Niddah 4a (ד.) — the Talmud in English

And whereas

the dispute between Hezekiah and Rabbi Yohanan—

is with regard to a checked basket!

Before he placed the ritually pure items in it, it had been checked. Therefore, Hezekiah maintains that if he removed the ritually pure items and only afterward discovered the creeping creature in the basket, the basket retains a presumption of purity from the time it was checked, and we attribute the matter to the possibility that the creeping creature entered it only after the items had been removed.

The Master,

Hezekiah

maintains: It was checked!

And the basket has a presumption of purity.

But the Master,

Rabbi Yohanan,

maintains: Perhaps—

when he withdrew his hand

from checking the basket, and before he placed the ritually pure items inside it—

the creeping creature fell

into the basket and rendered the ritually pure items impure .

And we raise an objection: How can the statements of Hillel and Shammai be established as referring to an unchecked basket? But the beraita above, which cites the statements of Shammai and Hillel, compares the law of a basket to the law of the sighting of blood by a woman, as we say: “And what is the difference between this and that?”

But it teaches a case analogous to that of a woman, and a woman—

is checked!

For she checks herself when she is occupied with ritually pure items in the morning and evening. If so, the case in which Hillel and Shammai agree with regard to a basket also concerns a checked basket. The question against Hezekiah therefore returns, based on the statements of Hillel and Shammai, who deem the ritually pure items in the basket impure.

And we answer: No! A woman is not considered to have a presumption of being checked [and consequently the basket mentioned in the statements of Hillel and Shammai should likewise not be established as having a presumption of being checked], because—

a woman,

since blood is common in her—

is considered as though she were unchecked!

And likewise, the basket concerning which Shammai and Hillel agree refers to an unchecked basket!

And if you wish, say:

A woman indeed has a presumption of being checked, and the basket concerning which Hillel and Shammai agree is also a checked basket. Rather, Hezekiah and Rabbi Yohanan disagree with regard to a basket that is unlike the basket concerning which Shammai and Hillel agree:

When Shammai and Hillel agree

with regard to a basket, that one must be concerned about ritually pure items prepared in it from the time the checker withdrew his hand, it refers

to an uncovered basket

whose opening faces upward. Therefore, one must be concerned that perhaps the creeping creature fell into it immediately after the checker completed his inspection. Accordingly, the basket does not have a presumption of purity .

And whereas

the dispute between Hezekiah and Rabbi Yohanan

concerns

a covered basket,

where there is no concern that a creeping creature entered it; therefore, Hezekiah deems the items pure.

And we object: How can their dispute, between Rabbi Yohanan and Hezekiah, be established as referring to

a covered basket?!

If it is covered, the question arises:

How did it fall

in there—a creeping creature?!

And we answer:

For example, its use

of the basket

is by means of

opening the

cover

over it and closing it.

Rabbi Yohanan and Hezekiah disagree as to whether, when he opens the basket, he guards it and takes care that creeping creatures do not enter it.

Hezekiah maintains that as long as the ritually pure items are in the basket, when he opens the cover he takes care to cover it again so that creeping creatures will not fall into it. But once the ritually pure items have been removed from the basket, he is no longer careful to cover it. Therefore, we must say that the creeping creature fell into the basket only after the ritually pure items had been removed from it.

Whereas Rabbi Yohanan maintains that even when the ritually pure items are inside it, he does not take precautions against creeping creatures when he lifts the cover. Therefore, one must be concerned that the creeping creature fell at the time he uncovered the basket.

And we refute this: How can the statements of Shammai and Hillel be established as referring to an uncovered basket?

But it teaches a case analogous to that of a woman, and a woman—

is covered!

For blood from elsewhere does not fall into her in that place. Similarly, Shammai and Hillel agree with regard to a covered basket that one must be concerned about the ritually pure items. How, then, can Hezekiah disagree and deem them pure?

And we answer: A woman,

since blood is common in her—

is considered like one who is uncovered!

And if you wish, say: When Shammai and Hillel agree

to impose a stringency, it is

in the corner of a basket 42,

whereas

when Hezekiah and Rabbi Yohanan disagree—it is

in the corner of a house!

And we inquire: How can one say that Hezekiah and Rabbi Yohanan disagree with regard to a creeping creature found in another corner of the house,

but it says “basket,”

as taught by the tanna of the beraita?

