Niddah 26a (כו.) — the Talmud in English

In connection with the explanation of our Mishna, the Gemara explains why the term sandal was mentioned in additional contexts:

The “sandal” that we learned !(pamud.bmp "

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with regard to firstborns,

for after the birth of the sandal, the offspring born after it is a firstborn with regard to inheritance, but is not a firstborn with regard to the priest, since the sandal is considered to have opened the womb.

For what halakhic purpose

was it written in the Mishna that the offspring born after the sandal is not a firstborn with regard to the obligation to give five sela to the priest? Since there is another offspring born with it who is not a sandal, the additional offspring opens the womb and exempts it, and it is obvious that the offspring born in the subsequent birth is not a firstborn with regard to the priest?

The Gemara resolves this: The novel ruling applies to that very birth! If the sandal emerged first, the twin offspring emerging with it afterward is not liable for firstborn status, because the sandal is the one that opened the womb. Therefore the Mishna taught the novel ruling

with regard to the one born after it,

which is

a firstborn with regard to inheritance

and receives a double portion of their father’s inheritance, but

is not

a

firstborn with regard to the priest!

The Gemara asks further:

The “sandal” that we learned with regard to offerings brought for childbirth,

for which the woman who gives birth is liable to bring an offering—

for what halakhic purpose?

In any event, she must bring an offering for childbirth because of the additional offspring?

The Gemara answers: The novel ruling is

that if she gives birth

to

the

additional offspring

through the side,

in which case she is exempt from bringing an offering for it, because she did not give birth through the place from which a woman who gives birth becomes ritually impure, and she gives birth to the

sandal

through the

through the womb,

in an ordinary birth,

she must bring an offering

for childbirth

for the sandal,

even though she is exempt from bringing an offering for the birth of the offspring that emerged through the side.

The Gemara asks:

And according to Rabbi Shimon, who says, “An offspring that emerges through the side is a fully viable offspring,”

and she is liable to bring an offering for childbirth even for an offspring that emerged through the side,

what can be said?

Since she is also liable to bring an offering for a birth through the side, the difficulty returns: Even if she is exempt from bringing an offering for the birth of the sandal, she should bring an offering for the fully formed offspring.

The Gemara answers:

Rabbi Yirmeya said: This is referring to a case where she gives birth to an offspring while she is a gentile,

when she does not become impure through childbirth,

and she gives birth to a sandal

after she

after she has converted,

having immersed for conversion during the brief interval between the birth of the offspring and the birth of the sandal .

She must bring an offering for the sandal

alone.

The Sages stated before Rav Pappa—

and were these resolutions indeed possible,

that she immersed in the midst of her childbirth, between the birth of the offspring and the birth of the sandal, and that the sandal exempts its twin born after it from firstborn status?

But it was taught in a beraita: When they emerge,

the sandal and the offspring born with it,

they emerge only intertwined!

If so, how could she immerse between them? And how can it exempt the second offspring emerging with it from firstborn status, when both emerge together?

Rav Pappa said: Infer from this

that the offspring and the sandal are not intertwined along the entire length of their bodies; rather,

the offspring is intertwined with the sandal along half of it,

with the offspring’s head reaching only as far as the sandal’s navel .

And it pushes it toward its head,

as the offspring pushes the sandal outward with its head; from the navel upward, the sandal is not intertwined with the offspring.

This resolves the difficulties:

With regard to firstborns,

where we learned that the sandal exempts the offspring from firstborn status, this refers to a case

where the sandal and the offspring emerged

through their heads,

for the sandal preceded and emerged,

since its upper half, which is not intertwined with the offspring, emerged by itself first. Once the sandal emerged first, only it is considered the firstborn with regard to the obligation to give five sela to the priest, and not the offspring born with it.

With regard to offerings brought for childbirth,

where we learned that the mother is liable to bring an offering for childbirth for the sandal, and we established the case as one involving a female convert who immersed between the birth of the offspring and the birth of the sandal, this refers to a case

where the sandal and the offspring emerged

through their feet,

for the offspring preceded and emerged,

as, when they emerge feet first, the offspring’s feet precede the sandal’s feet; and if she immersed for conversion after most of the offspring had emerged but before the sandal emerged, she is liable to bring an offering only for the sandal.

Rav Huna bar Tachlifa said in the name of Rava: Even if you say

that the sandal and the offspring were

lying tightly alongside one another,

with their entire lengths lying side by side, it is possible to resolve the matter. However,

reverse the traditions,

so that we reverse Rav Pappa’s interpretations of the cases.

With regard to firstborns—

it is discussing a case

where they emerged through their feet,

for only the emergence of most of the body is considered a birth!

The offspring, which possesses vitality, clings,

holding itself back during birth ,

and does not emerge

immediately. But

the sandal, which possesses no vitality, slips,

sliding,

and falls,

and therefore it emerges first, and it is the firstborn.

With regard to offerings brought for childbirth—

it is discussing a case

where they emerged through their heads!

An offspring that possesses vitality: once its head emerges, it is a birth,

as we maintain that “once its head emerges, it is considered born,” and it is not necessary for most of the body to emerge. But

a sandal,

even though its head emerges simultaneously with the offspring’s head, nevertheless, since it possesses no vitality, the emergence of its head is not called a birth; a head without vitality is like the other limbs. Only

once most of it emerges

is it considered born, and therefore she can manage to immerse and convert between the emergence of the offspring’s head and the emergence of most of the sandal . In such a case, she becomes liable to bring an offering because of the sandal, whose birth occurred after her conversion.

Mishna:

A placenta

(the gestational sac containing the offspring) found

in a house—

the house is impure

because of the tent of the corpse.

The Mishna explains:

Not

that the house is impure because

the placenta

itself is considered

an offspring. Rather,

because

there is no

placenta without an offspring,

and there is certainly a dead offspring within it; it is the offspring that renders the house impure.

Rabbi Shimon says:

The house is pure, because

the offspring dissolved before it emerged,

becoming blood, and the offspring’s blood became mixed with the blood of childbirth and was nullified in it by the majority; it therefore does not render the house impure as a corpse.

Gemara:

The Sages taught: A placenta—

at its beginning

(at the beginning of its formation),

resembles a weft thread

(which is thicker than a warp thread),

and at its end,

when it grows and expands,

it resembles

in its width

a lupine! And it is hollow

like a trumpet!

A placenta is never smaller than a handbreadth!

Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel says: A placenta resembles the gizzard of chickens

164 , from which the intestines

(the bowels)

emerge!

It was taught: Rabbi Oshaya, the youngest of his colleagues, said:

Five

things

have a measure of one handbreadth —

and these are they: a placenta, a shofar, the spine, the side wall of a sukka, and hyssop 166 .

a.

A placenta: This is what we said,

that every placenta is the size of a handbreadth; if she miscarried something smaller, it is certainly not a placenta.

b.

A shofar—

as it was taught: What is the measure of a shofar? Rabbi Shimon ben Gamliel explained: Enough that one can hold it in his hand,

with his four fingers,

and see

part of the shofar

on either side 167 ,

and the measure required for this is

a handbreadth.

The Gemara in Menahot (41b) explains that a handbreadth is measured as four thumbbreadths, and since the thumb is wider than the other fingers, a shofar one handbreadth long would not be covered by four other fingers .

c.

The spine—what is it? Rav Parnakh said in the name of Rabbi Yohanan: The spine of a lulav,

without the leaves above it,

must extend

upward

beyond the myrtle—

a handbreadth!

d.

The side wall of a sukka—

as it was taught: Two

of the walls of the sukka must be

according to its law,

seven handbreadths long; but the

third wall—

even

if it is only

one handbreadth

long, the sukka is valid.

e.

Hyssop—

as Rabbi Hiyya taught:

The hyssop with which one sprinkles upon the metzora, and likewise the hyssop required for burning the red heifer , has a measure of

one handbreadth!

Rabbi Hanina bar Pappa said: Sheila, a man of Kefar Tamarata, expounded: Three

things that were stated in a

tannaitic teaching

by the tannaim are the placenta, the shofar, and the wall of a sukka.

And two

things that were stated in an

amoraic statement

by the amoraim are the spine of a lulav and the hyssop;

their measure—

a handbreadth!

And the Gemara raises a difficulty: Is it so that there are

two

amoraic statements? But there is only

one,

the spine of a lulav, since hyssop is a tannaitic teaching, as Rabbi Hiyya taught?!

And it answers:

Abaye said: Say instead: “Rabbi Hiyya said: Hyssop—

a handbreadth.”

And not “Rabbi Hiyya taught,” for it is not a tannaitic teaching that Rabbi Hiyya transmitted in the name of the tannaim; rather, Rabbi Hiyya said it on his own. Therefore, this statement is considered an amoraic statement.

And the Gemara asks:

Is there no more

than the five things whose measure is a handbreadth?

But there is also—

a small tent that is

a handbreadth

in length

by a handbreadth

in width,

by a height of a handbreadth, square,

and inside it is an olive-bulk of a corpse—

it conveys ritual impurity

throughout the entire space of the tent and renders impure everything inside it, even though they do not touch the corpse. Likewise,

it forms a barrier against ritual impurity

if an object is found on top of the tent while the impurity itself is inside the tent: The tent forms a barrier between the impurity and the object, and the object remains ritually pure. However, if the tent were not a handbreadth high, the impurity beneath it would be considered “compressed impurity,” which rises straight up to the heavens and renders impure the object above it. It would not, however, render impure an object lying beside the impurity, even if it were inside the tent.

The Gemara answers:

“A handbreadth”

by itself

is what we said,

namely, that the measure of five things is a handbreadth. But

“a handbreadth by a handbreadth”—

we did not say!

The Gemara continues to ask:

But there is also: a stone projecting from an oven

up to

a handbreadth, and from a stove

up to

three fingerbreadths—

it is

considered joined!

The meaning is as follows: An oven and a stove made of earthenware render impure food that touches them on their outer surface. If the oven or stove has a handle, that handle, being attached to the oven, renders impure as though it were the oven itself. However, if that handle is too large, it is generally removed, and therefore it is not considered part of the oven and does not render impure anything that touches it. The measure of a handle required for the utensil differs between an oven and a stove. An oven is large and has room for placing two pots on it, and therefore requires a handle one handbreadth long. But a stove is small and has room for only one pot; a handle three fingerbreadths long is sufficient, and if it is longer, it is cut down.

The Gemara answers:

When we said

that there are five things whose measure is a handbreadth, we meant

where, if it is less than a handbreadth, it is not fit,

as a handbreadth is the smallest possible measure.

But here, all the more so that

a stone that is

less than a handbreadth is a “handle of an oven,”

for here a handbreadth is the greatest measure at which it is considered a handle; and all the more so, a stone smaller than a handbreadth will not be cut down, but will serve in its entirety as the handle of the utensil.