Pesachim 25b (כה:) — the Talmud in English

When Ravin came, he said

in the name of

Rabbi Yoḥanan: In the case of all

prohibitions in the Torah,

one may be healed through them, except for idolatry, forbidden sexual relations, !(pamud.bmp "")

and bloodshed!

For example, if they said to someone, “Kill your fellow Jew, and if not, we will kill you,” he must be killed rather than transgress. For these three transgressions are not overridden even by the need to save a life.

Idolatry,

its rationale is because of

what we said!

As it is written: “With all your soul.”

And

also

forbidden sexual relations and bloodshed

are subject to the rule that one must be killed rather than transgress. And

as it was taught in a beraita: Rabbi says

It is written concerning a man pursuing a betrothed maiden in order to rape her:

“Just as when a man rises against his fellow and murders him, so is this matter.”

And what connection is there between a murderer and a betrothed maiden?

And what need was there to derive anything from it? If it is to teach that the maiden is exempt, it is explicitly written: “But to the maiden you shall do nothing.”

Rather,

this

murderer

comes to teach

about the betrothed maiden,

and it is found that he is himself taught

by her.

Just as in the case of a betrothed maiden, permission is granted

to anyone who sees

her

being pursued,

at the cost of the pursuer’s life

[meaning, it is permitted to kill him], as it is written: “And there was no one to save her,” which implies that if there is someone who can save her, he must save her by every means available to him, even by killing the pursuer—

so too, a murderer

is the same.

And it is permitted to save

the pursued person

by

taking

the life

of the murderer.

And

we again derive the law of

a betrothed maiden from a murderer.

Just as

with regard to the prohibition of

murder,

if gentiles say to someone, “Kill your fellow Jew, and if not, we will kill you,”

he must be killed rather than transgress—

so too

the prohibition of

a betrothed maiden

is the same. If they say to her, “Transgress the prohibition of forbidden sexual relations, and if not, we will kill you,”

she must be killed rather than transgress. [

The Tosafot did not read “she must be killed,” but rather

“he must be killed”

—the man must be killed and must not have intercourse with her. But the woman should have intercourse and not be killed, because she is passive ground. As stated in Sanhedrin 74b, with regard to Esther. ]

We inquire:

Bloodshed itself—

from where do we know

that one must be killed rather than transgress?

And we answer:

It is a matter of reasoning. Like the incident involving one who came before Rava

and

said to him: The ruler of my city

[the governor of my city]

said to me: Go kill so-and-so, and if not, I will kill you!

Is it permitted for me to kill him because of the need to save my own life, just as all the prohibitions of the Torah are overridden by the need to save a life?

Rava said to him,

Rava:

Let them kill you, but do not kill!

It is forbidden for you to kill your fellow, even if they will kill you if you do not kill him. For

what did you see that makes your blood redder

than your fellow’s blood?

Perhaps the blood of that man

whom you were commanded to kill

is redder?!

And bloodshed is not overridden by the need to save a life. The Torah did not permit all prohibitions because of the need to save a life except on account of the value it places on the life of a Jew. But who can say that your life is more precious before the Omnipresent than your fellow’s life? Perhaps your fellow’s life is more precious. If you kill him, it follows that a life has been lost and a transgression has also been committed.

Mar bar Rav Ashi found Ravina applying unripe fruit of orla

[he was rubbing his daughter with unripe olives of orla] for medicinal purposes.

Mar bar Rav Ashi said to him,

Mar bar Rav Ashi:

Perhaps

this

which the Sages said, “In the case of all prohibitions involving benefit, one may be healed through them,”

one may be healed with all prohibitions from which one may not derive benefit,”

was said in a time of danger

“one may be healed through all prohibitions involving benefit,” and on account of the need to save a life. But

who said this applies when it is not a time of danger?

After all, medical treatment is ordinarily a form of benefit.

He said to him,

Ravina:

This tertian fever

[fever with chills] from which my daughter was suffering

is also considered like a time of danger.

Some say: He said to him,

Ravina:

Am I performing an act in the ordinary manner of

deriving benefit?!

