Pesachim 60a — the Talmud in English

Or perhaps

concerning one who entertained the two thoughts

during two services

in the Mishna.

And this is the case: he slaughtered it for its sake and received the blood not for its sake.

And

if the matter is speaking of this interpretation, our Mishna is

even according to Rabbi Meir, who says: seize the first expression.

For that which Rabbi Meir said, “seize the first expression,”

this applies

when he entertains the two thoughts

during one service.

For when he entertains a valid thought and an invalid thought during one service, the two thoughts contradict one another; and when there is a contradiction between the beginning of his words and the end of his words, Rabbi Meir holds that a person’s intention is grasped by the beginning of his words.

But

when he entertains [the thoughts]

during two services—

Rabbi Meir concedes

that

it is invalid.

Since the two thoughts do not contradict one another at all. For it is possible that he perform one service for its sake and another service not for its sake.

And when there is no contradiction between the two thoughts, his intention is grasped by both of them. Consequently, it becomes invalid, because each service is important in itself and has the power to invalidate the offering if it is performed with a thought not for its sake.

And we raise it in order to explain Rav Pappa’s question in greater detail:

For there are two laws in the Mishna:

A. For its sake and not for its sake—when the first thought is the valid thought.

B. Not for its sake and for its sake—when the first thought is the disqualifying thought.

And accordingly we raise it:

They said,

they asked in the beit-midrash:

With regard to which,

with regard to which of the two laws is the uncertainty?

If we say it is concerning “not for its sake and for its sake”—

that the disqualifying thought preceded the valid thought—it is difficult, for there is no practical difference in this uncertainty.

For in such a case,

whether during one service

and

whether during two services, whether according to Rabbi Meir or according to Rabbi Yosei—

it became invalid from the first

[from the first thought, which is the disqualifying thought].

For

even

according to Rabbi Yosei as well,

who holds that a person’s intention is grasped by the second thought, he did not say that a person’s intention is grasped only by the second thought and not by the first. Rather,

he holds that a person is also grasped by the end of his words

[that his intention is grasped both by the first thought and by the second, and both of them take effect].

And since one of the thoughts is not for its sake, the offering becomes invalid.

And all the more so is it invalid according to Rabbi Meir, who holds “seize the first expression,” for here the first thought was invalid.

And all the more so, if he entertained the thoughts during two services, it is invalid according to everyone, for there is no contradiction at all between the two thoughts; rather, each thought concerns a different service.

And we conclude:

Rather,

necessarily the uncertainty is concerning

“for its sake and not for its sake”—

that the first thought was valid—and in this there is a practical difference for the law in the uncertainty.

For if it is speaking of one service, it cannot accord with Rabbi Meir, since according to Rabbi Meir we follow the beginning of his words and it will be valid. But if we establish it as involving two services, it accords even with Rabbi Meir, because the second service is performed entirely with a disqualifying thought, and Rabbi Meir concedes in this case that it is invalid.

What [is the answer]?

Come and hear

from what we learned in our Mishna:

The Paschal offering that they slaughtered not for its sake, and received, carried, and sprinkled [its blood] not for its sake

is invalid.

And we raise it: From the wording of the tan­###nai, who stated “and received, and carried, and sprinkled,” with the conjunction “and,” and did not say “whether he received, whether he carried,” it follows that he is speaking of a case in which he performed all the services not for their sake.

And one must ask—

what are the circumstances?

If we say [it is] as he teaches—with the conjunction “and”—and the case is that he performed all the services not for its sake—

then

why do I need

to bring it to the point of invalidating it

until he thinks of all of them

the services not for its sake?

But already

from

the service

first

that he performed not for its sake,

it became invalid for him!

For so we learned in the first chapter of Zevahim: a thought not for its sake invalidates in each of the four services.

And it is proven from this:

Rather, is it not—

this is what it teaches:

The Paschal offering that they slaughtered not for its sake

[and they performed the other services for its sake].

Alternatively—

they slaughtered it for its sake, and received, carried, and sprinkled [its blood] not for its sake.

Alternatively—

they slaughtered it, received [its blood], and carried it for its sake, and sprinkled [its blood] not for its sake.

For

in such a case

there are two separate services

in one of which he entertained one thought, and in the other he entertained another thought.

And now the Gemara brings the proof to resolve the uncertainty:

Come and hear the latter clause:

or

“for its sake and not for its sake.”

What are the circumstances?

