Pesachim 25a (כה.) — the Talmud in English

And he objects:

What is there to say about orla, since it never had

a

period of permissibility [i.e., a period when it was permitted]? For the fruit of orla is forbidden from the moment it first forms, and it remains in its forbidden state forever.

Because of this severity, it is also forbidden to derive benefit from it. But can you say the same

about meat and milk,

which is not forbidden to benefit from, because

it had a period of permissibility

before it was cooked with the milk?

Rather,

leavened bread on Passover proves the point,

for although

it had a period of permissibility

before Passover, it is

forbidden to derive benefit from!

The same should apply to meat and milk.

He objects again:

What is there to say about leavened bread on Passover, since one is liable to receive karet

for eating it, and therefore it is forbidden to derive benefit from it? But can you

say

the same even

about meat and milk,

although

one is not liable to receive karet

for eating it, and it involves only a prohibition stated in a negative commandment?!

Rather,

diverse kinds in a vineyard prove the point, since one is not

liable to

receive karet

for eating them,

and

even so they are

forbidden

to derive benefit from

them!

The same should apply to meat and milk.

And he concludes the objection:

If it is indeed so

that one is lashed for diverse kinds in a vineyard even when one derives benefit from them in an atypical manner,

let us object: What is there to say about diverse kinds in a vineyard, since

one is

lashed for them even when one derives benefit from them in an atypical manner!

Therefore they are forbidden to derive benefit from. But meat and milk, which is like the other Torah prohibitions, for which one is lashed only when one eats them in the ordinary manner, should not be forbidden to derive benefit from.

And we answer:

And Abaye

holds that there is no difficulty at all. For

what would you say [i.e., from what would you refute the inference]? If

you would say

that meat and milk are different, because

one is not lashed for meat and milk

when one derives benefit from them in the ordinary manner—

that is not so. Rather, one is lashed for them even when one derives benefit from them in an atypical manner. For

is it the case that with meat and milk

“eating”

is written there?!

After all, the Torah writes there only the language of “you shall not cook.” We derive the prohibition against eating it by means of a gzera shava. And wherever “eating” is not written explicitly, the ordinary manner of eating is not required for liability to lashes.

But the other one

[the questioner] held

that this is why he derived it—the prohibition against eating it—by means of the gzera shava of “holy” and “holy”

from the verse concerning “carcass”

from a carcass [the word “carcass” is not precise; rather, we derive it from a terefa.

Rashi].

For “eating” is written with regard to a carcass. And we derive:

Just as with a carcass

one is lashed for it only when one eats it

in the ordinary manner of deriving benefit from it, so too with meat and milk

one is lashed only in the

ordinary manner of deriving benefit from it.

And Abaye

held that although we derive the very prohibition against eating meat and milk from a carcass, nevertheless the gzera shava does not serve to require the ordinary manner of deriving benefit from it. For

this is why “eating”

was not written

explicitly

with regard to meat and milk: in order

to teach that one is lashed for it even when one derives benefit from it in an atypical manner.

We learned the earlier beraita: Diverse kinds in a vineyard prove the point with regard to meat and milk: Although one is not liable to receive karet for it, it is nevertheless forbidden to derive benefit from it!

And we object:

Let us refute this: What is there to say about diverse kinds in a vineyard, since they never had a period of permissibility!

And for this reason they are forbidden to derive benefit from. It had occurred to us that in diverse kinds in a vineyard, only the growth that grew while forbidden became prohibited. But the seeds themselves, which had existed beforehand, did not become prohibited because of the mixture. The growth becomes forbidden from the moment it comes into existence. This is unlike meat and milk, which was permitted until it was cooked with milk.

Rav Adda bar Ahava said: This proves that the principal substance of diverse kinds in a vineyard becomes forbidden!

It is not only the growth that is forbidden, but also the seeds themselves. And the seeds themselves had a period of permissibility, since before they took root in the vineyard they were permitted. Thus, it is properly proven from them that meat and milk are forbidden to derive benefit from, even though they had a period of permissibility.

Rav Shemaya raised an objection:

We learned:

One who moves a perforated flowerpot

[containing seeds that had already sprouted] into a vineyard renders them diverse kinds in a vineyard, because they draw nourishment through the hole from the soil of the vineyard through the air.