After all, olives are not ordinarily rubbed until they have ripened and their oil has been extracted in the olive press.

It was stated:

If a person is found in a particular place, and he is compelled to derive benefit there from something prohibited for benefit, and that

benefit comes to the person against his will —

Abaye said: It is permitted,

and he need not leave that place.

And Rava said: It is prohibited.

He must leave that place so that he will not benefit from the prohibition.

And we explain: If it is

possible

for him to separate himself from there and not benefit from the prohibition,

and

he also

intends

to derive that benefit, everyone agrees that it is prohibited. For he is benefiting from the prohibition knowingly and willingly.

And likewise, even if it is

impossible

for him not to benefit in the situation in which he finds himself, but he

intends

to benefit,

everyone agrees that it is prohibited.

For anyone who intends the prohibition has certainly transgressed.

And if it is

impossible

for him not to benefit,

and

he also

does not intend

to derive this benefit, since there are two grounds for leniency,

everyone agrees that it is permitted.

They disagree

where it is

possible

for him not to benefit, but

he does not intend

that benefit.

For Rabbi Yehuda and Rabbi Shimon already disputed this issue with regard to all the prohibitions of the Torah: When a person performs a particular act, and as a result of it a prohibited action also occurs, while he does not intend that result [for example, dragging a bed or bench on Shabbat across the ground, where he intends only to drag it, but as a result a furrow is made in the ground, which is a derivative of plowing], Rabbi Yehuda prohibits this, while Rabbi Shimon permits it.

And according to Rabbi Yehuda, who says

“an unintentional act is prohibited,” everyone agrees

that whenever it is possible to avoid the prohibition,

it is prohibited

to perform the act, even though he does not intend the prohibited result.

They disagree—

Abaye and Rava—

according to Rabbi Shimon, who says

“an unintentional act is permitted”;

they disagree.

Abaye said

that “it is possible and he does not intend” is permitted, because he holds that this is

in accordance with Rabbi Shimon.

And Rava said: Rabbi Shimon said

only that “an unintentional act” is permitted

when it is impossible

for him to avoid the prohibition if he performs the permitted act. For example, he needs to move a heavy bed or bench from one place to another, and he cannot move them except by dragging them across the ground. Since it is both impossible for him to do so in another manner and he does not intend the prohibited result, there are two grounds for leniency.

But where it is possible

for him to perform the permitted act without producing the prohibited result—for example, in the case of a small bench or bed that he can carry on his shoulders—

Rabbi Shimon did not

permit him to drag them, even though he does not intend to make a furrow.

Some say:

Abaye and Rava did not disagree in this manner. Rather, everyone agrees that

“it is possible and he does not intend”

is the dispute between Rabbi Yehuda and Rabbi Shimon.

And where it is

impossible and

also

he does not intend, everyone

[Abaye and Rava]

does not disagree, for

both according to Rabbi Yehuda and according to Rabbi Shimon

it is permitted.

For what do they disagree

Abaye and Rava? It is where

it is impossible

for him to separate himself from the benefit in his present situation, but

he intends

to derive benefit.

And according to Rabbi Shimon, who

said, “An unintentional act is permitted,” and

follows intention, everyone agrees that

wherever he intends to benefit,

it is forbidden!

Even though in this situation it is impossible for him not to benefit, he is obligated to leave that place. For just as the absence of intention permits the act in every case, so the intention to perform the act causes it to be forbidden in every case, whether it is possible to avoid the benefit or impossible to avoid it.

They disagree according to Rabbi Yehuda, who says

“It makes no difference whether he intends to do it or does not intend to do it.”

And wherever

it is possible

for him to separate himself from the prohibited benefit,

it is forbidden

for him to do it.

Abaye holds that,

just as

Rabbi Yehuda

follows the distinction between what is possible and what is impossible stringently, without depending at all on intention—so that whenever it is possible, the act is forbidden even without intention—so too, here we follow that distinction leniently. Whenever it is impossible, we do not take into account that he intends to derive the prohibited benefit, and it is permitted.