Nedarim 87b — the Talmud in English

And if

he annulled the vow concerning figs

alone,

it is not annulled

with regard to the grapes

until he also annuls it with regard to the grapes; these are the words of Rabbi Ishmael.

Rabbi Akiva says: For it says: “A man shall uphold it, and a man shall annul it.”

Just as “he shall uphold it” means part of it, so too “he shall annul it” means part of it -

just as the expression “he shall uphold it” implies that upholding part of it [of the vow] is effective for the entire vow, so too annulment is compared to upholding, so that with annulment as well, it is effective when he annuls only part of it [of the vow].

And the Gemara explains the dispute of Rabbi Ishmael and Rabbi Akiva.

And Rabbi Ishmael

holds that annulment of part of the vow is not effective with regard to the remainder of the vow, because

who

[or: does it say]

is written

in the Torah

“he shall annul part of it”?

And if so, there is no derivation that annulment of part of the vow is effective for the entire vow.

And Rabbi Akiva

holds that

annulment is compared to upholding: just as with upholding, “part of it,” so too with annulment, “part of it.”

Rabbi Hiyya bar Abba said in the name of Rabbi Yohanan: This is the statement of Rabbi Ishmael and Rabbi Akiva.

But the Sages say: Upholding is compared to annulment.

Just as with annulment, what he annulled is annulled, so too with upholding, what he upheld is upheld -

just as annulment of part of the vow is effective only with regard to the part that was annulled, so too upholding of part of the vow is effective only with regard to the part that was upheld.

We learned in the latter clause of the Mishna:

“If she said: Konam, a fig”

and so on:

Rava said: Our Mishna is Rabbi Shimon -

our Mishna is in accordance with the view of Rabbi Shimon,

who said

in tractate Shevuot that when a person is sued for money by five people, and he lied and denied their claims, and swore falsely with one oath, saying that he owed nothing to this one and nothing to that one, and so on -

his oath is considered one oath, and he is liable for only one oath-offering,

until he says

an expression of

oath

separately

for each and every one.

For example: “I swear that I do not owe this one,” and “I swear that I do not owe that one”; then there are five oaths, and he is liable for five oath-offerings.

But the Sages dispute Rabbi Shimon, and hold that even when he said in the language of one oath, “I do not owe anything to this one and anything to that one,” the matter is considered five oaths, and he is liable for five offerings on their account.

And in our Mishna it is implied that only when she said, “Konam, a fig that I taste, and a grape that I taste,” is this considered two vows, as though she had said the expression of konam separately with regard to each species. But if she had said, “Konam, whatever I taste—not a fig and not a grape,” this would be considered one vow, and this is in accordance with the view of Rabbi Shimon.

Mishna:

If the husband said on the day that he heard the vow:

“I know that there are vows”

[that these vows take effect],

“but I do not know that there are those who annul them”

[that vows can be annulled] -

he shall annul

when he learns that it is possible to annul vows, even after the day on which he heard it has passed. Since as long as he did not know that vows can be annulled, this is not considered the day on which he heard it, only when he learns of it is that called the day on which he heard it.

But if he said:

“I know that there are those who annul them”

[that vows can be annulled],

“but I do not know that this is a vow”

[that this is a vow that can be annulled] -

Rabbi Meir says: He shall not annul

if he learned of it after the day on which he heard it had passed, but on the day on which he heard it, the husband may annul it even though he still did not know whether this vow can be annulled.

And the Sages say: He shall annul

after he learns that this is a vow that can be annulled, even if the day on which he heard it has passed, since as long as he did not know that the vow could be annulled, this is not considered that he heard the vow; therefore, only when he learns of it is that called the day on which he heard it.

Gemara:

And we raise a contradiction -

and we challenge Rabbi Meir with a contradiction in his statements:

Since we learned in a beraita:

It is written in the Torah that when a person unintentionally kills a person, he is exiled to the cities of refuge. And it is written in this passage

“without seeing.”

The verse teaches that specifically if the unintentional killer is a person capable of seeing, he is liable for exile,

excluding a blind person,

who cannot see,

the words of Rabbi Judah.

Rabbi Meir says: It includes a blind person -

since even a blind person can sense a person who is nearby, he is considered a person capable of seeing partially, and he is included in the passage concerning one who unintentionally kills a person.

It follows that Rabbi Meir’s statements contradict one another: in the first clause of the Mishna, we say that according to everyone, as long as the husband did not know that vows could be annulled, this is not called the day on which he heard it, and it follows that partial knowledge is not considered knowledge. Whereas in the beraita, Rabbi Meir holds that partial knowledge is considered knowledge, and for this reason a blind person is considered a person who can see.