Niddah 40a (מ.) — the Talmud in English

Mishna:

1.

Yotzei dofen,

a child who emerges from his mother’s womb through an incision made in the wall of his mother’s uterus, his emergence through the wall is not considered “birth” with regard to the laws governing a woman who gives birth. Therefore,

the days of impurity are not observed for him,

for his mother does not become impure with the impurity of childbirth, as does a woman who gives birth

who is impure for one week after giving birth to a male and two weeks after giving birth to a female.

And

the

days of purity

likewise do not apply to her, for this woman who gave birth does not have the status of pure blood that every woman who gives birth has, consisting of thirty-three days for a male child or sixty-six days for a female child.

And one is not liable for him,

for his birth,

an offering

of a woman who gives birth. The reason for all these laws is, as stated, that the birth of a yotzei dofen is not considered birth.

Rabbi Shimon says:

A yotzei dofen

is like an ordinary newborn

Therefore, the days of impurity and the days of purity are observed for him, and one is liable to bring a childbirth offering for his birth.

2.

All women become impure

with the impurity of menstruation or ziva

in the “outer chamber,”

which is the passageway located between the uterus and the exterior of the body.

That is, even though the blood has not emerged from the passageway to outside her body, once the blood has emerged from the uterus into the passageway [through which the blood passes on its way out of the body], she is impure.

As it is stated

(Leviticus 15):

“Her flow of blood shall be, in her flesh.”

The verse teaches, by the words “in her flesh,” that even if the blood is still found within her flesh and has not emerged outside her body, she is impure, since the blood has already emerged from the source into the passageway.

But a man with a flux and one who experiences a seminal emission do not become impure until their impurity emerges

their seminal emission or flux

outside.

That is, even if the flux or seminal fluid has been dislodged from its place and is already located in the channel inside the penis, the man does not become impure with the impurity of a man with a flux or with the impurity of one who experiences a seminal emission until the flux or seminal fluid emerges outside his body.

If he was eating teruma and sensed that his limbs trembled,

as the seminal fluid had been dislodged from its place and was about to emerge outside his body, he

holds his penis

in a manner that prevents the seminal fluid from emerging,

and swallows the teruma,

before the semen emerges and he becomes impure.

And they render impure

a man with a flux and one who experiences a seminal emission

with any amount, even

if only a small measure emerges from them,

like the size of a mustard seed, or less than that.

Gemara:

We learned in the Mishna that according to the first tanna [the Rabbis], the birth of a child by way of a yotzei dofen does not render his mother impure with the impurity of childbirth.

Rav Mani bar Pati said: What is the reason of the Rabbis?

The verse says

(Leviticus 12):

“When a woman conceives and gives birth to a male,” until she gives birth in the place where she “conceives.”

The verse teaches that the impurity of childbirth stated in the passage applies only when the child emerges through the place where the woman “conceives” during intercourse [the passageway, the “outer chamber” of the uterus]. But with regard to birth by way of a yotzei dofen, when the child does not emerge through the place where she conceives during intercourse,

the law of the days of impurity and the days of purity and the liability for offerings, which are set forth there in the passage “When a woman conceives,”

does not apply.

And Rabbi Shimon,

what does he derive from the verse “When a woman conceives”?

That

the homiletic interpretation of this verse comes to teach

that even if she did not give birth

to

anything but

a dissolved substance

resembling what her mother emitted when she conceived,

she too is

impure with the impurity of childbirth.

And Rabbi Shimon, what is his reason?

Why did he interpret the verse in this manner, and not as the Rabbis explained it?

Reish Lakish said: The verse says “And if she gives birth to a female, she shall be impure for two weeks,”

“if a female”

gives birth

“she shall be impure for two weeks.” It would have been possible to write, “And if a female, she shall be impure for two weeks,” since this is a continuation of the verse “When a woman conceives and gives birth to a male.” We therefore derive from the superfluous word “gives birth”

and it would have been possible to write “And if a female, and she shall be impure for two weeks,” since this continues the verse “When a woman conceives and gives birth to a male,” and they learn from the superfluous word “gives birth”

to include

any form of birth of a

yotzei dofen.

And the Gemara asks:

And the Rabbis,

what do they derive from the superfluous word “gives birth”?

The Gemara explains:

This

word “gives birth”

is needed to include a tumtum,

who has a layer of flesh covering his organ, making it impossible to determine whether he is male or female,

and an androgynos,

who has both male and female characteristics, and the Sages are uncertain whether he is male or female. 4.

It might enter your mind to say

that since in the verse

“male and female” are written,

perhaps specifically the birth of

a definite male

or

a definite female

renders the woman who gives birth impure with the impurity of childbirth,

but not a tumtum or an androgynos.

It teaches us that the birth of a tumtum or an androgynos also renders the woman who gives birth impure.

And Rabbi Shimon,

from where does he know that in the birth of a tumtum or an androgynos as well, the woman who gives birth observes days of impurity and purity?

He derives it from that which bar Leva'i taught.

For bar Leva'i taught: “For a male,” a male of any kind,

every type of male, even one whose maleness is not discernible.

“For a female,” a female of any kind,

every type of female, even one whose femaleness is not discernible.

And the Rabbis,

what do they derive from the verse “For a male,”

and what from the verse “For a female”?

This is needed to make one liable

for a separate offering

for

the birth of

each male, and to make one liable

for a separate offering

for

the birth of

each female,

when the second child was conceived during the days of purity of the first child and was born after the days of purity of the first child.

And Rabbi Shimon,

from where does he know that a woman who gives birth is liable for an offering for each male and for each female? —

He derives it from that which a tanna taught before Rav Sheshet:

(Leviticus 12)

“This is the law of the woman who gives birth,” teaches that she brings one offering for many children.

