Niddah 26b (כו:) — the Talmud in English

And the Gemara asks:

But there is

“ovens of girls”

made by young girls, whose smallest measure for becoming susceptible to impurity is

a handbreadth,

so why was this law not included among those whose measure is a handbreadth?

As we learned: “An oven, at its beginning,”

that is, at the beginning of its formation, is not considered an “oven” with regard to susceptibility to impurity unless its height is at least

four

handbreadths.

And

likewise,

“its remnants,”

[the fragments] of a large oven that became impure and then broke do not become pure unless no fragment remains that measures

four

handbreadths,

the statement of Rabbi Meir.

And the Sages say: “With regard to what are these words stated,”

that the beginning of an oven must measure at least four handbreadths in order to be designated an “oven,” and likewise, when it breaks, no fragment may measure four handbreadths—

with regard to a

oven

that is large,

which is the ordinary oven made for baking.

But with regard to a

oven

that is small,

made for babies to play with,

its beginning—

is any size.

And both a small oven and a large oven are designated an oven only

once its work has been completed!

“And its remnants”—

for the majority!

If a large oven became impure, it becomes pure only once the majority of the oven has broken, and not in accordance with Rabbi Meir, who maintains that the measure of the fragments is four handbreadths.

And the Gemara explains:

And how much

is

“any size,”

the amount required at the beginning of the making of a small oven?

The scholars of the house of Rabbi Yannai said: One handbreadth! For girls make ovens

small girls, who customarily make small ovens whose size is

one handbreadth

alone. Since one handbreadth is the measure, Rabbi Oshaya should have included this law among those whose measure is one handbreadth. And the Gemara answers:

He does not discuss matters subject to dispute!

All five cases mentioned as having a measure of one handbreadth are cases in which everyone agrees that this is the measure.

And the Gemara says:

Now that you have arrived at this

conclusion, that he does not discuss matters subject to dispute,

this too,

the earlier question—why was the law of a stone measuring one handbreadth that projects from an oven not mentioned—can be answered:

It is a matter of dispute,

and therefore Rabbi Oshaya did not count it.

As it is taught in the latter clause: Rabbi Yehuda said: “They said

that only

a handbreadth

projecting from the oven is considered like the oven, and not one that is larger,

only

when that handbreadth projected on the side that was

between the oven and the wall.

Since it interfered there with placing the oven next to the wall, if the handle were more than one handbreadth long, it would be cut off and would not be considered part of the oven. But if the handle pointed toward the interior of the house and did not interfere, even if it were longer than one handbreadth, it would not ordinarily be cut off and would be considered part of the oven. It follows that according to Rabbi Yehuda, one handbreadth is not a fixed measure, and he disagrees in this with the Sages. Since Rabbi Oshaya did not count laws that are subject to dispute, he did not mention the law of the handbreadth projecting from the oven.

The Gemara raises another objection:

But there is the frame

of the Table in the Temple, whose thickness is

one handbreadth,

as it is stated: “You shall make a table of acacia wood, and you shall make for it a frame one handbreadth all around” (Exodus 25:23–25).

It answers:

When it is written

explicitly in the Torah,

he does not discuss it!

The Gemara raises another objection:

But there is the Ark-cover

whose thickness is

one handbreadth,

although its measure is not stated explicitly in the Torah?

It answers:

He does not discuss sacred matters!

The Gemara raises another objection:

But there is

the halakha concerning permitting carrying in an alleyway on Shabbat:

It is sufficient for the crossbeam

placed as a lintel at the entrance of the alleyway

that it be one handbreadth wide!?

It answers:

He does not discuss rabbinic matters!

The entire prohibition against carrying in an alleyway and the regulations concerning the crossbeam are only rabbinic. Rabbi Oshaya dealt

only with matters written

whose essential law is in the Torah,

but whose measures are not specified

in the Torah!

Rav Yitzhak bar Shmuel bar Marta was sitting before Rav Kahana, and he was sitting and saying—

Rav Yehuda said that Rav said: During all of the first three days

following the birth,

they attribute the placenta

that emerges from the woman

to the fetus

that was born, saying that it is its placenta and that its emergence was delayed. They do not suspect that the placenta of the fetus before us dissolved, and that the placenta now emerging belongs to an additional fetus that dissolved, and therefore we did not see it, since a placenta can remain inside for up to three days.

But if the placenta emerged

from that point onward,

after having been delayed more than three days,

they suspect another fetus,

because the lengthy delay between the birth and the emergence of the placenta indicates that there was an additional fetus that dissolved within the placenta now emerging, while the placenta of the previous fetus dissolved, and therefore we did not see it.