And we explain:

This is what the tanna

of the beraita said:

A basket in which ritually pure items were used in this corner

of the house, and the ritually pure items were removed from it,

and

after the items were removed from it,

they moved it

to another place, and set it

in another corner

of the house,

and a creeping creature was found

inside the basket after the basket had been placed

in the

other

corner—

Hezekiah maintains

that the ritually pure items that had been in the basket when it was in the first corner are deemed pure, because Hezekiah maintains:

We do not establish impurity from one place

to

another place. Therefore, we do not say that the creeping creature was already in it when it was in the first corner; rather, we attribute the matter to the possibility that it fell into it here. Accordingly, the ritually pure items that were in it in the first corner are pure .

Therefore, we do not say that the creeping creature had already been in the basket when it was in the first corner. Rather, we suspend judgment and attribute its fall into the basket to this place; consequently, the pure items that had been in it in the first corner are pure.

And Rabbi Yohanan maintains that we do establish

impurity from one place to another, and we are concerned that the creeping creature fell in the earlier place and rendered the ritually pure items impure.

And we refute this:

Do we establish

impurity from one place to another?

But didn’t we learn:

One who

touched

another person

at night, and does not know

because of the darkness

whether

the person whom he touched was

alive or dead. And the next morning he rose early and found

the person whom he had touched at night

dead—

Rabbi Meir deems him pure,

for the person who touched him has a presumption of purity .

And the Sages deem it impure

it, because

all impurities

whose status is uncertain are adjudicated

according to their state at the time they are found!

That is, since at the time of contact it was uncertain whether this person was alive or dead, and when he was found—when they discovered in the morning what his condition was—they found him dead, we attribute that he was also dead at the time of contact.

And it was taught concerning it

that the Mishna stating that all impurities are adjudicated according to their state at the time they are found teaches:

According to their state at the time they are found and in the place where they are found!

The time when the object is found determines its status with regard to impurity only if the object whose status is uncertain is found in the same place where the uncertainty arose. But if one touched a person at night in one place, and in the morning he was found dead in another place, the person who touched him is pure. We do not say: Just as he is dead here, so too he was already dead in the earlier place, since impurity is not transferred from one place to another! If so, this is difficult: How could Rabbi Yohanan say that impurity may be transferred from one place to another?

And if you would say

that one should distinguish and say that

this applies

only to the rule taught in the Mishna—that impurity is not transferred from one place to another when establishing definite impurity,

to burn

the teruma that he touched because of it,

but

when there is uncertainty regarding impurity, and one is to

leave aside

the teruma because of it, meaning that it may neither be eaten nor burned,

we do attribute

the impurity to the earlier place.

