Nedarim 88a — the Talmud in English

And we answer:

Rava said,

the two matters cannot be compared.

Here, according to the subject of the verse, and here, according to the subject of the verse [

each passage and its subject], and the dispute between Rabbi Meir and Rabbi Yehuda is not whether partial knowledge is considered knowledge; rather, their dispute is how to expound the verses in the passage of an inadvertent murderer.

Rabbi Yehuda holds: concerning a murderer it is written, “And one who

comes upon his fellow in the forest,”

and from this verse it is to be learned that this passage is stated regarding

anyone capable of entering the forest [

any person who is capable of entering the forest].

And a blind person, too, is “capable of entering the forest.”

And if so, the blind person should already be included from this verse.

And if you say

that from the verse

“without seeing”

we expound

to include the blind person,

then it will be difficult: why is a special exposition needed for this?

For indeed,

it follows for him from “forest.”

Rather, conclude from it

that the verse

“without seeing” is to be expounded—

to exclude a blind person.

And

Rabbi Meir holds

that in the passage of a murderer

it is written, “without knowledge.”

And from this verse it is to be learned that this passage is stated regarding

anyone capable of knowing [

any person who is capable of knowledge],

and a blind person is not “capable of knowing.”

And if so, the blind person should already be excluded from this verse.

And if you say

that from the verse

“without seeing”

we expound

to exclude a blind person,

then it will be difficult: why is a special exposition needed for this? For indeed,

it follows for him from “without knowledge.”

Rather, conclude from it

that the verse

“without seeing” is to be expounded to include a blind person.

Mishna:

One who makes his son-in-law a mudar hanaa [

a person who vowed that his son-in-law is forbidden to derive benefit from his property].

and he wishes to give money to his daughter,

but everything that he gives her will belong to her husband, for whatever a woman acquires, her husband acquires.

He says to her: These coins are given to you as a gift, provided that your husband shall have no authority over them.

And you have no authority to use this

except for what you carry and put into your mouth.

That is: only to use these coins for eating.

Gemara:

Rav said: They taught this only when he said to her, “what you carry and put into your mouth.”

Then the husband does not acquire these coins, since she too has no right to these coins except for eating.

But if he said, “Do whatever you wish,”

meaning that he gave her the right to use these coins for whatever she wishes—

the husband acquires them.

For whatever a woman has, the husband acquires; and since the woman can use this for anything, it is entirely hers, and consequently the husband acquires it.

And Shmuel says: Even if he said, “Do whatever you wish,” the husband does not acquire them.

For since he stipulated and said that these coins are given to you on the condition that your husband shall have no authority over them, the stipulation is effective, and her husband does not acquire them.

Rabbi Zeira raised an objection against it: