Niddah 4a — the Talmud in English

But

when Hezekiah and Rabbi Yohanan disagree —

it concerns a checked basket!

It was checked before he placed the pure items in it. Therefore, Hezekiah holds that if he removed the pure items and only afterward discovered the creeping creature in the basket, it has the presumption of purity from the time of the checking, and we attribute it to the fact that the creeping creature entered it only after he removed the pure items from it.

The master,

Hezekiah

held: It was checked!

And the basket has the presumption of purity.

And the master,

Rabbi Yohanan,

held: Perhaps —

when he withdrew his hand

from checking the basket, and even before placing the pure items into it,

the creeping creature fell

into the basket and rendered the pure items impure .

And we raise an objection: how can it be possible to establish the words of Hillel and Shammai as referring to an unchecked basket? After all, the beraita above, which cites the words of Shammai and Hillel, compares the law of the basket to the law of seeing blood in a woman, as we say: “And what difference is there between this and that?”

But it teaches a case analogous to a woman, and a woman —

is checked!

For she checks herself when she is occupied with pure items, morning and evening. If so, this case in which Hillel and Shammai agree concerning a basket also speaks of a checked basket. The difficulty concerning Hezekiah returns, from the words of Hillel and Shammai, who render the pure items in the basket impure.

And we answer: No! A woman is not considered to have the presumption of being checked [and consequently the basket mentioned in the words of Hillel and Shammai should likewise not be established as having the presumption of being checked], because —

a woman,

since blood is common in her —

is like one who is unchecked!

And likewise, the basket concerning which Shammai and Hillel agree speaks of an unchecked basket!

And if you wish, say:

A woman indeed has the presumption of being checked, and the basket concerning which Hillel and Shammai agree is also a checked basket. Rather, Hezekiah and Rabbi Yohanan disagree concerning a basket that is not similar to the basket concerning which Shammai and Hillel agree

When Shammai and Hillel agree

concerning a basket, where they are concerned about pure items that were prepared in it from the time the checker withdrew his hands, it speaks

of an uncovered basket

whose mouth is open upward. Therefore, there is concern that perhaps the creeping creature fell into it immediately after the checker completed his checking. Hence the basket does not have the presumption of purity .

But

when Hezekiah and Rabbi Yohanan disagree,

it speaks

of a covered basket,

in which there is no concern that a creeping creature entered it; therefore, Hezekiah purifies.

And we are astonished: how is it possible to establish their dispute—Rabbi Yohanan and Hezekiah—as referring to a

covered basket!?

After all, if it is covered, there is a difficulty:

how did it fall

there, a creeping creature!?

And we answer:

For example, its use

of the basket is

by means of

opening the

cover

that is upon it and closing it.

And Rabbi Yohanan and Hezekiah disagree as to whether, when he opens the basket, he guards it and takes care that creeping creatures not enter it.

Hezekiah holds that as long as the pure items are in the basket, when he opens the cover he takes care to cover it again, so that creeping creatures will not fall into it. But once the pure items have been removed from the basket, he is no longer careful to cover it. Therefore, we must say that the creeping creature fell into the basket only after the pure items had been removed from it.

But Rabbi Yohanan holds that even when the pure items are inside it, he is not careful concerning creeping creatures when he lifts the cover. Therefore, there is concern that the creeping creature fell at the time when he uncovered the basket.

And we refute this: how is it possible to establish the words of Shammai and Hillel as referring to an uncovered basket?

But it teaches a case analogous to a woman, and a woman —

is covered!

For blood does not fall into that place from elsewhere. Similarly, Shammai and Hillel agree concerning a covered basket that there is concern regarding the pure items. How, then, does Hezekiah disagree and purify?

And we answer: a woman, since

blood is common in her —

is like one who is uncovered!

And if you wish, say: When Shammai and Hillel agree

to impose a stringency—

in the corner of a basket 42,

but

when Hezekiah and Rabbi Yohanan disagree —

in the corner of a house!

And we inquire concerning this: how is it possible to say that Hezekiah and Rabbi Yohanan disagree concerning a creeping creature found in another corner of the house?

But “basket,” he said

the tanna of the beraita.