The Ritba explains that because he was not established as alive in this house the Rabbis say that they do not grant him any presumption of life and deem him impure, to the extent that the teruma must be burned. Rabbi Meir deems him pure even in this case, since he must certainly have been alive beforehand, either here or elsewhere, and so on; see there. It emerges that the basis of the dispute between the Rabbis and Rabbi Meir is whether one applies an initial presumption from one place to another against the presumption of the present state in the same place. The Rabbis maintain that since he is found dead before us and was not established as alive at all in this house, we determine entirely according to the state at the time found and do not consider the initial presumption at all. Rabbi Meir maintains that even in such a case the initial presumption is stronger. According to the Rabbis, as explained in the note above, the basis of the rule “according to the time found” is either a legal presumption that we view him according to his state before us and do not entertain any uncertainty that he may previously have been in another state; and since in this place he was never established as alive, we do not entertain such an uncertainty at all. This is the advantage of the place where he was found, as the Ritba explained. But if they saw him alive from the previous evening in this place, the Rabbis agree with Rabbi Meir. Or, alternatively, the matter is based on a presumption, except that the advantage of the presumption of the body enables us to determine regarding this place that he had always been in this state, so that the presumption is not judged with reference to the time of the change at all. See Tosafot of Rabbi Asher who asked: What is the proof that the ruling is not in accordance with Rabbi Yohanan? It is obvious that if he touched him at night in one place and found him in another place in the morning, he was alive, and that is why he was not found in the first place. They answered that the case is one in which it is known that a person brought him there. The view of Tosafot [2a] is that the determination according to the state at the time found is merely a stringency with regard to teruma and sacrificial food; with regard to ordinary food, he is pure, since the initial presumption is always stronger. Even when they did not see him alive, there is a presumption, because he had the presumption of being alive. Their primary proof is that in the case of a woman, from one period of time to the next, we deem her pure with regard to ordinary food. See Tosafot [Ketubot 76b], who offered an additional proof: Otherwise, there would be a difficulty for Shmuel [Kiddushin 79a], who does not follow the presumption of the present state. The view of Maimonides [Laws of the Fathers of Impurity 18:14] is analyzed by Hakham Tzvi [2] as holding that in the case of one who touched him at night, the determination according to the state at the time found makes him certainly impure even in the public domain and even with regard to ordinary food, whereas when they saw him alive from the previous evening, the status is uncertain and he is pure in the public domain. And the Noda BiYehuda [first edition, Even HaEzer 11] wondered: If this is the fundamental law, what difference does it make whether they saw him alive from the previous evening? He has a presumption of life even if they did not see him alive, so let us establish him according to his presumption. He explained the matter in two ways: 1. The uncertainty in the case of one who touched him at night is not whether the person found dead before us was alive at the time of contact. Rather, with regard to the person who touched him, the question is whether he touched a dead person from among all the dead in the world or a living person from among all the living in the world. In such a case, it is not appropriate to consider a presumption of life. 2. Since in this place they never saw him alive, and he is certainly dead before us, we do not apply a presumption of life from one place to another against the state at the time found. This rationale is mentioned by the Ritba as cited in the preceding note. See Maimonides [Laws of the Fathers of Impurity 15:6–7], whose words necessarily indicate that the foundation of the determination according to the state at the time found is that it removes the uncertainty. This is also necessarily indicated by Maimonides [there 15:10], who applies the determination according to the state at the time found even in the private domain. Regarding the view of Tosafot, the Noda BiYehuda raises a difficulty from their words in Pesahim [91a], where they applied the determination according to the state at the time found to one who clears away a collapsed building, even though that case concerns a matter of Torah law. And the Hazon Ish [Even HaEzer 69:16] explained that that case is different, since there is no initial presumption at all once the building has collapsed upon him. Here, by contrast, there certainly is an initial presumption, even when they did not see him alive from the previous evening, because Tosafot do not accept the advantage of the place where he was found as assisting the presumption of the present state, as explained by the Ritba. The view of Tosafot Rid [Kiddushin 79a] is that the determination according to the time found is a Torah law, even with regard to ordinary food. One cannot raise a difficulty from the case of a menstruant woman, who is deemed impure only with regard to teruma and sacrificial food, or from Shmuel’s view [Kiddushin 79a] concerning one who betrothed herself on the day completing six years, that he does not follow the presumption of the present state. This is because the uncertainty there does not concern the nature of the signs themselves, but rather when they came into being. Similarly, in the case of a menstruant woman, the uncertainty is not whether the blood was impure before the preceding twenty-four-hour period, as it is now, or whether previously it was pure. Rather, the uncertainty concerns the time when the impurity came into being. Since there certainly was a time when there was no blood and there were no signs, and the uncertainty is when they came into being, in such a case we do not follow the state at the time found against the initial presumption, even if that presumption is weak and subject to change, because the presumption has no power to determine when the change occurred. Even though on the day completing six years she has the presumption that she will bring signs, it is nevertheless considered that the change occurred that day; from where do we know that she became a bogeret in the morning? [Rabbi’s view is explained in the Tosafot Rid as distinguishing between the day completing six years and the twenty-four-hour period of a menstruant woman. On the day completing six years, since she has the presumption that she will bring signs, even though Rashi’s wording in Kiddushin precisely indicates that she does not have the presumption of maturity, that day may nevertheless be judged separately from the preceding days, and we may determine that on that day she was a bogeret throughout the entire day, in accordance with how she now appears before us. In the case of a menstruant woman, by contrast, it is impossible to separate the days, since they are all included in the uncertainty; necessarily, one must judge that the matter changed from its earlier state. See Rabbi Akiva Eiger [Yevamot 80a].] But in the case of one who touched him at night, the uncertainty is not when he died, but whether at the time of contact he was in the same state and condition in which he now is when found. In this respect, we say that he did not change, and that previously too he was in the same state. The Tosafot Rid concludes: “Therefore, we say that the state at the time found determines the matter, whether leniently or stringently.” That is, the determination means that there is no uncertainty at all. This is readily understood, particularly if we add the Ritba’s words concerning the advantage of the place where he was found. The Hazon Ish explained the words of the Tosafot Rid. See Shev Shema'tata [3:6], which elaborated in raising difficulties against the Tosafot Rid. [Regarding his objection from the case of the chest, see the Rashba [2b, s.v. ufarik], who cited an answer like that of the Tosafot Rid and raised the same difficulty.] And the Hazon Ish [Ketubot 80:12] resolves it well. Alternatively, one can explain that in the case of one who touched him at night, the essential uncertainty is whether he was dead at the time he was touched and not when he died, since the root of the uncertainty is the matter that has a practical legal consequence. In the case of a dead person, there is no reason to entertain uncertainty concerning him except with regard to the person who touched him. Therefore, Shmuel agrees that we follow the state at the time found, since this determination does not establish the time of the change, and we do not consider it at all against the initial presumption. [See Rabbi Akiva Eiger Yevamot 80a.] In the case of a menstruant woman, by contrast, besides the ritual foods that she touched, there is a practical legal consequence for the woman herself: from what time did she become impure? With regard to the woman herself, the uncertainty is when the contact occurred, when she saw the blood, and in that respect one cannot apply the presumption of the present state. Similarly, in the case of a bogeret, the uncertainty is when she brought the signs. See the Tosefta [Toharot 6:6]. It may also be explained that there too the essential uncertainty concerns the person: whether at the time when there was certainly contact, the creature that causes impurity was already present or not. See Shev Shema'tata [3:5], which cited several approaches by which the authorities determined cases according to the state at the time found, even leniently, and raised a difficulty against them from the words of Tosafot, who hold that we apply the state at the time found only stringently, and only with regard to teruma and sacrificial food. This cannot be said. For

For

do we indeed attribute

the impurity when we have an uncertainty of impurity extending from one place to another!?

And we learned in the Mishna: A needle

that had been impure

which is found

now upon ritually pure objects, when it is

full of rust or

when it is

broken,

and there is uncertainty whether the needle fell upon the pure objects while it was whole and free of rust, thereby rendering them impure, [and only afterward developed rust or broke], or whether it may have fallen upon them only after it developed rust or had already broken, in which case it does not render them impure [for any vessels that have broken or developed rust no longer impart impurity].

And the Mishna says: That needle is

pure

from imparting impurity, and we do not even suspect that it rendered the pure objects impure retroactively, because

all impurities

whose status is uncertain are adjudicated

according to their state at the time they are found, 50 ,

and we say that just as it is pure now, so too it was pure when it fell upon the pure objects.

And we analyze it:

But why do we say that the pure items are not impure?

Let us say: This

needle,

originally

was a superior needle;

and if so, one could say that only

now has the rust develop

ed

rust, but originally, when it fell onto the pure items, it was intact and rendered them impure.

And since we do not say this, it is proven that the rule that all impurities are judged as they are found applies despite the needle’s ḥazaka from its original state.

And it entered our minds that the same applies to the rule that “all impurities are judged according to the place where they are found”: one does not take the other place into account at all, not even in order to suspend judgment; rather, we say that only the place where the impurity is found determines the matter, and we do not presume impurity from one place to another. This is difficult for Rabbi Yoḥanan, who says that we do presume impurity from one place to another and are concerned that the earlier place may retroactively be impure.

Furthermore,

we learned that all impurities are judged as they are found.

For

we learned: If one found a burnt creeping creature

, which does not render anything impure when burnt,

upon olives, and likewise

if one found a

cloth

of a man with a flux

worn and tattered,

worn-out and threadbare, upon olives, then the burnt creeping creature is

pure

and does not render the olives impure, and likewise the cloth of the man with a flux is pure and does not render them impure. We say that the burnt creeping creature or the worn cloth fell upon the olives in their present state, when they were pure, and we are not concerned—even merely to suspend judgment because of the uncertainty—that perhaps they fell upon the olives while they were intact and capable of rendering them impure,

because all impurities—

are judged as they are found!

