Pesachim 26b — the Talmud in English

And we answer:

this

first clause

is not comparable, but rather to this

which we learned in the tractate Para:

if a bird rested upon it, it is fit. If a male animal mounted upon it, it is disqualified!

For the yoke disqualifies the red cow, as it is written concerning it: “upon which a yoke has not come.” And it implies that even if the yoke came upon it by itself, it is thereby disqualified. And even so, it is not disqualified by the bird having come upon it, because its owners do not desire this yoke. But specifically by the male animal mounting upon it is it disqualified, because they desire this .

The same law applies to work with a cow and with an eglah arufah. Even though when work was performed upon it by itself it is likewise disqualified, this is only with work that he desires, such as when he brought it into a pen so that it should nurse and thresh. But if he does not want its threshing, it is not disqualified .

We raise this question concerning it:

What is the reason?

Rav Pappa said: If it were written “

which has not

worked

upon it,”

and we would also read

“worked,”

we would have said that

until he himself works with his hands

work upon it, it is not disqualified. And

if

it had

been written

“works,” and we would read

also

“works,”

we would have said that

even

through work that occurs

by itself as well

it is disqualified, and even when he does not desire it. But

now that it is written

“worked,” and we read

“works,”

we derive that specifically through

“works,”

which is

similar

to

“worked,”

it is disqualified.

Just as

“worked”

work upon it with his hands, it is

desired

by him that there be work,

so

“works”

too: the work disqualifies it only when

he desires it

. [

And even though “upon which a yoke has not come” is written concerning the eglah arufah, we derive the red cow from it by the gzera shava of “upon” and “upon.”]

Come and hear:

One who finds his fellow’s lost object and becomes obligated to guard it and return it to its owner,

may not spread it out neither upon a bed nor upon a peg

[a wooden peg],

for his own need!

But

it is permitted for him to

spread it out for its need

of the lost object,

upon a bed and upon a peg!

For example, so that the moth should not eat it.

And if

guests happened to come to him

in his house,

he may not spread it out neither upon a bed nor upon a peg, whether for its need

of the lost object,

or for his own need!

And although he is doing so for the need of the lost object, since he intends thereby also to honor himself before the guests, and it follows that he derives benefit from it, the matter is forbidden because of robbery . And even though it is impossible for him to fulfill the need of the lost object without deriving benefit from it . It follows that wherever it is impossible and he intends [to benefit], it is forbidden. And this is a difficulty for Rava.

And we answer:

It is different there,

for it is forbidden because

it damages it

[it burns it, meaning it causes the lost object a loss] by spreading it out before the guests.

Either because of the evil eye,

for the one who sees it will cast an evil eye upon it.

Or because of thieves!

Perhaps the guests are thieves, and they will steal it .

Come and hear:

It is the practice of sellers to place upon their bodies the garments that they sell. And even

sellers of garments

of shatnez [which they sell to gentiles]

sell in their usual manner,

and it is permitted for them to wrap themselves in them.

Provided that he does not intend in

the days of

sun

that the shatnez should protect him

from the sun. And

that he does not intend

in

the days of

rain

that it should protect him

from the rain!

For anything in which he does not intend for the pleasure of wearing, there is no prohibition of shatnez.

And the discreet ones

[the ascetics who distance themselves from ugliness and from what resembles it]

draw

the shatnez

behind themselves with a stick,

and do not place it upon their bodies.

And we conclude the objection:

But here, where it is possible

for all the sellers

to act like the discreet ones

and refrain from wearing them by drawing them behind themselves with a stick, and even so,

when he does not intend,

it is permitted

according to the fundamental law to wrap himself in them . And from here there is

a refutation of the one who teaches

according to

the first formulation,

that according to

Rava,

even according to Rabbi Shimon, wherever it is possible and one does not intend, it is forbidden.

And we conclude:

Refutation!

We learned in the Mishna:

and he may not fire with it

an oven or a stove!

The Sages taught:

The peels of fruit of orla are forbidden to derive benefit from, like the fruit itself, because they are a protection for the fruit. And with kil'e ha-kerem, even the thorns are forbidden, because “fruit” is not written concerning them.

Therefore,

an oven that was fired with peels of orla, or with thorns of kil'e ha-kerem—

if the oven was

new, it must be shattered!

Because it has become forbidden to derive benefit from. For it was fired through this firing, and through this its making is completed. And anything brought about through substances from which it is forbidden to derive benefit is forbidden like them .

And if the oven was

old,

and this firing does not complete it and establish it, its substance is not forbidden to derive benefit from. Therefore, it is not necessary to shatter it; rather,

it must be cooled!

And one may not bake bread in the oven until it cools from the firing of the orla and the kil'e ha-kerem, so that he will not derive benefit from them.

And if

he baked in it

with the prohibited firing

the bread —

Rabbi says: The bread is forbidden!

Because there is enhancement of the wood in the bread. That is, the prohibited wood is what causes the baking of the bread. And anything caused by the substance from which it is forbidden to derive benefit is forbidden.

And the Sages say: The bread is permitted!

Because there is no enhancement of the wood in the bread, since the flame does not come from the wood while it exists, but from the wood that is being burned. And after orla and kil'e ha-kerem have been burned, their prohibition is removed, as we hold: “All that are burned, their ashes are permitted” .

And if the prohibited wood had already been burned and become coals, and

she cooked

a turnip

upon

those

coals, according to everyone

the bread

is permitted!

For the coals of orla and kil'e ha-kerem are permitted to derive benefit from, in accordance with the law of all that are burned, whose ashes are permitted. And the bread was baked through a permitted thing.

We learned above: A new one must be shattered; an old one must be cooled!

And we object:

But it was taught:

An oven that was fired with peels of orla or with thorns of kil'e ha-kerem—

whether new or old, it must be cooled!

And even in the case of a new one, the substance of the oven does not become forbidden, despite the fact that it is completed and established through the causation of the prohibited substance.

And we answer:

It is not difficult. This is Rabbi, and that is the Rabbis.

Just as Rabbi and the Rabbis disputed above concerning bread baked in the oven, whether we say that there is enhancement of the wood in the bread or not, so did they dispute concerning the oven itself. According to Rabbi, even the oven is forbidden, because there is enhancement of the wood in the oven. But according to the Rabbis, the wood itself is not present in the oven; rather, it is completed through the wood that has already been burned. Therefore, whether new or old, it must be cooled, and it is not necessary to shatter it. And its requiring cooling is only a law concerning the outset [Rashi].

And we reject this:

Say: You may infer that you heard Rabbi

forbidding bread baked with prohibited wood

because there is enhancement of the wood in the bread.

But why should the oven be shattered? And although it itself was brought about through the prohibited substance, it itself is not eaten. Rather, it remains in order to bake with it. And if he again bakes bread in it through a later firing of permitted wood, there is no reason to forbid that bread, for it is not brought about only through the prohibited wood that completed the oven, but also through the firing of permitted wood . And whenever

both this and that

[the prohibited and the permitted]

cause it, have you heard Rabbi

forbidding it ?! Perhaps he forbids only a thing that is brought about by the prohibited substance alone.

And not a thing brought about by prohibited and permitted substances together .

And we answer:

Rather, it is not difficult. This

which it teaches, “it must be newly built,”

is Rabbi Eliezer

’s opinion.

And this

which it teaches, “it is cooled,”

is the Rabbis’

opinion.

And we raise an objection:

Which Rabbi Eliezer?

If you say it is Rabbi Eliezer concerning leaven —

and

as we learned:

leaven of a forbidden substance that fell into permitted dough and caused it to leaven, it becomes forbidden on account of the law of “causing.” For everything caused by the forbidden substance is forbidden like it.

And likewise is the law concerning leaven of teruma that fell into dough of non-sacred produce: it becomes forbidden to non-kohanim like teruma, on account of the law of “causing.”

Leaven of non-sacred produce and

leaven

of teruma that fell into dough

of non-sacred produce, and

there is not in this

alone

enough to cause it to leaven

the dough,

and there is not in this

alone

enough to cause it to leaven

it,

and they joined together

together

and caused it to leaven

it —

Rabbi Eliezer says: I follow the last one!

For if the leaven of non-sacred produce fell into it last, the dough is permitted. And if the teruma fell last, it is forbidden. And this will be explained shortly.