[The practical consequence of suspecting an additional fetus applies both when the first fetus was male, in which case they suspect that the second fetus was female and that she has fourteen days of impurity, and when the first fetus was female. Since several days separated the births, there is concern that an additional female was born with the second placenta, and the eighty days must be counted from the second birth. The stringency involved is as follows: If the eighty-first day after the first birth arrived and she saw blood and became a nidda, and on the eighty-eighth day she again saw blood, then without the concern for an additional birth, she would become a nidda on the eighty-eighth day, which is the first day of the eleven days of zivah, under the law of one who observes one day corresponding to one day, and she would immerse and become pure. But now, since the placenta emerged after three days and there is concern that it is the placenta of an additional fetus, and that fetus may have been an additional female, for whom she counts eighty days from the day the placenta emerged, the sighting of blood on the eighty-first day after the first birth is a sighting during the eighty days of purity following the second birth, and she does not become a nidda. Consequently, her additional sighting on the eighty-eighth day after the first birth is not a sighting of zivah, whose law is that she observes one day corresponding to one day; rather, it is a sighting marking the “beginning of nidda,” which requires her to observe seven days of nidda].

Rav Kahana said to him,

to Rav Yitzhak bar Shmuel—

But did Rav say this,

that it is possible for an additional fetus to be born several days later and that the placenta belongs to the second fetus?

But Rav said: A second fetus

does not

remain delayed after its companion

the first

at all!

If so, certainly the placenta belongs to the first fetus, and it is attributed to it even after more than three days.

He was silent,

Rav Yitzhak bar Shmuel, and did not trouble himself to answer him.

He said to him,

Rav Kahana:

Perhaps here,

where for up to three days the placenta is attributed to the fetus, it is

a miscarriage,

for when the first is a miscarriage, the second may be delayed for several days.

Here,

where it does not remain delayed at all, it is

a viable fetus,

for when the first is born alive, the second does not remain delayed after it at all?!

He said to him,

Rav Yitzhak bar Shmuel: Are

you expounding Rav’s statement

and explaining Rav’s words on your own? But

Rav explicitly said this:

“If she miscarried a miscarriage, and afterward miscarried a placenta—

for all three days, they attribute the placenta to the fetus; from that point onward—

they suspect another fetus. If she gave birth

to a live fetus

and afterward miscarried a placenta—

even from that point until ten days, they do not suspect another fetus!”

Shmuel, and Rav’s students, and Rav Yehuda were sitting. Rav Yosef son of Rav Menashya of Divil passed and went

[a place]

before them, coming and going

[Rav Yosef was hurrying toward them].

Shmuel said

A man is coming to us, whom we can toss with a straw of wheat

[like a stalk of wheat; a man is coming whom a few questions can easily refute]

and he tosses and drives him away

[and he cannot answer even those questions].

without even knowing how to answer them.

Meanwhile, he arrived,

Rav Yosef, son of Rav Menashya.

Shmuel said to him: What did Rav say concerning a placenta?

He said to him,

Rav Yosef:

This is what Rav said—

They attribute the placenta only to a viable fetus,

that is, only if she miscarried a fetus complete in its form, which could have lived had its months of gestation been completed, do they attribute the placenta to it and do not suspect another fetus. But if she miscarried a fetus whose form was defective and which could not live because of its defect, such as a fetus with an imperforate body or one resembling an animal or bird, they suspect that the placenta emerging after it, even within three days of the birth, belongs to another fetus that dissolved.

Shmuel questioned all of Rav’s students,

whether Rav Yosef’s words were correct,

and they said to him so,

that this was indeed what Rav had said.

Afterward, Shmuel saw

Rav Yehuda

with displeasure

and was angry with him because he had heard this from Rav but had not told him.

Rabbi Yosei ben Shaul asked Rabbi: If a woman miscarries something resembling a raven, followed by a placenta,

what is the law?

What is it?

Do they attribute the placenta to the raven-like form, or do they suspect another fetus together with the placenta?

He said to him,

Rabbi:

They attribute

the placenta

only to a species in which there is a placenta,

whereas a raven has no placenta; it lays eggs from which the chicks hatch. Therefore, the placenta cannot be attributed to it, and they suspect that another fetus dissolved within the placenta.

Rabbi Yose ben Shaul returned and asked Rabbi: There was

a placenta attached to it

in a raven—

what is the halakha?

Does one also suspect another fetus here, when the attachment demonstrates that the placenta is connected to the raven?

He said to him

Rabbi:

Something that does not

exist in reality—

you ask about!

Meytivi: One who miscarries the form of a domesticated animal, wild animal, or bird, and a placenta with it—

When the placenta is attached to them—

we do not suspect another fetus!