This too is difficult for Rabbi Yoḥanan, since it proves that we do not presume impurity from one place to another, just as we say, “All impurities are judged as they are found”!

And if you would say

that this case here is not comparable to Rabbi Yoḥanan’s ruling concerning a box in which a creeping creature was found after the box had been moved to another place,

because here the status of the impurities is determined

according to the time they are found, whether leniently,

to declare the needle and the cloth pure,

or stringently,

to declare impure one who touched one of two people during the night without knowing which one he touched; this is because both principles apply:

the time they are found and

also

the place where they are found!

Therefore, in the case of one who touched one of them during the night and in the morning one of them was found to be dead, we rule with certainty that he is impure, since both the time and the place of finding indicate that the person was dead. Likewise, in the cases of the creeping creature and the cloth, we rule with certainty to declare the items pure, in accordance with the time and the place where they are found.

But

with regard to retroactively declaring something impure

in a place other than where it is found,

it is possible to say that although

we do not burn

the teruma as we would in a case of certain impurity, there is nevertheless room for uncertainty, and therefore

we do suspend judgment

concerning it! This is what Rabbi Yoḥanan said regarding a creeping creature found in a box that had been moved from one corner to another: because of the uncertainty, one must suspend judgment concerning the teruma, for because of the uncertainty one must presume impurity from one place to another!

It is impossible to say this! For

was it not taught in a beraita: A loaf

of pure teruma that was lying

upon the board

of a plank, while that plank was lying upon pegs projecting from the wall of the house.

And

there was also a

“medaf” impurity,

a garment above a man with a flux, which conveys only the lesser form of impurity called “medaf” [from the expression “a falling leaf.” The initial assumption is that this refers to an outer garment worn by the man with a flux that does not touch his flesh, which by Torah law conveys impurity only to food and does not render a person or vessels impure as the bedding of a man with a flux does].

The impure garment [with “medaf” impurity] was lying on the ground,

beneath

the board upon which the pure loaf had been lying. Subsequently, someone came and found the loaf on the ground, beyond the impure garment.

The question now arises: Did the loaf fall from its place on the board onto the garment of the man with a flux, thereby becoming impure, and then roll beyond the garment? Or perhaps a pure person took it and placed it on the ground?

And the Mishna says:

Even though, if it had fallen

the loaf on its own from the board,

it would be impossible

for it to fall

without touching

the garment of the man with a flux as it fell, nevertheless, the loaf is

pure!

And the reason for this is

that I differ:

I suspend judgment and

say—

a pure person entered there and took

the pure loaf and placed it on the ground, and it did not become impure from the garment.

This ruling, that the loaf is certainly pure, remains in force

until someone says

the following:

“I am certain that no person entered there!”

For then, necessarily, the loaf fell on its own and became impure when it touched the garment of the man with a flux as it fell.

And Rabbi Elazar said: It was necessary

to state the principle, “I say that a pure person took it,”

only for a sloping place,

where the board upon which the loaf had been lying stood at such an angle that the loaf could have fallen from it on its own and become impure from the garment of the man with a flux as it fell. Therefore, it is necessary to suspend judgment that a pure person took it.

But if the loaf had been lying on a straight, level board, from which it was not liable to fall, then even without suspending judgment and saying, “I say that a pure person took it,” it is pure, despite the fact that it is presently on the ground and not in its former place. For there is room to say that when it fell it did not touch the garment of the man with a flux, and we leave the loaf with its presumption of purity.

Thus, it is proven that we do not presume impurity from one place to another. Therefore, when the loaf is found on the ground, we need not be concerned that it became impure in another place, when it rolled down from the board onto the garment. Rather, we say that since it did not become impure in the place where it is presently standing on the ground, there is no further reason for concern, not even to suspend judgment because of the uncertainty that it may have become impure earlier, in another place, as it fell.

If so, this is difficult for Rabbi Yoḥanan, who ruled stringently to declare impure the pure items prepared in a box in one place, even though the creeping creature was found only when the box was in another place!?

And we answer:

There,

in the case of the loaf that fell onto the ground and is declared certainly pure, the reason is

as it teaches

there,

the reason: