Pesachim 27a (כז.) — the Talmud in English

And the Sages say: Whether

it fell into it

as a prohibited substance initially, or whether the prohibited substance fell in at the end, always

the teruma leaven

does not prohibit it,

until there is in it

by itself

enough to cause leavening !

That is, the prohibited substance must be capable of causing leavening. But the permitted leaven is not capable of causing leavening. For if the prohibited substance by itself were also capable of causing leavening, this would be the dispute between Rabbi Shimon and the Sages. And the Sages here follow the opinion of Rabbi Shimon, who permits it. Tosafot. See Maharsha, who wrote that they were compelled to understand that the Sages follow Rabbi Shimon. For where each of the two substances by itself is capable of causing leavening, this too is considered “this and that cause it.” Indeed, above Tosafot linked the law of old bread that was not baked with this principle of “this and that cause it,” since it was baked with the oven as well. And although, in the case of the prohibited torches, the prohibited one by itself is also capable of baking, nevertheless, he concludes that this can be rejected. Karnei Re’em wrote that there is no proof from there, because Tosafot wrote only that, on account of “this and that cause it,” it was unnecessary to cool it. But it is possible that it still had to be supplemented with a permitted torch. It would therefore be considered “this and that cause it” on account of that, and not on account of the oven. Penei Yehoshua already explained their words in this manner [see above 26b, note 14]. But in tractate Avoda Zara, Tosafot explained that even when each one by itself is capable of causing leavening, the dough is not prohibited. This follows the Sages in opposition to Rabbi Shimon. It is considered “this and that cause it” only when neither one by itself is capable of causing it, except in combination with the other. Maharshal.

And Abaye said:

As for what Rabbi Eliezer said, “I follow the last one,” and if the permitted substance fell in last, the mixture is permitted,

this was stated

in this manner

only

when he

first removed the

leaven

of the prohibited substance

that had fallen in initially, and after he removed it, the non-sacred leaven fell into it. Since he removed it before the dough became leavened, the leavening is not attributed to it at all. Rather, the permitted leaven alone caused the dough to become leavened. And although without the initial action of the prohibited leaven the permitted leaven would not have been able to complete the leavening, nevertheless, since at the time of the leavening the prohibited substance had already been nullified and was gone, it does not become reawakened.

But

if he

did not first remove the

leaven

of the prohibited substance

from the dough before the permitted leaven also fell into it, and the leavening was completed by both of them together,

the dough is prohibited

as teruma.

And although the dough did not become leavened on account of the prohibited substance alone, but both the prohibited leaven and the permitted leaven contributed to its leavening, it is nevertheless prohibited.

Apparently,

Rabbi Eliezer holds that whenever

this and that cause it ,

it is also

prohibited .

This requires examination. The principle of causation does not apply to teruma at all, since teruma is not among the prohibitions from which one may not derive benefit. The dough is prohibited only because of the admixture of the prohibited leaven. Ordinarily, the prohibited substance would be nullified in sixty parts. But leaven is not nullified, because it is like a substance that establishes the form of another substance, on account of its leavening. What connection does this have to the principle of “this and that cause it”? It can be explained that although these are two distinct matters, they nevertheless depend upon one another. According to the one who says, “this and that cause it is permitted,” this is because half a cause is not considered a cause. Accordingly, the same applies to leaven of teruma: if it does not by itself cause the dough to become leavened, but only together with the permitted leaven, it is not considered a substance that establishes the dough. It should therefore be nullified in the permitted mixture. Kehillot Yaakov. See and refer to Rabbeinu David. This is difficult: It is taught in tractate Temura: With regard to all substances prohibited for the altar, such as an animal that engaged in bestiality, its offspring are permitted. Yet Rabbi Eliezer prohibits them! And Rav Huna bar Ḥinnana said that Rabbi Eliezer prohibits them only when the animal became pregnant and subsequently engaged in bestiality, because the fetus is considered the thigh of its mother and therefore also participated in the act. But when the animal engaged in bestiality and only afterward became pregnant, the offspring is permitted. And if “this and that cause it” is prohibited, why should the offspring not be prohibited because of causation? Tosafot. [ Although there the offspring is not prohibited under the principle of causation, but under the principle that “that which emerges from a prohibited substance is prohibited” [since the principle of causation applies only to prohibitions from which one may not derive benefit], nevertheless, it depends upon the dispute concerning “this and that cause it,” since it emerges from a prohibited and a permitted source together. And this is stated explicitly in tractate Chullin 58, with regard to the offspring of a tereifa. Kovetz Shiurim]. And in tractate Temura they answered that Rabbi Eliezer prohibited only something that is prohibited to an ordinary person, but not something prohibited only with regard to the Most High.

