ради его имени, жертва непригодна],

so too, with not for its sake, which renders it valid not at its appointed time, it does not remove it from for its sake, and it is invalid.

And he said to me: No!

For it can be refuted:

If you have said this with regard to not for its sake, for

this is a severe invalidation, since it

applies to all the offerings,

for in all the offerings there is the invalidation of not for its sake.

But the invalidation is not equal in all of them: for a Passover-offering and a sin-offering that were offered not for their sake are entirely invalid and require burning, whereas the other offerings that were offered not for their sake are valid with regard to the fact that their blood is sprinkled, their sacrificial portions are burned, and their flesh is eaten.

But they are invalid with regard to the fact that the owners have not fulfilled their obligation through this offering, and they are required to bring another offering in order to fulfill their obligation. And so we learned in the beginning of Zevachim.

And since the invalidation of not for its sake applies to all the offerings, its law is therefore severe; specifically there, a valid thought is not effective to remove it entirely from the invalidating thought and render it valid.

Can you say with regard to

the invalidation of

for its sake [which invalidates a Passover-offering not at its appointed time], that its law is lenient,

[которое делает пасхальную жертву непригодной не в установленное для нее время], поскольку ее закон легче,

for it does not apply to all the offerings, but only to a Passover-offering

during the rest of the days of the year

alone?

And since its law is lenient, it is possible that the valid thought has the power to remove it entirely from the thought for its sake [which invalidates it in this case] and render it valid.

And we conclude:

what has become of it?

Rava said: A Passover-offering that he slaughtered during the rest of the days of the year for its sake and not for its sake—

is valid.

For, by default, it stands for its sake [for this is the law with all the offerings: if he slaughtered one without any particular thought, it is valid as though he had explicitly thought of its sake, as we conclude at the beginning of Zevachim],

[таков закон относительно всех жертв: если их закололи без какого-либо особого намерения, они пригодны, как если бы было явно задумано принести их ради их имени, как мы заключаем в начале трактата Звахим],

and even so, when he slaughters it [the Passover-offering before its appointed time]

[пасхальную жертву до установленного для нее времени]

not for its sake—

it is valid.

It follows that not for its sake comes [with regard to a Passover-offering during the rest of the days of the year]

[у пасхальной жертвы в остальные дни года]

and removes it from for its sake [from the default assumption that is considered like for its sake].

[то есть из-под действия безымянного намерения, которое считается намерением ради ее имени].

And therefore,

when he also slaughters it

explicitly

for its sake and not for its sake—

not for its sake comes and removes it from for its sake,

and it is valid.

And we reject this:

Rav Adda bar Ahava said to Rava: Perhaps it is different when he says

explicitly “for its sake” and afterward says “not for its sake”—for then we can say that not for its sake does not have the power to remove it from what he explicitly said for its sake—

from when he does not say

explicitly “for its sake,” but there is only the default assumption that it is for its sake; since there was only the default assumption that it is for its sake, not for its sake is effective to remove it from that assumption.

And a proof of this distinction is:

for indeed, if he slaughtered the Passover-offering with the thought

for those fit to eat it

and for those unfit to eat it, it is valid,

and “for those unfit to eat it” is not effective to remove it from the thought “for those fit to eat it” and invalidate it.

And

if

in every case where he slaughters it only for those unfit to eat it, it is invalid,

and why?

For, by default, it stands for those fit to eat it,

and why is it not considered as though it had been with the thought “for those fit to eat it and for those unfit to eat it,” which is valid?!

Rather, it is different when he says

explicitly “for those fit to eat it”—there, “for those unfit to eat it” is not effective to remove it from that entirely, and it is valid—

from when he does not say

anything, but there is only the default assumption that it is for those fit to eat it—there, “for those unfit to eat it” is effective to remove it from the default assumption that it is for those fit to eat it, and it is therefore invalid.

So too, it is different when he says from when he does not say.

He said to him

Rava to Rav Adda bar Ahava:

is it necessarily so [and Rashi’s version reads:

[а у Раши другая версия:

how can this be compared

and he explained: Is it possible to compare the default assumption that it is for those fit to eat it with the default assumption that it is for its sake, and to bring proof from one to the other?]

For there is a distinction to be made:

Granted, there

with regard to the default assumption that it is for its sake,

as long [as long as]

[все время]

he has not removed it through the slaughter, its default assumption certainly stands for its sake,

for after it has been consecrated as a Passover-offering, it is impossible to change its consecration to that of another offering through mere speech [and only by slaughtering it for the sake of a peace-offering does he remove the designation “Passover-offering” from it].

