Niddah 50a (נ.) — the Talmud in English

And from where [is this derived]?

It is Rabbi Meir’s opinion,

who disqualifies a blind person, even one blind in only one eye, from judging.

As it is taught in a beraita: Rabbi Meir would say: What is the meaning of the verse “

And the kohanim shall draw near, for the Lord your God has chosen them,

and

by their word shall every dispute and every affliction be determined”—what connection do disputes

between people

have with afflictions?

Rather,

the verse juxtaposes

the written law

disputes with afflictions: Just as afflictions

are seen by a koen only

during the day, as it is written, “

And on the day that living flesh appears in it

it shall become impure,”

so too, disputes

between people may be judged only

during the day

and not at night.

And

likewise:

Just as afflictions

are seen specifically

when the koen is not blind,

even not blind in only one eye [since one who is blind in both eyes is obviously disqualified, as he cannot see],

as it is written, “

For every

vision of the koen’s eyes,”

so too, disputes

are judged specifically

when the judges are not blind,

by judges who are not blind.

And it likewise juxtaposes

also

afflictions with disputes: Just as disputes

are judged specifically

when the litigants are not relatives, so too afflictions

are seen by a koen specifically

when the person involved is not his relative.

If so, just as disputes

are judged

by three

judges,

so too afflictions

are seen only

by three

kohanim [by force of the juxtaposition].

And

likewise, apart from the juxtaposition,

it is logically derived

that afflictions should be examined only by three kohanim, by means of a kal va-homer: If

a person’s property

is judged

by three

judges, then afflictions of

his body—how much more so

should they be examined and declared impure by three kohanim?

The verse states: “And he shall be brought to Aharon the koen or to one of his sons, the kohanim,”

12 from this you learn that even one koen may examine afflictions!

There was a certain blind man

blind in one eye

who lived in the neighborhood

in the neighborhood

of Rabbi Yohanan, and he was judging cases, yet Rabbi Yohanan did not say anything to him

Rabbi Yohanan

at all.

And [the Gemara] asks:

How did

Rabbi Yohanan

do this,

in that he did not protest against him?

But Rabbi Yohanan said: The halakha follows an unattributed Mishna. And we learned: Anyone who is qualified to judge is qualified to testify; and there are those who are qualified to testify but are not qualified to judge. And we said: What does this come to include? And Rabbi Yohanan said: It comes to include one who is blind in one eye,

and if so, according to Rabbi Yohanan, the halakha is that one who is blind in one eye is disqualified!

And [the Gemara] answered:

Rabbi Yohanan found another unattributed Mishna

and determined the halakha in accordance with it, that one who is blind in one eye is qualified to judge.

As we learned: Monetary cases are judged during the day and concluded at night,

and it is evident from this that disputes are not juxtaposed with afflictions [because if they were juxtaposed, it would be impossible to conclude a case at night, just as afflictions are not examined at all at night], and we have no source for disqualifying one who is blind in one eye.

And we wonder:

What is the superiority

what is the advantage

of this unattributed Mishna

on the basis of which Rabbi Yohanan determined the halakha

over that unattributed Mishna?

And we explain:

If you wish, say: an unattributed Mishna representing the view of the majority is preferable,

while the unattributed Mishna that juxtaposes disputes with afflictions follows Rabbi Meir, whose view is that of an individual; therefore, that other unattributed Mishna, which accords with the majority, is preferable.

And if you wish, say:

the reason Rabbi Yohanan determined the halakha in accordance with this unattributed Mishna

is that it is taught

in tractate Sanhedrin

in the context of the laws of

judging, where its appropriate place is, and therefore it is primary in comparison with our Mishna, which was taught in tractate Niddah only incidentally, as part of the expression “a similar case was taught.”

Mishna:

Anyone who is obligated in tithes

is food and therefore may be eaten, and he is

susceptible to the ritual impurity of food.

And there are items that are susceptible to the ritual impurity of food but are not obligated in tithes.

Gemara:

When they said, “There are items that are susceptible to the ritual impurity of food but are not obligated in tithes,”

what does this come to include?

It comes to include meat, fish, and eggs,

which are exempt from tithes.

Mishna:

Anyone who is obligated in pe’a is obligated in tithes.

And there are items that are obligated in tithes but are not obligated in pe’a.

Gemara:

The Gemara discusses: When we learned, “There are items that are obligated in tithes but are not obligated in pe’a,”

what does this come to include?

It comes to include figs and vegetables, which are not obligated in pe’a

but are obligated in tithes.

The Gemara brings two mishnayot, one in tractate Pe’a and the other in tractate Ma’aserot, from which the distinction between pe’a and tithes with regard to figs and vegetables is apparent:

As we learned

in tractate Pe’a, with regard to the obligations of pe’a:

There is a general principle stated with regard to pe’a: Anything that is food, is guarded, grows from the ground, is harvested all at once, and is brought in for storage

is

obligated in pe’a!

And we say in explanation of the Mishna:

“Food”—to exclude the aftergrowths of istis and kotsa,

which are not food but types of dyes [the novelty is that they are exempt even though they are fit for eating, since they are not designated for that purpose].

“Is guarded”—to exclude ownerless produce,

since one who harvests an ownerless field is exempt from leaving pe’a.

“Grows from the ground”—to exclude mushrooms and fungi,

which grow by drawing nourishment from the air.

“Is harvested all at once”—to exclude figs,

whose fruit ripens successively over an extended period.

“And is brought in for storage,”

meaning that it can be stored in a house for a long time,

to exclude vegetables

which spoil quickly.

But

with

regard to tithes, we learned

in tractate Ma’aserot:

Anything that is food, is guarded, and grows from the ground is obligated in tithes!

And we infer:

But

the conditions of

“being harvested all at once”

and

“being brought in for storage”

are not taught

here with regard to tithes. It follows that a fig is obligated in tithes even though it is not harvested all at once, and likewise a vegetable is obligated in tithes even though it cannot be brought in for storage.

There are vegetables that are exceptions and are also obligated in pe’a, such as:

If there were garlic or onions among them, they are obligated

in pe’a, because they are brought in for storage.

As we learned: Beds

rows

of onions that are among the vegetables

[that grow within a vegetable field exempt from pe’a].

Rabbi Yosei says:

He separates

from each one individually,

because the vegetables separating the rows cause each row of onions to be considered a field in its own right, and it is obligated in separation from that field itself.

And the Sages say:

He may separate

from one for all of them,

as they do not regard the vegetables between the rows as something that divides them into separate fields.

It is evident that according to all opinions onions are obligated in pe’a even though they are vegetables, because they are brought in for storage.

We learned above in the Mishna that anything obligated in tithes is susceptible to the ritual impurity of food. And there are items that are susceptible to it but are exempt from tithes.

Rabba bar bar Ḥana said that Rabbi Yohanan said:

Endives,

a type of vegetable that is sometimes sown for human consumption, in which case it has the status of food with regard to the laws of the ritual impurity of food, and sometimes is sown for animal fodder, in which case it is not deemed human food and is not susceptible to the ritual impurity of food. It happened

that they sowed them

endives

initially for the animals, and then reconsidered their purpose

after they had grown but before they had been uprooted,

for

human

consumption; his intention before they were uprooted does not suffice to render them food. Rather,

the endives require

the endives

an additional intention

for human consumption

once they are uprooted.