Niddah 5b (ה:) — the Talmud in English

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Tosafot [s.v. “Combine”]: Why does he need this? Rabbi Meir is concerned for the minority, and without combining it with the presumption it would be an uncertainty. “For one cannot say that although it is an uncertainty, nevertheless we learn from sota to declare pure only in an even balance, for although we do not learn from sota, we learn from Rav Giddel, who expounds, ‘And the meat that touches.’” It is explained that Tosafot hold that according to Rav Giddel’s law there is no need for a presumption, and it is enough that Rabbi Meir is concerned for the minority, which is not certain; although it is opposed to the majority, nevertheless it is pure when it is a thing that has no awareness to be questioned. But Tosafot in Nidda [18b, s.v. “Combine”] maintain that even according to Rabbi Meir we do not follow the minority in a thing that has no awareness to be questioned, and we declare it pure only because it is an even balance. It is possible that their disagreement depends on the investigation mentioned above. See Rashi [s.v. “Since”], who wrote: Why do we declare it pure in our discussion because of the impurity of a menstruating woman when there is no awareness to be questioned? Because we learn from sota. However, Tosafot [2a, s.v. “From time to time”] explained that we learn it from Rav Giddel.

And

even in a vessel

that is

placed on the ground,

if a doubt of ritual impurity arose with regard to it as a result of uncertainty whether an impure person touched it, it is impure,

as one that has the capacity to be asked

about it.

And if so, in the case of the bed upon which she sat,

even though her companions are not carrying her on the bed,

but she sat on the bed while the bed was standing on the ground, the bed has the status of an object that has the capacity to be asked, and a doubt involving it renders the matter impure, analogous to the case of a sota.

The Gemara returns to the matter itself. Rabbi Yoḥanan said: A doubt of ritual impurity that occurs through a person—

“they ask about it”!

Therefore,

even if

the doubt was

with regard to a vessel placed on the ground,

but the doubt arose through a person, that vessel is

like an object that has the capacity to be asked about!

And we derive from the case of a sota that it is rendered impure in the private domain.

The Gemara raises an objection:

An impure person who

was wrapping himself in his garment

that was impure, having become impure through him,

and

while he was wrapping himself,

pure objects

were beside the person, and it is not known whether the garment touched the pure objects while he was wrapping himself and rendered them impure, or not.

Or, the person who wrapped himself in the garment was pure, and his garment was pure,

and

there were

impure objects,

such as a creeping creature,

beside him,

and it is not known whether the garment touched the creeping creature while he was wrapping himself, or not.

And the same uncertainty applies when there were

pure and impure objects above the head

of the person wrapping himself:

It is uncertain whether he touched them or did not touch them—

in all these cases, he is

pure!

And it initially entered our minds that the reason they deem him pure and do not compare the case to that of a sota in the private domain is that the uncertainty concerns pure objects lying on the ground, which are not in the hands of the person wrapping himself; therefore, they are objects that do not have the capacity to be asked. This proves that even though the doubt of impurity occurred through a person, the objects are nevertheless not considered objects that have the capacity to be asked, since he is not holding them in his hands.

And the beraita continues:

And if it is impossible

for him to wrap himself in the garment

unless he touches

the pure objects or the creeping creature, he is

impure!

Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel says:

If the matter was uncertain,

they say to him,

to the person wrapping himself:

Repeat!

That is, repeat the act of wrapping himself in the garment so that we can ascertain whether, during this wrapping, he touches the pure and impure objects beside him and above his head.

And he repeats,

and if it is found that he touches them now, it is known that he also touched them during the first wrapping.

The Sages said to him,

the Sages said to Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel:

One does not repeat the act with regard to pure objects!

For what occurred during the second wrapping is not proof of what occurred during the first wrapping!

This concludes the wording of the beraita.

And we infer:

Why

did the Sages say that if it is uncertain whether he touched them or did not touch them, he is pure?

But it is a doubt of impurity that occurred through a person! From here there is a refutation of Rabbi Yoḥanan, who said that even a vessel placed on the ground is considered an object that has the capacity to be asked if the uncertain event occurred through a person. And it initially entered our minds that the beraita is discussing every circumstance, both in the private domain and in the public domain; yet in the private domain, we derive from the case of a sota that anything that has the capacity to be asked is rendered impure!?

And we answer:

It is excluded!

That is, this beraita cannot serve as a refutation of Rabbi Yoḥanan,

because

Rav Hoshaya taught

with regard to this beraita: If the wrapping occurred

in the private domain—

its doubt is impure; in the public domain—

its doubt is pure!

The Gemara returns to the matter itself.

Ze’eiri said:

The rabbinic decree of the impurity of

the period from one examination to the next in the case of a menstruating woman renders

the impurity of

her lying and sitting surfaces capable of rendering a person impure

with severe impurity, which is also

capable of rendering garments impure

that the person who touches the lying or sitting surface is wearing.

And we challenge this:

Is that so? But when Avimi came from Bei Ḥozai, he came and brought a Mishna in his hand,

and it stated:

The Sages decreed concerning the impurity of

the period from one examination to the next in the case of a menstruating woman that

her

lying and sitting surfaces would be

like her touch!

And we infer:

Does it not mean—

just as her touch,

the vessel that the menstruating woman touched,

does not render a person impure [

since the vessel that she touched is a rishon le-tuma, and a rishon le-tuma does not render a person impure],

so too, her lying surface does not render a person impure,

for this was the rabbinic decree concerning the impurity of the period from one examination to the next: that it renders only pure objects impure, but they did not decree that this impurity, which is merely an added stringency, should render objects impure with the severity of a menstruating woman’s impurity, namely, to render her lying and sitting surfaces impure. This is difficult for Ze’eiri, who said that it renders even the impurity of a lying surface, rendering a person impure and thereby rendering his garments impure!?

Rava said—

Can you understand it that way!

For

it is a kal va-chomer,

that the Sages decreed that during the period from one examination to the next she should impart severe impurity:

And just as an earthenware vessel enclosed with a tightly sealed cover, [

whose opening is sealed with a tightly sealed cover],

which is saved in the tent of a corpse,

which is saved from impurity imparted by a tent [as stated in an explicit verse], nevertheless

is not saved during the period from one examination to the next in the case of a menstruating woman,

as is explained in the beraita below, that if the woman moved an earthenware vessel sealed with a tightly sealed cover during the period from one examination to the next before her sighting, it is impure;

the lying and sitting surfaces

mentioned

which are not saved

from impurity

in the tent of a corpse—does it not follow that they are not saved during the period from one examination to the next in the case of a menstruating woman,

but should render the person who touches them impure, thereby rendering the garments he is wearing impure!?

And we challenge Abaye:

But Avimi from Bei Ḥozai said an explicit Mishna

that

states that during the period from one examination to the next in the case of a menstruating woman, her lying and sitting surfaces are like her touch! Yet her touch, when she touches a vessel, does not render a person impure!?

And we answer:

And we answer:

Say

that this is what the tanna of the Mishna is saying: One who touches

the lying and sitting surfaces

of a menstruating woman during the period from one examination to the next, counting backward from her sighting, is—