Niddah 23a (כג.) — the Talmud in English

And we derive it from a verse that is superfluous on both sides!

The Gemara explains the answer:

And for this reason the Torah made the verse concerning an animal superfluous on both sides, so that it would not be derived from

fish, which is

superfluous on only one side.

Rather, we juxtapose an animal to a human being, and only a woman who expels the form of an impure animal has the status of one who gives birth.

Rav Aḥa, son of Rava, taught it in the name of Rabbi Elazar

with regard to the dispute between Rabbi Yishmael and the Rabbis

leniently

(that even when it is not superfluous at all, one derives from it).

The Gemara cites Rav Aḥa’s version:

a.

Any gezeira shava that is not superfluous at all—

one derives from it but may refute it.

There is no requirement that the verse be superfluous in order to expound it by means of a gezeira shava.

b.

When it is superfluous on one side: according to Rabbi Yishmael—

one derives from it but may not refute it; according to the Rabbis—

one derives from it but may refute it.

c.

When it is superfluous on both sides: according to everyone—

one derives from it but may not refute it!

The Gemara asks:

And according to the Rabbis—

what difference is there between one that is superfluous on one side and one that is not superfluous at all,

since according to them, in both cases “one derives from it but may refute it”? For what purpose did the Torah make a verse superfluous, and what benefit is there in the gezeira shava being superfluous on one side?

It answers:

The practical difference applies where one finds

a verse suitable for expounding by means of a gezeira shava that is

superfluous on one side, and

there is also an option to expound it in another way

that is not superfluous at all. And it is not the case that this one

which is superfluous on one side

has a refutation, while that one

which is not superfluous at all

has a refutation;

and since neither of them has a refutation, the gezeira shava could be established through either of them. In that case,

we abandon

the gezeira shava

that is not superfluous at all, and derive it from the one that is superfluous on one side!

For this purpose the Torah made the verse superfluous: to teach us that we should derive the gezeira shava from that verse, and not from the verse that is not superfluous at all.

The Gemara returns to explain the answer stated above (22b): According to the Rabbis, one derives the gezeira shava from an animal, where the verse is superfluous on both sides and cannot be refuted, but one does not derive the gezeira shava from fish, where it is superfluous only on one side, since it can be refuted.

The Gemara asks:

And here,

with regard to the gezeira shava from fish and an animal to a human being, which teaches that a woman who expels the form of an impure animal or fish has the status of one who gives birth to the form of a human being,

what refutation

of the gezeira shava

is there?

It answers:

Because it is possible to refute it:

What is so special about a human being? It conveys impurity during its lifetime,

for example, if it touches a corpse or a creeping creature. Since the Torah increased the impurity associated with it, the woman who gives birth to it likewise becomes impure. This is not so with regard to living creatures, which do not convey impurity during their lifetime, but only after their death, when they become an animal carcass. Therefore, the woman who gives birth to them is not impure on account of childbirth?!

The Gemara adds to the statement of Rav Yehuda in the name of Shmuel cited above:

And likewise Rabbi Ḥiyya bar Abba said in the name of Rabbi Yoḥanan: This is the reason for Rabbi Meir,

who deems a woman who expels a species resembling an animal, wild animal, or bird impure:

Since the term “forming” is stated with regard to them, as it is with regard to a human being.

Rabbi Ami

said to Rabbi Ḥiyya bar Abba:

If that is so,

since because the term “forming” is stated with regard to an animal, we juxtapose it to a human being and also render impure

a woman who expels the form of a mountain—

shall

its mother be impure with the impurity of childbirth

because

it is stated, “For behold, He forms mountains and creates wind,”

so let us juxtapose the “forming” stated with regard to mountains to that of a human being?!

He said to him,

Rabbi Ḥiyya bar Abba to Rabbi Ami:

A mountain—

is it what she expels?

For the piece that she expels is not as large as a mountain; rather, it is the form of

a stone that she expels!

At most, she expels a mass of flesh the size of a stone, and since

that

piece is small,

it is called a “mass,” not a “mountain”!

Rabbi Ami continued to question Rabbi Ḥiyya bar Abba:

If that is so, a woman who expels wind,

whose limbs have not yet taken shape,

shall its mother be impure with the impurity of childbirth, since the term

“creation” is stated with regard to wind,

as it is with regard to a human being, as it is written, ‘and creates wind’?!

And if you would say—

no,

this gezeira shava is

not superfluous

(and it may be refuted, since wind does not contract impurity like a human being), as the word is needed for the verse itself: This is not so, for

since it could have written, “Who forms mountains and wind,” but it writes, “and creates wind,”

infer from it

that the extra word “creates” is

to make it superfluous,

and we derive from it by means of a gezeira shava even when there is a logical refutation?!

He said to him,

Rabbi Ḥiyya:

One derives

by means of a gezeira shava

matters of Torah from matters of Torah, but one does not derive matters of Torah from matters of tradition;

and since the verse “Who forms mountains and creates wind” is stated in the Prophets, which are matters of tradition, it is impossible to derive a gezeira shava from it.

The Gemara offers another explanation of the reason for Rabbi Meir’s ruling, that a woman who expels the form of an animal is impure, while one who expels the form of a fish is pure:

Rabba bar bar Ḥana said in the name of Rabbi Yoḥanan: This is the reason for Rabbi Meir,

who deems a woman who expels a species resembling an animal, wild animal, or bird impure:

Since their eyes

—those of the wild animal and the domesticated animal—

resemble those of a human being,

for the black pupil of their eyes is round, as is that of a human eye, whereas the black part of a fish’s eye is not round.

The Gemara raises a difficulty:

If that is so,

since the determining factor for the impurity of a woman who gives birth is the form of the pupil, then also

a woman who expels the form of a snake should have the impurity of childbirth, since its eyeball

—that of the snake—

is round like that of a human being?

And if you would say, so too,

that a woman who gives birth to the form of a snake also becomes impure, the difficulty is that if so,

let the Mishna state

only

“snake”

in our Mishna. Then we would know that anything whose eyeball resembles that of a human being—that is, an animal, a wild animal, and a snake—renders her impure through childbirth.

It answers:

If it had stated

in the Mishna

“snake,” I would have thought

specifically

with regard to a snake that the Rabbis disagree with Rabbi Meir,

while the Rabbis also agree that one derives a gezeira shava from a human being to an animal and a wild animal, and it is only with regard to a woman who expels the form of a snake

with regard to which “forming” was not written

that the Rabbis deem her pure, since they do not hold that the resemblance of the eyeball to that of a human being is sufficient.

But with regard to an animal and a wild animal, the Rabbis do not disagree,

and they too deem a woman impure with the impurity of childbirth, since

“forming” is written with regard to them

and they are learned through a gezeira shava from a human being. Therefore, “snake” was not stated separately in the Mishna; rather, it is included within the category of animal and wild animal.

The Gemara raises a difficulty: How can we say that the similarity between a human being and an animal or wild animal is in the eyeball, namely, that in all of them the black part of the eye is round?

But with regard to blemishes

of an animal,

it is taught,

as we learned that one of the blemishes that disqualify the firstborn animal is

“one whose eyeball is round like that of a human being.”

It follows that it is a blemish in an animal for its eyeball to be round, whereas ordinary animals do not have eyeballs resembling those of a human being?!

It answers:

This is not difficult. This—

with regard to the black part of the eye,

the black part of the animal’s eye resembles that of a human being, as both are round.

This—

.

with regard to the socket,

which is the setting of the eye and does not resemble that of a human being: In a human being it is round, whereas in an animal it is not round. Therefore, if the eye socket of a firstborn is round like that of a human being, it is considered blemished.

The Gemara presents a third explanation of Rabbi Meir’s view:

Rabbi Yannai said: This is the reason for Rabbi Meir: Since their eyes

of the wild animal and bird

are directed forward

—they are situated at the front of the face—

as are those of a human being,

whereas the eyes of fish are on their sides, and a snake’s eyes are likewise on its sides.

The Gemara raises a difficulty:

But a bird does not have its eyes directed forward, and Rabbi Meir says that it is impure

(that a woman who expels it is impure with the impurity of childbirth)?

It answers:

Abaye said:

Rabbi Meir deemed a woman who gives birth to a bird impure only

in the case of a karia

(a small owl)

and a kipofa

(an owl), which are types of birds whose eyes are directed forward;

but not in the case of other birds,

for Rabbi Meir deems them impure because they do not resemble a human being.

The objection is raised:

It was taught in a beraita:

Rabbi Ḥanina ben Antigonus says

that it is reasonable to rule in the dispute between Rabbi Meir and the Rabbis partly in accordance with Rabbi Meir and partly in accordance with the Rabbis:

The words of Rabbi Meir appear

who deems impure

in the case of an animal and a wild animal.

But with regard to birds, it is not reasonable to deem them impure in accordance with Rabbi Meir; rather, in accordance with

the words of the Rabbis,

who deem them pure,

in the case of birds!

And the Gemara specifies:

What

are the birds concerning which Rabbi Ḥanina said that the words of the Sages appear more plausible in

“birds”?

If we say that even

the keriya and kipofa

whose eyes are directed forward, it is reasonable to deem pure, this is difficult:

What is different about a domesticated animal and a wild animal

which are rendered impure because

their eyes are directed forward, like those of a human being,

when

the keriya and kipofa as well

have eyes directed forward like those of a human being? And why should a woman who gives birth to them not be rendered impure?!

Rather, it is obvious that Rabbi Ḥanina’s ruling in accordance with the Sages applies specifically

to

other birds,

whose eyes are not directed forward; but concerning the keriya and kipofa, he agrees with Rabbi Meir.

And if so, since Rabbi Ḥanina deemed the other birds pure only because he ruled concerning them in accordance with the Sages,

by inference, Rabbi Meir disagrees

also

with regard to other birds

and renders a woman who gives birth to them impure as well. And this is difficult for Abaye, who said that Rabbi Meir renders a woman impure only in the case of the keriya and kipofa?!

And the Gemara answers:

The baraita is incomplete ,

and this is what it teaches:

Rabbi Ḥanina ben Antigonus says: The words of Rabbi Meir, who renders her impure, appear plausible

—with regard to

a domesticated animal and a wild animal; and the same is true of the keriya and kipofa,

because the eyes of these birds are directed forward, like those of a human being.

And the words of the Sages

who deem her pure

apply to other birds.

And the reason that other birds are pure is not that the halakha concerning them follows the Sages, but rather

that even Rabbi Meir disagreed with them only concerning the keriya and kipofa, but concerning other birds he agrees with them.

According to this version of the baraita, Rabbi Ḥanina ruled entirely in accordance with Rabbi Meir, and in accordance with Abaye’s position that Rabbi Meir also deems other birds pure.

And the Gemara cites a proof for Abaye’s statement:

And it was taught in a baraita: Rabbi Elazar, son of Rabbi Tzadok, said: In the case of a woman who gives birth to a species of domesticated animal or wild animal, according to Rabbi Meir

it is an offspring, but according to the Sages

it is not an offspring. And with regard to birds,

not all birds are the same, and therefore

it must be examined

to determine the form of which bird is represented in the piece.

And the Gemara asks:

According to whom is it to be examined?

Which of the tanna’im requires an examination of the birds?

What,

is it not according to Rabbi Meir, who said: The keriya and kipofa

are not, but other birds

are?

And therefore one must examine whether the bird that she miscarried had its eyes directed forward, in which case she is impure, or whether its eyes were directed to the sides, in which case she is pure. For according to the Sages, all species of birds are equally pure, and there is nothing to examine in their case. And from the fact that an examination is required, it is proven in accordance with Abaye’s statement: Rabbi Meir did not render a woman impure in the case of all birds, but only in the case of the keriya and kipofa, which resemble a human being in that their eyes are directed forward.

And the Gemara rejects this:

Rav Aḥa, son of Rav Ika, said:

No,

not as you said, that the requirement “it must be examined” concerning birds follows the opinion of Rabbi Meir. Rather,

“it must be examined”

in the case of birds

is according to the Sages!

And Rav Aḥa bar Ika teaches that although the Sages deem all domesticated animals, wild animals, and most birds pure, there are nevertheless species of birds that they render impure. Therefore, the Sages said that in the case of birds it must be examined, because

they say:

the Sages say:

The keriya and kipofa

are not

[rendered impure],

but other birds

are!

The Gemara explains:

And what is different about the keriya and kipofa

that the Sages render a woman who gives birth to them impure,

from a domesticated animal and a wild animal

and other birds?

Since they have

the keriya and kipofa,

jaws

with upright cheeks,

like a human being,

which is not the case with other living creatures!

Rabbi Yirmeya asked Rabbi Zeira

in jest [he attempted to cause Rabbi Zeira to laugh]:

According to Rabbi Meir, who says, “A domesticated animal in the womb of a woman

is a full-fledged offspring,”

and this animal form has the status of a human being, so that a woman who gives birth to a form resembling a domesticated animal is impure with the impurity of childbirth, and the form is determined only by the fact that anything born of a human being is a human being—if it happened that

her father accepted

the animal offspring’s

betrothal

by betrothing this animal after it was born to a man, as a father is entitled to betroth his daughter—

what is the halakha?

And

what practical difference is there

concerning this betrothal?

That she should become forbidden to her sister,

as the sister of one’s wife?!

And the Gemara expresses astonishment:

Does this imply that it lives,

such a fetus, which is a species of domesticated animal born to a woman? For if it does not live, it cannot render its sister forbidden as a wife’s sister, since a wife’s sister becomes permitted to him after his wife’s death, and her sister is forbidden only during his wife’s lifetime?!

But Rav Yehuda said that Rav said: Rabbi Meir stated

that a woman who gives birth to a species of domesticated animal is impure with the impurity of childbirth

only since its species is viable,

and it is sufficient that the species as a whole is capable of living for even those individual creatures that do not live to render their mothers impure. And from the fact that Rav had to explain that she is impure because “its species is viable,” it follows that only a fully formed animal in the womb of its mother is viable, whereas an animal fetus in the womb of a woman does not live. And since it does not live, it cannot render its sister forbidden .

Rav Aḥa bar Ya’akov said: Rabbi Yirmeya brought Rabbi Zeira only this far

[Rabbi Yirmeya attempted to bring Rabbi Zeira]

to laughter

76, but he did not laugh!

For Rabbi Zeira was stringent and did not laugh, because it is forbidden for a person to fill his mouth with laughter. And even with regard to such laughter, which is not included in the prohibition, Rabbi Zeira was stringent not to laugh, lest he come to engage in the prohibited form of laughter .

The essential matter: Rav Yehuda said that Rav said: Rabbi Meir stated

that a woman who gives birth to the form of a domesticated animal is impure with the impurity of childbirth

only since its species is viable!

For Rabbi Meir learned this law by means of a gezerah shavah, “forming”–“forming,” from the case of a human being. Therefore, just as in the case of a human being, if it is not viable it does not render the woman impure with the impurity of childbirth, so too in the case of an animal, she is impure only if its species is viable.