And if so, it certainly stands only for the sake of a Passover-offering. And even so, “not for its sake” is effective to remove it from the default assumption that it is for its sake and render it valid. It emerges that, on the one hand, the default assumption that it is for its sake is absolute and strong, and on the other hand, “not for its sake” is sufficiently strong to remove it from that assumption; and this is proof that the thought “not for its sake” has great power.

Therefore, I properly said that if its power is great enough to remove it from a default assumption that stands absolutely for its sake, likewise its great power will enable it to remove it from an explicit statement that it is for its sake.

But here,

with regard to the thought concerning the eaters—is it an absolute matter that

its default assumption

specifically

stands for those fit to eat it

или

?

For even after they have consecrated it, while the offering is still alive, there is always the possibility that

perhaps these

first people will withdraw their hands from being registered for it,

and others will come

and acquire it from the first ones,

and register themselves for it [

others ].

For we learned: people may register themselves [it is possible to register oneself for the Passover-offering],

[то есть стать участником пасхальной жертвы]

and they may withdraw their hands from it [one who had already been registered for it may withdraw his hands from it]

[тот, кто уже числился среди ее участников, может отказаться от своего участия]

until it is slaughtered.

And therefore, even if “for those unfit to eat it” removes it from the default assumption that it is for those fit to eat it and invalidates the offering, this is not because the thought “for those unfit to eat it” has great power, but because the default assumption that it is for those fit to eat it is not absolute.

Accordingly, if he explicitly said “for those fit to eat it,” “for those unfit to eat it” does not have the power to remove it from that.

And it emerges that only with regard to “for those unfit to eat it” is it possible to distinguish that it is different when he says from when he does not say. But with regard to “not for its sake,” there is no distinction between when he says it and when he does not say it.

And through this the proof of Rav Adda bar Ahava is rejected [who wished to distinguish between when he says it and when he does not say it with regard to “not for its sake”].

And Rava’s resolution remains: “for its sake and not for its sake” during the rest of the days of the year is valid, for we derive from “not for its sake” alone that it removes it from the default assumption that it is for its sake.

And the Gemara brings another uncertainty concerning the removal of the designation “Passover-offering” when he slaughters it not at its appointed time:

They raised a dilemma: A Passover-offering that he slaughtered during the rest of the days of the year with a change of owners [it belonged to Reuven and he slaughtered it for the sake of Shimon, but he did not remove the designation “Passover-offering” from it]—

[она принадлежала Реувену, а ее закололи ради Шимона, но статус пасхальной жертвы с нее не сняли] —

what is the law?

Is it valid as a peace-offering through this thought, or not?

And the sides of the uncertainty are:

Do we say that

a change of owners

with regard to a Passover-offering not at its appointed time is

similar to a change of sacred designation [like changing the name of the offering—from a Passover-offering to a peace-offering],

[например, изменению названия жертвы — с пасхальной жертвы на мирную жертву],

and renders it valid

according to the status of a peace-offering?

Or not?

Rav Pappa said: I stated the following teaching [of below]

[приведенное далее]

before Rava,

that it is possible to resolve the uncertainty by means of an a fortiori derivation:

Since a change of sacred designation invalidates it at its appointed time, and a change of owners invalidates it at its appointed time.

For the law of a change of owners is equal to the law of a change of sacred designation: a Passover-offering and a sin-offering are entirely invalidated both through a change of sacred designation and through a change of owners. And the other offerings are invalidated in the sense that they do not count for the owners as an obligation, but their blood is sprinkled and their flesh is eaten, both through a change of sacred designation and through a change of owners.

Therefore, one can derive:

just as a change of sacred designation, which invalidates it at its appointed time, renders it valid after its appointed time,

so too, a change of owners, which invalidates it at its appointed time, renders it valid after its appointed time.

And he said to me: No!

For it can be refuted:

If you have said this with regard to a change of sacred designation,

that it is effective to remove the designation “Passover-offering” not at its appointed time, because at its appointed time it is invalid, and it has several stringencies—

a.

for its invalidation is in its very substance [he thinks an invalidating thought concerning the offering itself—that he thinks of the Passover-offering as being a peace-offering],

[ведь он создает непригодное намерение относительно самой жертвы — намеревается, чтобы пасхальная жертва стала мирной жертвой],

b.

and it is present in the four services.

Every offering has four services that prevent the offering’s atonement from being achieved: slaughter, receiving the blood, conveying the blood to the altar, and sprinkling [these four services are called “the four blood services”]. And a thought of a change of sacred designation invalidates the Passover-offering in each one of these services.

With regard to slaughter, it is written: “And you shall say, It is a Passover sacrifice”—that the slaughter must be for the sake of a Passover-offering. And we derive the other services from what is written: “And you shall perform the Passover”—that all its performances must be for the sake of a Passover-offering. As we derive in Zevachim 7a],