Nedarim 85b — the Talmud in English

The consecration does not take effect, but

“this one performs and eats”

from the proceeds of her labor.

“And the surplus” —

if the husband consecrated the surplus of the proceeds of her labor, that is, everything that she produces beyond the value of five sela, which the husband inherits after her death.

“Rabbi Meir says,”

this is

consecrated

after the woman dies, for then the husband acquires the surplus through inheritance.

“Rabbi Yohanan the sandal-maker says,”

this is

ordinary property.

Since it is impossible to consecrate something that has not yet come into the world, and this surplus has not yet been acquired by the husband during her lifetime, it is considered something that has not yet come into the world.

And Samuel said

about this Mishna:

“The halakha is in accordance with Rabbi Yohanan the sandal-maker.”

It follows that a person does not consecrate something that has not yet come into the world.

And it is found that there is a contradiction in Samuel’s own statements.

And if you would say —

if you wish to resolve that

when Samuel said

that

“the halakha is in accordance with Rabbi Yohanan ben Nuri,”

it was

only concerning the surplus that he said this,

Samuel ruled in accordance with Rabbi Yohanan ben Nuri only in what he maintains, that the surplus is liened to the husband; but in what he maintains, that a person consecrates something that has not yet come into the world, Samuel does not agree with him, but rather with Rabbi Yohanan the sandal-maker.

It cannot be resolved in this way, since if so,

let him say —

Samuel should have stated his words as follows:

“The halakha is in accordance with Rabbi Yohanan ben Nuri concerning the surplus,”

Alternatively,

Samuel could have stated it in this way:

“The halakha is in accordance with the first Tanna,”

for even the first Tanna maintains that the surplus belongs to the husband, and likewise he maintains that a person does not consecrate something that has not yet come into the world.

Alternatively,

Samuel could even have stated it in this way:

“The halakha is not in accordance with Rabbi Akiva,”

and from this we would learn that the halakha is not in accordance with Rabbi Akiva, who says that the husband may annul, but rather in accordance with the first Tanna, who says that the husband may not annul.

And from the fact that Samuel left his statement unqualified and said that the halakha is in accordance with Rabbi Yohanan ben Nuri, it follows that he rules in accordance with him in all his statements, even in this law, that a person consecrates something that has not yet come into the world,

and if so, the contradiction in Samuel’s statements returns: in Nedarim he rules that it is possible to prohibit by a vow something that has not yet come into the world, whereas concerning consecration he rules that it is impossible to consecrate something that has not yet come into the world.

And we resolve:

Rather, Rav Yosef said,

consecrations cannot be compared to konamot.

For

the case of konamot is different, since just as a person prohibits his fellow’s produce to himself

[to himself],

, he likewise prohibits something that has not yet come into the world to himself —

Just as we find that a person can prohibit to himself by a vow something that is not his, so too a person can prohibit to himself even things that have not yet come into the world and are not yet in his possession.

But concerning consecration, since it is impossible to consecrate something that is not his, likewise it is impossible to consecrate something that has not yet come into the world, since it is not yet considered to be in his possession.

And we object to this resolution:

Abaye said to him:

Indeed, it is as you say, that something that has not yet come into the world is like something that is not his; but the objection is still not resolved.

For

granted

this law, that

a person prohibits his fellow’s produce to himself

[to himself], is understandable,

for

likewise we also find that

a person prohibits his produce to his fellow,

meaning that a person can prohibit either his produce to his fellow or his fellow’s produce to himself.

Therefore, a person can also prohibit something that has not yet come into the world to himself, since this is like prohibiting his fellow’s produce to himself.

But

[would you say] also that

a person prohibits

a

thing that has not yet come into the world to his fellow?

Surely we have not found such a thing,

for a person does not prohibit his fellow’s produce to his fellow.

And if so, how can you say that the woman can prohibit the proceeds of her labor, which have not yet come into the world, to her husband?

And Rav Yosef’s resolution is rejected.

And we resolve with another resolution:

Rather, Rav Huna, son of Rabbi Yehoshua, said,

to resolve the contradiction in Samuel’s statements:

Our Mishna is speaking

of one who says: “Let my hands be consecrated to those who make use of them,”

for she did not prohibit the proceeds of her labor, but rather said: Let my hands themselves be konam to my husband; consequently, whatever comes from her hands is prohibited with the prohibition of konam. (The Gemara refers to vows with the language of consecration, since konam is like consecration; see the chapter “There Is No Difference Between One Who Is Prohibited by a Vow.”)

And since her hands are the ones prohibited with the prohibition of konam, the vow can take effect, and this is not considered something that has not yet come into the world,

for the hands, behold, they exist in the world —

her hands already exist in the world, and the vow takes effect.

And we object:

And when she said this, does it become consecrated? —

Does a vow take effect in this manner?

But her hands are liened to the husband —

Are her hands not liened to the husband, and therefore she cannot prohibit her hands to her husband?

And we resolve:

For example, she

said: “When he divorces me.” —

She said that the vow should take effect when she is divorced.

And we object:

“At present, he has not divorced her”

[for she has not yet been divorced], and if so, the divorce is something that has not yet come into the world,

and from where do we know that when she said this, it is effective —

And from where do we know that such a vow takes effect? After all, it is impossible to prohibit something that has not yet come into the world?