Pesachim 26b (כו:) — the Talmud in English

And we answer:

This

first clause

is comparable only to this

that we learned in tractate Parah:

If a bird alighted upon it, it is fit. If a male animal alighted upon it, it is unfit!

For labor disqualifies the red heifer, as it is written concerning it: “upon which no yoke has been placed.” This indicates that even if the yoke was placed upon it on its own, it is thereby disqualified. Nevertheless, it is not disqualified when a bird alights upon it, because its owner does not want this yoke. It is specifically when a male animal alights upon it that it is disqualified, because its owner is pleased with this.

The same applies to labor performed with a cow and with an eglah arufah. Although if labor was performed on it on its own it is likewise disqualified, this applies only to labor with which he is pleased, such as when he placed it in a cattle pen so that it would nurse and thresh. But if he does not want it to thresh, it is not disqualified.

We inquire concerning this:

What is the reason?

Rav Pappa said: If it were written

“upon which no”

work was done

upon it

and it is also read

“work,”

we would have said that

until he himself performs

labor upon it by hand, it is not disqualified. And

if

it had

been written

“working,” and it is read

also

“working,”

we would have said that

even

through labor performed

on its own

it is disqualified, even when he is not pleased with it. But

now that it is written

“work,” and it is read

“working,”

we expound that it is disqualified specifically through

“working,”

which is

analogous

to

“work.”

When

“work”

was performed

upon it by hand,

he is pleased

with the labor;

so too,

“working,”

the labor disqualifies it only when

he is pleased

with it.

Although “upon which no work was done” is written with regard to an eglah arufah, we derive the law of the red heifer from it by a gzera shava of “upon” and “upon.”

Ta shma:

One who finds an item belonging to another and becomes obligated to guard it and return it to its owner

may not spread it out, for his own use, neither upon a bed nor upon a peg

[a wooden stake],

for his own needs!

But

he may

spread it out for its needs

—the needs of the lost item—

upon a bed or upon a peg!

For example, in order that moths should not eat it.

And if

guests happen to come to him

in his home,

he may not spread it out, neither upon a bed nor upon a peg, whether for its needs

—the needs of the lost item—

or for his own needs!

Although he does so for the needs of the lost item, since he also intends thereby to enhance his standing before the guests, and thus benefits from it, the matter is prohibited on account of robbery. Even though he cannot fulfill the needs of the lost item without benefiting from it, it follows that wherever it is impossible to avoid the act and he intends to benefit, it is prohibited. This is difficult for Rava.

And we answer:

That case is different,

as it is prohibited because

it damages it

[it burns it, meaning that by spreading it before the guests he causes the lost item to suffer a loss].

Either because of the evil eye,

as the person who sees it may cast an evil eye upon it,

or because of thieves!

Perhaps the guests are thieves, and they will steal it.

Ta shma:

It is the practice of sellers to place upon their bodies the garments that they are selling. Even

sellers of garments

of kilayim [which they sell to gentiles]

sell them in the usual manner,

and they are permitted to wrap themselves in them,

provided that they do not intend, in

the days of

heat,

that the kilayim protect them

from the heat. And

that they do not intend

in

the days of

rain

that the garments protect them

from the rain!

For whenever he does not intend to derive benefit from wearing it, there is no prohibition of kilayim.

And the scrupulous

[the ascetics who distance themselves from anything ugly and anything resembling it]

carry

the kilayim

behind them on a stick,

and do not place them upon their bodies.

And we conclude the refutation:

But here, it is possible

for all the sellers

to act like the scrupulous

and refrain from wearing them by carrying them behind themselves on a stick, and nevertheless,

when he does not intend,

it is permitted

as a matter of fundamental law to wrap himself in them. And from here there is

a refutation of the one who teaches

according to

the first formulation,

that according to

Rava,

even in accordance with Rabbi Shimon, whenever it is possible to avoid the act and he does not intend it, it is prohibited.

And we conclude:

Refutation!

We learned in the Mishna:

And one may not kindle with it

an oven or a stove!

The Sages taught:

The peels of fruit of orla are prohibited for benefit like the fruit itself, because they serve as a protective covering for the fruit. And with regard to kil'ei hakerem, even the woody parts are prohibited, because the term “fruit” is not written concerning them.

