Nedarim 90b (צ:) — the Talmud in English

To say that there was no action involved. -

The meaning of the verse is that the neder can be dissolved even when it still consists merely of words; that is, the neder has not yet been actualized..

Meitivī -

And we challenge this from a beraita:

One who says:

“Konam: I shall not derive benefit from so-and-so, and

afterward he vowed, “I shall not derive benefit”

from the one whom I will ask about it.”

That is, he vowed not to derive benefit from the person to whom he would go to ask about the dissolution of his first neder—

He asks

a sage

about the first, and afterward asks about the second.

If this man wishes to dissolve his nedarim, he must dissolve both nedarim, since if he does not dissolve the second neder, then by asking about the first he violates his second neder, for he derives benefit from the person who dissolved his neder for him.

The Gemara challenges Ravina from the words of this beraita:

Why

—why must the man ask first about his first neder and afterward about his second neder?

After all,

if he wishes, he can ask about this one first; and if he wishes, he can ask about that one first.

After all, the man can ask about his second neder before the first neder, even when the second neder has not yet taken effect, since the first neder has not yet been dissolved. For according to Ravina’s words, one can ask about a neder even before it has actually taken effect?

And we answer:

Who knows which is the first and which is the second?

How do you know that when the tanna said “first and second,” he meant the first neder that he vowed and the second neder that he vowed? Perhaps the tanna meant the first neder that he came to dissolve and the second neder that he came to dissolve. The tanna’s essential intent would then be to say that he must dissolve both nedarim, and it makes no difference which neder he dissolves first.

Meitivī -

And we challenge this again from a beraita:

A man who said:

“Konam: I shall not derive benefit. And

he added and said:

“I hereby become a nazirite when I ask about it.”

If I ask about the first neder, I shall become a nazirite. This is the case—

He asks about his neder, and afterward asks about his naziriteship.

That is, if he wishes to dissolve his neder, he must also dissolve his naziriteship, since if he does not dissolve his naziriteship, then immediately when the neder is dissolved he will become a nazirite.

The Gemara challenges Ravina from the words of this beraita:

And why? -

Why must he ask first about the neder and afterward about the naziriteship?

After all,

if he wishes, he can ask about his neder first.

And

if he wishes, he can ask about his naziriteship first -

the man can ask about his naziriteship even before he asks about the neder, and even though the naziriteship has not yet taken effect as long as the neder has not been dissolved; nevertheless, according to Ravina, it is possible to dissolve nedarim even before they actually take effect?

And we conclude:

Teyku.

Mishna:

Originally they would say that three women leave their husbands and receive their ketuba,

a.

A woman who says, “I am impure to you” -

a woman who tells her husband that she committed a forbidden act is believed, and she is forbidden to her husband.

b.

“Heaven is between me and you.”

That is: Heaven is witness to the matter between you and me: You are unable to father children. The woman is believed concerning this claim, and she can demand a divorce and her ketuba.

c.

“I am forbidden to the Jews” -

a woman who forbids herself from deriving the benefit of intercourse with all Jews: We compel the husband to divorce her and give her her ketuba, since her words demonstrate that intercourse is difficult for her, and she is therefore considered coerced.

These are the words of the first Mishna.

They reconsidered and said [

they retracted their ruling ],

in order

that a woman should not set her eyes on another man and ruin her relationship with her husband.

a.

A woman who says, “I am impure to you,”

is not believed and

must bring proof for her words.

b.

“Heaven is between me and you,”

she is not believed, and

they should proceed by way of entreaty -

the husband should attempt to appease and reassure her so that she will no longer say this. c.

“I am forbidden to the Jews”: He may nullify the vow with regard to his portion, and she may serve him, while she remains forbidden to the Jews.

These are the words of the final Mishna:

Gemara:

It was asked of them:

A kohen’s wife who

said to her husband, “I am impure to you”—may she eat teruma?

Is she not believed only with regard to becoming forbidden to her husband, because of the concern that she may have set her eyes on another man, but with regard to becoming forbidden to eat teruma is she believed? Or is she not believed at all, even with regard to teruma?

Rav Sheshet said: She eats

teruma, and she is not believed at all, in order

that she should not cast aspersions on her children

by causing people to say that they are ḥalalim and disqualified from the kehuna.

Rava said: She may not eat,

and there is no concern that aspersions will be cast on her children, since

it is possible that she ate non-sacred food -

she can eat non-sacred food, and people will not realize that she refrains from eating teruma because of her adultery.

Rava said, and Rav Sheshet concedes that if she became widowed [

was widowed ]

she may not eat.

What is the reason -

for all of Rav Sheshet’s reasoning is

only because

she should not

cast aspersions on her children.

If so, this reason does not apply when she

became widowed or divorced,

because then no aspersion will be cast, since

they will say: Now she has become disqualified -

people will say that the reason she is forbidden to eat teruma is that she was disqualified only now, after she became widowed, and therefore no aspersion will be cast on her children.

Rav Pappa said: Rava tested us [

Rava questioned us ],

“A kohen’s wife who was raped—does she have a ketuba, or does she not have a ketuba?”

And the explanation of the uncertainty is:

Is it

since, with regard to a kohen, rape is considered equivalent to willful intercourse with regard to an Israelite [

just as an Israelite’s wife becomes forbidden to her husband if she commits adultery willingly, so a kohen’s wife becomes forbidden to her husband even if she was raped ], then likewise with regard to a ketuba: Just as an Israelite’s wife who committed adultery willingly has no ketuba, so a kohen’s wife, even if she was raped,

has no ketuba.

Or perhaps, she can say to him [

the woman can claim ] :

“I am here before you.”