Niddah 18b — the Talmud in English

As Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi said:

If it happened that a pregnant woman

crossed a river, ![](pamud.bmp "

exact column position")

and miscarried,

but she does not know whether what she miscarried was a fetus or merely a mass of flesh, her status is that of a woman who gave birth to a viable fetus, and she

brings the offering

of a woman who gave birth. As part of this offering, she also brings the bird sin-offering, whose neck is pinched from the back of the neck.

And it may be eaten:

although only a bird offering whose neck was pinched may be eaten, whereas an ordinary non-sacred bird whose neck was pinched becomes an animal carcass, we say:

“Follow the majority of women,”

and the majority of women give birth to a viable fetus,

and therefore we assume with certainty that she miscarried a viable fetus rather than a mere mass of flesh, and she is obligated to bring an offering.

This offering is brought for the impurity associated with childbirth. Why, then, is this case not counted among the matters in which the Sages followed the majority and treated the matter as certain?

And the Gemara answers:

We were referring to a Mishna!

There are three statements of tannaim—Sages of the Mishnaic period—in which they follow the majority,

but

a tradition

stated by amoraim—Sages of the period of the Gemara—

we were not referring to.

And Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi was an amora.

The Gemara returns to challenge this answer: But Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi did not state his ruling on his own; rather, it was derived from a beraita—a tannaitic source not included in the Mishna.

And the Gemara explains which beraita this was:

And when Ravin came, he said: Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Ḥanina, raises an objection from a source

to Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi’s ruling, from a source that dealt with the case of a woman

who is uncertain

and does not know when she gave birth, as will be explained shortly. Ravin added:

“And I do not know what the conclusive refutation was,”

that Rabbi Yosei raised from this source against Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi.

Does this mean that it was not a refutation, but a support?

Ravin’s intention was not merely to say that this source does not challenge Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi; rather, it provides support for his ruling. If so, there is a source that agrees with Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi, and his ruling is based on the words of the tannaim. Why, then, did Rabbi Yoḥanan not count this case in addition to the three cases?

And the Gemara answers:

No! Perhaps

Ravin’s intention was to say

that there is neither a refutation nor a support

.

The Gemara analyzes the matter: These are the three places about which Rabbi Yoḥanan said that the Sages followed the majority and treated the matter as certain. This implies that only in these three places is the ruling established as certain on the basis of the majority, whereas in other places a certain ruling is not established on the basis of the majority.

What case was he excluding? If you say that he was excluding a majority opposed by an existing presumption,

that is, where an opposing presumption weakens the force of the majority, he teaches us

that we do not burn

[the teruma that became impure on the basis of a majority opposed by an existing presumption]

because of it!

And this is what Rabbi Yoḥanan said: only in those three cases do we rule, on the basis of the majority, that the impurity is certain. But where an existing presumption opposes the majority, we follow the majority only as a matter of uncertainty.

But

Rabbi Yoḥanan

already stated this once,

when he stated it as a general rule concerning the laws of ritual impurity, including the impurity of a woman.

As we learned: If a child is found beside dough, with dough in his hand,

so that it is certain to us that the child touched the dough , but it is uncertain whether the child was impure or pure,

Rabbi Meir declares

the dough pure.

But the Sages declare it

impure,

because it is the normal behavior of a child to handle things

in refuse, where impure creeping creatures are found. The child became impure through contact with them, and when he subsequently touched the dough, he rendered it impure.

And we said

[and asked]:

What is Rabbi Meir’s reason

for declaring the dough pure? After all, it is certain that the child touched it, and it is certain that children handle things in refuse containing creeping creatures! And we explained:

He holds—

Rabbi Meir—that

most children

[but not all children]

handle things

in refuse, while

a minority

of children do not handle things in refuse.

And this dough

stands with a presumption of purity,

and the presumption of purity opposes the determination based on the majority.

Therefore Rabbi Meir held that one says:

Add the minority

of children who do not handle things

to the presumption

of the dough’s purity ,

and the majority is thereby weakened!

Since the majority cannot, by itself, overcome the presumption when combined with the minority, the matter remains uncertain and we declare the dough pure. [This is the law in a case of uncertain impurity arising through someone who has no awareness.] And Beit HaLevi [II:23] asked: It is stated in the Gemara in Ḥullin [86a] that Rabbi Meir’s reason for adding the minority to the presumption is that he holds that one may not rely on a majority. According to Tosafot, who hold that one may not rely on a majority only by rabbinic law, how could the Gemara connect adding the minority to the presumption, which is a Torah-law principle, with a rabbinic law? He answered that the dispute between Rabbi Meir and the Sages concerns the nature of the Torah law of majority. The Sages hold that the Torah established the minority side as though it did not exist, whereas Rabbi Meir holds that the Torah established that even though a minority possibility exists, one may act in accordance with the majority. For this reason, he holds that the minority may be added to the presumption, since the minority too is an existing possibility. For the same reason, the stringency enacted by the Sages—not to rely on a majority—applies more readily according to Rabbi Meir’s approach than according to the Sages’ approach, since the Sages hold that the minority is not a possibility at all.

But the Sages,

who disagree with Rabbi Meir, hold that

the minority

is considered as though it does not exist!

The minority is not considered a factor that must be taken into account, such that it could join the presumption against the majority.

Therefore, the presumption remains alone against the majority.

And when there is a majority and a presumption

opposing the majority,

the majority is stronger!

The amoraim disagreed concerning the view of the Sages that the majority is stronger:

And Reish Lakish said in the name of Rabbi Oshaya,

in explaining this Mishna:

This is

[the presumption that children handle things in refuse: On the basis of the majority of children who handle things in refuse, we treat all children as presumed impure]

a

complete

presumption, for which one burns teruma

as a matter of certainty!

But

Rabbi Yoḥanan

said: This is not a presumption for which one burns teruma!

That is, the fact that most children handle things in refuse does not create a complete presumption of impurity , and one may not burn teruma on the basis of a presumption [arising from such a majority] as though the impurity were certain.

The challenge here is therefore complete: Rabbi Yoḥanan already said here that a majority opposed by an existing presumption does not establish the ruling as certain in the laws of impurity. Consequently, one does not burn teruma on the basis of the majority that children handle things in refuse [that is, this majority does not create a certain presumption establishing the children as certainly impure]. Why, then, did Rabbi Yoḥanan need to repeat that only in those three places did they treat the determination based on the majority as certain, and not in other places!?

In response to this challenge, we answer:

Rather,

Rabbi Yoḥanan’s intention when he said that only in three places does one follow the majority was

to exclude the majority of Rabbi Yehuda!

That is, although we find that Rabbi Yehuda held [in the matter that will be explained below] that one follows the majority, Rabbi Yoḥanan’s accepted tradition was that Rabbi Yehuda said to suspend judgment and not to burn teruma.

And the Gemara explains what majority Rabbi Yehuda introduced:

As we learned:

A woman

who miscarries a piece of flesh

that has no form resembling a fetus:

If blood accompanies it, she is

impure

because she saw menstrual blood, and not because of the impurity of childbirth, since any woman who miscarries a piece of flesh that has no fetal form has not given birth and does not become impure with the impurity of childbirth.

But if not,

if blood did not accompany it, she is

pure

entirely.

Rabbi Yehuda says: In either case

[whether blood accompanied it or not], she is

impure

because of menstrual blood!

And Rav Yehuda said in the name of Shmuel,

in explaining Rabbi Yehuda’s position:

Rabbi Yehuda declares her impure

because the piece of flesh emerged by itself

only when it is a piece corresponding to one of the four types of blood,

meaning that the appearance of the piece of flesh resembles one of the four appearances of impure blood, which are taught in the Mishna below, on 19a. Rabbi Yehuda holds that the piece of flesh she miscarried has the status of blood rather than flesh, and she is impure with the impurity of menstruation, like a woman who sees menstrual blood.

But

if the appearance of the piece resembled

the other types of blood

that do not cause impurity through menstruation, it is

pure

entirely, both from the impurity of menstruation and from the impurity of childbirth.

But

Rabbi Yoḥanan

said: This is another explanation of Rabbi Yehuda’s position and of his dispute with the Sages: If the appearance of the piece resembled

one of the appearances

of the four types of blood

that are impure,

everyone agrees that she is impure!

Even the first tanna holds that the piece is considered menstrual blood and renders her impure like a woman who sees blood.

But if the appearance of the piece resembled

the other types of blood

that are pure,

everyone agrees that she is pure!