Pesachim 25b — the Talmud in English

When Ravin came, he said

in the name of

Rabbi Yohanan: In all

prohibitions of the Torah

one may be healed. Except for idolatry, forbidden sexual relations, ![](pamud.bmp "

precise page location")

and bloodshed!

And this is, for example, when they said to him, “Kill your fellow Israelite, and if not, we will kill you”: he must be killed and not transgress. For these three transgressions are not set aside on account of preserving life.

Idolatry,

its reason is because of

that which we said!

As it is written, “with all your soul.”

And

also

forbidden sexual relations and bloodshed

are subject to “he must be killed and not transgress.” And

as it was taught in a beraita: Rabbi says:

It is written concerning one who pursues a betrothed maiden in order to violate her,

“For just as a man rises against his fellow and murders him, so is this matter.”

And what connection does a murderer have with a betrothed maiden?

And what did we need to learn from it? If it is to say that the maiden is exempt, it is explicitly written, “But to the maiden you shall do nothing.”

Rather,

this

murderer

comes to teach

about the betrothed maiden,

and it is found that he is learned

from her.

Just as with a betrothed maiden, permission is given

to everyone who sees

to save her

from the one pursuing her,

with his life

that is, the life of the pursuer [meaning, that it is permitted to kill him], as it is written, “and there was no savior for her,” which implies: if there is someone who can save her, he must save her by everything he can, even by killing the pursuer—

so too a murderer

is the same.

And it is possible to save

the pursued person

by

taking

the life

of the murderer.

And

again we derive

the betrothed maiden from the murderer.

Just as

in the prohibition of

murder,

if gentiles say to him, “Kill your fellow Israelite, and if not, we will kill you,”

he must be killed and not transgress—

so too

the prohibition of

the betrothed maiden

is the same. If they say to her, “Transgress the prohibition of forbidden sexual relations, and if not, they will kill you,”

she must be killed and not transgress. [

And Tosafot did not have the reading “she must be killed,” but rather

“he must be killed”

the man, and he must not have intercourse. But the woman should have intercourse and not be killed because she is passive ground , as it is stated in Sanhedrin 74b, concerning Esther].

And we inquire:

Bloodshed itself—

from where do we know

that he must be killed and not transgress?

And we answer:

It is a logical consideration. Like that case of one who came before Rava,

and

said to him: The ruler of my city

[the ruler of my city]

said to me: Go kill so-and-so, and if not, I will kill you!

Is it permitted for me to kill him on account of preserving my life, just as all the prohibitions of the Torah are set aside because of preserving life?

He said to him,

Rava:

Let them kill you, and do not kill!

It is forbidden for you to kill your fellow, even if they will kill you if you do not kill him. For

what did you see that your blood is redder

than your fellow’s blood?

Perhaps the blood of that man

whom you were commanded to kill

is redder?!

And bloodshed is not set aside on account of preserving life. For the Torah did not permit all the prohibitions because of preserving life except because of the preciousness of the life of an Israelite. And who will say to you that your life is more precious before the Omnipresent than the life of your fellow? Perhaps your fellow’s life is more precious. And if you kill him, it is found that a life has also been lost and a transgression has been committed.

Mar bar Rav Ashi found Ravina rubbing his daughter with unripe olives of orla

[he anointed his daughter with unripe olives of orla] for healing.

Mar bar Rav Ashi said to him,

Mar bar Rav Ashi:

Say,

this

which the Sages said “

one may be healed with all prohibitions from which one may not derive benefit,”

they said it at a time of danger

and because of preserving life. But

who said

this when it is not a time of danger? For healing is a manner of deriving benefit.

He said to him,

Ravina:

This fever with chills

[fever, chills] with which my daughter was ill

is also considered like a time of danger.

Some say: He said to him,

Ravina:

Am I performing a manner

of deriving benefit?!

But it is not customary to anoint with olives except after they have ripened and their oil has come out in the olive press.

It was stated:

If a person is found in a particular place, and he is compelled to derive benefit there from something from which it is forbidden to derive benefit, and that

benefit comes to a person against his will—

Abaye said: It is permitted,

and he need not leave from there.

And Rava said: It is forbidden.

And he must leave that place, so that he will not derive benefit from the prohibition.

And we explain: If

it is possible

for him to separate from there and not derive benefit from the prohibition,

and

also

he intends

in his mind that benefit, everyone agrees that it is forbidden. For he derives benefit from the prohibition knowingly and willingly.

And likewise, if

it is impossible

for him not to derive benefit in the situation in which he finds himself, but he

intends

in his mind to derive benefit,

everyone agrees that it is forbidden.

For anyone who intends the prohibition has certainly transgressed.

And if

it is impossible

for him not to derive benefit,

and

he also

does not intend

in his mind for this benefit, since there are two reasons for permitting,

everyone agrees that it is permitted.

When do they disagree?

Where

it is possible

for him not to derive benefit, but

he does not intend

in his mind for that benefit.

For Rabbi Yehuda and Rabbi Shimon already disputed this with regard to all prohibitions of the Torah, when a person performs a particular act and, as a result of it, an act of prohibition is also performed, while he does not intend that result [for example, dragging a bed or bench on Shabbat over the ground, where he intends only to drag it, but as a result a furrow is made in the ground, which is a derivative of plowing]. Rabbi Yehuda prohibits this, and Rabbi Shimon permits it.

And according to Rabbi Yehuda, who says

“an unintentional act is forbidden,” everyone agrees

that whenever it is possible to separate from the prohibition,

it is forbidden

to perform it, even though he does not intend it.

When do they disagree?

Abaye and Rava,

according to Rabbi Shimon, who says

“an unintentional act is permitted,”

disagree.

Abaye said that “it is possible and he does not intend” is permitted, because he holds that this is

according to Rabbi Shimon.

in accordance with Rabbi Shimon.

And Rava said: Rabbi Shimon said

only that “an unintentional act” is permitted

only where it is impossible

for him to avoid the prohibition if he performs the permitted act. For example, when he needs to transfer heavy beds and benches from one place to another, and he cannot transfer them except by dragging them over the ground. Since it is impossible for him to do so in another manner and he also does not intend [the prohibited result], there are two grounds for permitting.

But where it is possible

for him to perform the permitted act without arriving at the prohibited result, for example, with small benches and beds that he can carry on his shoulders,

not

did Rabbi Shimon permit him to drag them, even though he does not intend to make a furrow.

Some say:

Abaye and Rava did not disagree in this manner. Rather, everyone agrees that

“it is possible and he does not intend”

is the dispute between Rabbi Yehuda and Rabbi Shimon.

And where

it is impossible and

also

he does not intend, everyone

[Abaye and Rava]

does not disagree, for

both according to Rabbi Yehuda and according to Rabbi Shimon

it is permitted.

For Abaye and Rava disagree

where

it is not possible

for him to separate himself from the benefit in the situation in which he finds himself, but

he intends

to derive benefit.

And according to Rabbi Shimon, who

said, “an unintended act is permitted,” and

follows intention, everyone agrees that

wherever he intends,

it is forbidden! Even though in this place it is impossible for him not to derive benefit, he is obligated to withdraw from there. For just as the absence of intention permits the act in every manner, so does intention regarding the act cause it to be forbidden in every manner, whether it is possible or impossible.

Even though in this situation it is impossible for him not to benefit, he is obligated to leave that place. For just as the absence of intention permits the act in every case, so the intention to perform the act causes it to be forbidden in every case, whether it is possible to avoid the benefit or impossible to avoid it.

They disagree according to Rabbi Yehuda, who said

“it is no different whether one intends or whether one does not intend.”

And wherever

it is possible

for him to separate himself from the prohibition,

it is forbidden

for him to perform it.

Abaye held, just as

there

Rabbi Yehuda

followed the distinction between possible and impossible stringently, and did not depend on intention at all, but wherever it is possible it is forbidden even without intention, so too we follow this afterward leniently. And wherever it is impossible, we do not care that he intends the prohibition, and it is permitted.