And we explain:

This is what the tanna

of the beraita is saying:

A basket in which pure items were used in this corner

of the house, and they removed the pure items from it,

and

after they removed the pure items from it,

they moved it

the basket and placed it

in another corner

of the house,

and a creeping creature was found

inside the basket, after the basket had been placed

in the corner

of the

other

Hezekiah held

that the pure items that had been in the basket while it was in the first corner are purified, because Hezekiah held:

we do not establish impurity from one place

to

another place,

and therefore we do not say that the creeping creature was in it while it was still in the first corner. Rather, we attribute it to the fact that it fell into it here. Therefore, the pure items that had been in it in the first corner are pure .

But Rabbi Yohanan held that we do establish

impurity from one place to another, and we are concerned that the creeping creature fell in the earlier place and rendered the pure items impure.

And we refute this:

Do we establish

impurity from one place to another?

But we learned:

One who

touched

one person

at night, and does not know

because of the darkness

whether

the person whom he touched was

alive or dead. And the next morning he rose early and found

the person whom he had touched at night

dead —

Rabbi Meir purifies

him, for the person who touched him has the presumption of purity .

And the Sages render it impure

it , because

all impurities

about which there is a doubt have their ruling determined

according to the time of their finding!

That is, since at the time of the contact there was a doubt whether this person was alive or dead, and at the time of his finding, when they became aware in the morning of what he was, they found him dead, we attribute that at the time of the contact too he had been dead

Tosafot cite in the name of the Tosefta a distinction between whether they saw him alive from the previous evening or did not see him alive, and the reason why the Rabbis render him pure when they saw him alive can be explained in two ways: a. From the words of Tosafot [ Gittin 3b, s.v. Ika] it appears that when they saw him alive from the previous evening he is pure because this is a case of uncertain impurity in the public domain, and therefore we render him pure only in the public domain. b. In Tosafot [ Ketubot 2b, s.v. de-ika] it is explained that this is because of the original presumption that he was certainly alive, and the Maharam [ there] explained that when they did not see him alive from the previous evening, there is no strong presumption of being alive, and therefore we render him impure by the principle that all impurities are treated according to the time of their finding; but when they saw him alive, there is an original presumption against it, so it is half-and-half, and because it is uncertain, therefore he is pure in the public domain, like every case of uncertain impurity in the public domain. It is further explained in Tosafot that in the private domain we render him impure even when they saw him alive. This may be explained either as merely a stringency, that they imposed in the private domain when there is one presumption against another presumption, or it may be said, according to the words of the Maharsha [Ketubot 2b], that when there is no presumption, we derive from the case of the sota that he is rendered impure even retroactively. If so, here, when according to the Maharam’s interpretation we remove the presumptions, we render him impure like uncertain impurity in the private domain. Above it was explained that Tosafot [Ketubot 2a, s.v. me’et] were required to answer why, in the case of a woman, we do not render her pure because of uncertain impurity in the public domain, since she is certainly impure before us now; this is according to the side that for Hillel too she is considered examined. Now, if this is according to the words of the Maharam, Tosafot’s question is: why is she impure in the public domain? It is half-and-half, an original presumption against the time of her finding, and she should be rendered pure because of uncertain impurity in the public domain. And it is somewhat difficult, for according to this approach it emerges that Shammai renders this pure because of uncertain impurity in the public domain, and does not accept Tosafot’s answer that when she is certainly impure before us we do not derive from the case of the sota—and this does not appear so. But if we maintain that the principal reason for rendering him pure when they saw him alive is because of a presumption that when there is a complete presumption, we do not judge at all according to the time of finding, [and in the private domain it is merely a stringency], it is more understandable that according to Hillel, even if the woman is examined, nevertheless we impose the rule of the time of finding with regard to teruma and sacrificial foods because she has an indication of deficiency from her body, and Shammai disputes this; while because of uncertain impurity in the public domain, everyone may be said to follow Tosafot’s answer. It is possible to prove further that Tosafot’s intention is to render pure solely because of a presumption, and not as the Maharam says, that it is because of one presumption against another and is uncertain impurity in the public domain. For Tosafot [Ketubot 2a, at the end of their words] asked: what is the reason of Rabbi Meir, who renders pure even when they did not see him alive? How is this different from a woman, concerning whom we attribute? They answered: because we establish him on his presumption, whereas in the case of a woman there is an indication of deficiency from her body. One must examine what Tosafot held in their question: if they thought that Rabbi Meir renders pure because uncertain impurity in the public domain is pure, what did they ask? For in the case of a woman one cannot render pure in this way, as they previously answered, because she is certainly impure before us. [In the case of one who touched another on the first night, there is no “certainly dead before us,” since the matter is judged only with regard to the person who touched him, while that person still remains in doubt regarding the contact. See Shev Shema’tata [ 1:8] and this requires examination.] It is necessarily the case that even in their question they held that the reason was because of a presumption; they merely held that since Rabbi Meir renders pure even when they did not see him alive, and it is a complete presumption, there is no practical difference whether there is an indication of deficiency from her body or not. They answered that nevertheless this may also be said according to Rabbi Meir. But according to the Maharam, that Tosafot’s intention in saying “we establish him on his presumption” is one presumption against another, and he is rendered pure because of uncertain impurity in the public domain, this requires examination, for if so, in the case of a woman there would in any event be no basis for rendering her pure for this reason. See the following note. And it was taught concerning it

