Pesachim 26a — the Talmud in English

And Rava would say to you: Rabbi Judah said only thus, that

the law of

one who does not intend

is

like

the law of

one who intends, only stringently:

and to forbid even when one does not intend. But that one who intends should be like one who does not intend even

leniently, he did not say!

And he did not permit where it is impossible and he intends.

Abaye said: From where do I say it

that wherever it is impossible and one intends, it is permitted? From this

as it was taught: They said about Rabban Yohanan ben Zakkai that he would sit in the shade of the Sanctuary and expound the entire day!

For he would expound before a large crowd. No bet midrash could contain all the listeners, and therefore he would expound in the street before the Temple Mount. And the Sanctuary, which was one hundred cubits high, cast shade over them from the sun.

But

the Sanctuary is forbidden in benefit because it is sacred, and nevertheless Rabban Yohanan ben Zakkai benefited from its shade. He even intended this benefit. Rather, certainly

here

Rabban Yohanan did so because it was impossible for him not to benefit from the shade while he stood there. It follows that wherever

it is impossible and one intends,

it is permitted, and he is not required to withdraw from there.

And Rava said:

It is not proof from there, because

the Sanctuary is different, for it is made for what is within it.

It

is made!

For the use of the Sanctuary is only within it, and enjoyment of the shade is not the normal manner of its enjoyment. Therefore it was not forbidden.

Rava said: From where do I say it

that where it is impossible and one intends, it is forbidden? From this

as we learned: Openings

[apertures]

were open in the upper chamber of the Holy of Holies.

And

when

there was a need to repair the wall of the Holy of Holies,

through them

[by their way]

they would lower the craftsmen in chests, so that they would not

look here and there

and their eyes would be nourished by the sight of the Holy of Holies!

And thus they were benefiting from the beauty of the appearance of the Holy of Holies, which is forbidden in benefit.

But here it is impossible and he intends.

For it was impossible for them to repair the damage of the building without finding themselves within it, and nevertheless they would not enter without chests, because they were concerned lest they intend to benefit. It follows that whenever one intends,

it is forbidden,

even where it is impossible.

And we reject this:

Can you understand it so? Did Rabbi Shimon ben Pazi not say that Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi said in the name of Bar Kappara: The sound

of the musical instruments in the Temple,

and the appearance

of the Temple,

and the smell

of the incense,

do not contain

[in their benefit]

the prohibition of

misappropriation of consecrated property

by Torah law

because they have no substance?

And since they are forbidden in benefit only rabbinically, it is reasonable that the Sages did not forbid them where there was a need to repair the building. They would not have troubled them to enter in chests. It is necessarily not because of the prohibition of benefit from sacred things that they lowered them in chests.

Rather,

they did so because of

the elevation that they made concerning the Holy of Holies,

so that they would not look at it! And if so, there is no proof from this that wherever it is impossible and one intends, it is forbidden.

There are those who say: Rava said: From where do I say

that “where it is impossible and one intends, it is forbidden”?

From this

as it was taught: Rabbi Shimon ben Pazi said that

Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi said in the name of Bar Kappara: Sound, appearance, and smell do not involve misappropriation!

It implies that specifically

misappropriation is absent

from them.

But a prohibition is present

in them.

What, is it not

that they are forbidden even

to those

people

standing inside

the Temple courtyard? Even though it is impossible for them not to benefit from the sound of the musical instruments, from the appearance of the Temple, and from the smell of the incense, it is forbidden for them to intend to benefit from them. It follows that whenever it is impossible and one intends, it is forbidden.

And we reject this:

No,

it is not proof. Rather, they are forbidden

to those

people

standing

from

outside

the Temple courtyard, because they are not compelled to benefit from them. It is a case where it is possible and one intends, which according to everyone is forbidden.

The body of the matter: Rabbi Shimon ben Pazi said that Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi said in the name of Bar Kappara: Sound, appearance, and smell do not involve misappropriation!

And we ask:

And

for

does smell not involve misappropriation?

But it was taught:

Anyone

who compounds the incense in order to learn from it

the craft of compounding,

or in order to deliver it to the community, is exempt.

But one who compounds it in order

to smell it is liable!

As it is written: “Any man who makes one like it, to smell it, shall be cut off from his people.”

And one who smells it

from the communal incense

is exempt

from excision, because the Torah made liable only the one who compounds it, and not the one who smells it.

But

everyone who smells it

commits misappropriation!

For since he benefited from the sacred property, he is liable for a guilt-offering for misappropriation. It follows that smell does involve misappropriation, and is not considered something without substance.

Rather, Rav Pappa said: Sound and appearance,

indeed

do not involve misappropriation,

because

they have no substance.

And

if

smell—

after

the incense has been burned and

its column of smoke rises

[its smoke]—

does not involve misappropriation, since

it has already

fulfilled its mitzva!

And anything whose mitzva has been fulfilled has left the domain of misappropriation, for since the Most High no longer needs it, it has left the category of “sacred things of the Lord”.

But before the incense has been burned and its column of smoke has risen, one commits misappropriation through its smell, because the spices of the smell are something that has substance.

And we ask:

Does this mean that wherever its mitzva has been fulfilled,

there is henceforth

no misappropriation?

But the teruma of

the ashes [which each day the priest would take a full panful of ashes and place it beside the altar, where it was swallowed in its place],

whose

mitzva had already

been fulfilled,

and nevertheless it is forbidden to benefit from it,

and it involves misappropriation.

And

as it is written

concerning it,

“And he shall place it beside the altar.”

And we expound: “And he shall place it”

so that he shall not scatter it,

but shall leave it in a pile. And we also expound:

“And he shall place it”

so that he shall not benefit

from it.

And we answer: Although one commits misappropriation through the teruma of the ashes, one does not derive from it for the world at large,

because

we also find that with the priestly garments one commits misappropriation through them even after their mitzva has been fulfilled. If so,

the teruma of the ashes and the priestly garments are two verses that come as one, and every two verses that come as one do not teach

for other places. For if this were a foundational principle for the entire Torah, it would have been sufficient to write this law in one place. Rather, the verse repeated the same law in two places to say that the law applies specifically in these two cases, and not in other places.

And we explain:

The teruma of the ashes,

one commits misappropriation through it even though its mitzva has been fulfilled,

as we said.

And

the priestly garments,

one commits misappropriation through them even after they have worn out and their mitzva has already been fulfilled. For we find concerning the High Priest that after he entered on the Day of Atonement into the innermost place wearing the white garments, they were again forbidden for use.

As it is written,

“And he shall leave them there.”

And we expound:

This teaches that they require being stored away!

And we ask:

This works according to the Rabbis, who

expound thus concerning the priestly garments and

say,

“This teaches that they require being stored away.”

But according to Rabbi Dosa, who disagrees with them and maintains that they are not fit for the High Priest,

but they are fit for an ordinary priest,

these four white garments, to use them throughout the year,

what is the meaning of “And he shall leave them there”?

So that

the High Priest

shall not use them on another Day of Atonement—

according to him,

what can one say?

For according to him there is no verse prohibiting benefit from the High Priest’s white garments after their mitzva has been fulfilled. Rather, there is only one verse concerning the teruma of the ashes, prohibiting benefit from something whose mitzva has been fulfilled. Let us derive from it for every place that even something whose mitzva has been fulfilled involves misappropriation.

And we answer: It is still impossible to derive from the teruma of the ashes,

because

we also find that the heifer whose neck is broken is forbidden in benefit even after its mitzva has been fulfilled. For it is written concerning it, “And they shall break the heifer’s neck there,” and we expound: “There” means its burial place.

And the teruma of the ashes and the heifer whose neck is broken are two verses that come as one, and every two verses that come as one do not teach.

And we ask again:

This works according to the one who says that “two verses that come as one

do

not teach.”

But according to the one who says

[Rabbi Judah in tractate Sanhedrin] “two verses that come as one

do teach,” what can one say?

And we answer:

Two exclusions are written

concerning the teruma of the ashes and the heifer whose neck is broken. Concerning the teruma of the ashes

it is written, “And he shall place it”

beside the altar. And we exclude, from “and he shall place it,” that specifically the teruma of the ashes is forbidden in benefit, and not another thing whose mitzva has been fulfilled.

And

concerning the heifer whose neck is broken

it is written, “the one whose neck is broken.”

And we exclude that specifically the one whose neck is broken is forbidden in benefit, and not another thing whose mitzva has been fulfilled.

Come and hear:

A heifer upon which work was performed is disqualified from being a heifer whose neck is broken. And if one

brought it

[the heifer]

into the team

[if he tied it to a yoke together with other cows threshing grain]

and it threshed

with them, it is

fit!

Its threshing is not considered work, because he did not intend for this.

And if he brought it into the yoke

so that it would nurse

from its mother,

and

also so that it would

thresh, it is

disqualified!

And we ask:

And we ask:

But here it is impossible

to bring it into the yoke so that it would nurse without it threshing. Nevertheless, because he

intends

that it thresh,

it teaches

that it is

disqualified.

It follows that even where it is impossible, whenever one intends the performance, it is considered an act. And this is difficult for Abaye, who permitted doing this with prohibitions of benefit.

And we answer:

The case there is different,

with the heifer whose neck is broken,

for it is written

“upon which no work has been done.”

This implies

in every manner!

Although throughout the Torah, wherever it is impossible, it is not considered an act of prohibition, concerning the heifer the Torah disqualified it even through such work.

And we ask again:

If so, even

in the

first clause,

where he did not intend at all that it thresh,

also

should we say that it is disqualified? For “upon which no work has been done” is written, which implies even if the work was done by itself, without his intending this.