Pesachim 60a (ס.) — the Talmud in English

Or perhaps

the one who entertained the two thoughts

during two distinct sacrificial rites

is what we learned in the Mishna.

And this is the case: He slaughtered it with the proper designation, but received its blood without the proper designation.

And

if the Mishna is referring to this interpretation, our Mishna applies

even according to Rabbi Meir, who says that one follows the first expression.

For when Rabbi Meir said that one follows the first expression,

that applies

when he entertains both thoughts

during a single rite.

For when he entertains a valid thought and an invalid thought during one rite, the two thoughts contradict one another. And when there is a contradiction between the beginning of his statement and its conclusion, Rabbi Meir holds that a person’s intention is determined by the beginning of his statement.

But

when he entertains thoughts

during two rites—

Rabbi Meir concedes

that

he renders it disqualified.

Since the two thoughts do not contradict one another at all, it is possible for him to perform one rite with the proper designation and another rite without the proper designation.

And when there is no contradiction between the two thoughts, his intention is effective with regard to both of them. Consequently, the offering is disqualified, since each rite is significant in its own right and can disqualify the offering if it is performed without the proper designation.

And we considered this in order to explain Rav Pappa’s dilemma more fully:

There are two laws in the Mishna:

a. With the proper designation and without the proper designation—when the first thought is the valid thought.

b. Without the proper designation and with the proper designation—when the first thought is the disqualifying thought.

Accordingly, we considered this:

They said,

the question was asked in the beit-midrash:

With regard to which

of the two laws is the dilemma?

If we say it is concerning “without the proper designation and with the proper designation”—

where the disqualifying thought preceded the valid thought—this is difficult, since in such a case the dilemma has no practical difference.

For in such a case,

whether during one rite

or

during two rites, whether according to Rabbi Meir or according to Rabbi Yosei—

it is disqualified from the first

[from the first thought, which is the disqualifying thought].

For

even

according to Rabbi Yosei as well,

who holds that a person’s intention is determined by the second thought, he did not say that a person’s intention is determined only by the second thought and not by the first. Rather,

he holds that a person’s intention is effective even at the conclusion of his statement

[that his intention is effective both with regard to the first thought and with regard to the second, and both remain in force].

And since one of the thoughts was without the proper designation, the offering is disqualified.

All the more so, it is disqualified according to Rabbi Meir, who holds that one follows the first expression, since here the first thought was invalid.

And all the more so, if he entertained the thoughts during two rites, it is disqualified according to everyone, since the two thoughts do not contradict one another at all; rather, each thought concerns a different rite.

And we conclude:

Rather,

necessarily, the dilemma concerns

“with the proper designation and without the proper designation”—

where the first thought was valid—and in this case the dilemma has a practical halakhic difference.

For if it is speaking of one rite, it cannot accord with Rabbi Meir, since according to Rabbi Meir we follow the beginning of his statement, and the offering would be valid. But if we establish it as referring to two rites, it can accord even with Rabbi Meir, since the second rite was performed entirely with a disqualifying thought, and Rabbi Meir concedes in such a case that it is disqualified.

What is the conclusion?

Come and hear

from what we learned in our Mishna:

A Paschal offering that one slaughtered without the proper designation, and received, carried, and sprinkled its blood without the proper designation

is disqualified.

And we considered this: From the wording of the tanna, who stated “and received, and carried, and sprinkled,” using the conjunction “and,” rather than saying “or received, or carried,” it appears that he is speaking of a case in which he performed all the rites without the proper designation.

And one must ask:

What are the circumstances?

If we say that it is as it is stated—with the conjunction “and”—and that the case is one in which he performed all the rites without the proper designation—

then

why do I need

to bring it to the point of disqualification

until he entertains the thought with regard to all

the rites without the proper designation?

After all, already from

the

first rite,

the first,

which he performed without the proper designation,

he rendered it disqualified!

For so we learned in the first chapter of tractate Zevahim: A thought without the proper designation disqualifies in each of the four rites.

And this proves:

Rather, is it not

so stated:

A Paschal offering that one slaughtered without the proper designation

[while he performed the other rites with the proper designation].

Alternatively—

he slaughtered it with the proper designation, and received, carried, and sprinkled its blood without the proper designation.

Alternatively—

he slaughtered it, received its blood, and carried it with the proper designation, and sprinkled its blood without the proper designation.

For

in such a case

there are two distinct rites,

in one of which he entertained one thought, and in the other he entertained a different thought.

The Gemara now brings the proof that will resolve the dilemma:

Come and hear the latter clause:

“Or

with the proper designation and without the proper designation.”

What are the circumstances?