that the ruling of that Mishna, that all impurities are treated according to the time of their finding, is—

according to the time of their finding and in the place of their finding!

For the time of finding determines the impurity only if the object about which there is doubt is found in the same place in which the doubt arose. But if he touched a person at night in one place, and in the morning he is found dead in another place, the person who touched him is pure, for we do not say: just as he is dead here, so he was already dead in the previous place, since we do not transfer impurity from place to place! If so, this is difficult: how did Rabbi Yohanan say that impurity is transferred from place to place?

And if you would say

to distinguish and say that

these words

of the Mishna, that impurity is not transferred from place to place, apply specifically to establishing certain impurity,

to burn

the teruma that came into contact with it,

but

when there is a doubt concerning impurity, and one is

to suspend

the teruma on its account—meaning that one neither eats it nor burns it—

we attribute.

And Rabbi Yohanan, who said that impurity is transferred from place to place, was speaking with regard to suspending because of a doubt, and not with regard to certain impurity.

There is no possibility of saying so. For

—

do we indeed attribute

when we have a doubt of impurity from place to place?

And we learned in the Mishna: A needle

that had been impure,

which is found

now upon pure items, when it is

full of rust or

when it is

broken, and there is a doubt whether the needle fell upon the pure items while it was whole and without rust, and rendered them impure, [and afterward it became rusty or broke], or whether it may have fallen upon them only after it became rusty or was broken, in which case it does not render them impure [for all vessels that have broken or become rusty no longer render impure].

And the Mishna says: that needle is

pure

from rendering impure, and we are not concerned about it even as a doubt, to render the pure items impure retroactively. Because

all impurities

that are uncertain have their ruling determined, for they are

according to the time of their finding 50 ,

and we say that just as it is pure now, so it was pure at the time when it fell upon the pure items.

and we say that just as it is pure now, so too it was pure at the time it fell onto the pure food.

And we infer:

And why

do we say that the pure objects are not impure?

Let us say: This

needle, behold,

originally—

it was a proper needle;

and if so, one should say that only

now has it risen

—

rust,

but originally, when it fell upon the pure objects, it was whole and made them impure.

And from the fact that we do not say this, it is proven that the rule that all impurities are [judged] as at the time of their finding applies despite the presumptive status of the needle.

And it entered our minds that the same is true with regard to the rule that “all impurities are [judged] according to the place of their finding”: one does not take the other place into consideration at all, not even in order to suspend judgment, but rather we say that only the place where the impurity was found is determinative, and one does not establish impurity for another place. And this is difficult for Rabbi Yohanan, who says that one establishes impurity from one place to another and is concerned that the objects at the previous place may retroactively be impure.

Furthermore,

we learned that all impurities are [judged] as at the time of their finding.

For

we learned: If one found a burned creeping creature

, which does not cause impurity when it is burned,

upon the olives, and likewise

if he found

a cloth

of a man with a flux,

worn out,

worn and frayed, upon the olives, then the burned creeping creature is

pure

from causing the olives to be impure. And likewise the cloth of the man with a flux is pure from causing them to be impure. For we say that the burned creeping creature or the worn-out cloth fell upon the olives in their present state, when they are pure, and we are not concerned—even merely to suspend judgment because of doubt—that perhaps they fell upon the olives while they were whole and fit to cause impurity,

since all impurities—

[are judged] as at the time of their finding!

