Niddah 5a (ה.) — the Talmud in English

And

if the

beraita

that says that a bloodstain renders a woman impure retroactively even when she has a fixed menstrual cycle

is universally accepted:

everyone agrees that Rabbi Dosa concedes that when she sees blood not at the time of her expected menstrual cycle, she is rendered impure retroactively.

The Gemara raises the following question: Why does the Gemara retract its initial position because of the beraita and establish the Mishna as the opinion of an individual, that of Rabbi Dosa, in order to establish the beraita as universally accepted?

And let it establish it in the opposite manner,

as the Gemara initially understood: The Mishna is according to everyone, whereas the beraita is only according to the Rabbis!?

And we answer:

Since it is possible to establish

the beraita as according to everyone

both leniently and stringently,

for it is possible to be lenient and say that everyone agrees that when she sees blood at the time of her expected cycle, her present time suffices, and that they disagree only when she sees blood not at the time of her expected cycle. Conversely, it is possible to be stringent and say that even when she sees blood at the time of her expected cycle, the Rabbis disagree and are stringent, whereas when she sees blood not at the time of her expected cycle, everyone agrees that she is rendered impure retroactively.

Therefore—

we establish it stringently!

We must be stringent and say that the Mishna, which states that a woman who has a fixed menstrual cycle need account only from her present time, is only according to Rabbi Dosa; but the Rabbis are stringent even when she sees blood at the time of her expected cycle. And the beraita, which is stringent and renders her impure retroactively, is discussing a case in which she sees blood not at the time of her expected cycle, and is according to everyone.

The Gemara now explains the law concerning the bloodstain mentioned in the beraita.

It teaches

in the beraita that the reason for the matter, that the Sages decreed that even a bloodstain should render her impure retroactively, is that we find a decree of retroactive impurity extending for twenty-four hours in the case of a woman who sees blood issuing from her body:

If she sees

blood issuing from her body

not at the time of her expected cycle,

she is

rendered impure for the preceding twenty-four hours.

And we infer:

The reason that they disagree is that a woman who has a fixed menstrual cycle is rendered impure retroactively when she sees blood not at the time of her expected cycle,

as they distinguish

between her bloodstain,

which renders her impure retroactively,

and her sight

at the time of her expected cycle, which does not render her impure retroactively, since her bloodstain cannot be more stringent than her sight. For if she sees blood issuing from her body not at the time of her expected cycle, she is rendered impure retroactively for the preceding twenty-four hours .

But as for the other women concerning whom the Sages said that their present time suffices,

such as the four women whose bodies are considered removed from the likelihood of menstrual blood, with regard to whom we do not find retroactive impurity,

their bloodstain

does not render them impure retroactively

like their sight,

which does not render them impure retroactively under any circumstances, since it is impossible for their bloodstain to be more stringent than blood issuing from their bodies .

Whose

beraita is this?

It is that of Rabbi Ḥanina ben Antigonus!

As Rav Yehuda said in the name of Shmuel in the name of Rabbi Ḥanina ben Antigonus:

All women—

their bloodstains render them impure retroactively! And women

whose bodies are considered removed from the likelihood of menstrual blood,

concerning whom the Sages said

that they do not become impure retroactively, but

their present time suffices—

their bloodstain

renders them impure only from that point onward,

like their sight!

Except for a minor girl who has not yet reached the time when she is expected to see blood,

for her bloodstains do not render her impure even from that point onward!

Even if her sheets are soiled with blood—

and she does not know whether the blood issued from her body—

we have no concern about her

rendering her impure! Even if she has no other blood to which the blood can be attributed, for example, she says that she did not pass through a butchers’ market, it is nevertheless possible to say that she did pass through there but does not remember doing so.

The reason for the matter is that the impurity of bloodstains is only a rabbinic decree, since she found the bloodstain without experiencing the sensation of blood issuing from her body, and according to Torah law a woman becomes impure only when she senses the blood issuing from her body.

And when the Sages decreed that a woman who finds a bloodstain becomes impure, they decreed this only with regard to a woman for whom it is possible to attribute the blood to an emission from her body. But in the case of this minor girl, who has not yet reached the time when she is expected to see blood, there is no basis whatsoever for attributing the blood to an emission from her body.

And we challenge this:

Does Rabbi Ḥanina

indeed hold that women whose bodies are removed from the likelihood of menstrual blood are subject to the law of

bloodstains

that renders a bloodstain impure, even from that point onward!?

But it was taught in a beraita: All women—

their bloodstains render them impure!

And women

whose bodies are removed from the likelihood of menstrual blood,

concerning whom the Sages said that their present time suffices—

their bloodstains render them impure!

Rabbi Ḥanina ben Antigonus says: Women concerning whom the Sages said that their present time suffices—

they have no bloodstain at all!

And we infer:

Does this not mean

that when Rabbi Ḥanina ben Antigonus says that women whose bodies are removed from the likelihood of menstrual blood have no bloodstain, his intention is to say that

they have no bloodstain at all,

and they do not become impure even from that point onward?

And we answer:

No,

do not say that their bloodstain does not render them impure at all,

rather,

this is what he is saying:

They have no

impurity of a

bloodstain retroactively, but they do have

impurity of a

bloodstain from that point onward!

The Gemara raises the following question:

By inference

from the words of Rabbi Ḥanina ben Antigonus, as we have now established them—that they have a bloodstain from that point onward but not retroactively—you learn

that the first tanna,

who disagrees with him and says, “Women concerning whom the Sages said that their present time suffices—their bloodstain renders them impure,”

holds

that the bloodstain of women whose bodies are removed from the likelihood of menstrual blood renders them impure

even retroactively,

although actual blood issuing from their bodies does not render them impure retroactively!?

And we answer:

Yes! It is Rabbi Meir, who is stringent with regard to bloodstains

in the case of the four women whose bodies are removed from the likelihood of menstrual blood, more than he is with regard to blood issuing from their bodies.

The reason for the matter is that with regard to blood issuing from their bodies, it may be said that since they are removed from the likelihood of menstrual blood, one must assume that the blood did not issue earlier, but only now, when it was found. But with regard to blood found in the form of a bloodstain on her garment, there is no reason to say that since she has now found the bloodstain on the garment, it issued from her body only now onto the garment. Rather, we must be concerned that perhaps, had she examined the garment earlier, she would have found the blood there earlier.

As it was taught in a beraita: All women—

their bloodstains render them impure retroactively. And women concerning whom the Sages said that their present time suffices,

they too—

their bloodstains render them impure retroactively! This is the statement of Rabbi Meir.

Rabbi Ḥanina ben Antigonus says: Women concerning whom the Sages said that their present time suffices,

their bloodstains do not render them impure retroactively; rather,

their bloodstains are like their sight,

rendering them impure only from that point onward.

And a minor girl who has reached the time when she is expected to see blood

and finds a bloodstain

has

the impurity of a

bloodstain

from that point onward, even though she has never yet seen blood issuing from her body.

And

a minor girl

who has not reached the time when she is expected to see blood—

she has no

impurity of a

bloodstain!

And when has she reached the time

when the minor girl is expected to see blood?

When she reaches the days of adolescence,

when she has grown two pubic hairs, or when she reaches the age of twelve years and one day, even if she has not grown two pubic hairs .

We learned in the Mishna:

And a woman who engages in intercourse while using examination cloths—

this examination is considered an examination checkpoint!

Rav Yehuda said in the name of Shmuel: The cloth with which she

examined herself

before intercourse does not reduce the period like an examination checkpoint,

and therefore it does not reduce the preceding twenty-four-hour period or the interval from one examination checkpoint to the next. When the Mishna says that a woman who engages in intercourse while using examination cloths is considered to have made an examination checkpoint, it is referring to the cloth with which she examines herself after intercourse.

The Gemara raises the following question:

What is the reason

that an examination with the cloth used before intercourse is not considered an examination checkpoint?

Rav Ketina said: Since

the woman,

being agitated,

hurries

to her home

for intercourse, we do not rely on that examination performed before intercourse.

And we challenge this:

And if she is “agitated on her way to her home,” what of it?

After all, she did ultimately examine herself!?

And we answer:

Since she is agitated on her way to her home,

she does not insert

the examination cloth

into the crevices and folds,

and it turns out that she does not examine herself properly .

And we challenge this:

We learned

in our Mishna that a woman

who engages in intercourse while using examination cloths—

this is considered an examination checkpoint!

And we infer from the fact that the tanna used the plural expression “cloths” that the Mishna is speaking of two cloths.

Does this not mean

that these two cloths are:

one,

the cloth with which she examines herself

before intercourse, and one,

the cloth with which she examines herself

after intercourse 71 .

It is thus proven that the examination cloth used before intercourse is also considered an examination checkpoint.

And we reject this:

No,

the Mishna was not referring to the examination cloth used before intercourse. Rather,

both this and that,

those two cloths, are cloths used

after intercourse. And

the intention of the Mishna is to say:

One for him,

for the husband, who wipes himself with it after intercourse,

and one for her,

for the woman.

And these two cloths used after intercourse are

as we learned:

The practice of Jewish women

is that they

engage in intercourse using two cloths—

one for him and one for her.

And we challenge this answer:

This

answer—that the Mishna is discussing two cloths, one for him and one for her, both used after intercourse—

what

kind of answer is it!?

For

if you say, granted,

that the two cloths in the Mishna are the woman’s own cloths,

one before intercourse and one after intercourse, it is well that the tanna needed to teach us

this law.

For

it might enter your mind to say that since she is agitated on her way to her home, she did not examine herself properly

with the examination before intercourse;

the tanna teaches

us, the tanna of the Mishna, that nevertheless this examination as well

is considered an examination checkpoint,

and therefore it reduces the preceding twenty-four-hour period and the interval from one examination checkpoint to the next.

But

[meaning, “however”],

if you say that both this and that

are examinations

after intercourse,

what does the tanna of the Mishna teach us? After all, it is

obvious

that the examination after intercourse, which is a proper examination, reduces the preceding twenty-four-hour period and the interval from one examination checkpoint to the next!?

And we answer: The tanna needed to teach us that even the examination after intercourse is considered a proper examination. For

it might enter your mind to say

that there is reason for concern

that perhaps she sees a drop of blood

that is as small

as a mustard seed, and seminal fluid covers it,

that drop of blood, and therefore the examination after intercourse is not a proper examination. Therefore,

the tanna teaches

us, the tanna of the Mishna, that there is no concern for this, and the Mishna is in fact discussing only the examination after intercourse.

And if you wish, say

that indeed

the Sages required two examinations

of the woman,

one before intercourse and one after intercourse,

and these are the two cloths mentioned in the Mishna. However, this presents no difficulty to Shmuel’s statement that only the second cloth, the one used after intercourse, is considered an examination checkpoint,

as when it teaches

in the Mishna that a woman who engages in intercourse while using examination cloths

this is considered an examination checkpoint—

it

refers only to the cloth used

after intercourse

and no other!

And the reason the Mishna also mentioned the first cloth, the one used before intercourse, is to teach us that she has a mitzva to engage in intercourse using two cloths, before intercourse and after it. However, only the second cloth is considered an examination checkpoint.

And we challenge

this: How can you say that the Mishna teaches that it is a mitzva to engage in intercourse using two cloths, before intercourse and after it?

But it teaches, “a woman who engages in intercourse”

using cloths

it teaches!

This implies that this is not the language of a mitzva or obligation, but merely that this is what she does of her own accord!?

If so, the statement “and a woman who engages in intercourse using cloths” must necessarily be intended to indicate that the two examinations are equivalent and that both are considered an “examination checkpoint.” And if you say that only the final examination is considered an examination checkpoint, the question arises: Why was the first examination, before intercourse, written at all?

And we answer:

Read

in our Mishna in place of "and the one who engages in intercourse using witnesses" -

"and she engages in intercourse using witnesses"

in the language of obligation. And the tanna of our Mishna informs us of two matters: first, that she is commanded to use two witnesses, one before intercourse and one afterward; and second, that the examination after intercourse is considered a valid examination. But the examination before intercourse, since she hurries through it, is not performed properly and therefore is not considered a valid examination.

We learned in the Mishna: And one who engages in intercourse using witnesses

reduces the twenty-four-hour period.

And we raise a difficulty:

Now, a twenty-four-hour period,

which is a longer period than the interval between one examination and the next [for example, from the morning examination to the evening examination], and nevertheless the examination with the witnesses at the time of intercourse

reduces it.