And the Rabbis hold that “this and that cause it” is permitted!

And they likewise disagree concerning a new oven that was heated with shells of orla. As for the teaching that it “must be demolished,” that follows Rabbi Eliezer. According to him, every loaf baked in it is prohibited, even if it is heated again with a new, permitted fuel. For the prohibited heating that completed the firing of the oven also contributes to the loaf that will be baked in it. And “this and that cause it” is prohibited.

And as for the teaching that it “must be cooled,” that follows the Rabbis. Since the prohibited heating by itself does not cause the loaf, but only in combination with the heating from the permitted wood used afterward, the loaf is permitted. For “this and that cause it” is permitted. Therefore, the oven need not be demolished. [

And the requirement to cool it is only a matter of the proper procedure initially. For whenever “this and that cause it,” it is permitted only after the fact. Since by cooling it one does not impair the oven itself, but only the heat produced by the prohibited benefit, it must be cooled.

Tosafot.]

And we raise an objection:

From where do you know that Rabbi Eliezer’s reasoning is as Abaye explained,

and that Rabbi Eliezer permitted it only when the prohibited substance had first been removed?

Perhaps Rabbi Eliezer’s reasoning

is as implied by the plain wording of his statement,

because

he says,

“I follow the last one”!

“This and that cause it” is always permitted. And if the prohibited substance fell in first, the dough is always permitted.

It makes no difference whether he first removed the prohibited substance, and it makes no difference whether he did not first remove the prohibited substance.

Rabbi Eliezer prohibited it only when the prohibited substance fell in last, because we follow the completion of the process. Since the leavening was completed by the prohibited substance, the dough is prohibited.

But

if both of them fell in

at the same time, it is likewise permitted.

And we answer:

Rather,

from

Rabbi Eliezer’s ruling concerning the wood of an asheira

we learn that he holds, “this and that cause it is prohibited.”

As we learned:

From it [

the asheira] he took

wood, and it is

prohibited to derive benefit from it!

For idolatry is prohibited from which one may derive no benefit, as it is written: “Nothing from the doomed property shall cling to your hand.”

And if he

used them [

from the wood of the asheira] to heat

the oven—

if it is

new, it must be demolished.

And if it is an oven

old,

which had already been fired and whose construction had been completed,

it must be cooled!

One may not bake bread in it until it has cooled from the heating produced by the prohibited fuel.

If he baked the bread in it, it is prohibited to derive benefit from it!

And if that bread

became mixed

with

loaves

other

loaves, all of them are prohibited.

And

if bread from those loaves became mixed with

other

loaves that had become prohibited because of the mixture,

with

loaves

other,

all of them are prohibited

from deriving benefit! For idolatry is not nullified even in a majority, not even in a thousand-to-one ratio. It prohibits its mixture, and the mixture of its mixture.

Rabbi Eliezer says: He shall take the benefit

alone

to the Salt Sea!

He must destroy the money he gained by heating the oven with the asheira, and cast the value of that wood into the Salt Sea , so that he will not benefit from the value of the idolatry. But the bread itself is not prohibited, for it is not actually an object of idolatry; rather, the enhancement contributed by the wood is present in the bread. The prohibited cause is considered merely like an admixture of idolatry. [Rashi, based on the Ran there].

