Niddah 23b (כג:) — the Talmud in English

Rav Yirmeya of Difti said:

We, too, have learned this:

an animal-like fetus in a woman’s womb does not live.

As we learned concerning a firstborn, regarding who is considered a viable offspring that exempts the womb, so that the one born after it is not a firstborn:

If a woman expels something resembling an animal or beast

it is a fully viable offspring[,]

and the one born after it is not a firstborn at all [as will be explained shortly],

the statement of Rabbi Meir.

And the Sages say: Until it has some human form

it exempts the womb; but as long as the first offspring has no human form, if another offspring is born after it, the second offspring is obligated in pidyon haben, because the first offspring is not considered an offspring that exempts the womb.

And

both according to Rabbi Meir and according to the Sages,

if a woman expels a sandal,

an offspring whose facial features are not recognizable,

or a placenta,

[the gestational sac containing the fetus,] which, despite our not having seen the fetus, certainly indicates that there was one, for there is no placenta without a fetus,

or a formed amniotic sac

[the fetal skin before veins and bones have formed within it]

that is partially formed,

in which the formation of the limbs is already partially recognizable,

or a dismembered fetus—

the one born after it

who is born after one of these miscarriages is

a firstborn with regard to inheritance,

and receives a double portion of his father’s estate. Since the first miscarried fetus was not fit to live, it does not prevent the one born after it from being considered a firstborn with regard to the law of inheritance.

But—

it is not a firstborn with regard to a koen!

There is no obligation to redeem from the koen the one born after these miscarriages, because the first miscarried fetus is considered the firstborn with regard to the laws of pidyon haben; even a stillborn fetus is called “the opener of the womb.” [The miscarried fetus itself is exempt from redemption because it is not alive.]

The Gemara explains what the proof is from the beraita that a fetus with the form of an animal does not live:

And if it enters your mind that

a fetus resembling an animal or beast

lives,

then concerning what we learned in the beraita, that

the one born after it

is

a firstborn with regard to inheritance—

is this

law correct? Surely the first fetus is alive, and it is the firstborn even with regard to inheritance, and not the one born after it?! We reject this:

Rava said: Actually,

it is possible to say

that it lives,

and nevertheless the one born after it is the firstborn with regard to inheritance, and not that offspring.

And there it is different,

with regard to the laws of inheritance, for the determining factor in the law of a firstborn is not only whether he is alive or dead.

For the verse states: “For he is

the

first of his strength—the birthright is his,” and we expound:

he has the right of the firstborn.” And we derive from this:

The one whose heart

of his father

grieves for him

and who suffers when he dies is a firstborn with regard to inheritance. And since even a living offspring whose death does not cause his father distress is not a firstborn,

exclude

this

offspring

resembling an animal,

for his father’s heart

does not

grieve for him

when he dies; therefore he is not a firstborn with regard to inheritance, but the one born after him is.

Rav Adda bar Ahava asked Abaye:

According to Rabbi Meir, who says, “An animal in a woman’s womb—

it is a fully viable offspring,”

and the fetus whose form is that of an animal is considered, in human law, as a human being, since it was born from a human being:

A human being in an animal’s womb—

what is the law?

If it happened that a human form was found in an animal’s womb, is it treated as a human being, since its form is human, or do we say that the identity of the fetus is determined according to its relationship to its mother, the one giving birth to it, in which case it is an animal?

The question was asked specifically according to Rabbi Meir, who grants a woman who expels an animal-like form the status of a woman who has given birth to a human being. This implies that, according to his statement, the identity of the fetus is determined according to its mother; if so, one might say that a human form found in an animal’s womb should likewise be assigned its mother’s status and is therefore an animal, not a human being. But according to the Sages there is no uncertainty at all: the fetus’s own form determines its identity, whether as a human being or as an animal, and not its relationship to its mother.

The Gemara asks:

What practical difference is there

whether it is a human being or an animal?

It answers:

To permit it for consumption,

and although it cannot be slaughtered, it would not be forbidden as an unslaughtered carcass if its animal mother were slaughtered and a human form were found in her womb. If its law is that of an animal, it is permitted through the slaughter of its mother, like a ben pekua, which is permitted without being slaughtered; but if its law is that of a human being, it is forbidden to eat.

The Gemara raises an objection:

Let us resolve it

as forbidden to eat

from that which Rabbi Yohanan said. For Rabbi Yohanan said: If one slaughters an animal and finds in it the form of a dove—

it is forbidden

the dove

to eat!

This proves that the slaughter of the mother is effective only for a fetus resembling its mother, and not for a fetus with a different form?!

It answers:

How can these cases be compared?!

There,

the dove is not rendered permitted through the slaughter of its animal mother, because

there are neither hoofs nor even a hoof!

The permission of a fetus through the slaughter of its mother is derived in tractate Chullin [69a] from the verse: “And every animal that has split hooves, with the hoof completely separated into two, among the animals, that you may eat.” From the superfluous word “among the animals,” they derive: “An animal within an animal—you may eat,” meaning that an animal fetus found within an animal may be eaten through the slaughter of its mother. But this applies only on condition that the fetus also has two hoofs, with each hoof split in two, or at least that it has a hoof, even if it is not split, as implied by the wording of the verse, which requires the animal found within the animal to have a hoof. A dove, however, which has no hoof whatsoever, is not included in this verse and cannot be rendered permitted through the slaughter of its animal mother.

But

here,

when a human form is found in an animal

although it is true that there are no “hoofed feet,”

for a human foot is not split and he has no “hoofed feet,”

a hoof

one

at least does exist

in a human being. It is therefore possible to include him in the derivation from the verse, that every animal found within an animal that has a hoof is permitted through the slaughter of the mother. The question is: What is the identity of this fetus—is it a human being, according to its form, and therefore forbidden to eat, or is it an animal, according to its affiliation, and therefore permitted? This question was not resolved, and the matter remains uncertain.

We learned in the Mishna:

And the Sages say—

Anyone who does not have

a human form is not an offspring. The Sages’ extended wording—“Anyone who does not have a human form”—rather than simply saying “it is not an offspring,” precisely indicates that there is an additional dispute between the Sages and Rabbi Meir concerning an offspring part of whose form is human and part of whose form is animal.

The Gemara explains this dispute.

Rav Yirmeya bar Abba said that Rav said: Everyone agrees

that if a woman expels a fetus whose:

body is that of a goat and whose face is human—

it is

a human being!

Even according to the Sages, his mother becomes impure through childbirth.

body is human and whose face is that of a kid—

it is

“nothing at all”!

For it is neither a human being nor an animal, and it does not impart impurity through childbirth even according to Rabbi Meir!

Rabbi Meir and the Sages disagree

only when

its face is human, and it was created with one eye like an animal’s,

with one of its eyes resembling an animal’s eye and the other eye resembling a human eye.

For Rabbi Meir says:

Since part of its face has

a human form,

it is considered an offspring and imparts impurity through childbirth.

And the Sages say:

until there is

the entire human form,

but if only part of it resembles an animal and it lacks the complete human form, its mother does not contract impurity through childbirth.

They said to Rav Yirmeya bar Abba—

But was it not taught conversely

that

Rabbi Meir

is the one who

says, “the entire form,”

and since the phrase “the entire form” was stated according to Rabbi Meir, who is lenient, its meaning is that if a fetus born to a woman has the face of a goat, but possesses some element of human form—for example, it resembles a human being in one eye—it is deemed impure through childbirth. And “the entire form” means any part of the form, not the entire form.

And the Sages say, “of the form,”

and they require half of its form to be human. It follows that everyone agrees that it is not necessary for its entire face to have the appearance of a human being?!

He said to them

Rav Yirmeya:

If it was taught, it was taught!

I heard from Rav what I said, but since you have a Mishna in your possession, follow it!

Rav Yirmeya bar Abba said that Rabbi Yoḥanan said:

A woman who miscarries a fetus does not contract impurity through childbirth unless its face resembles a human face in all its parts, except for the ears:

the forehead, the eyebrows, the eyes, the jaws, and the beardline

[the chin],

until they are all present together,

only then does its mother contract impurity through childbirth!

Rava said

in the name of

Ḥasa: The forehead, the eyebrow, the eye, the jaw, and the beardline—

until they are all present together!

It is not necessary for both sides of the face to resemble a human being; one side of the face is sufficient, but on that side all the parts of the face must resemble those of a human being [and according to Ḥasa as well, except for the ears]!

The Gemara explains:

And they do not disagree

Rav Yirmeya and Ḥasa; both spoke according to the opinion of the Sages, but they disagreed as to what the position of the Sages is, just as Rav Yirmeya disagreed with the beraita.

This

is Rav Yirmeya, who said that even if it resembles a human being in only one eye, the Rabbis deem it pure—

according to the one who says

that according to the Rabbis

the entire form

of the face must be human, in accordance with Rav Yirmeya’s teaching in the name of Rav. [And Rav Yirmeya did not retract his difficulty from the beraita].

This

is Ḥasa, who said that according to the Rabbis, even if only one side of the face resembles a human being, it is a fetus—

according to the one who says “of the form,”

as we learned in the beraita from which we challenged Rav Yirmeya in the name of Rav.

The Gemara raises an objection: “The form of the face that the Sages mentioned,”

meaning that the fetus must resemble a human being in the form of its face—

even one face from among the faces, except for the ear!

The Gemara explains: Is it not that the intention of the beraita is

to say that even one is sufficient!

That one organ of the face resembling that of a human being, such as an eye or a jaw [but not an ear], is sufficient for it to be considered a human fetus, which is difficult for Rava in the name of Ḥasa, who said that at least one side of the face must resemble a human being in all its parts?!

The Gemara assumed that the beraita explains the position of the one who requires “the form of a human being.” Therefore, there is no difficulty for Rav Yirmeya, who holds that Rabbi Meir is the one who holds “of the form,” since according to lenient Rabbi Meir it may be said that one organ resembling that of a human being is sufficient, in accordance with the beraita.

But according to Rava in the name of Ḥasa, who holds that it is the stringent Sages who maintain “of the form,” it must be that only when half the form resembles that of a human being is it considered to possess “the form of a human being.” This presents a difficulty from the beraita, which explains that one organ is sufficient for it to be considered to possess “the form of a human being.”

The Gemara answers:

Abaye said:

The meaning of the beraita is different, and is the reverse:

When that teaching was taught

that “the form of the face” mentioned by the Sages means even one face from among the faces—

it was taught to be indispensable:

even one organ resembling that of an animal prevents the fetus from being considered human, and only when all the organs of the face are human does the mother contract impurity! The beraita follows

the one who says “the entire form,”

in accordance with Rav Yirmeya’s understanding of the Sages, that “the entire form” means the entire form of the face, and even one organ resembling that of an animal prevents it from being considered a human fetus.

Alternatively, say:

The beraita does indeed hold

according to the one who says “of the form,”

and nevertheless there is no difficulty for Ḥasa.

And what

did the beraita mean by “even one face

one”?

That the beraita stated—

one by one

of each organ: In the case of paired organs, it is not necessary for both to resemble those of a human being; one of them is sufficient. However, the resemblance must comprise all the details of the organs—the eye, jaw, eyebrows, and the like. This is in accordance with Ḥasa’s understanding of the Rabbis, who require resemblance in half of the face.

Rava said:

A woman who gives birth to a fetus that

was formed with one eye and one thigh

and lacks its second eye or thigh—if the eye or thigh was formed in its proper place,

on the side

as it is in other human beings,

its mother contracts impurity

through childbirth despite the absence of the second eye or thigh. But if the eye or thigh was formed

in the middle

of the body—

its mother is pure,

because its form is not the form of a human being.

Rava said:

A fetus born when

its esophagus is perforated,

although it is a tereifa,

its mother contracts impurity

through childbirth, as Rava holds that a tereifa can live. But if

its esophagus is blocked

[sealed]—

its mother is pure,

because any fetus possessing a defect that prevents it from living does not cause its mother to contract impurity through childbirth.

The Sages taught: If a woman miscarries an opaque body

[deficient]—

its mother does not contract impurity through childbirth!

And what is an opaque body? Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi says: One from which, if removed from a living person, he would die,

meaning that if organs are missing from the fetus, and a living person would die if those organs were removed from him, its mother does not contract impurity through childbirth, because the form of a fetus incapable of living does not cause impurity.

The Gemara explains:

And how much can be removed from a living person, causing him to die?