Niddah 22b — the Talmud in English

And the Gemara raises an objection:

If so:

a piece that was dry from the outset should render impure—

without its having dissolved

afterward in water,

also

they should have needed to render impure, so why did the Mishna make their impurity conditional only upon their subsequently dissolving in water?

And it answers:

Rabba said: When they did not dissolve

afterward in water—

it is an entity in its own right

and not blood , and therefore they do not render impure. But dry blood, which afterward dissolves in water, is blood, and it is not necessary that it flow from her body.

And the Gemara discusses the cases mentioned in the Mishna:

Is there such a case

in which a woman expels something resembling hairs and something resembling peels?

And the Gemara answers:

Yes!

We find that cases such as these were mentioned:

And it was taught in a beraita: Rabbi Eleazar bar Rabbi Tzadok said: My father brought two incidents from Mativin

[the name of a place]

to Yavneh,

and asked the Sages about them:

a.

An incident involving a woman who was expelling something resembling red peels, and they came and asked my father, and my father asked the Sages

in Yavneh,

and the Sages

in Yavneh

asked physicians, and they said to them

the physicians:

This woman has a wound inside her intestines

46 , from which

she

expels something resembling peels,

and therefore—

let her place

the peels

in water; if they dissolved

in the water, then she is

impure!

b.

And again: An incident involving a woman who was expelling something resembling red hairs, and she came and asked my father, and my father asked the Sages, and the Sages asked physicians, and they said to them—

She has a growth inside her intestines, from which she expels something resembling red hairs.

And therefore,

let her place

them

in water; if they dissolved

in water—

she is impure!

And the Gemara explains how one examines in water:

Reish Lakish said—

And in lukewarm water!

For specifically when she placed it in lukewarm water and the piece did not dissolve, it is proven that it is not congealed blood; but if she placed it in cold water and it did not dissolve, this is no proof of purity.

It was also taught so: Let her place it in water—

and in lukewarm water!

Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel says: She crushes it in

so that she places it in

saliva,

and places the piece and the saliva

on the fingernail

and crushes them with the fingernail of her other hand!

And the Gemara asks:

What is the difference between them?

And what is the difference between the words of the first tanna and Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel?

And it answers:

Ravina said: Crushing by force,

when she crushes it by the pressure of the fingernail,

is the difference between them.

For according to the first tanna, it is sufficient that it did not dissolve on its own to prove that it is not menstrual blood, and even though after she pressed it, it dissolved, it is pure. But according to Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel, only if it remains whole after the force of crushing is it proven that it is not menstrual blood.

The Gemara further clarifies what the duration of soaking in lukewarm water is:

There [A0130][below, 54b, with regard to a creeping creature and an animal carcass that dried, which do not render impure when they are dry, unless they are again soaked in water until the moisture they had before drying returns to them]

[below, 54b, concerning a creeping creature and an animal carcass that dried, which do not cause impurity when dry unless they are soaked in water until they regain the moisture they had before drying,]

we learned: How much is the

time of

their soaking in lukewarm water,

so that if their moisture returns they are impure?—

Twenty-four hours!

But if a longer soaking is required, they are pure even if their moisture returns to them.

But

here,

with dry blood—

what?

Do I require twenty-four hours

as with the soaking of a creeping creature and an animal carcass, and a shorter soaking is insufficient to prove that the piece is not made of blood?

Or not?

And the sides of the uncertainty are:

Perhaps specifically

a creeping creature and an animal carcass, which are hardened

[which become hard when dry]

we require twenty-four hours

in order to soften them until they return to their previous moist state,

but blood, which is soft, does not

require this: it is soft even while dry, and even with a shorter soaking it dissolves; and if it remains whole, it is not blood.

Or perhaps, it makes no difference

whether blood or a creeping creature and an animal carcass: the measure of twenty-four hours is the measure established by the Sages concerning transforming something dry into something moist; it makes no difference whether it is hard or soft?

The conclusion of the Gemara is:

Let it stand.

We learned in the Mishna:

One who expels something resembling fish,

and there is no other blood with it—is pure.

And the Gemara asks:

And let Rabbi Judah also disagree

who holds in the first clause of the Mishna that one who expels a piece is impure even when there is no blood with it.

Here,

that even one who expels something resembling fish should be rendered impure by Rabbi Judah. For the reason that he rendered one who expels a piece impure is as explained above [21a]: he held that it is impossible for the womb to open without blood exiting. Although she did not see the blood, it certainly existed. If so, also in the case of one who expels fish, certainly when the womb opened for their exit, blood exited!

And it answers:

Reish Lakish said—

Indeed, our Mishna is not agreed upon by everyone; rather, it is

taught as a dispute,

and

it is the Sages,

whereas Rabbi Judah disagrees with them and renders one who expels fish impure, because it is impossible for the womb to open without blood exiting.

And Rabbi Yohanan said—

You may even say

that our Mishna is

Rabbi Judah’s.

For

Rabbi Judah said only there

that one who expels a piece is impure,

but with regard to a piece,

and its impurity is not because of the blood that exited with it when the womb opened, but rather

blood can congeal and become a piece,

and therefore Rabbi Judah renders her impure because the piece itself is made of congealed blood, and blood renders impure even when it has congealed.

But

the form of an

entity is not

made from blood, for blood does not, through congealing, take the form of fish or locusts; and the form of the piece proves that it is made of flesh. Therefore, one who expels something resembling locusts does not render impure even according to Rabbi Judah.

And the Gemara asks:

And according to that version

above [21a]

in which Rabbi Yohanan said

that

they disagree concerning “it is impossible for the womb to open without blood,”

the Sages and Rabbi Judah—and this version in the name of Rabbi Yohanan disagrees with what is brought in our sugya in the name of Rabbi Yohanan, and holds according to the first explanation that Rabbi Judah renders her impure because of the blood that exits with the piece—if so,

let Rabbi Judah also disagree here

concerning one who expels something resembling fish, since once the womb opened, she is impure?

And it answers:

The one who teaches

above

that version

according to which Rabbi Yohanan said that Rabbi Judah rendered her impure because of blood that exited when the womb opened,

teaches thus

in our sugya:

Rabbi Yohanan and Reish Lakish both say

that they both hold that our Mishna

is taught as a dispute, and it is the Sages

alone

whose view it is,

and not only Reish Lakish holds that Rabbi Judah disagrees with the Mishna; Rabbi Yohanan too holds so. And those who say in the name of Rabbi Yohanan that the Mishna is accepted by everyone do not hold what is brought above [21a] in the name of Rabbi Yohanan.

We learned in the Mishna:

One who expels something resembling an animal

—if male, she shall sit for a male, and if female, she shall sit for a female; these are the words of Rabbi Meir.

Rav Judah said in the name of Shmuel: What is the reason of Rabbi Meir?

For she did not expel the form of a human being, but the form of an animal; and from where do we know that even through the birth of the form of an animal she is considered a woman who has given birth?

And Shmuel answers:

Since concerning them

the animals

“formation” was stated, as concerning man [A0221][“And the Lord God formed from the earth every beast of the field and every bird,” while concerning man it is stated, “And He formed the man”], and we derive it through a gezerah shavah.

—“And the Lord God formed from the earth every animal of the field and every bird,” while concerning man it is stated, “And He formed the man”—and we derive this by means of a gzera shava.

And the Gemara raises an objection:

But from now on, one who expels the form of a serpent [A0224][a large fish]

[a large fish],

shall its mother be impure with the impurity of childbirth, since

also concerning it there is a gezerah shavah, for

“formation” was stated concerning it, as concerning man, as it is stated: “

And God created the great sea creatures,”

and why did we learn in our Mishna that one who expels something resembling fish is pure?

And it answers:

They say: We derive by a gezerah shavah “formation” from “formation,”

which are identical words,

but we do not derive “creation” from “formation”!

And the Gemara asks:

What difference does it make

that the wording is different? And

the school of Rabbi Ishmael’s tanna

teaches that we learn by a gezerah shavah [that there is an obligation to remove the stones of a house afflicted with leprosy] from the verse

“And the priest shall return,”

to the verse

“And the priest shall come,”

even though the words are not identical—

this is “returning,” and this is “coming,”

and since the meaning of the words is one, there is no deficiency in the difference of wording!?

And the Gemara adds another question:

And furthermore,

it is also possible with regard to the serpent to learn a gezerah shavah from identical words, that

we should derive “creation”

stated concerning the serpent

from “creation”

stated concerning man, for in addition to “formation,” “creation” was also stated concerning man,

as it is written, “And God created man in His image,”

and one who expels a serpent should be rendered impure by virtue of this gezerah shavah?

And it answers:

They say—

“And He created”

is needed

for its own matter,

to teach us the act of man’s creation, and only from a superfluous verse, which is not needed for the substance of the matter in which it is stated, may one learn a gezerah shavah. But

“and He formed”

is not needed for its own matter, since we have already learned the act of creation from the verse “and He created”; therefore it stands

free

to learn a gezerah shavah from it.

And

therefore

we derive

only

“formation” from “formation,”

namely, animals, concerning which “formation” was stated, from the formation of man; but we do not derive the creation of fish from the creation of man, since “and He created” is not free .

And the Gemara asks: From where do we know that “and He created” is needed to teach us the essence of the act of creation?

On the contrary,

let it be said that

“and He formed”

is

for its own purpose,

and from it we learn the creation of man, while

“and He created” is available

55, and

since “and He created” is superfluous,

we derive

by a gzera shava

the creation

of fish

from the creation

of man, and only one who miscarries fish becomes impure, but not one who miscarries an animal?!

And because of the difficulty, the Gemara retracts and offers another answer as to why a serpent is not compared to man:

Rather,

it is preferable to expound the gzera shava from

“and He formed,”

which is

redundant

[superfluous]

on both sides,

as both the verse that teaches and the verse from which it is learned are superfluous;

the verse is redundant

“and He formed,” which was stated

concerning man,

the teaching verse, for creation can be learned from “and He created.”

And redundant

is also the verse that was stated

concerning an animal

[as will be explained]. However,

“and He created

the great serpents,” even if we compare it to “and He created” that was stated concerning man, it is only

concerning man

that it is

redundant

[as it is written, “and He formed”]; but

concerning the serpents it is not redundant,

for their creation was stated only once, and the verse is needed for its own purpose!

And the Gemara explains:

What is the redundancy

of “and He formed”

concerning an animal?

And from where else can their creation be learned?

If you say, from what is written, “And God made the beast of the earth,” and it is written

in addition, in order to make it available,

“And the Lord God formed from the earth every beast of the field,”

then

concerning the serpent also it is available, redundant,

the verse “and He created,”

as it is written,

following “He formed from the earth every beast of the field” —

“and every creeping thing of the earth,”

and “creeping thing” includes the serpents as well.

And it is written,

in addition,

“And God created the great serpents,”

and if “and He created” too is superfluous, and we derive a gzera shava from it?

And the Gemara answers: We do not have a verse concerning the serpents that is available, because

“creeping thing,” which is written there

[in the verse “and every creeping thing of the earth”] — is only

of land animals 56,

and it does not include the serpents in the sea! It follows that only “and He formed” is redundant on both sides, and therefore from it we derive by a gzera shava.

The Gemara challenges its earlier statement:

What practical difference is there

and what difference does it make for the strength of the derivation

between

an identical-expression derivation that

is set aside as superfluous on one side and

an identical-expression derivation that

is set aside as superfluous on both sides,

so that the identical-expression derivation is applied to animals, whose verse is superfluous on both sides, but not to fish, whose verse is superfluous on only one side?

And it answers:

There is a practical difference,

because of what

Rav Judah said in the name of Shmuel in the name of Rabbi Ishmael: [a]

Every gzera shava that is not redundant at all —

nothing is learned from it!

For a gzera shava is learned only from a superfluous verse

that is not needed for its own purpose. [b]

(b)

Redundant on one side —

according to Rabbi Ishmael, one derives, and

even if there is a logical objection for distinguishing between the laws,

one does not answer it; according to the Rabbis, one derives

if there is no logical objection,

and one answers

when there is an objection, and rejects the gzera shava. [c]

(c)

Redundant on both sides —

according to everyone one derives, and one does not answer!

And since there is an objection to the gzera shava from man to animal and fish [as will be explained below], it is possible to compare only an animal, which is redundant on both sides, and not fish .

And the Gemara asks:

According to Rabbi Ishmael,

who also holds that when something is redundant on one side one derives and does not answer —

What difference is there between something redundant on one side and something redundant on both sides?

Is not the law of both the same, since even when there is a logical argument against the gzera shava one derives it? And the difficulty has returned: let us compare fish to man.

And it answers:

There is a practical difference, for where there are

two ways to expound the gzera shava: one way is to learn from a verse that is

redundant on one side,

and

a second way is to learn from a verse that is

redundant on both sides —

we leave aside what is redundant on one side,