Therefore,

an oven that was heated with peels of orla, or with the woody parts of kil'ei hakerem—

if the oven was

new, it must be demolished!

Since it has become prohibited for benefit: It was fired through this heating, and thereby its manufacture was completed. And anything that is brought about by substances prohibited for benefit is prohibited like them.

And if the oven was

old,

and this heating does not complete it or establish it in its final state, its substance does not become prohibited for benefit. Therefore, it need not be demolished; rather,

it must be cooled!

One may not bake bread in the oven until it has cooled from the heating with the orla and kil'ayim, so that he will not benefit from them.

And if

he baked in it

through the prohibited heating

the bread —

Rabbi says: The bread is prohibited!

Because the wood imparts benefit to the bread; that is, the prohibited wood causes the bread to be baked. And anything caused by a substance prohibited for benefit is prohibited.

And the Sages say: The bread is permitted!

Because the wood does not impart benefit to the bread. For the flame does not come from the wood while it exists as wood, but from the wood after it has been burned. Once orla and kil'ei hakerem have been burned, their prohibition lapses, as we maintain: “All substances that must be burned—their ashes are permitted” .

And if the prohibited wood had already been burned and become coals, and he

cooked

a dish

on

those

coals, according to everyone

the food

is permitted!

For coals of orla and kil'ei hakerem are permitted for benefit, in accordance with the law of all substances that must be burned, whose ashes are permitted. The food was baked through something permitted.

We learned above: A new oven must be demolished; an old one must be cooled!

And we challenge this:

But it was taught:

An oven that was heated with peels of orla or with the woody parts of kil'ei hakerem—

whether new or old, it must be cooled!

Even a new oven does not itself become prohibited, despite the fact that it is completed and established through the agency of the prohibited substance.

And we answer:

This is not difficult. This one is Rabbi, and that one is the Sages.

Just as Rabbi and the Sages dispute above concerning bread baked in the oven, whether we say that the wood imparts benefit to the bread, so too they dispute with regard to the oven itself. According to Rabbi, the oven too is prohibited, because the wood imparts benefit to the oven. According to the Sages, the wood does not remain as an appreciable factor in the oven; rather, the oven is completed through wood that has already been burned. Therefore, whether new or old, it must be cooled, and it need not be demolished. The cooling that is required is only a rule governing initial use [Rashi].

And we reject this:

Say: You may have heard that Rabbi

prohibits bread baked with prohibited wood

because the wood imparts benefit to the bread.

But why should the oven be demolished? Although it itself was brought about through the prohibited substance, it itself is not eaten; rather, it remains available for baking in it. If he subsequently bakes bread in it using another heating of permitted wood, there is no reason to prohibit that bread. For it is not brought about solely by the prohibited wood that completed the oven, but also by the heating from the permitted wood. And whenever

both this and that

[the prohibited substance and the permitted substance]

cause it, have you heard Rabbi

prohibit it ? Perhaps he prohibits only something brought about solely by the prohibited substance.

And not something brought about jointly by a prohibited substance and a permitted one.

And we answer:

Rather, it is not difficult. This

baraita that teaches, “A new one must be demolished,”

is Rabbi Eliezer’s

opinion.

And this

baraita that teaches, “It is cooled,”

is the Rabbis’

opinion.

And we raise an objection:

Which Rabbi Eliezer?

If you say it is Rabbi Eliezer’s opinion concerning leaven—

and as

we learned:

If prohibited leaven fell into permitted dough and caused it to leaven, the dough is prohibited, by the law of causing; anything caused by the prohibited substance is prohibited like it.

The same law applies to teruma leaven that fell into non-sacred dough: the dough is prohibited to non-kohanim, like teruma, by the law of causing.

Leaven of non-sacred produce and

leaven

of teruma that fell into non-sacred dough,

and

neither of them

alone

was sufficient to leaven

the dough,

and neither of them

alone

was sufficient to leaven

it,

and they combined

together

and leavened

it—

Rabbi Eliezer says: I follow the last one!

If the non-sacred leaven fell into it last, the dough is permitted; but if the teruma fell into it last, it is prohibited. This will be explained shortly.