Niddah 26b — the Talmud in English

The Gemara asks:

But there is also ![](pamud.bmp "

Exact page location")

“children’s ovens”

made by young girls, whose minimum size for becoming susceptible to ritual impurity is

one handbreadth,

so why was this law not included among those whose measure is one handbreadth?

As we learned in a Mishna: “An oven, at its beginning,”

that is, at the beginning of its formation, is not called an “oven” with regard to susceptibility to ritual impurity unless it is at least

four

handbreadths high.

And

likewise

its remnants,

the fragments of a large oven that became ritually impure and then broke, do not become ritually pure unless no fragment remains that measures

four

handbreadths;

this is the statement of Rabbi Meir.

And the Sages say: “When are these matters applicable?”

The requirement that a newly formed oven must be at least four handbreadths high to be called an “oven,” and likewise that, when it breaks, no fragment may measure four handbreadths, applies

to a

large

oven,

the ordinary oven made for baking.

But a

small

oven,

made for infants to play with,

at its beginning

may be of any size.

Both a small oven and a large oven have the status of an oven only

once its work has been completed!

“And its remnants” —

most of it!

If a large oven became ritually impure, it becomes pure only once most of the oven has broken, and not according to Rabbi Meir, who holds that the relevant measure of the fragments is four handbreadths.

The Gemara explains:

And how much

is

“any size”

that is required for a small oven at the beginning of its manufacture?

The academy of Rabbi Yannai said: One handbreadth! For girls make ovens

young girls who customarily make small ovens measuring

one handbreadth

alone. Since one handbreadth is the measure, Rabbi Oshaya should have included this law among those whose measure is one handbreadth. The Gemara answers:

He did not discuss disputed matters!

All five matters mentioned as having a measure of one handbreadth are matters concerning which everyone agrees that this is the measure.

The Gemara says:

Now that you have arrived at this

understanding, that he did not discuss disputed matters,

this also,

the earlier question of why the law of a one-handbreadth stone protruding from an oven was not mentioned, can be answered:

It is a dispute,

and therefore Rabbi Oshaya did not count it.

As it is taught in the latter clause: “Rabbi Yehuda said: They said

that only

one handbreadth

protruding from the oven is considered part of it, and not a larger projection,

only

when that handbreadth projected on the side that is

between the oven and the wall.

Since it interferes there with placing the oven against the wall, if the handle was longer than one handbreadth, it would be cut off and would not be considered part of the oven. But if the handle faced toward the house and did not interfere, even if it was longer than one handbreadth, it would not normally be cut off and would be considered part of the oven. It follows that according to Rabbi Yehuda, one handbreadth is not a fixed measure, and he disagrees with the Sages. Since Rabbi Oshaya did not count laws that are disputed, he did not mention the law of a one-handbreadth projection from an oven.

The Gemara raises another difficulty:

But there is also the frame

of the table in the Temple, whose thickness is

one handbreadth,

as it is stated: “You shall make a table of acacia wood, and you shall make for it a frame one handbreadth wide all around” [Exodus 25:23–25].

It answers:

He did not discuss measures that are written

explicitly in the Torah;

he did not discuss them!

The Gemara raises another difficulty:

But there is also the cover

of the Ark, whose thickness is

one handbreadth,

although its measure is not stated explicitly in the Torah?

It answers:

He did not discuss sacred matters!

The Gemara raises another difficulty:

But there is also

the law permitting carrying in an alleyway on Shabbat:

It is sufficient for the crossbeam

placed like a lintel at the entrance of the alleyway

that it be one handbreadth wide!?

It answers:

He did not discuss rabbinic matters!

The entire prohibition against carrying in an alleyway and the requirements concerning its crossbeam are only rabbinic. Rabbi Oshaya dealt

only with matters whose basis is written

in the Torah,

but whose measures are not specified

in the Torah.

Rav Yitzhak bar Shmuel bar Marta was sitting before Rav Kahana, and he was sitting and saying:

Rav Yehuda said in the name of Rav: During all the first three days

after childbirth,

the placenta is presumed to belong

to the woman’s

newborn.

They say that it is the placenta of the newborn who was born and that its delivery was delayed. We do not suspect that the placenta of the fetus before us dissolved, and that the placenta now emerging belongs to another fetus that dissolved and therefore was not seen, because a placenta can remain inside for up to three days.

But if the placenta emerged

from that point onward,

after being delayed for more than three days,

we are concerned that there was another fetus.

The long delay from the birth until the placenta emerged indicates that another fetus was present and dissolved within the placenta now emerging, while the placenta of the earlier fetus dissolved and therefore was not seen.