And if

the flowerpot continues to produce growth within the vineyard, and that additional growth amounts to one part of

two hundred

of the total growth in it, the entire contents are

forbidden

because of the diverse kinds in the vineyard mixed into them!

This is referring to a case in which, before it was moved into the vineyard, there were 199 measures in it, and another measure was added in the vineyard. In such a case, the additional growth is forbidden and is not nullified by the majority of permitted material. Because of it, the entire mixture becomes forbidden. As we hold, diverse kinds in a vineyard are nullified in a mixture only when there are two hundred parts of permitted material corresponding to them.

And we conclude the objection: Only if

the flowerpot added

to the forbidden growth

is it not

[forbidden]. But if it

did not add

one part in two hundred,

it is not

rendered forbidden, even though it is now drawing nourishment from the vineyard. Evidently, only the growth becomes forbidden, but the seeds themselves do not become forbidden, even if they took root in the vineyard. This is difficult for Rav Adda bar Ahava.

Rava said:

There is no difficulty, because

two verses are written

with regard to diverse kinds. It is written: “You shall not sow your vineyard with diverse kinds, lest the seed and the produce become consecrated.” And afterward it is written:

“The seed

that you sow and the produce of the vineyard.” And since it is

written

“the seed,” this implies that the seeds themselves become forbidden.

And

since it is

written

“the

produce,”

this implies that only the growth [namely, “produce”] becomes forbidden.

How so?

Rather, a seed that is

sown from the outset

in the vineyard becomes forbidden in its very substance

when it takes root.

But a seed that had already

been sown previously

before it was placed in the vineyard does not become forbidden in its substance; only the growth becomes forbidden. And if it

added

one part in two hundred,

it is not

nullified, and the additional growth renders the entire seed forbidden because of the mixture of the prohibition. But if it

did not add, it is not

rendered forbidden itself. And whenever the additional growth is no more than one part in two hundred, it is nullified by the majority of permitted material.

Therefore, the perforated flowerpot is not rendered forbidden without additional growth, because the seeds had already been sown in the flowerpot beforehand. But Rav Adda was speaking about seed that was sown in the vineyard from the outset, and it itself becomes forbidden. Thus, it is properly proven from this that meat and milk becomes forbidden to derive benefit from, even though it had a period of permissibility.

Rabbi Yaakov said that Rabbi Yoḥanan said: With regard to all

the prohibitions from which the Torah forbids deriving benefit,

one may receive medical treatment!

Although the treatment constitutes benefit, it is permitted to receive treatment through them.

Except for the wood of an ashera!

It is forbidden to receive medical treatment through it, because it is idolatry.

And we inquire about this:

What are the circumstances?

If we say

that it concerns a sick person

who has

a

danger

to his life, then

even through the wood of an ashera as well

he may receive treatment, since saving a life overrides the entire Torah.

And if

it concerns a sick person

who has no

danger

to his life, then

even through all the prohibitions of the Torah one may not

receive treatment, since he derives benefit from them.

And we answer:

Actually, it concerns a sick person

who has

a

danger

to his life.

And even so,

through the wood of an ashera one may not

receive treatment, because of the accessories of idolatry. By receiving treatment through it, he appears to acknowledge its validity. And the prohibition of idolatry is not overridden even by saving a life.

And as

it was taught in a beraita: Rabbi Eliezer says:

It is written: “And you shall love the Lord your God with all your heart, with all your soul, and with all your might.” “With all your might” means with all your money.

If

“with all your soul” is stated, why is

“with all your might” stated?

And if

“with all your might”

is stated, why is

“with all your soul” stated?

Why must both be written? Let the Torah write the one that is more precious to a person, and we would know that one must surrender what is less precious by means of a kal va-chomer.

Rather, this comes to teach you: If a person’s body is precious to him

more

than his money, therefore it is stated

“with all your soul”!

He is obligated to surrender his life, provided that he not worship idols.

And if a person’s money is precious to him

more

than his body, therefore it is stated

“with all

your might”!

He is obligated to surrender all his money, provided that he not violate the prohibitions of the Torah.