If we say [it is] during two services,

in one of which he thought “for its sake” and in one of which he thought “not for its sake,” it is difficult—for

that is

the law that we already learned in

the first clause!

And it is proven from this:

Rather, is it not

necessarily speaking of one who thinks “for its sake and not for its sake”

during one service,

and it is invalid because at the end he said “not for its sake,” despite the fact that at the beginning he said “for its sake.”

And it is Rabbi Yosei, who says: A person is also grasped by the end of his words.

The uncertainty is therefore resolved: it is speaking of one service, and according to Rabbi Yosei.

And we reject this:

No! Actually,

the latter clause too is speaking

during two services,

in one of which he thought “for its sake” and in the second he thought “not for its sake.”

Rather, a new law was taught in the latter clause.

For there are two ways to think two thoughts during two services:

A. He performed the two services, and while performing each one of them he entertained a different thought.

And the first clause is speaking of this.

B. He thinks about the two services while occupied with the first service.

That is to say: at the time of the first service he entertains two thoughts.

One: that this service, which he is now performing, he is performing with one thought.

And the second: that he now thinks that the second service will be performed with another thought.

And the latter clause is speaking of this.

And now the Gemara explains the two interpretations, of the first clause and of the latter clause, and their laws:

And the first clause,

the case it is speaking of is that he entertained a thought during each service separately, while he was occupied with that service.

And that which it teaches that they slaughtered it not for its sake is speaking of

his standing at the slaughtering and thinking during the slaughtering.

While he slaughtered, he thought concerning the slaughtering itself that he was performing it not for the sake of the offering; and afterward, while performing the other services, he thought concerning them that he was performing them for the sake of the offering.

And that which it teaches, “and sprinkled [its blood] not for its sake” [which was explained above as meaning “or sprinkled [its blood] not for its sake”—but the slaughtering, receiving, and carrying were performed for its sake], the intention of the tan­###nai is to say:

Alternatively, he stands at the sprinkling and thinks during the sprinkling.

While sprinkling, he thought concerning the sprinkling itself that it was being performed not for its sake. But when he slaughtered, received [the blood], and carried it, he thought concerning each of them for its sake.

And as stated, all these are cases in which he entertained different thoughts while performing different services.

But in

the latter clause

the case is that while occupied with one service, he thought about two services. And this is, for example,

that he stands at the slaughtering and thinks about the sprinkling.

For he says: “I am slaughtering the Paschal offering for its sake,

in order

to sprinkle its blood not for its sake.”

And it is invalid even according to the one who says that a person is grasped by the beginning of his words. For here there is no contradiction between the two thoughts; rather, one thought concerns the slaughtering and another thought concerns the sprinkling.

And when there is no contradiction between the two thoughts, both take effect according to everyone, and it becomes invalid by virtue of that service which was performed with a disqualifying thought.

And it teaches us

the Mishna

that “one may think from one service concerning another service.”

That is to say, one who is occupied with one service and thinks in it of performing another service with a disqualifying thought—the offering becomes invalid immediately. And even if in the end he performed the second service with a valid thought!

And this is Rav Pappa’s uncertainty,

who said in Zevahim 10a that one may think from one service concerning another service.

And the Gemara brings another proof:

Come and hear

from what we learned in the last clause of the last clause of our Mishna:

Or “not for its sake and for its sake”—

it is invalid.

And we raise it:

What are the circumstances?

If we say [it is] during two services,

that in the first he thought “not for its sake” and in the second he thought “for its sake,” it is difficult, for this law is superfluous and there is no need to teach it.

For

now

“for its sake and not for its sake”

already

you stated

in the first clause of the latter clause that it

is invalid.

For although at first he entertained a valid thought, nevertheless a disqualifying thought in the second service is effective to invalidate it.

“Not for its sake and for its sake,”

which became invalid already during the first service—

is it necessary

to inform us of this?!

For since it already became invalid at the beginning, how could it return to being valid?!

And we conclude for the proof:

Rather, is it not

necessarily speaking of one who thinks “not for its sake and for its sake”

during one service.

And

if so, it should be proven:

From the latter clause

[“not for its sake and for its sake”]

during one service—

the first clause too

[“for its sake and not for its sake”]

during one service,

and the uncertainty is resolved.

For if it is speaking of one service, it is well explained why both laws were needed.

For the first law, “for its sake and not for its sake,” teaches that a person is grasped by the end of his words, and not like Rabbi Meir.

And the second law, “not for its sake and for its sake,” teaches that a person is also grasped by the beginning of his words.

Were it not for this, we would think that a person is grasped only by the end of his words, and that “not for its sake and for its sake” would be valid. And therefore it teaches us that “not for its sake and for its sake” is also invalid, because a person is also grasped by the end of his words, like Rabbi Yosei.

And we reject this:

No! Actually,

the case is

during two services.

And concerning what we asked—that if so the latter clause is superfluous—it may be answered that indeed, so it is.

And in strict law, it was not necessary for him

to teach the law of “not for its sake and for its sake.”

Only

since

[it happened that]

the tan­###nai taught

“for its sake and not for its sake”

in order to teach us that one may think from one service concerning another service—

he also taught

“not for its sake and for its sake.”

Come and hear:

from what we learned in the Mishna below, 61a:

They slaughtered it

with the thought

“not for those capable of eating it”

[for the sake of one who is unable to eat an olive-sized portion of the flesh of the Paschal offering, such as an elderly or sick person, and it is invalid because it is written, “each man according to his eating”—[for one] fit to eat [it]].

And “not for those registered for it”

[a group had registered for it, and he slaughtered it for the sake of another group].

For the sake of

those who are

uncircumcised

[even though they are prevented by circumstances from being circumcised, such as one whose brothers died because of circumcision. They are forbidden to eat from the Paschal offering, as it is written: “No uncircumcised person may eat of it”].

And for the sake of

those who are

impure

[who are forbidden to eat sacrificial food and are liable to karet for eating it].

If he entertained one of these thoughts—

it is invalid.

And we conclude for the proof: And here

it is obvious

that it is speaking only

during one service.

For it is speaking of one who entertained only a single thought, “not for those capable of eating it” or “not for those registered for it,” and did not entertain any valid thought at all. And it is obvious that one thought means during one service.

And since the latter clause

[of the Mishna below]

[is] during one service—

the first clause

[our Mishna, which teaches “for its sake and not for its sake”]

also

even

during one service.

And nevertheless it is invalid, unlike Rabbi Meir!

And we reject this:

Is that necessarily so

[and is this a proof]?!

For each clause may be established—

this one according to its circumstances and that one according to its circumstances

[each one according to what applies to it]—

The latter clause

[of the Mishna below], which speaks of one who entertains one thought, must necessarily be established

during one service.

But

the first clause

[our Mishna], which speaks of one who entertains two thoughts, may be established

either

[or]

during one service,

and it is invalid in the case of “for its sake and not for its sake” during one service because of following the latter expression, and not according to Rabbi Meir.

Either

[or] specifically

during two services,

and specifically in such a case “for its sake and not for its sake” is invalid, but during one service it is valid, and it accords with Rabbi Meir, who says: seize the first expression.

Come and hear

from what we learned in the latter clause of the Mishna below: They slaughtered it with two thoughts—

“for those capable of eating it and not for those capable of eating it”

[some of those registered for it were fit to eat it and some were not fit to eat it, and he slaughtered it for the sake of these and for the sake of those]—

it is valid.

And we raise it:

What are the circumstances?

If we say

that at the time of the slaughtering he entertained the two thoughts

during two services,

that he slaughtered it for those capable of eating it in order to sprinkle its blood for those incapable of eating it, and this teaches us that it is valid,

if this is the interpretation of the beraita, it is difficult, for from this interpretation we will infer:

And the reason

that it is valid is only because

he thought during the sprinkling

[that he would sprinkle the blood for those incapable of eating it], and because

a thought concerning the eaters

[that is, a thought for the sake of one who is unfit to eat] does not invalidate

during the sprinkling,

because the disqualification of “not for those capable of eating it” is learned from that which is written: “each man according to his eating shall you slaughter,” and “you shall slaughter” means slaughtering, [for the Aramaic translation renders “and he slaughtered” as “and he slaughtered”].

But

if he entertained the two thoughts

during one service—

for example, during the slaughtering, where a thought concerning the eaters is effective

[when he said: “I am slaughtering for the sake of all those registered, both those fit to eat and those unfit to eat]—

it is invalid.

But this law is not correct. For—

And we have established

[below, 61a] that a thought concerning

some of the eaters

[one who slaughters for the sake of a group some of whom are fit to eat and some of whom are unfit to eat]—

does not invalidate!