Pesachim 27b (כז:) — the Talmud in English

And we raise a difficulty:

By inference, the Sages who disagree with

Rabbi,

permit it even when the flame is opposite it!

This is because they hold that the flame does not come from the wood while it still exists, but from what has already been burned and whose prohibition has lapsed [Tosafot].

And if so,

in the case of prohibited wood

that is forbidden for benefit,

according to the Sages, where can such a case be found?

For the benefit of using it as fuel is always permitted.

Rav Ami bar Ḥama said:

It can be found

with a sharshefa

[a chair]! If one fashioned a chair or a footstool from wood that is forbidden for benefit, that chair is forbidden to sit on. For he benefits from the wood while it still exists.

Rami bar Ḥama raised a question before Rav Ḥisda: If one stoked an oven with consecrated wood and baked in it

with this stoking

the bread,

what is the law?

According to Rabbi, the bread is certainly forbidden, since the consecrated wood adds benefit to the bread. But

according to the Sages, who permit in the first case

[bread baked with the peels of orla], and do not accept the principle “there is benefit from wood in the bread,”

what

is the law with regard to consecrated wood?

He said to him,

Rav Ḥisda: Even according to the Sages,

the bread is forbidden.

The law of consecrated property is more stringent than that of other items forbidden for benefit. And Rami bar Ḥama challenged him:

What difference is there between

bread

this

that was baked with consecrated wood

and

bread that was baked with wood of

orla?

Rava said: How can these cases be compared?!

Consecrated property is certainly more stringent. For

orla is nullified in

a mixture containing

two hundred

parts of permitted produce opposite it. But

consecrated property is not nullified even in a thousand

parts of non-sacred property opposite it;

it is not nullified.

Rather, Rava said: If Rami bar Ḥama found a difficulty

with Rav Ḥisda’s statement forbidding the bread,

this is the difficulty

he found:

But the one who stokes the oven has committed sacrilege

with the consecrated wood, and became liable for the laws of sacrilege from the moment he took it in order to fuel the oven.

And wherever the one who stokes the oven commits sacrilege, the wood leaves

the domain of consecrated property and becomes

non-sacred.

As we learned in the Mishna: There is no sacrilege after sacrilege except with regard to a sacrificial animal and a service vessel. For any consecrated property that is not sanctified with intrinsic sanctity but only with sanctity of monetary value, the first person who commits sacrilege removes it from the status of consecrated property, and thereafter no further sacrilege can be committed with it.

And once the wood left the status of consecrated property immediately when the one who stoked the oven committed sacrilege with it, how could it subsequently render the bread baked with it forbidden?

Rav Pappa said: Here we are dealing with the wood of a peace offering.

The person designated monetary sanctity upon the wood in order to use its value to bring a peace offering. There is no law of sacrilege with regard to a peace offering, because it is an offering of lesser sanctity, and the designation “offerings of the Lord” does not apply to it. Nevertheless, it certainly carries a prohibition against deriving benefit from it. The same is true of wood that was designated with the monetary sanctity of a peace offering: It is forbidden, but the law of sacrilege does not apply to it.

Rav Ḥisda therefore resolved the question for him: The wood does not become unconsecrated through the stoking, because the one who stoked the oven did not commit sacrilege.

And this is according to Rabbi Yehuda, who says: Consecrated property, through

an act of

unintentional

sacrilege,

becomes unconsecrated.

But

through

an act of

intentional sacrilege, it does not become unconsecrated!

In the case of intentional sacrilege, why does it not

become unconsecrated? —

Since it is not subject to sacrilege

[for there is no liability for the sacrilege offering in a case of intentional action, but only in a case of unintentional action], therefore

it does not leave the status of non-sacred

through intentional sacrilege.

And accordingly, one who commits sacrilege with property possessing the sanctity of

a peace offering as well —

since it is not subject to sacrilege

[for the designation “offerings of the Lord” does not apply to it],

it does not leave the status of consecrated property

when one commits sacrilege with it.

And we raise an objection:

But

is it true that

wherever the one who stokes the oven commits sacrilege, the wood leaves

the status of consecrated property

and becomes non-sacred?

But it was taught: All

items forbidden for benefit

that are burned have ash that is permitted

for benefit,

except for the wood of an asheira!

And we derive this from what is written concerning idolatry: “Nothing from the condemned property shall cleave to your hand.”

And the ash of consecrated property remains forbidden forever. [

It is forbidden forever specifically in the case of consecrated property. But the wood of an asheira, if a gentile burns it, is permitted, because a gentile can annul the idolatry. ]

And if it is as you said, that through sacrilege it leaves the status of consecrated property, then the wood became unconsecrated from the moment they took it in order to burn it; so why is its ash forbidden?

Rami bar Ḥama said:

What are we dealing with here?