She is not liable to bring an offering for the birth of each male and for each female birth.

One might have thought that she may bring

one offering

for a birth and for a flux together?

The Gemara expresses astonishment at this initial assumption:

Rather,

according to your statement,

a woman who gave birth and ate blood, and a woman who gave birth and ate forbidden fat,

would

one offering suffice for her?

Is it possible to say that a woman may discharge any two liabilities for offerings by bringing one offering?

Rather,

the tanna said as follows:

One might have thought that she may bring

one offering

for a birth before the completion

of the days of purity

and for a birth after the completion

of the days of purity

together?

The verse states: “This.”

Only when the second birth occurred during the days of purity of the first birth does she discharge her obligation with one offering, but not when the second birth occurred after the completion of the days of purity of the first birth.

And the Rabbis,

what do they derive from “This”?

Although “This” is written, it is also necessary

as well

to derive “for a male or for a female.”

For

it might enter your mind to say that this applies

when she must bring a separate offering for every birth after the completion of the days of purity,

in two conceptions,

when she gave birth and, after the completion of the days of purity, before she had managed to bring an offering, conceived again and gave birth to another child.

But in one conception, as in the case of Judah and Hezekiah, the sons of Rabbi Ḥiyya,

who were twins, except that one was delayed in emerging for three months after the other, so that the seven days of impurity and thirty-three days of purity of the first had already ended before the birth of the second,

one might say that one offering suffices for her; it therefore teaches us otherwise.

Rabbi Yoḥanan said: And Rabbi Shimon concedes with regard to sacrificial animals

that the offspring of a yotzei dofen among sacrificial animals

is not consecrated

with inherent sanctity, but only with sanctity of value. For the inherent sanctity that takes effect upon the offspring of a sacrificial animal at the time of its birth can take effect only through a normal birth, but not through the birth of a yotzei dofen.

What is the reason? He derives “birth” from “birth”

by means of a gzera shava

from the firstborn. Just as there, “the one that opens the womb,”

only birth through the womb is considered birth, whereas the birth of a yotzei dofen is not considered birth that sanctifies the firstborn with firstborn sanctity,

so too here,

with regard to the imposition of inherent sanctity upon the offspring of sacrificial animals, only the birth of

the one that opens the womb

is considered birth.

The Gemara asks:

And let

Rabbi Shimon

derive “birth” from “birth” from a human being. Just as there, the birth of a yotzei dofen

is considered birth with regard to the days of impurity and purity and the offering,

so too here, the birth of a yotzei dofen

should be considered birth with regard to sacrificial animals!

The Gemara answers:

It is more logical that he should derive it from the firstborn, since

with regard to sacrificial animals it is written: “And it shall be seven days under

its mother.”

And we derive

from

the firstborn, concerning which it is stated: “For seven days it shall be with

its mother.”

The Gemara challenges this:

On the contrary, he should have derived it from a human being, since it is ordinary from ordinary!

Sacrificial animals and human beings are more similar, because the laws governing them apply even to an ordinary offspring and not only to a firstborn; we should not derive sacrificial animals from the firstborn, whose law applies specifically to a firstborn offspring and not to an ordinary offspring, unlike sacrificial animals.

The Gemara answers:

Rather,

therefore, with regard to the offspring of sacrificial animals that emerges by way of a yotzei dofen,

he should have derived it from the firstborn, since

there are several reasons why sacrificial animals are more similar to the firstborn:

a. A gzera shava

of “mother,”

as “its mother” is stated in a verse concerning both of them.

b. Both of them are

sacrificial animals.

c. d. e. In both, the laws of

pigul, notar, and impurity apply.

The Gemara challenges this:

On the contrary, he should have derived it from a human being, since

there are several reasons why sacrificial animals are similar to human beings:

a. Both are

ordinary,

and not specifically firstborn.

b. In both cases, there is no requirement of

a male specifically [whereas a firstborn applies only to males].

[unlike a firstborn animal, which applies only to males].

c. In both cases, they are not

sanctified automatically [whereas a firstborn is sanctified automatically from the womb].

d. In both cases, they are not given

as a gift

to a kohen [whereas a firstborn is one of the gifts of the priesthood].

to a priest [unlike a firstborn animal, which is one of the gifts given to the priests].

And we answer:

These matters in which consecrated offerings resemble a firstborn,

are more numerous:

they outnumber

the matters in which consecrated offerings resemble a person. For consecrated offerings resemble a firstborn in five respects, but resemble a person in only four respects. Therefore, Rabbi Shimon derives the law of consecrated offerings from that of a firstborn, and an offspring born by caesarean section is considered a birth.

Rav Hiyya, son of Rav Huna, said in the name of Rava: A beraita was taught that supports Rabbi Yohanan, who said that Rabbi Shimon concedes with regard to an offspring born by caesarean section in the case of consecrated offerings.

As it was taught:

Rabbi Judah says,

with regard to that which is written:

“This is the law of the burnt-offering; it is the burnt-offering

that remains upon its fire on the altar all night,” we learn from this verse below that any invalid consecrated offerings that were placed upon the altar may not subsequently be removed from it; rather, they are burned upon the altar.

And this is how they expound the verse: “It is the burnt-offering”—once it has ascended upon its fire, even if it is disqualified, let it remain there to be burned all night! Rabbi Judah excluded three disqualifications from this rule, since three exclusions are stated in the passage:

a. “This”—but not another!

b. “It”—this is an exclusion!

c. “The burnt-offering,” with the definite article, indicating the particular valid burnt-offering, but not the disqualified one.

These are the three exclusions

that exclude these three disqualified offerings, which, even if they were placed upon the altar, are removed from it: