Niddah 4b — the Talmud in English

for I say:

that is, there is room to attribute and say:

a pure person entered there and took it

and placed it on the ground.

And wherever it is possible to attribute, one must deem it pure, because by Torah law the loaf has a presumption of purity, and only with teruma and consecrated things did the Sages rule stringently to be concerned for their purity. Therefore, where it is possible to attribute, we say, “for I say”.

But, in the basket in which a creeping creature was found, at the time of its discovery it is certainly impure, and we have nothing on which to attribute that it is not impure now. And since we have the principle that all impurities are [established] as at the time of their discovery, we must be stringent and deem it impure retroactively [as at the time of their discovery], even when it is not in the place of its discovery, at least as a matter of doubt. And this is the reason of Rabbi Yohanan.

And we object: But also with the basket there is something on which to attribute:

Here too, let us say

that the creeping creature was not inside it in the previous place, but only in this place did it reach the basket. For it is possible that

a raven came,

after they had moved the basket to its new place,

and cast

the creeping creature into the basket?!

And we answer:

A person,

is likely to take the loaf

intentionally

in order to save it from impurity, and therefore

we say “for I say,”

and we attribute that he did so, and deem the loaf pure on the basis of this attribution.

But

a raven,

even if we wish to say that it was the one that now brought the creeping creature, after they moved the basket to the second place, it is clear

that unintentionally

it did this. And therefore

we do not say

that one may attribute it to the raven in order to deem pure the pure things made while the basket was in the first place .

That is, we say an attribution in order to deem [something] pure only when it is possible to attribute that someone became involved in the matter in order to purify; but not when the attribution is merely in an act [that occurred] .

And after we have resolved the words of Rabbi Yohanan, the Gemara returns and clarifies the law of the loaf that was on the board:

After all,

behold

this loaf,

its doubt is—

a doubt of impurity in a private domain. And every doubt of impurity in a private domain—its doubt is impure

by Torah law, and we do not take into account the presumption of purity .

And if so, how can we attribute leniently and say, “I say that a pure person took it,” when this is a leniency only with rabbinic impurity?!

And we answer:

Because it is,

the loaf,

“a matter that has no awareness with which to be asked”

if it touched a garment.

And every matter that has no awareness with which to be asked—

whether in a private domain or in a public domain—

its doubt is pure!

For we establish it on its presumption of purity. And it is not comparable to a sota, from which we derive stringency in a doubt of impurity in a private domain, because a sota has awareness with which to be asked, whereas the loaf has no awareness.

And if you wish, say: Here,

in the law of the loaf, it is speaking

of rabbinic impurity.

And not of the garment of a person with a flux, which is impure by Torah law; and for this reason its doubt is pure, for we attribute that a pure person took it.

This is also precise

that here it is speaking of rabbinic impurity.

For it teaches “

a midaf

is impure beneath it,” and the meaning of “midaf” is rabbinic impurity,

as it is written, “a leaf driven [by the wind]”—

that is, a light impurity, which is only rabbinic.

We learned in the Mishna:

And the Sages say: not in accordance with the words of this one and not in accordance with the words of that one.

The Sages taught: And the Sages say—

not in accordance with the words of this one and not in accordance with the words of that one!

Not in accordance with the words of Shammai, who did not make a safeguard for his words,

who said that all women who see blood have only their time [of discovery] determining their status,

and not in accordance with the words of Hillel, who went beyond the proper measure,

and was stringent to deem all pure things impure from the time of the examination—the previous inspection,

but:

From time to time—

it reduces [the period] from inspection to inspection! And from inspection to inspection—

it reduces [the period] from time to time!

And the beraita explains:

“From time to time it reduces [the period] from inspection to inspection”—

How so?

She examined herself on the first day of the week and found

herself

pure. And she remained [without examining herself] on the second and third [days] and did not examine herself.

And on the fourth [day] she examined herself and found herself impure—

we do not say that she becomes impure from inspection to inspection,

and that the pure things she touched on the second and third days become impure,

but

she renders impure only the pure things that she touched

from time to time

retroactively, only from the time of the sighting on the fourth day.

“And from inspection to inspection it reduces [the period] from time to time” \-

How so?

She examined herself at the first hour and found herself pure. And she remained [without examining herself] for the second and third hours and did not examine herself.

And at the

fourth [hour] she examined herself and found herself impure—

we do not say that she becomes impure from time to time, but only from inspection to inspection!

For only the pure things that she touched during the second and third hours are retroactively impure! [Thus far is the wording of the beraita].

We raise a question concerning the words of the beraita: if she examined herself at the first hour and found herself pure, we do not decree impurity upon her from time to time.

But

it is obvious

that she does not become impure from time to time.

Since she examined herself at the first hour and found herself pure,

surely

we do not deem her impure from time to time?!

And we answer:

Since it taught, “From time to time it reduces [the period] from inspection to inspection,”

and there is a novelty there, that we are not concerned retroactively until the time of the previous examination, but only from time to time.

it also taught, “From inspection to inspection it reduces [the period] from time to time,”

even though there is no novelty in this.

Rabba said: What is the reason of the Sages?

Why did the Sages decree only regarding time to time, and not be concerned that perhaps she became impure immediately after the previous inspection?

Because

a woman feels it herself

when she becomes impure through the blood’s emission, and therefore there is no concern that perhaps it had already emerged several days earlier, after the previous inspection.

Abaye said to him

to Rabba—

if so

that she knows by her sensation when she becomes impure—

let her have only her time [of discovery]!

For since she did not feel [anything] before her sighting, surely she did not become impure earlier! Rather, necessarily, this reason is not correct. And the woman cannot rely on the absence of sensation.

And Rabba,

who said to Abaye that the reason of the Sages is because “a woman feels it herself”

—he said this only to sharpen Abaye.

And we explain:

Rather, what is the reason of the Sages

who decreed the measure of time of “from time to time”?

As Rav Judah said in the name of Samuel: The Sages instituted for the daughters of Israel

who engage in the pure things of teruma and consecrated things, that they should be “established as pure,” and obligated them

to examine themselves morning and evening!

Morning—

to render pure the pure things of the night!

For when she finds herself pure in the morning examination, she knows with certainty that the pure things that she touched during the night are pure.

And evening—

to render pure the pure things of the day!

And

a woman

this one, since

she did not fulfill the enactment of the Sages,

and did not examine herself,

we decreed retroactive impurity upon all the pure things that she touched. But we do not deem [them] impure retroactively until the previous examination, but only

she forfeited one “

period”

for the Sages rendered impure, as a matter of doubt, all the pure things with which she dealt during that period. [A “period” is all twelve hours of the day or all twelve hours of the night].

And we explain:

What is a “period”?

After all, they did not decree only regarding twelve hours, but regarding twenty-four hours.

And we answer:

An additional period!

For they also decreed concerning the period before the period in which she found blood. For in that very period she renders [things] impure even without the penalty. If she examined herself in the morning and was pure, and in the evening examined herself and was found impure, all the pure things that she handled during the day became impure even without the decree of “from time to time” .

Rav Pappa said to Rava: But sometimes you find

that there will be

three periods within “from time to time,”

for example, she did not examine herself for several days, and afterwards examined herself at midday and found herself impure. Since we deem her impure from time to time, until midday of the previous day, she is impure:

a. During the period of that day.

b. During the period of the preceding night.

c. During the period of the preceding day, until midday.

And it follows that we impose a penalty upon her for two periods before the period in which she saw, whereas the Sages, when they imposed a penalty, imposed it for only one period?!

Rava said to him:

The Sages made their measures uniform,

and gave a fixed time for their decree,

so that you should not distinguish within “from time to time”!

And if you wish, say:

therefore they deem her impure for more than one period and impose a penalty of “from time to time”—in order

that the sinner should not profit!

