Niddah 22b (כב:) — the Talmud in English

And the Gemara raises a difficulty:

If so:

if a piece that was dry from the outset is deemed impure

even when it did not dissolve

afterward in water,

also

then they should have been deemed impure, and why did the Mishna make their impurity contingent only on their subsequently dissolving in water?

And it answers:

Rabba said: When they did not dissolve

afterward in water,

it is an entity unto itself

and not blood ; therefore, they do not render the woman impure. But dry blood, which subsequently dissolves in water, is blood, and it need not flow from her body.

The Gemara discusses the cases mentioned in the Mishna:

Can there actually be such a case

in which a woman miscarries something resembling hairs or something resembling shells?

The Gemara answers:

Yes!

We find that cases of this kind were mentioned:

And it was taught in a beraita: Rabbi Elazar ben Rabbi Tzadok said: My father brought two cases from Mata'in

[the name of a place]

to Yavne,

and asked the Sages about them:

1.

An incident occurred involving a woman who was miscarrying something resembling red shells. They came and asked my father, and my father asked the Sages

in Yavne.

The Sages

in Yavne

asked the physicians, and they told them:

The physicians said:

This woman has a wound inside her intestines

46 , from which

she

miscarries something resembling shells,

and therefore

she should place

the shells

in water; if they dissolve

in the water, she is

impure!

2.

And again: An incident occurred involving a woman who was miscarrying something resembling red hairs. She came and asked my father, and my father asked the Sages, and the Sages asked the physicians, and they told them:

She has a growth inside her intestines, from which she miscarries something resembling red hairs.

Therefore,

she should place

them

in water; if they dissolve

in the water, she is

impure!

The Gemara explains how the test is performed in water:

Reish Lakish said:

And in lukewarm water!

Only when she places it in lukewarm water and the piece does not dissolve is it demonstrated that it is not clotted blood. But if she places it in cold water and it does not dissolve, this is no proof of her purity.

It was likewise taught in a beraita: “She should place it in water”—

and in lukewarm water!

Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel says: She presses it with

something by placing it in

saliva,

and places the piece and the saliva

on top of her fingernail

and presses them with the fingernail of her other hand!

The Gemara asks:

What is the practical difference between them?

What is the difference between the statement of the first tanna and that of Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel?

And it answers:

Ravina said: Pressing under pressure

—pressing it with pressure from the fingernail—

is the difference between them.

According to the first tanna, it suffices that it does not dissolve on its own to demonstrate that it is not menstrual blood; even if it dissolves after being pressed, she is pure. But according to Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel, it is demonstrated not to be menstrual blood only if it remains whole after being pressed forcefully.

The Gemara further clarifies the duration of soaking in lukewarm water:

There [

below, 54b, concerning a creeping creature and an animal carcass that dried, which do not render objects impure when dry unless they are soaked again in water until the moisture they had before drying returns to them]

we learned: How long is

the

duration of their soaking in lukewarm water,

such that if their moisture returns they render objects impure?

Twenty-four hours!

But if a longer soaking is required, they remain pure even if their moisture returns.

But

here,

in the case of dry blood,

what is the ruling?

Do I require twenty-four hours

as with the soaking of a creeping creature and an animal carcass, so that a shorter soaking is insufficient to demonstrate that the piece is not made of blood,

or not?

The alternatives of the uncertainty are:

Perhaps specifically

in the case of a creeping creature and an animal carcass, which harden [

becoming hard when they dry],

we require twenty-four hours

in order to soften them until they return to their former moist state;

but blood, which is soft, does not

require this. Since it is soft even while dry, it dissolves in a shorter soaking, and if it remains whole, it is not blood.

Or perhaps, it makes no difference

whether it is blood or a creeping creature and an animal carcass: twenty-four hours is the measure established by the Sages for transforming a dry substance into a moist one, whether it is hard or soft?

The Gemara concludes:

Teyku!

We learned in the Mishna:

If a woman miscarries something resembling fish

and there is no other blood with it, she is pure.

The Gemara asks:

And should Rabbi Yehuda not also disagree

with this ruling, as he holds in the first clause of the Mishna that when a woman miscarries a piece she is impure even when there is no blood with it?

In this case,

Rabbi Yehuda should likewise deem a woman who miscarries something resembling fish impure. The reason he deemed a woman who miscarries a piece impure, as explained above [21a], is that he holds that the uterus cannot open without blood emerging. Although she did not see the blood, it certainly emerged. If so, when a woman miscarries fish, surely blood emerged when the uterus opened to allow them to exit!

And it answers:

Reish Lakish said:

Indeed, our Mishna is not universally accepted; rather, it is

taught as a dispute,

and

it is the view of the Sages,

whereas Rabbi Yehuda disagrees with them and deems a woman who miscarries fish impure, because the uterus cannot open without blood emerging.

And Rabbi Yoḥanan said:

You may even say

that our Mishna is

the view of Rabbi Yehuda.

For

Rabbi Yehuda stated that there

a woman who miscarries a piece is impure

only with regard to a piece,

and its impurity is not due to blood that emerged with it when the uterus opened. Rather,

blood can clot and become a piece,

and therefore Rabbi Yehuda deems her impure because the piece itself is made of clotted blood, and blood renders a woman impure even when it has clotted.

But

the form of

an entity cannot be made

from blood. Blood does not, when it clots, take the form of fish or locusts, and the form of the piece demonstrates that it is made of flesh. Therefore, a woman who miscarries something resembling locusts is not impure even according to Rabbi Yehuda.

The Gemara asks:

According to that formulation

above [21a],

which Rabbi Yoḥanan said

that

the Sages and Rabbi Yehuda disagree over “the uterus cannot open without blood,”

and this formulation, stated in Rabbi Yoḥanan’s name, disagrees with the account in our sugya in Rabbi Yoḥanan’s name, and holds according to the first interpretation that Rabbi Yehuda deems her impure because of blood that emerges with the piece—if so,

should Rabbi Yehuda not also disagree in this case

of a woman who miscarries something resembling fish, since once the uterus has opened, she should be impure?

And it answers:

The one who teaches

above

that formulation,

according to which Rabbi Yoḥanan says that Rabbi Yehuda deemed her impure because of blood that emerged when the uterus opened,

teaches it as follows

in our sugya:

Rabbi Yoḥanan and Reish Lakish both say

that they both hold that our Mishna

is taught as a dispute, and it is the view of the Sages

alone,

it is,

and not only does Reish Lakish hold that Rabbi Yehuda disagrees with the Mishna; Rabbi Yoḥanan also holds so. Those who state in Rabbi Yoḥanan’s name that the Mishna is accepted by everyone do not accept the statement cited above [21a] in Rabbi Yoḥanan’s name.

We learned in the Mishna:

If a woman miscarries something resembling an animal,

if it is male, she observes the waiting period for a male, and if it is female, she observes the waiting period for a female; these are the words of Rabbi Meir.

Rav Yehuda said in the name of Shmuel: What is the reason of Rabbi Meir?

After all, she did not miscarry the form of a human being, but the form of an animal; from where do we know that even when she gives birth to the form of an animal she is considered to have given birth?

And Shmuel answers:

Since concerning them,

the animals,

“formation” is stated as concerning man

—“And the Lord God formed from the earth every animal of the field and every bird,” while concerning man it is stated, “And He formed the man”—and we derive this by means of a gzera shava.

The Gemara raises a difficulty:

But if that is so, if a woman miscarries the form of a serpent

[a large fish],

should its mother be impure with the impurity of childbirth, since concerning it too

there is a gzera shava, for

“formation” is stated concerning it as concerning man, as it is stated:

“And God created the great sea creatures,”

and why, then, did we learn in our Mishna that a woman who miscarries something resembling fish is pure?

And it answers:

They said: We derive by means of a gzera shava “formation” from “formation,”

since they are identical words,

but we do not derive “creation” from “formation”!

The Gemara asks:

What practical difference does it make

that the wording is different?

But the tanna of the school of Rabbi Yishmael

teaches that we derive by means of a gzera shava [that there is an obligation to remove the stones from a house afflicted with leprosy] from the verse

“And the koen shall return,”

to the verse

“And the koen shall come,”

even though the words are not identical:

“Returning” is “coming,”

and since the meanings of the words are the same, the difference in wording is no impediment!?

The Gemara adds another question:

Furthermore,

even concerning a serpent, a gzera shava can be derived from identical words: let us derive

“creation”

stated concerning the serpent

from “creation”

stated concerning man, since in addition to “formation,” “creation” is also stated concerning man,

as it is written: “And God created man in His image,”

and let a woman who miscarries a serpent be impure by virtue of this gzera shava?

And it answers:

They said:

“And He created”

is needed

for its own matter,

to teach us about the creation of man. Only from a verse that is superfluous, one that is not needed for the substance of the matter, may a gzera shava be derived. But

“and He formed,”

which is not needed for its own matter, since we have already learned about the creation of man from the verse “and He created,” stands

available for derivation,

to derive a gzera shava from it.

And

therefore,

we derive

only

formation from formation,

that is, animals, concerning which “formation” is stated, from the formation of man. But we do not derive the creation of fish from the creation of man, since “and He created” is not available .

And the Gemara asks: From where do we know that “and He created” is needed to teach us the essence of the act of creation?

On the contrary,

let it be said that

“and He formed”

is

for its own sake,

and from it we learn the creation of man, while

“and He created” is free

55, and

since “and He created” is superfluous,

we derive

by a gzera shava

the creation

of fish

from the creation

of man; and consequently only a woman who miscarries the form of a fish is rendered impure, but not one who miscarries the form of an animal?!

Because of the objection, the Gemara retracts this explanation and offers another reason why the dragon should not be equated with man:

Rather,

it is preferable to derive the gzera shava from

“and He formed,”

which is

free

(superfluous)

on both sides,

meaning that both the verse that teaches and the verse from which the teaching is derived are superfluous. For

the verse

“and He formed,” which is stated

with regard to man,

the source verse, is free, since the creation of man can be learned from “and He created.”

And free

is also the verse stated

with regard to an animal

(as will be explained). However, even if

“and He created

the great dragons” is equated with “and He created” stated with regard to man, it is free only

with regard to man;

it

is free

(as it is written, “and He formed”), but

with regard to the dragons it is not free,

since their creation is mentioned only once, and the verse is needed for its own sake!

And the Gemara explains:

What is the meaning of “free”

“and He formed”

with regard to an animal?

And from where else can their creation be learned?

If you say, from that which is written, “And God made the beasts of the earth,” and it is written

in addition, in order to make it free,

“And the Lord God formed from the earth every beast of the field,”

then

with regard to the dragon as well, the verse “and He created” is free,

the verse “and He created”

as it is written,

following “and He formed from the earth every beast of the field” —

“and every creeping thing of the earth,”

and “creeping thing” also includes the dragons.

And it is written,

in addition,

“And God created the great dragons,”

so if “and He created” is also superfluous, why not derive a gzera shava from it?

And the Gemara answers: We do not have a verse concerning the dragons that is free, because

“creeping thing,” which is written there

(in the verse “and every creeping thing of the earth”) refers only to animals

of the dry land 56,

and does not include the dragons of the sea! It follows that only “and He formed” is free on both sides, and therefore it is the verse from which the gzera shava is derived.

And the Gemara challenges its earlier statement:

And what practical difference is there,

and what difference is there in the force of the derivation,

between

a gzera shava that is

free on one side and

a gzera shava that is

free on both sides,

so that the gzera shava is derived with regard to an animal, which is free on both sides, but not with regard to fish, which is free on only one side?

And it answers:

There is a practical difference,

as to why this is so,

as Rav Yehuda said that Shmuel said in the name of Rabbi Yishmael: [a]

a

gzera shava that is not free at all —

we do not derive from it!

For a gzera shava is derived only from a superfluous verse that is not needed for its own sake. [b]

(b)

Free on one side —

according to Rabbi Yishmael, we derive from it, and

even if there is a logical refutation distinguishing between the laws,

we do not respond; according to the Rabbis, we derive from it

if there is no logical refutation,

but we do respond

when there is a refutation, and we reject the gzera shava. [c]

(c)

Free on both sides —

everyone agrees that we derive from it and do not respond!

And since there is a refutation against the gzera shava from man to animal and fish [as will be explained below], it is possible to equate only an animal, which is free on both sides, but not fish.

And the Gemara asks:

According to Rabbi Yishmael,

who maintains that even when a gzera shava is free on one side we derive from it and do not respond —

What difference is there between one free on one side and one free on both sides?

For the law concerning both is the same: even when there is a logical argument against the gzera shava, we derive from it. The question therefore returns: Why should fish not be equated with man?

And it answers:

There is a practical difference, namely, where there are

two ways to derive the gzera shava: one way is to derive it from a verse that is

free on one side

and

a second way is to derive it from a verse that is

free on both sides —

we set aside the one free on one side,