Nedarim 87b (פז:) — the Talmud in English

And if

he annulled the vow concerning figs

alone,

it is not annulled

with regard to the grapes

until he also annuls it with regard to the grapes; this is the statement of Rabbi Yishmael.

Rabbi Akiva says: For it says: “A man may uphold it, and a man may annul it.”

Just as “he may uphold it” means from it, so too “he may annul it” means from it —

just as the wording “he may uphold it” implies that upholding part of the vow is effective for the entire vow, so too annulment is compared to upholding, and annulment is likewise effective when he annuls only part of the vow.

The Gemara explains the dispute between Rabbi Yishmael and Rabbi Akiva.

And Rabbi Yishmael

holds that annulment of part of a vow is not effective with regard to the rest of the vow, because

who

—

is it

written in the Torah

“he may annul it from it”?

And therefore, there is no derivation that annulment of part of a vow is effective for the entire vow.

And Rabbi Akiva

holds that

annulment is compared to upholding: Just as with upholding, “from it,” so too with annulment, “from it.”

Rabbi Ḥiyya bar Abba said that Rabbi Yoḥanan said: This is the statement of Rabbi Yishmael and Rabbi Akiva.

But the Sages say: Upholding is compared to annulment.

Just as with annulment, what he annulled is annulled, so too with upholding, what he upheld is upheld —

just as annulment of part of a vow is effective only with regard to the part that was annulled, so too upholding part of a vow is effective only with regard to the part that was upheld.

We learned in the latter clause of the Mishna:

If she said: “A fig is konam”

and so on:

Rava said: The Mishna is the opinion of Rabbi Shimon —

our Mishna is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Shimon,

who said

in tractate Shevuot that when five people demand money from a person, and he lies and denies their claims, and swears falsely in a single oath, saying that he is not liable either to this one or to that one, and so on, —

his oath is considered a single oath, and he is liable for only one oath-offering,

until he says

the wording of a

separate oath

to

each and every one.

For example: “I swear that I am not liable to this one,” and “I swear that I am not liable to that one”; in that case there are five oaths, and he is liable for five oath-offerings.

But the Sages disagree with Rabbi Shimon and hold that even when he uses a single oath formula, saying that he is not liable either to this one or to that one, the matter is considered five oaths, and he is liable for five offerings on their account.

It is implied from our Mishna that only when she says, “A fig is konam, which I will taste, and a grape is konam, which I will taste,” is this considered two vows, as though she had stated the formula of konam separately with regard to each species. But if she had said, “What I taste is konam, neither a fig nor a grape,” this would be considered one vow, and this is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Shimon.

Mishna:

If the husband said on the day that he heard the vow:

“I know that there are vows”

— that these vows take effect —

“but I do not know that there are those who may annul them”

— that vows can be annulled —

he may annul it

when he learns that vows can be annulled, even after the day of his hearing has passed. Since, as long as he did not know that vows could be annulled, this is not considered the day of his hearing, only when he learns of it is it called the day of his hearing.

But if he said:

“I know that there are those who may annul them”

— that vows can be annulled —

“but I do not know that this is a vow”

— that this is a vow that can be annulled —

Rabbi Meir says: He may not annul it

if he learns of this after the day of his hearing has passed. But on the day of his hearing, the husband may annul it even though he still did not know whether this vow could be annulled.

And the Sages say: He may annul it

after he learns that this is a vow that can be annulled, even if the day of his hearing has passed, since as long as he did not know that the vow could be annulled, this is not considered that he heard the vow. Therefore, only when he learns of it is it called the day of his hearing.

Gemara:

And it raises a contradiction —

we challenge Rabbi Meir with a contradiction in his statements:

For we learned in a beraita:

The Torah states that when a person unintentionally kills someone, he is exiled to cities of refuge. And it is written in this passage:

“Without seeing.”

The verse teaches that specifically if the unintentional killer is a person capable of seeing, he is liable to exile.

Except for a blind person,

who cannot see,

the statement of Rabbi Yehuda.

Rabbi Meir says: “To include a blind person” —

since even a blind person can sense a person who is nearby, he is considered a person capable of seeing partially, and he is included in the passage concerning one who unintentionally kills someone.

It follows that Rabbi Meir’s statements contradict one another. In the first clause of the Mishna, we say that according to everyone, as long as the husband did not know that vows could be annulled, this is not called the day of his hearing; it follows that partial knowledge is not considered knowledge. Yet in the beraita Rabbi Meir holds that partial knowledge is considered knowledge, and therefore a blind person is considered a person who can see.