For example,

they did not commit sacrilege with the wood; rather,

a fire fell on its own upon the consecrated wood, for no one committed sacrilege

with it.

Rav Shemaya said:

What are we dealing with here?

With those

[that ash]

that require interment!

That is, the ash of the removal of the ashes. There was no sacrilege in its burning; rather, it was burned upon the altar as required.

And it is forbidden to derive benefit from it, as

it was taught:

It is written concerning the ashes: “And they shall place it beside the altar.”

And we expound:

“And they shall place it” —

gently.

“And they shall place it” —

all of it.

“And they shall place it” —

that they should not scatter

it, but rather place it in a heap. “And they shall place it” — that one should not derive benefit from it.

We learned in the Mishna:

Rabbi Yehuda says: The removal

of leaven is only through burning!

It was taught: Rabbi Yehuda said: The removal of leaven is only through burning.

And the conclusion follows

that this is so, through a kal va-chomer, from the leftovers of sacrificial meat.

And as for the leftovers, which are not subject to “do not be seen”

or

“do not be found,”

and even so they are

required to be burned

— as it is written: “And what remains of the flesh of the sacrifice, on the third day, shall be burned in fire” —

leaven, which is subject to “do not be seen”

and “do not be found,” certainly

is

required to be burned!

The Sages said to him:

The Sages said to him

Every

kal va-chomer

that you derive at the outset to be stringent

with the more stringent matter, and to impose an additional stringency upon it,

but whose conclusion

is

to be lenient, is not a valid derivation.

For the stringency that you add to it ultimately causes leniency with regard to it.

And here too, if you require him specifically to burn it, the ultimate result is a leniency.

For the stringency that you add to it ultimately causes the law to become more lenient.

For

if he does not find wood

to burn it,

he will sit idle,

and will not eliminate it through another means.

But absent the kal va-chomer, the mitzva of removing it would not be negated. For the Torah said: “You shall eliminate leaven from your houses.”

This implies: You shall burn it

by any means through which you can eliminate it!

And if he has no wood, he should eliminate it by crumbling it and scattering it to the wind, or the like. [

And although it was stated above [12b] that even according to Rabbi Yehuda, at the time of removal it may be eliminated by any means, it can nevertheless result in a leniency—for example, in the case of one who wishes to leave on a caravan within thirty days before Passover. The obligation to remove it has already taken effect. If he has no wood, according to the Sages he should eliminate his leaven by any means, whereas according to Rabbi Yehuda he will sit idle and not eliminate it. ]

Rabbi Yehuda retracted

because of this response,

and

did not derive this law through a kal va-chomer.

Rather,

he derived it through another principle of an av binyan [an analogy based on what is found in another case]. Since it is not a kal va-chomer, it does not matter that its conclusion is lenient, for it is a decree of the verse. We must equate leaven with the leftovers of sacrificial meat both with regard to leniency and with regard to stringency.

he established it through a different principle

of a foundational analogy [“what do we find”]. Since it is not an a-fortiori inference, it does not matter that its conclusion is lenient, because it is a specific decree of the Torah. We must compare leaven to leftover sacrificial meat both with regard to stringency and with regard to leniency.

And thus he argued: Behold,

the leftover is forbidden to eat, and

even

leaven is forbidden to eat. Just as leftover is burned, so leaven is burned!

The Sages said to him:

The

carcass proves otherwise,

even though

it

is forbidden to eat, it is not required to be burned.

And likewise, leaven is not required to be burned.

Rabbi Judah said to them:

There is

a distinction

between a carcass, leftover, and leaven.

For

leftover is forbidden both for eating and for benefit, and

likewise

leaven is forbidden both for eating and for benefit.

And it is therefore properly derived from leftover:

just as leftover is burned, so leaven is burned.

Unlike a carcass, which is forbidden only for eating; it is, however, permitted for benefit.

The Sages said to him:

The

ox sentenced to stoning proves otherwise,

even

it

is forbidden both for eating and for benefit, it is not required to be burned.

And likewise, let us say this with regard to leaven.

He said to them: There is a distinction

between leaven and leftover, on the one hand, and an ox sentenced to stoning, on the other.

For

leftover is forbidden for benefit and for eating, and one is liable to karet

for eating it.

And

likewise

leaven is forbidden both for eating and for benefit, and one is liable to karet

for eating it. Therefore, they can be derived from one another.

Just as

we find with

leftover

that it is

burned, so leaven

is also

burned.

Unlike an ox sentenced to stoning, for eating which one is not liable to karet.

The Sages said to him:

The

fat of an ox sentenced to stoning proves otherwise, that

it

is forbidden both for eating and for benefit

[because of the prohibition of an ox sentenced to stoning],

and

even

one is liable to karet

for eating it [because of the prohibition of forbidden fat].

And

even so,

it is not

it

required to be burned.

And likewise, let us say this with regard to leaven.