For if she did not examine herself for many days, and examined herself in the morning and found herself impure, the penalty upon her would be that she forfeits one period, and she would be penalized with “from time to time,” which is one period before the night period. [For she forfeits the night period itself not because of the penalty, but because she did not examine herself at the beginning of the night].

But this woman, who did not examine herself in the morning but delayed the examination until midday—if we imposed a penalty upon her that she forfeit only the preceding night period, it would follow that by delaying the examination she profited [by retaining] the preceding day period.

Therefore, the Sages decreed that in every case she forfeits twenty-four hours.

And we explain:

What is the difference between them,

between the two explanations for the enactment of twenty-four hours?

There is a difference between them

where

she was prevented by circumstances beyond her control,

in the morning

and did not examine herself

because of the circumstances beyond her control. According to the first reason, that the Sages’ enactment was fixed, so that one should not distinguish, here too she forfeits [the time].

But according to the second reason, that they enacted this so that a sinner should not benefit, here, since she did not sin, but rather was unable to examine herself because of circumstances beyond her control, they did not decree that she should be impure retroactively for twenty-four hours.

We learned in the Mishna:

Every woman who has a veset—

her time is sufficient.

And we raise a difficulty concerning it:

Shall we say that our Mishna is [in accordance with the opinion of] Rabbi Dosa, and not [in accordance with the opinion of] the Rabbis?

For it was taught in a beraita: Rabbi Eliezer says: Four women

whose blood is presumed to be absent—

their time is sufficient!

And these are they: a virgin

who has never seen blood in her lifetime,

a pregnant woman, a nursing woman, and an old woman.

Rabbi Dosa says: Every woman who has a veset, her time is sufficient!

!?And it follows from the wording of the beraita that only Rabbi Dosa says this, but the Sages dispute him. If so, it emerges that our Mishna, which says that all women who have a veset, their time is sufficient, is in accordance with Rabbi Dosa, even though he is an individual in his opinion!?

And we answer:

Even if you say [that it is in accordance with] the Rabbis. The Rabbis disputed Rabbi Dosa only

when she sees [blood]

not at the time of her veset,

when the blood came early or late. For then, with this sighting, she does not have the presumption that “the wayfarer comes in its time,” and there is concern lest the blood lingered during its departure in the outer passage.

But, at the time of her veset—

the Sages agree with him,

that her time is sufficient!

And our Mishna

deals

with the time of her veset, and it is [an opinion] accepted by all!

And we infer:

By inference, Rabbi Dosa,

who disputes the Sages—

said [that] even when it is not the time of her veset

that her time is sufficient, and if so, there is cause for astonishment:

Who is the tanna for that which the Sages taught: A woman who has a veset,

such that if she saw actual blood, her time is sufficient. And nevertheless—

her stain is impure retroactively!

And the reason for the matter, that the stain is impure retroactively, is:

that if she sees [blood] not at the time of her veset

then she is

rendered impure retroactively for twenty-four hours,

and therefore, also with the sighting of a stain, she is rendered impure retroactively! Is it possible that

we should say

that this beraita

is [in accordance with] the Rabbis and not Rabbi Dosa!?

For according to Rabbi Dosa, we explained that her time is sufficient even if she sees [blood] not at the time of her veset!?

And on account of this question, the Gemara retracts the previous assumption that they disputed only with regard to one who sees [blood] not at the time of her veset, while they agree with regard to the time of her veset, and it presents the dispute in the opposite manner—

Even if you say

that the beraita also deals according to

Rabbi Dosa!

For

Rabbi Dosa disputed the Rabbis only with regard to the time of her veset,

for even at the time of her veset, the Sages hold that she is rendered impure retroactively, while Rabbi Dosa says that if she saw [blood] at the time of her veset, her time is sufficient.

But not at the time of her veset—

Rabbi Dosa agrees with them,

Rabbi Dosa agrees with the Sages that she is rendered impure retroactively. And therefore, with regard to a stain, she is rendered impure retroactively .

And our Mishna

deals

with the time of her veset, and

according to

Rabbi Dosa.