Nedarim 90b — the Talmud in English

To say that there was no act in it. -

That the meaning of the verse is that it is possible to release the vow even when the vow is still merely words; that is, the vow has still not been enacted in practice.

It was objected -

and we raise an objection against this from a beraita:

One who says:

“Konam, I shall not derive benefit from so-and-so, and

afterward vowed, “I shall not derive benefit”

from the one from whom I shall seek release.”

That is, he vowed not to derive benefit from the person to whom he would go to seek release from his first vow—

He seeks release

from a sage

from the first, and afterward seeks release from the second.

If that man wishes to release his vow, he must release both vows, since if he does not release the second vow, then by seeking release from the first he violates his second vow, for he derives benefit from the person who releases his vow.

And the Gemara raises an objection from the words of this beraita against Ravina:

Why -

why does the man need to seek release first from his first vow and afterward from his second vow?

Is it not that

if he wishes, he may seek release from this one first; and if he wishes, he may seek release from that one first.

Is it not possible for the man to seek release from his second vow before the first vow, and even when the second vow has not yet taken effect [since the first vow has not yet been released], for according to Ravina’s words, it is possible to seek release from a vow even before it takes effect in practice?

And we answer:

Who knows which is first and which is second?

From where do you know that the tanna’s intention in saying “first and second” is the first vow that he made and the second vow that he made? It is possible, is it not, to say that the tanna’s intention in saying “first and second” is the first vow that he comes to release and the second vow that he comes to release; and the principal intention of the tanna is to say that he must release both vows, and it makes no difference which vow he releases first.

It was objected -

and we raise another objection from a beraita:

A man who said:

“Konam, I shall not derive benefit. And

he added and said:

“Behold, I am a nazir when I seek release from it.”

If I seek release from the first vow, I shall be a nazir. This is,

he seeks release from his vow, and afterward seeks release from his nazirut.

That is: if he wishes to release his vow, he must also release his nazirut, since if he does not release his nazirut, then immediately when the vow is released he will be a nazir.

And the Gemara raises an objection from the words of this beraita against Ravina:

And why? -

why does he need to seek release first from the vow and afterward from the nazirut?

Is it not that

if he wishes, he may seek release from his vow first.

And

if he wishes, he may seek release from his nazirut first -

the man can seek release from the nazirut even before he seeks release from the vow, and even though the nazirut has not yet taken effect as long as the vow has not been released; nevertheless, according to Ravina, it is possible to release vows even before they take effect in practice?

And we conclude:

refutation.

Mishna:

At first they would say: three women go out and take their ketuba,

a.

The one who says, “I am impure to you” -

a woman who said to her husband that she had committed a forbidden act is believed, and she is forbidden to her husband.

b.

“Heaven is between me and you.”

That is: Heaven is witness to the matter between me and you, that you are unable to father children. And the woman is believed concerning this claim, and she can demand a divorce and a ketuba.

c.

“I am removed from the Jews” -

a woman who prohibited upon herself the benefit of intercourse from all Jewish men: the husband is compelled to divorce her and give her a ketuba, since it is evident from her words that intercourse is difficult for her, and she is considered coerced.

These are the words of the first Mishna.

They reconsidered their position [

they retracted their position ],

in order

that a woman should not set her eyes on another man and ruin her relationship with her husband.

a.

The one who says, “I am impure to you,”

is not believed and

must bring proof for her words.

b.

“Heaven is between me and you,”

she is not believed, and

they should proceed by way of entreaty -

the husband should try to appease her and persuade her not to say this any longer. c.

“I am removed from the Jews.” He may annul it with regard to his portion, and she shall serve him, and she shall be removed from the Jews.

These are the words of the last Mishna:

Gemara:

It was asked of them:

A koen’s wife who

said to her husband, “I am impure,” what is the law regarding her eating teruma?

Is it only with regard to being forbidden to her husband that she is not believed, because we are concerned that she may have set her eyes on another man, but with regard to being forbidden to eat teruma she is believed; or is she not believed at all, even with regard to teruma?

Rav Sheshet said: She eats

teruma, and she is not believed at all, in order

that she should not bring discredit upon her children

by saying that they are ḥalalim and disqualified from the priesthood.

Rava said: She does not eat,

and there is no concern that discredit will be brought upon her children, since

it is possible that she eats non-sacred food -

she can eat non-sacred food, and people will not notice that she refrains from eating teruma because of her adultery.

Rava said, and Rav Sheshet concedes that if she became widowed [

became a widow ]

she does not eat,

What is the reason -

for all of Rav Sheshet’s reasoning is

only because

she should not

bring discredit upon her children,

and if so, this reason does not apply in a case in which she

became widowed and was divorced,

because then discredit will not be brought, since

they will say: now she has been compelled -

people will say that the reason she is forbidden to teruma is that she was disqualified only now, after she became widowed, and if so, discredit will not be brought upon her children.

Rav Pappa said: Rava tested us [

Rava asked us ],

“Does a koen’s wife who was raped have a ketuba, or does she not have a ketuba?”

And the explanation of the doubt is:

Is it that

since coercion with regard to a koen is deemed equivalent to will with regard to an Israelite [

just as an Israelite’s wife becomes forbidden to her husband if she committed adultery willingly, so a koen’s wife becomes forbidden to her husband even if she was raped ], then likewise with regard to the ketuba: just as an Israelite’s wife who committed adultery willingly has no ketuba, so a koen’s wife, even if she was raped,

has no ketuba.

Or perhaps she can say to him [

the woman can claim ] :

“I—I am here before you.”