Nedarim 88a (פח.) — the Talmud in English

And we answer:

Rava said:

The two matters cannot be compared.

Here, it is derived according to the context of the verse, and here, it is derived according to the context of the verse

[each passage according to its context]. The dispute between Rabbi Meir and Rabbi Judah is not whether partial knowledge is considered knowledge; rather, their dispute concerns how to expound the verses in the passage concerning one who kills unintentionally.

Rabbi Judah holds: Concerning a murderer it is written, “And one who

brings his fellow into the forest,”

and from this verse it may be learned that this passage refers to

every person capable of entering the forest

[any person who is capable of entering the forest].

And a blind person, too, is “capable of entering the forest.”

And therefore the blind person can already be included by this verse.

And if you say

that from the verse

“without seeing”

we derive

to include a blind person,

then there would be a difficulty: Why is a special derivation necessary for this?

For surely,

it follows from “forest.”

Rather, conclude from it

that the verse

“without seeing” should be expounded as

excluding a blind person.

And

Rabbi Meir holds

that concerning a murderer

it is written: “Without knowledge.”

And from this verse it may be learned that this passage refers to

every person capable of knowing

[any person who possesses the capacity for knowledge],

but a blind person is not “capable of knowing.”

Therefore, the blind person can already be excluded by this verse.

And if you say

that from the verse

“without seeing”

we derive

excluding a blind person,

then there would be a difficulty: Why is a special derivation necessary? For surely,

it follows from “without knowledge.”

Rather, conclude from it

that the verse

“without seeing” should be expounded to include a blind person.

Mishna:

One who vows to deny benefit to his son-in-law

[a person who prohibited his son-in-law by a vow from deriving benefit from his property],

and he wishes to give his daughter money,

yet everything that he gives her will belong to her husband, because whatever a woman acquires is acquired by her husband,

says to her: “These coins are given to you as a gift, provided that your husband has no authority over them.”

And you have no permission to use them

except for what you carry into your mouth and take out of it.

That is, she may use these coins only for eating.

Gemara:

Rav said: They taught this only when he said to her, “Except for what you carry into your mouth and take out of it.”

In that case, the husband does not acquire these coins, since even she has no rights to them except with regard to eating.

But if he said: “Do whatever you wish,”

granting her the right to use these coins for whatever she wants—

the husband acquires them.

For whatever a woman possesses is acquired by her husband. And since the woman may use these coins for any purpose, they are entirely hers, and consequently her husband acquires them.

And Shmuel says: Even if he said, “Do whatever you wish,” the husband does not acquire them.

Since he stipulated and said that these coins were given to her on the condition that her husband have no authority over them, the stipulation is effective, and her husband does not acquire them.

Rabbi Zeira raised an objection against it: