Niddah 23a — the Talmud in English

And we derive an exposition that is open on both sides!

And the Gemara explains the answer

: And for this reason the Merciful One made “beheima” open on both sides, so that it would not be derived from

fish, which is

open on one side.

Rather, we compare beheima to man, and only a woman who miscarries the form of an impure animal has the status of one who gives birth

. Rav Aḥa son of Rava transmitted it in the name of Rabbi Elazar

as referring to the dispute between Rabbi Ishmael and the Sages

leniently

[that even when it is not open at all, one derives from it].

And the Gemara brings Rav Aḥa’s version:

a.

Any gezera shava that is not open at all—

one derives and refutes.

For it is not necessary that the verse be superfluous in order to expound it by means of a gezera shava

. b.

When it is open on one side: according to Rabbi Ishmael—

one derives and does not refute; according to the Sages—

one derives and refutes.

c.

When it is open on two sides: according to everyone—

one derives and does not refute!

And the Gemara asks

: And according to the Sages—

what difference is there between one that is open on one side and one that is not open at all,

and since according to them in both cases “one derives and refutes,” for what purpose did the Torah make a verse superfluous, and what benefit is there in the gezera shava being open on one side

?

And it answers: The practical difference arises where one finds

a verse to expound by means of a gezera shava that is

open on one side, and

there is an alternative possibility of expounding it in a manner

that is not open at all. And it is not that this one

which is open on one side

has a refutation, and it is not that this one

which is not open at all

has a refutation,

and since neither of them has a refutation, one may establish the gezera shava in both. In that case,

we abandon

the gezera shava

that is not open at all, and derive from the one open on one side!

And for this purpose the Torah made the verse superfluous: to teach us that we should expound the gezera shava from it, and not from the verse that is not open at all.

And the Gemara returns and explains the answer stated above [22b]: that according to the Sages one derives a gezera shava from ḥayya, which is open on two sides and cannot be refuted, and we do not derive a gezera shava from fish, which is open only on one side, since it can be refuted.

And the Gemara asks

: And here,

with regard to the gezera shava from fish and beheima to man, which teaches that a woman who miscarries the form of an impure animal or fish has the status of one who gives birth to the form of a man,

what refutation

of the gezera shava

is there?

And it resolves:

Because there is room to refute—

What is so about man? He imparts impurity during life,

for example, if he touched a corpse or a creeping creature; and since the Torah multiplied his impurity, therefore the woman who gives birth to him also becomes impure, whereas this is not so with living creatures, which do not impart impurity during life, but only after their death, when they become carrion , and therefore the woman who gives birth to them is not impure because of childbirth ?!

And the Gemara adds to the words of Rav Judah in the name of Samuel, stated above:

And likewise Rabbi Ḥiyya bar Abba said in the name of Rabbi Yoḥanan: This is the reason of Rabbi Meir,

who renders a woman who miscarries a species of animal, wild animal, or bird impure—

since “forming” was stated with regard to them, as with man.

Rabbi Ami said to him

to Rabbi Ḥiyya bar Abba:

But if that is so,

that because “forming” was stated with regard to an animal we compare it to man and render also

a woman who miscarries the form of a mountain

shall

have her mother impure with the impurity of childbirth

because

it is stated, “For behold, He forms mountains and creates wind,”

and let us compare its forming, which was stated with regard to mountains, to man

?! He said to him,

Rabbi Ḥiyya bar Abba to Rabbi Ami:

A mountain—

is she really miscarrying it?

For the piece that she miscarried is not as large as a mountain, but rather a form of

a stone is what she is miscarrying!

For at most she miscarries a mass of flesh the size of a stone, and since

that

piece is small,

it is called a “mass,” and not a “mountain”!

And Rabbi Ami continued to question Rabbi Ḥiyya bar Abba:

But if that is so, a woman who miscarries wind,

whose limbs have not yet taken shape,

shall her mother be impure with the impurity of childbirth, since “creation” was stated concerning it,

with regard to wind,

as with man. For it is written, “and creates wind”?!

And if you would say—

no,

this gezera shava

is open!

[and it can be refuted, since wind does not receive impurity as man does], because it is needed for its own meaning. This is not so, for

since it could have written, “He forms mountains and wind,” and it is written, “and creates wind,”

infer from it,

from the superfluous word “creates,”

to make it open

and derive from it by means of a gezera shava even when there is a refutation based on reasoning?!

He said to him,

Rabbi Ḥiyya:

One derives

by means of a gezera shava

words of Torah from words of Torah, but one does not derive words of Torah from words of tradition,

and since the verse “He forms mountains and creates wind” is stated in the Prophets, which are words of tradition, it is impossible to derive a gezera shava from it

. And the Gemara brings another explanation of the reason of Rabbi Meir, who rendered impure a woman who miscarried the form of an animal and rendered pure a woman who miscarried the form of fish:

Rabba bar bar Ḥana said in the name of Rabbi Yoḥanan: This is the reason of Rabbi Meir

who renders impure a woman who miscarries a species of animal, wild animal, or bird—

since their eyes

of the wild animal and animal

resemble those of man,

for the black pupil in their eyes is round, as in the human eye, whereas the black part in a fish’s eye is not round.

And the Gemara objects:

But if that is so,

that what determines the law of the impurity of a woman who gives birth is the form of the pupil, then also

a woman who miscarries the form of a snake—shall its mother be impure with the impurity of childbirth, since the eyeball

of the snake

is round like that of man?

And if you would say, so too,

that a woman who gives birth to the form of a snake is also rendered impure, it is difficult, for if so,

let it teach

only

snake

in our Mishna , and we would know that everything whose eyeball is like that of man—that is, an animal, a wild animal, and a snake—renders the woman impure through childbirth?

And it answers:

If it taught

in the Mishna

snake, I would have said

specifically

with regard to snake the Sages disagree with Rabbi Meir,

that the Sages too agree that one derives a gezera shava from man to animal and wild animal, and only with regard to a woman who miscarries the form of a snake,

with regard to which “forming” is not written,

do the Sages render her pure, for they do not hold that it is sufficient that the eyeball resemble that of man.

But with regard to animal and wild animal, the Sages do not disagree

and they too render the woman impure with the impurity of childbirth, since

“forming” is written concerning them

and they are derived by a gezera shava from man. Therefore, snake was not written separately in the Mishna, but is included in the category of wild animal and animal

. And the Gemara raises a difficulty: How do we say that the resemblance between man and animal and wild animal is in the eyeball, that in all of them the black part of the eye is round

? But concerning blemishes

of an animal,

it teaches it,

for we learned that one of the blemishes that disqualify an animal firstborn is

“one whose eyeball is round like that of man,”

which shows that it is a blemish in an animal for its eyeball to be round, whereas ordinary animals do not have eyeballs resembling those of man?!

And it answers:

It is not difficult! This—

with regard to the black part,

the black part of the animal’s eye resembles the human eye, for in both it is round

This—

.

This— with regard to the socket,

which is the setting of the eye; and it does not resemble it, for in man it is round, whereas in an animal it is not round. Therefore, if the socket of the eye of an animal firstborn is round like that of man, it is blemished

. And the Gemara brings a third explanation according to Rabbi Meir:

Rabbi Yannai said: This is the reason of Rabbi Meir: Since their eyes

of the wild animal and bird

go before them,

as they are at the front of the face,

as those of man,

whereas fish have their eyes at their sides, and likewise the snake’s eyes are at its side.

And the Gemara raises a difficulty:

But a bird, whose eyes do not go before it, and Rabbi Meir says that it is impure

[that a woman who miscarries it is impure with the impurity of childbirth]?

And it answers:

Abaye said:

What Rabbi Meir rendered impure in the case of a woman who gives birth to a bird was specifically

with regard to the karya

[owl]

and the kipofa

[a screech owl], which are species of birds whose eyes are before them,

but not with regard to the other birds,

for Rabbi Meir does not render the woman impure because they do not resemble man.

An objection is raised:

It was taught in a beraita:

Rabbi Ḥanina ben Antigonus says

that it is reasonable to decide the dispute between Rabbi Meir and the Sages partly according to Rabbi Meir and partly according to the Sages:

the words of Rabbi Meir appear

who renders impure

with regard to animal and wild animal.

But with regard to birds it is not reasonable to render impure according to Rabbi Meir, but rather according to

the words of the Sages,

who render them pure—

with regard to birds!

And the Gemara specifies:

What

are the birds concerning which Rabbi Hanina said that the words of the Sages appear [correct] in

“birds”?

If we say that even

the karia and the kipofa,

whose eyes are in front, it is reasonable to deem [the woman who gives birth to them] pure, it is difficult:

what is different about an animal and a wild animal

that they render [the woman who gives birth to them] impure because

their eyes are directed in front of them like those of a human,

whereas

the karia and the kipofa also

have their eyes directed in front of them like those of a human. And why should the woman who gives birth to them not become impure?!

Rather, it is obvious,

that Rabbi Hanina’s ruling in accordance with the Sages applies specifically

to the other birds,

whose eyes are not in front of them; but regarding the karia and the kipofa, he agrees with Rabbi Meir.

And if so, since Rabbi Hanina deemed [the woman who gives birth to] the other birds pure only because he ruled in accordance with the Sages,

by inference, Rabbi Meir disagrees

also

regarding the other birds,

and renders impure also the woman who gives birth to them; and this is difficult for Abaye, who said that Rabbi Meir renders impure only [in the case of] the karia and the kipofa?!

And the Gemara answers:

The baraita is incomplete

in the baraita ,

and this is what it teaches: Rabbi Hanina ben Antigonus says: The words of Rabbi Meir appear [correct]

who deems [the woman who gives birth to them] impure—

in the case of an animal and a wild animal, and the same law applies to the karia and the kipofa

and because the eyes of these birds are directed in front of them, like those of a human.

And the words of the Sages

who deem [her] pure—

in the case of the other birds.

And the fact that the other birds are pure is not because the halakha regarding them is in accordance with the Sages, but rather

because Rabbi Meir too disagreed with them only regarding the karia and the kipofa, but regarding the other birds he agrees with them.

And according to this version of the baraita, Rabbi Hanina ruled entirely in accordance with Rabbi Meir, and in accordance with Abaye’s view that Rabbi Meir too deems [the woman who gives birth to] the other birds pure.

And the Gemara brings a proof for Abaye’s words:

and it was taught in a baraita: Rabbi Elazar the son of Rabbi Tzadok said: In the case of a woman who gives birth to a species of animal or wild animal, according to Rabbi Meir—

it is a [valid] offspring, and according to the Sages—

it is not a [valid] offspring. And regarding birds

not all birds are equal, and therefore

it must be examined

the mass, to see the form of which bird it contains.

And the Gemara asks:

According to whom is [the ruling] “it must be examined”—

which of the Tannaim requires the birds to be examined?

What,

is it not according to Rabbi Meir, who says: [in the case of] the karia and the kipofa—

yes; [in the case of] the other birds—

no!

And therefore they need to examine whether this bird that she expelled has its eyes in front of it, in which case she is impure, or its eyes at its sides, in which case she is pure. For according to the Sages, all types of birds are equally subject to purity, and there is nothing to examine in them. And from the fact that they required examination, Abaye’s words are proven: Rabbi Meir did not render [the woman who gives birth] impure in the case of all birds, but only in the case of the karia and the kipofa, which resemble a human in that their eyes are directed in front of them.

And the Gemara rejects this:

Rav Aḥa, son of Rav Ika, said—

no,

not as you said, that “it must be examined” regarding birds is according to Rabbi Meir. Rather,

“it must be examined”

regarding birds—

is according to the Sages!

And Rav Aḥa son of Rav Ika teaches that although the Sages deem all wild animals and animals, and most birds, pure, nevertheless there are species of birds that they render impure. Therefore the Sages said that regarding birds it must be examined, and because

they say

the Sages:

the karia and the kipofa—

no [

do they render [the woman who gives birth to them] impure],

the other birds—

no!

And the Gemara explains:

And what is different about the karia and the kipofa

that the Sages render the woman who gives birth to them impure

from an animal and a wild animal

and the other birds?—

Since they have,

the karia and the kipofa,

jaws [

upright cheeks]

like a human,

which is not so with the other living creatures!

Rabbi Yirmeya asked Rabbi Zeira

in jest [he attempted to bring Rabbi Zeira to laughter]:

According to Rabbi Meir, who says, “an animal in the womb of a woman

is a fully valid offspring,”

and this animal form has the status of a human, for which reason a woman who gives birth to a form of an animal becomes impure through childbirth, and the form determines only that whatever is born from a human is a human. If it happened that

her father accepted for her,

for the animal offspring,

betrothal,

meaning that he betrothed this animal, after it was born, to a man, as is the law regarding a father who is entitled to betroth his daughter—

what is [the law]?

And

what practical difference is there

regarding this betrothal—

to prohibit her sister,

by the law of the sister of one’s wife?!

And the Gemara wonders:

Does this mean that it lives

such an offspring, which is a species of animal born from a woman? For if it does not live, it does not prohibit [its sister] on account of a wife’s sister, since his wife’s sister is permitted to him after his wife’s death, and her sister is prohibited only during his wife’s lifetime?!

But Rav Yehuda said that Rav said: Rabbi Meir stated

that a woman who gives birth to a species of animal becomes impure through childbirth

only since its species is viable

and it is sufficient that the species as such can live, so that even those that do not live cause impurity to the woman who gives birth to them. And from the fact that Rav had to explain that she becomes impure because “its species is viable,” it follows that only a complete animal in the womb of its mother is viable, but an animal fetus in the womb of a woman does not live. And since it does not live, it does not prohibit its sister .

Rav Aḥa bar Yaakov said: Rabbi Yirmeya brought Rabbi Zeira this far [

Rabbi Yirmeya attempted to bring Rabbi Zeira]

to laughter

76, and he did not laugh!

For Rabbi Zeira was stringent not to laugh, because it is forbidden for a person to fill his mouth with laughter. And even with regard to such laughter, which is not included in the prohibition, Rabbi Zeira was stringent not to laugh, lest he come to prohibited laughter.

The body of the matter: Rav Yehuda said that Rav said: Rabbi Meir stated

that a woman who gives birth to the form of an animal becomes impure through childbirth

only since its species is viable!

For Rabbi Meir derived this law through a gzera shava, “formation” and “formation,” from a human; therefore, just as in the case of a human, if it is not viable it does not render [the woman who gives birth] impure through childbirth, so too in the case of an animal, she becomes impure only if its species is viable.