Nedarim 85b (פה:) — the Talmud in English

The consecration does not take effect; rather,

she may work and eat

from the proceeds of her labor.

And the surplus —

If the husband consecrated the surplus of her labor, meaning everything she does beyond the value of five sela, which the husband inherits after her death.

Rabbi Meir says:

This is

consecrated

after the woman dies, for then the husband acquires the surplus through inheritance.

Rabbi Yohanan the Sandalmaker says:

This is

non-sacred.

Since one cannot consecrate something that has not yet come into existence, and the husband has not yet acquired this surplus during her lifetime, it is considered something that has not yet come into existence.

And Shmuel said

about this Mishna:

The halakha is in accordance with Rabbi Yohanan the Sandalmaker.

Apparently, a person cannot consecrate something that has not yet come into existence.

It follows that there is a contradiction within Shmuel’s own statements.

And if you would say —

If you wish to resolve this by saying that

when Shmuel said

that

the halakha is in accordance with Rabbi Yohanan ben Nuri,

it was

only with regard to the surplus that he said this,

meaning that Shmuel ruled in accordance with Rabbi Yohanan ben Nuri only with regard to his view that the surplus is owed to the husband; but with regard to his view that a person can consecrate something that has not yet come into existence, Shmuel does not agree with him, but rather agrees with Rabbi Yohanan the Sandalmaker.

This cannot be the resolution, since, if so,

let him say —

Shmuel should have stated his ruling as follows:

The halakha is in accordance with Rabbi Yohanan ben Nuri with regard to the surplus.

Alternatively,

Shmuel could have stated it as follows:

The halakha is in accordance with the first tanna,

since even the first tanna holds that the surplus belongs to the husband, and likewise holds that a person cannot consecrate something that has not yet come into existence.

Alternatively,

Shmuel could even have stated it as follows:

(There is) no halakha in accordance with Rabbi Akiva,

and from this we would learn that the halakha is not in accordance with Rabbi Akiva, who says that the husband can annul the vow, but rather in accordance with the first tanna, who says that the husband cannot annul it.

Since Shmuel stated his words without qualification and said that the halakha is in accordance with Rabbi Yohanan ben Nuri, it appears that he rules in accordance with him in all his statements, even in this matter—that a person can consecrate something that has not yet come into existence.

If so, the contradiction in Shmuel’s statements arises once again: with regard to vows, he rules that one can prohibit through a vow something that has not yet come into existence, whereas with regard to consecration, he rules that one cannot consecrate something that has not yet come into existence.

And we resolve:

Rather, Rav Yosef said:

Consecrations cannot be compared to konamot.

For

the case of konamot is different, since a person can prohibit another person’s produce to himself

[to himself],

he can likewise prohibit something that has not yet come into existence to himself —

Just as we find that a person can prohibit through a vow something that does not belong to him, so too a person can prohibit to himself even things that have not yet come into existence and are not yet in his possession.

But with regard to consecration, since one cannot consecrate something that does not belong to him, one likewise cannot consecrate something that has not yet come into existence, since it is not yet considered to be in his possession.

And we challenge this resolution:

Abaye said to him:

Indeed, it is as you say, that something that has not yet come into existence is like something that does not belong to a person; nevertheless, the difficulty has still not been resolved.

For

granted

that the law is that

a person can prohibit another person’s produce to himself

[to himself]—this is understandable,

for

we likewise find that

a person can prohibit his own produce to another person,

meaning that a person can prohibit either his own produce to another person or another person’s produce to himself.

Therefore, a person can also prohibit something that has not yet come into existence to himself, since this is comparable to prohibiting another person’s produce to himself.

But

[would you] say also that

a person can prohibit

a

thing that has not yet come into existence to another person?

Surely we have found no such case,

for a person cannot prohibit another person’s produce to another person.

If so, how can you say that the woman can prohibit the proceeds of her labor, which have not yet come into existence, to her husband?

Rav Yosef’s resolution is therefore rejected.

And we offer another resolution:

Rather, Rav Huna, son of Rabbi Yehoshua, said:

This is how to resolve the contradiction in Shmuel’s statements.

Our Mishna is speaking

of a woman who says: “Let my hands become consecrated to those who make use of them,”

meaning that she did not prohibit the proceeds of her labor; rather, she said that her hands themselves should be konam to her husband, and consequently everything produced by her hands is prohibited with the prohibition of konam. (The Gemara refers to vows using the language of consecration, since konam is equivalent to consecration; see also the chapter “There Is No Difference between One Who Is Prohibited by a Vow.”)

And since her hands are what is prohibited with the prohibition of konam, the vow can take effect, and this is not considered something that has not yet come into existence,

for the hands do exist in the world —

Her hands already exist in the world, and the vow takes effect.

And we challenge:

But did she say it in this manner? Did it become consecrated

—does a vow take effect in this manner?

But her hands are bound to her husband

—her hands are obligated to her husband, and she cannot prohibit her hands to her husband.

And we resolve:

For example, when she

said: “When he divorces me” —

she said that the vow should take effect when she is divorced.

And we challenge:

At present, she has not been divorced

[she is still not divorced], and if so, the divorce is something that has not yet come into existence;

And from where do we know that, when she said this, it is effective —

how can we say that such a vow takes effect? After all, one cannot prohibit something that has not yet come into existence.