The practical consequence of this concern for another fetus applies whether the first fetus was male, in which case we are concerned that the second fetus was female, giving the woman fourteen days of impurity, or whether the first fetus was female. Since several days separated the births, there is concern that another female was born in the second placenta, and the woman must count the eighty days from the second birth. The stringency is as follows: If the eighty-first day after the first birth arrived and she saw blood and became a menstruant, and on the eighty-eighth day she saw blood again, then without the concern for an additional birth she would become impure on the eighty-eighth day, which is the first day of the eleven days designated for irregular bleeding, under the law of one who observes one day corresponding to one day, and she would immerse and become pure. But now, since the placenta emerged after three days and there is concern that it is the placenta of another fetus, which may have been an additional female, and she counts eighty days from the emergence of the placenta, the blood seen on the eighty-first day after the first birth is blood seen during the eighty days of purification following the second birth, and she does not become a menstruant. Consequently, the additional blood seen on the eighty-eighth day after the first birth is not irregular bleeding subject to the law of “one day corresponding to one day”; rather, it is bleeding at the “beginning of menstruation,” which requires her to observe seven days of menstruation.

Rav Kahana said to him,

to Rav Yitzhak bar Shmuel:

Did Rav really say this,

that another fetus may be born several days later and that the placenta belongs to the second fetus?

But Rav said: A second fetus

does not

remain after its fellow

the first fetus

at all!

If so, the placenta certainly belongs to the first fetus, and we presume that it belongs to it even after more than three days.

Rav Yitzhak bar Shmuel was silent,

and did not trouble himself to answer him.

He said to him,

Rav Kahana said:

Perhaps here,

where the placenta is presumed to belong to the fetus if it emerged within three days, the reference is

to a nonviable fetus,

because when the first fetus is nonviable, the second may remain inside for several days.

Here,

where it does not remain at all, the reference is

to a viable fetus,

because when the first fetus is born alive, the second does not remain after it at all.

He said to him,

Rav Yitzhak bar Shmuel said:

Are you the one who stated Rav’s teaching?

Are you explaining Rav’s words on your own? Yet

Rav explicitly said this:

If she miscarried a nonviable fetus and afterward discharged a placenta,

during all three days the placenta is presumed to belong to the fetus; from that point onward,

we are concerned that there was another fetus. If she gave birth

to a live

fetus and afterward discharged a placenta,

even from then until ten days later, we are not concerned that there was another fetus!

Shmuel, Rav’s students, and Rav Yehuda were sitting. Rav Yosef, son of Rav Menashya of Divil, passed by and was going

there, a place name,

toward them, coming quickly

Rav Yosef was hurrying to come toward them.

Shmuel said

A man is coming to us, whom we can toss with a straw of wheat

A man is coming to us whom we can throw with a handful of wheat

as one throws a handful of wheat; a man is coming here who can be driven away with a few questions

and he will be driven away

without even knowing how to answer them.

Meanwhile, Rav Yosef arrived,

son of Rav Menashya.

Shmuel said to him: What did Rav say concerning a placenta?

He said to him,

Rav Yosef said:

This is what Rav said:

The placenta is presumed to belong only to a viable fetus,

that is, only if she miscarried a fully formed fetus that could have lived had its months of gestation been completed do we presume that the placenta belongs to it and do not suspect another fetus. But if she miscarried a fetus whose form was defective and which could not live because of its defect, such as one that expelled a sealed body or a creature resembling an animal or bird, we are concerned that the placenta emerging after it, even within three days of the birth, belongs to another fetus that dissolved.

Shmuel questioned all of Rav’s students,

whether Rav Yosef’s words were correct,

and they told him this,

that Rav had indeed said so.

Afterward, Shmuel looked

at

Rav Yehuda with displeasure

and became angry with him because he had heard this from Rav but had not told Shmuel.

Rabbi Yosei ben Shaul asked Rabbi: If a woman miscarried something resembling a raven, followed by a placenta,

after it,

what is the law?

Do we presume that the placenta belongs to the raven-like creature, or are we concerned that the placenta belongs to another fetus?

He said to him,

Rabbi said to him:

The placenta is presumed to belong

to a fetus

only when its species has a placenta.

A raven has no placenta; it lays eggs from which its young hatch. Therefore, the placenta cannot be presumed to belong to it, and we are concerned that another fetus was in the placenta.

Rabbi Yose ben Shaul returned and asked Rabbi: Was there

a placenta attached to it

in the crow—

what is [the law]?

Is even here, when it is proven through the attachment that the placenta is attached to the crow, are we concerned for another fetus?

He said to him

Rabbi:

Something that does not

exist in reality

you ask!

He raised an objection to him: One who miscarries a species of animal, beast, or bird, and a placenta with them—

When the placenta is attached to them—

one is not concerned for another fetus!