The Sages said to him,

the

Sages:

There is no redemption for idolatry! Even bread that became prohibited because of the enhancement contributed by the wood of the asheira cannot be redeemed. It is not enough to destroy the value of the benefit; it remains prohibited forever and likewise prohibits its mixture.

In any event, we learn from Rabbi Eliezer’s statement that as long as he has not taken the value of the benefit to the Salt Sea, he agrees with the first tanna that a new oven heated with an asheira must be demolished, and an old one must be cooled. The bread too is prohibited. Apparently, he holds that “this and that cause it is prohibited.” The beraita concerning shells of orla, which teaches that a new oven must be demolished, likewise follows his opinion. [

The same would apply if we could establish the beraita concerning shells of orla as following Rabbi Eliezer’s opponent, the first tanna. For it explicitly says, “a new oven must be demolished.” However, since we do not know who that tanna is, it is preferable for us to establish it as following Rabbi Eliezer. In truth, the Gemara’s intention is Rabbi Eliezer and his disputant.]

And the beraita that teaches, “Whether new or old, it must be cooled,” follows the Rabbis [concerning shells of orla], who hold that even bread baked with prohibited fuel is permitted. They do not recognize at all the enhancement contributed by wood in bread, even where there is only one prohibited cause. All the more so in the case of a new oven, which need not be demolished, since the oven itself is not eaten; only the bread baked in it is eaten. And in the bread there are two causes: one prohibited cause and one permitted cause, as explained above.

And we reject this again:

Say,

that

from Rabbi Eliezer you have learned

that “this and that cause it is prohibited,” only

in the case of idolatry.

Perhaps he said this only there, because

the

idolatry

has a more stringent prohibition.

But

with regard to the other prohibitions of the Torah, have you heard Rabbi Eliezer

say this?

And we answer: Necessarily, Rabbi Eliezer said this with regard to all the prohibitions of the Torah as well. For if you say that he holds this only with regard to idolatry,

then as whom will you establish it [

that is, as whose opinion will you establish] the beraita concerning shells of orla? We find no one who says, “this and that cause it is prohibited,” other than Rabbi Eliezer, who said this with regard to an asheira. And since we find that this beraita says so with regard to other prohibitions, we must establish it as following his opinion, and say that he did not distinguish between idolatry and other prohibitions.

Furthermore,

we answer:

Is it not explicitly taught: And likewise Rabbi Eliezer would prohibit

“this and that cause it,”

with regard to all the prohibitions of the Torah!

Abaye said: If you should conclude,

that Rabbi, who prohibited in the latter clause of the beraita the bread baked with shells of orla, also holds that

“this and that cause it is prohibited,”

and he is the one who taught in the first clause, “a new oven must be demolished,” then

Rabbi is Rabbi Eliezer.

And if you should conclude

that Rabbi holds

“this and that cause it is permitted,”

and does not accept “a new oven must be demolished,”

and

prohibited only

here,

in the case of bread baked with prohibited fuel,

because there is enhancement contributed by the wood in the bread,

and there is only one prohibited cause—nevertheless,

these bowls, cups, and saucers

of earthenware, which were fired with prohibited wood,

are prohibited

even according to Rabbi. For

when Rabbi and Rabbi Eliezer disagree,

Rabbi and Rabbi Eliezer

disagree concerning an oven

and

a pot

as well. For

according to the one who says [

Rabbi Eliezer]

“this and that cause it is prohibited,”

they too

are prohibited

even though they themselves are not eaten; nevertheless, the bread and the cooked dish prepared in them are caused by them. And although they too have a permitted cause, namely, the permitted heating, they are prohibited. But

according to the one who says [

Rabbi]

“this and that cause it is permitted,” it is permitted

to bake and cook in them. For one does not derive benefit from the oven or pot itself, but from the bread and cooked dish prepared in them. They are permitted because they too have a permitted cause.

But bowls, cups, and saucers that were completed through the prohibited substance, and in which there is enhancement contributed by the wood, are prohibited to use, because a person derives benefit from the objects themselves when using them. In their case there is only one prohibited cause, without a second, permitted cause.

Some say: Even according to the one who says

“this and that cause it is permitted,”

only an oven is permitted, because there is no benefit in the oven itself without heating by permitted wood. Thus, the benefit comes through both causes together. But

a pot

that was fired with prohibited wood

is prohibited,

because one derives benefit from it even without the second cause, the permitted heating,

for it received its cooking before

the

permitted wood was placed beneath it !

The very fact that it holds the cooked dish is considered benefit. Thus, one derives benefit through the prohibited cause alone .

Rav Yosef said that Rav Yehuda said that Shmuel:

this is how it is taught in the aforementioned beraita:

“An oven that was heated with the peels of orla or with straw of kilayim of the vineyard: a new oven must be demolished; an old one must be allowed to cool!”

If he baked bread in it—

Rabbi says: The bread is permitted!

And the Sages say: The bread is forbidden!

Shmuel reversed the opinions of Rabbi and the Sages.

And we raise an objection:

But wasn’t it taught

in a beraita

the opposite!

Rabbi is the one who forbids it, and the Sages permit it.

And we answer:

Shmuel taught that beraita in reverse

from the way that beraita is before us.

And if you wish, say:

Shmuel, too, taught the beraita as it is written before us. However, he intentionally reversed the opinions, because

Shmuel generally maintains

“The halakha is in accordance with Rabbi when he disputes an individual colleague.”

But

not when he disputes his colleagues.

And wherever Rabbi disputes the majority, the halakha is not in accordance with him.

And in this case

Shmuel held that the dispute was one in which the halakha is in accordance with Rabbi

even when he disputes his colleagues.

And he forbade the bread because the wood makes a substantive contribution to the bread.

And he thought: Let him teach it

this beraita

in reverse, so that we will establish

the position of

the Sages as the prohibiting opinion!

This was so that what he ruled here as forbidden would not contradict what we have established: “The halakha is not in accordance with Rabbi when he disputes his colleagues.” For had he taught the beraita in its original form and ruled it forbidden in accordance with Rabbi, this would have led to an error, and they would have ruled in accordance with Rabbi everywhere, even when he disputes the majority.

We learned above:

If he cooked

a turnip

on coals

of orla and kilayim of the vineyard,

according to everyone, the bread is permitted!

Rav Yehuda said that Shmuel said, and Rav Hiyya bar Ashi said that Rabbi Yohanan,

disputed the explanation of this ruling.

One said: The statement that

the bread is permitted

was taught only

when he cooked it on

dimmed coals

that were extinguished! For even Rabbi concedes with regard to them that their prohibition has already lapsed, since their status is like that of the ashes of forbidden substances that are burned, which are permitted.

But glowing coals

that are burning and appear to move and whisper to one another

are forbidden!

For they are not included in the category of ashes, and their prohibition has not yet lapsed. Therefore, according to Rabbi, the bread baked with them is forbidden.

And one said: Even glowing coals are also permitted!

For according to everyone, they have the status of ashes, and their prohibition has lapsed.

And we consider:

Granted, according to the one who says “

coals

are forbidden,”

it is understandable that Rabbi forbids bread baked on them,

because the wood makes a substantive contribution to the bread!

They are still wood and not ashes.

But according to the one who says

“even glowing coals are permitted,” how can you find the case in which Rabbi forbids the bread

at the beginning because

“the wood makes a substantive contribution to the bread”?

But they are not wood; they are merely ashes.

Rav Pappa said:

You can find it

when

the burning wood is still present and has not yet become coals, and a

flame

emanates from it

opposite it

opposite the bread—and bakes it.