And here too it is difficult for Rabbi Yohanan, for it is proven that one does not establish impurity from one place to another, just as we say: “All impurities are [judged] as at the time of their finding”!

And if you would say

that this matter here is not comparable to Rabbi Yohanan’s ruling concerning a box in which a creeping creature was found after it had been carried to another place:

For here it is different, since we determine the status of impurities

as at the time of their finding, both leniently,

to declare the needle and the cloth pure,

and stringently,

to declare impure one who touched one person during the night and does not know whom he touched, because both of these principles apply:

both as at the time of their finding and

also

at the place of their finding!

Therefore, when one touched one person during the night and in the morning it was found that he was dead, we certainly declare him impure, for the time of the finding and the place of the finding indicate that he was dead. And likewise, with the creeping creature and the cloth, we certainly declare [the olives] pure according to the time of their finding and according to the place of their finding.

But

with regard to retroactively declaring [objects] impure

not at the place of their finding,

it is possible to say that indeed

we do not burn

the teruma as the law of certain impurity, but there is room for us to be uncertain, and therefore

we suspend judgment

concerning it! And this is what Rabbi Yohanan said concerning a creeping creature found in a box that they moved from one corner to another: because of the doubt, one must suspend judgment concerning the teruma, for because of the doubt one establishes impurity from one place to another!? It is impossible to say this! For

the beraita teaches:

A loaf

of pure [food] that was lying

on the board

of a plank, and that plank was lying upon pegs protruding from the wall of the house.

And

there was also

an impure “shelf”

, which is a garment above a man with a flux, causing only a lesser impurity, called the impurity of a “shelf” [modeled on “a falling leaf.” And it entered our minds that this refers to an upper garment worn by the man with a flux that does not touch his flesh, which causes food to contract impurity by Torah law, but does not cause a person or vessels to contract impurity like the bedding of a man with a flux].

And the impure garment [with the impurity of a “shelf”] was lying on the ground,

beneath it

—beneath that board upon which the pure loaf had been lying. And afterward someone came and found the loaf upon the ground, beyond the impure garment.

And now there is a doubt: Did the loaf fall from its place upon the board onto the garment of the man with a flux, become impure, and roll farther from the garment, or perhaps a pure person took it and placed it upon the ground?

And the Mishna says:

Even though, if it fell

the loaf by itself from the board,

it is impossible

for it to fall

unless it touched

the loaf, in its fall, the garment of the man with a flux, nevertheless—the loaf is

pure!

And the reason for the matter is:

It is different

from suspending judgment and

saying—

A pure person entered there, and took it

the pure loaf, and placed it on the ground, and it did not become impure from the garment.

And this ruling, that the loaf is certainly pure, applies

until someone says

the one who says:

“It is clear to me that no person entered there!”

For then, necessarily, the loaf fell by itself and became impure on the way down through its contact with the garment of the man with a flux.

And Rabbi Eleazar said: It was necessary

to state the matter in which we say, “I say that a pure person took it,”

only in the place of a slope,

where the board upon which the loaf had been lying stood at such an incline that the loaf was fit to fall from it by itself and to become impure on the way down from the garment of the man with a flux. Therefore, it is necessary to suspend judgment in favor of a pure person having taken it.

But if the loaf had been lying on a straight and level board, from which it was not about to fall, then even without suspending judgment and saying, “I say that a pure person took it,” it is pure, despite the fact that it is presently found on the ground and not in its previous place, because we have a side [to say] that at the time of its fall it did not touch the garment of the man with a flux, and we establish the loaf upon its presumptive status of purity.

Evidently, it is proven that one does not establish impurity from one place to another. Therefore, when the loaf is found on the ground, we need not be concerned that perhaps it became impure in another place, when it rolled down from the board onto the garment. Rather, we say that since in this place where it now stands on the ground it did not become impure, we need no longer be concerned—even merely to suspend judgment because of doubt—that perhaps it became impure beforehand, in another place, on the way down.

And if so, this is difficult for Rabbi Yohanan, who was stringent to declare the pure objects prepared in the box impure in one place, even though the creeping creature was found only when the box was in another place!?

And we answer:

There,

in the case of the loaf that fell upon the ground, which we certainly declare pure, the reason for the matter is

as it teaches

there

the reason: