Niddah 18b (יח:) — the Talmud in English

For Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi said:

If it happened that a pregnant woman

crossed a river,

and miscarried,

and she does not know whether what she miscarried was a fetus or merely wind, her status is that of a woman who gave birth to a fetus, for she

brings the offering

of a woman who gave birth; and as part of her offering she also brings the bird sin-offering, which is pinioned,

and the offering is eaten

—for although only a bird-offering that was pinioned with a fingernail may be eaten, whereas a non-sacred bird that was pinioned becomes an animal carcass, we say:

Follow the majority of women;

and the majority of women give birth to a viable fetus,

and we take it as certain that she miscarried a viable fetus and not mere wind, and she is obligated to bring an offering.

And this offering comes because of the impurity of childbirth. Why, then, is this not counted among the matters in which they followed the majority as though it were certain?

The Gemara resolves:

We were speaking of a Mishna!

There are three statements of tannaim in which they follow the majority,

but the

halakhic tradition

stated by amoraim

we were not speaking of; and Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi is an amora.

The Gemara returns to challenge this: But Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi did not state his ruling on his own; rather, it was learned from a beraita.

The Gemara explains which beraita this is:

And when Ravin came, he said: Rabbi Yosei bar Rabbi Ḥanina raised an objection

to Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi’s ruling from a teaching that dealt with the law of a woman

who is mistaken

and does not know when she gave birth, as will be explained shortly; and Ravin added—

and I do not know what his objection was

—that is, what Rabbi Yosei had challenged Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi with from this teaching.

What, then, does it mean: It is not an objection to him, but a support for him?

Ravin’s intention was not merely to say that this teaching poses no difficulty for Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi; on the contrary, it provides

support for his words from that teaching. If so, there is a teaching that agrees with Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi, and his ruling is based on the words of the tannaim. Why, then, did Rabbi Yoḥanan not count it in addition to the three cases? The Gemara answers:

No! Perhaps

Ravin intended to say that

there is

neither an objection nor a support

from this teaching.

The Gemara discusses: These three places in which Rabbi Yoḥanan said that the Sages followed the majority, treating the matter as certain—implying that only in these three places was a definite ruling established on the basis of the majority, whereas in other places a definite halakhic ruling is not established on the basis of the majority—

what does this exclude? If we say it excludes a majority that has a presumption alongside it,

where there is a contrary presumption opposing the majority and weakening its force, and he teaches us

that we do not burn on its account [

with regard to impurity determined on the basis of a majority opposed by a presumption]

the teruma!

This is what Rabbi Yoḥanan said: only in those three places do we rule on the basis of the majority that there is definite impurity, but not where a presumption opposes the majority; there, the majority is followed only as an uncertainty.

But

he had already

said this once in the name of Rabbi Yoḥanan,

stating it as a general principle concerning the laws of impurity, including the impurity of a woman.

As we learned in a Mishna: A child found beside dough, with dough in his hand,

such that it is certain to us that the child touched the dough , but it is uncertain whether the child was impure or pure—

Rabbi Meir declares

the dough pure.

And the Sages declare it impure

because

it is characteristic of a child to play with things

in refuse heaps, where impure creeping animals are found; the child became impure through contact with them, and when he subsequently touched the dough, he rendered it impure.

And we said [

and asked]:

What is Rabbi Meir’s reason

for declaring the dough pure? After all, the child certainly touched it, and it is certain that a child’s practice is to play in a refuse heap containing creeping animals! And we explained:

He holds

—Rabbi Meir—

most children [

but not all children]

play with things

in refuse heaps,

and a minority

of children do not play with things in refuse heaps.

And this dough

stands with a presumption of purity,

and the presumption of purity opposes the determination based on the majority.

Therefore, Rabbi Meir held that we say:

Add the minority

of children who do not play with things

to the presumption

of the dough’s purity ,

and the majority is thereby weakened!

Since the majority by itself cannot overcome the presumption when joined by the minority, the matter remains an uncertainty and we declare it pure. [This is the law in the case of uncertain impurity that comes through one who lacks understanding.]

And the Sages,

who disagree with Rabbi Meir, hold that

the minority

is regarded as though it were nonexistent!

The minority is not considered a factor that must be taken into account, such that it could join the presumption against the majority.

Therefore, the presumption alone remains opposed to the majority.

And when there are a majority and a presumption

opposing the majority—

the majority is superior!

The amoraim disagreed concerning the Sages’ view that the majority is superior:

And Reish Lakish said in the name of Rabbi Oshaya,

in explaining this Mishna:

This is

the presumption of children who play with things in refuse heaps: on the basis of the majority of children who play in refuse heaps, we hold all children to have the presumptive status of impurity—

a

complete

presumption, on the basis of which teruma is burned

as a matter of certainty!

But

these are the words of

Rabbi Yoḥanan: This is not a presumption on the basis of which teruma is burned!

That is, the majority of children who play with things in refuse heaps does not create a complete presumption of impurity , and one may not burn teruma on the basis of a presumption [resulting from such a majority] as though the impurity were certain.

The difficulty is now complete: Rabbi Yoḥanan already stated here that a majority opposed by a presumption does not determine the law as certain in the laws of impurity. Therefore, teruma is not burned on the basis of the majority of children who play with things in refuse heaps [that is, this majority does not create a certain presumption establishing the children as certainly impure]. Why, then, did Rabbi Yoḥanan need to state again that only in those three places was the determination based on the majority treated as certain, but not in other places!?

On the basis of this difficulty, we answer:

Rather,

Rabbi Yoḥanan’s intention when he said that only in three places do we follow the majority was

to exclude the majority of Rabbi Yehuda!

That is, although we find that Rabbi Yehuda held [in a matter that will be explained below] that one follows the majority, it was accepted by Rabbi Yoḥanan that Rabbi Yehuda said to suspend judgment ] and not to burn.

The Gemara explains what majority Rabbi Yehuda introduced:

As we learned in a Mishna:

A woman

who miscarries a piece

of flesh that has no form of a fetus—

if blood accompanies it—she is

impure

because of the sighting of menstrual blood, and not because of the impurity of childbirth, since any woman who miscarries a piece of flesh that has no form of a fetus has not given birth and does not contract the impurity of childbirth.

And if not,

if no blood accompanied it, she is

pure

entirely.

Rabbi Yehuda says: In either case

[whether blood emerged with it or not], she is

impure

because of menstruation!

And Rav Yehuda said in the name of Shmuel,

in explaining Rabbi Yehuda’s view:

Rabbi Yehuda did not declare her impure

because the piece of flesh emerged by itself,

but in the case of a piece corresponding to one of the four types of blood,

meaning that the appearance of the piece of flesh is like the appearance of one of the four appearances of impure blood [listed in the Mishna below, 19a]. Rabbi Yehuda holds that the piece of flesh she miscarried has the status of blood rather than flesh, and she is impure with the impurity of menstruation, like one who sees menstrual blood.

But

if the appearance of the piece was like that of

the other types of blood

that do not impart the impurity of menstruation, she is

pure

entirely, both from the impurity of menstruation and from the impurity of childbirth.

But

these are the words of

Rabbi Yoḥanan: There is another explanation of Rabbi Yehuda’s view and of his dispute with the Sages: if the appearance of the piece was like that

of the four types of blood

that are impure—

everyone agrees that she is impure!

Even the first tanna holds that the piece is considered menstrual blood and renders her impure like a menstruant who sees blood.

But if the appearance of the piece was like that

of the other types of blood

that are pure—

everyone agrees that she is pure!

everyone agrees that she is pure!