Nedarim 87a (פז.) — the Talmud in English

And we raise an objection:

But regarding rending garments

the obligation to rend one’s garment for the dead], if two or three relatives died, we learn that one must rend his garment twice from

as it is written

the word “for” twice,

as it is written: “For Saul and for Jonathan his son.”

And if so, even regarding rending garments, one should learn from the fact that it is written, “For Saul and for Jonathan,” that one must rend specifically for that particular deceased person; and if he rended for another deceased person, he has not fulfilled the obligation of rending.

And it was taught

otherwise:

They told him that his father had died, and he rended his garment, and afterward it was discovered

that the deceased was

his son; he has fulfilled the obligation of rending,

and he need not rend his garment again?

And we answer:

They said: This is not difficult. Here it is an unspecified case, and there it is an explicitly specified case —

Our Mishna is speaking of a case in which he explicitly stated that he was annulling this particular vow. Therefore, if it became clear that he had erred, the annulment did not take effect with regard to the other vow.

But regarding rending, it is speaking of a case in which he rended his garment without specifying for whom he was rending. Therefore, he fulfilled the obligation of rending even when it became clear that the deceased was his son and not his father.

The Gemara cites a beraita that supports this answer:

And it was taught: They told him that his father had died, and he rended his garment, and afterward it was discovered that it was his son; he has not fulfilled the obligation of rending.

But

if they told him that a relative of his had died, and he thought that it was his father, and he rended his garment, and afterward it was discovered that it was his son, he has fulfilled the obligation of rending.

It follows that the beraita distinguishes between a case in which he rended his garment without specifying, merely assuming that the deceased was his father, and a case in which he explicitly rended his garment for his father.

Rav Ashi said —

another answer to resolve the Gemara’s objection:

Here it is within the time of speech; there it is after the time of speech,

and the Gemara explains the answer:

That which you said, that he has fulfilled the obligation of rending even

when

it was discovered

that the deceased was

his son

and not his father, is speaking of a case in which he learned of it

within the time of speech

from the time of rending.

But

that which you said, that he has not fulfilled the obligation of rending,

is speaking of a case in which he learned of it

after the time of speech

from the time of rending.

Accordingly, in our Mishna as well, which states that the annulment or upholding is ineffective when he does not know which vow it is or who made the vow, the case is one in which he learned of this only after the time of speech. But if he learned of it within the time of speech, the annulment is effective.

The Gemara cites a beraita that supports this answer:

And it was taught: If one has a sick person in his house, and the sick person fainted, and he thought that he had died, and he rended his garment, and afterward the sick person died, he has not fulfilled the obligation of rending.

Rabbi Shimon ben Pazi said that Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi said in the name of bar Kappara:

They taught this only when the sick person died after the time of speech; but if he died within the time of speech, it is considered speech

and he has fulfilled the obligation of rending.

And the halakha is:

Within the time of speech, it is considered speech,

Except for one who blasphemes —

A person who violated the prohibition against blaspheming the Name of God and retracted within the time of speech cannot rely on his retraction to save him from punishment.

And one who worships idolatry —

A person who said to an idol, “You are my deity,” and retracted within the time of speech cannot rely on his retraction to save him from punishment.

And one who betroths a woman, and one who divorces her —

If he betrothed a woman or divorced her and retracted within the time of speech, his retraction is ineffective to annul the betrothal or the divorce.

Mishna:

She said: Konam, these figs and grapes are forbidden to me

to taste,

and

the husband upheld

the vow

with regard to the figs; the entire vow is upheld —

the entire vow remains in force, and she is prohibited from eating the grapes as well.

But if he

annulled the vow with regard to the figs

alone,

it is not annulled

with regard to the grapes

until he also annuls it with regard to the grapes.

She said: Konam, a fig is forbidden to me to taste, and a grape is forbidden to me to taste; these are two vows.

It is possible to annul one of them and uphold the other.

Gemara:

Whose opinion is expressed in our Mishna? —

Rabbi Yishmael’s.

Our Mishna is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yishmael.

As it was taught: “Her husband may uphold it, and her husband may annul it.”

From here, if

she said: Konam, these figs and grapes are forbidden to me to taste,

and

the husband upheld

the vow

with regard to the figs; the entire vow is upheld —

the entire vow remains in force, including the vow concerning the grapes.