If we say that it is referring to two rites,

in one of which he entertained the thought “with the proper designation” and in the other the thought “without the proper designation,” this is difficult—for

that is

the same

as the first clause!

And this proves:

Rather, is it not

necessarily speaking of one who entertains the thoughts “with the proper designation and without the proper designation”

during a single rite,

and it is disqualified because he said at the end “without the proper designation,” despite having said at the beginning “with the proper designation.”

And it is the opinion of Rabbi Yosei, who says: “A person’s intention is effective even at the conclusion of his statement.”

The dilemma is therefore resolved: The case concerns one rite and follows the opinion of Rabbi Yosei.

And we reject this:

No! Actually,

the latter clause is also speaking

of two rites,

in one of which he entertained the thought “with the proper designation” and in the second the thought “without the proper designation.”

Rather, a new law is introduced in the latter clause.

For there are two ways to entertain two thoughts during two rites:

a. He performed the two rites, and while performing each one he entertained a different thought.

This is what the first clause is discussing.

b. He thinks about both rites while he is engaged in the first rite.

That is, while performing the first rite he entertains two thoughts.

The first is that this rite, which he is now performing, is being performed with one particular thought.

The second is that he now thinks that the second rite will be performed with a different thought.

This is what the latter clause is discussing.

The Gemara now explains the two interpretations, of the first clause and of the latter clause, and their respective laws:

And with regard to the first clause,

the case is one in which he entertained a thought during each rite separately, while he was engaged in that rite.

And when it states that he slaughtered it without the proper designation, this means

that he was engaged in slaughtering and was entertaining the thought during slaughtering.

While slaughtering, he thought with regard to the slaughtering itself, which he was performing without the proper designation of the offering; and afterward, while performing the other rites, he thought with regard to each of them that he was performing it with the proper designation of the offering.

And when it states “and sprinkled its blood without the proper designation”—as explained above, this means “or sprinkled its blood without the proper designation,” while the slaughtering, receiving, and carrying were performed with the proper designation—the tanna intends to say:

Alternatively, he was engaged in sprinkling and was entertaining the thought during sprinkling.

While sprinkling, he thought with regard to the sprinkling itself that it was being performed without the proper designation. But when he slaughtered, received, and carried it, he entertained the thought with regard to each of them that it was being done with the proper designation.

As stated, all these are cases in which he entertained different thoughts while performing different rites.

But in

the latter clause,

the case is one in which, while engaged in one rite, he entertained thoughts concerning two rites. For example,

he was engaged in slaughtering and was thinking about sprinkling.

He said: “I am slaughtering the Paschal offering with the proper designation,

intending

to sprinkle its blood without the proper designation.”

And it is disqualified even according to the one who says that a person’s intention is determined by the beginning of his statement. Here the two thoughts do not contradict one another; rather, one thought concerns the slaughtering and another thought concerns the sprinkling.

And when there is no contradiction between the two thoughts, both remain in force according to everyone, and the offering is disqualified by virtue of the rite that was performed with a disqualifying thought.

And it teaches us

the Mishna

that one’s thought concerning one rite can affect another rite.

That is, one who is engaged in one rite and thinks that he will perform another rite with a disqualifying thought renders the offering disqualified immediately—even if he ultimately performs the second rite with a valid thought!

And this is Rav Pappa’s dilemma,

who said in tractate Zevahim 10a that one’s thought concerning one rite can affect another rite.

The Gemara brings another proof:

Come and hear

from what we learned in the final clause of our Mishna:

Or “without the proper designation and with the proper designation”—

it is disqualified.

And we considered this:

What are the circumstances?

If we say that it is referring to two rites,

in the first of which he entertained the thought “without the proper designation” and in the second the thought “with the proper designation,” this is difficult, since this law is superfluous and need not be taught.

For

now that

“with the proper designation and without the proper designation”

has already

been stated

in the first clause of the latter section, that it is

disqualified—

for although at first he entertained a valid thought, nevertheless a disqualifying thought during the second rite is effective in disqualifying it—

“Without the proper designation and with the proper designation,”

which was already disqualified during the first rite—

is it necessary

to teach us this?!

After all, once it was initially disqualified, how could it become valid again?!

And we conclude concerning the proof:

Rather, is it not

necessarily referring to one who entertains the thoughts “without the proper designation and with the proper designation”

during a single rite.

And

if so, it can be proved:

Since the latter clause

[“without the proper designation and with the proper designation”]

concerns one rite,

the first clause as well

[“with the proper designation and without the proper designation”]

concerns one rite,

and the dilemma is resolved.

For if it concerns one rite, it is well understood why both laws were necessary.

The first law, “with the proper designation and without the proper designation,” teaches that a person’s intention is determined at the end of his statement, and not in accordance with Rabbi Meir.

The second law, “without the proper designation and with the proper designation,” teaches that a person’s intention is effective even at the beginning of his statement.

Had this not been taught, we would have thought that a person’s intention is effective only at the end of his statement, and that the offering would be valid in a case of “without the proper designation and with the proper designation.” Therefore, it teaches us that even “without the proper designation and with the proper designation” is disqualified, because a person’s intention is effective even at the conclusion of his statement, in accordance with Rabbi Yosei.

And we reject this:

No! Actually,

the case

concerns two rites.

And as for our difficulty that the latter clause would then be superfluous, this can indeed be answered.

In principle, it was not necessary for him to state

the law of “without the proper designation and with the proper designation.”

However,

since

[it was incidental]

the tanna taught

“with the proper designation and without the proper designation”

in order to teach us that one’s thought concerning one rite can affect another rite,

he also taught

“without the proper designation and with the proper designation.”

Come and hear:

from what we learned in the Mishna below, on page 61a:

If he slaughtered it

with the thought

for those who can eat it

[for the sake of one who cannot eat an olive-bulk of the flesh of the Paschal offering, such as an elderly or ill person, and it is disqualified because it is written: “Each man according to what he eats” (Exodus 12:4)—one fit to eat] .

and not for those registered for it

[a group had been registered for it, but he slaughtered it for the sake of another group].

For

the sake

of uncircumcised persons

[even if they are prevented by circumstances beyond their control from circumcising, such as one whose brothers died as a result of circumcision. They are forbidden to eat the Paschal offering, as it is written: “No uncircumcised male may eat of it”].

And for

the sake

of ritually impure persons

[who are forbidden to eat consecrated food and are liable to karet for eating it].

If he entertained one of these thoughts—

it is disqualified.

And we conclude concerning the proof: Here,

it is obvious

that the case concerns only

one rite.

For the case concerns one who entertained only a single thought, either “not for those who can eat it” or “not for those registered for it,” and did not entertain any valid thought at all. It is obvious that a single thought means that it occurred during one rite.

And since the latter clause

[of the Mishna below]

concerns one rite,

the first clause

[of our Mishna, which states “with the proper designation and without the proper designation”]

also

even

concerns one rite.

And even so, it is disqualified, contrary to Rabbi Meir!

And we reject this:

Is that necessarily so

[and is this a proof]?!

Each clause can be established—

this one according to what applies to it, and that one according to what applies to it

[each one in accordance with the circumstances relevant to it]—

The latter clause

[of the Mishna below], which deals with one who entertains a single thought, must be established as referring to

one rite.

But

the first clause

[of our Mishna], which deals with one who entertains two thoughts, may be established as referring

either

[or]

to one rite,

and the case of “with the proper designation and without the proper designation” is disqualified during one rite because one follows the latter expression, contrary to Rabbi Meir.

Or

[or] specifically

two rites,

and specifically in such a case the “with the proper designation and without the proper designation” is disqualified; but during one rite it is valid, in accordance with Rabbi Meir, who says that one follows the first expression.

Come and hear

from what we learned in the latter clause of the Mishna below: “He slaughtered it with two thoughts”—

for those who can eat it and not for those who can eat it

[some of those registered for it were fit to eat it, while some were not fit to eat it, and he slaughtered it for the sake of both groups],

it is valid.

And we considered this:

What are the circumstances?

If we say

that while slaughtering he entertained both thoughts

during two rites,

that he slaughtered it for those who could eat it with the intention of sprinkling its blood for those who could not eat it, and this teaches us that it is valid,

If this is the interpretation of the beraita, it is difficult, since from this interpretation we could infer:

And the reason

that it is valid is only

because he entertained the thought during sprinkling

[that he would sprinkle the blood for those who could not eat it], and because

a thought concerning those who eat

[that is, a thought for the sake of one who is unfit to eat] does not disqualify

during sprinkling,

because the disqualification of “not for those who can eat it” is derived from the verse: “Each man according to what he eats shall you take” (Exodus 12:4). And “take” refers to slaughtering, since the Aramaic translation renders “and he slaughtered” as “and he took.”

But

if he entertained both thoughts

during one rite—

for example, during slaughtering, where a thought concerning those who eat is effective

[as when he said: “I am slaughtering for the sake of all those registered, both those fit to eat and those unfit to eat”]—

it is disqualified.

But this law is not correct. For—

We have established

[below, on page 61a] that a thought concerning

some of those who can eat

[when one slaughters for the sake of a group some of whom are fit to eat and some of whom are not fit to eat]—

does not disqualify!