Nedarim 85a (פה.) — the Talmud in English

Rabbi holds that the benefit of possession has monetary value—

this right of benefit in terumot and tithes is considered a monetary right, and by virtue of this monetary right the owner of the produce has ownership of the terumot and tithes; therefore, the thief must pay their value to the owner of the produce.

And Rabbi Yosei bar Rabbi Yehuda holds that the benefit of possession does not have monetary value—

this right of benefit of possession is not considered a monetary right, and the terumot and tithes are not considered to belong to the owner of the produce. Therefore, the thief is not required to pay the owner of the produce the value of the terumot and tithes contained in the tevel.

It follows that this law is the subject of a dispute between tannaim. Accordingly, Rav Hoshaya explains that the first clause of the Mishna follows the opinion of Rabbi Yosei bar Rabbi Yehuda, while the latter clause of the Mishna follows the opinion of Rabbi.

And we reject this:

No; everyone agrees that the benefit of possession does not have monetary value.

Rather, here they disagree with regard to gifts

of the priesthood

that have not yet been separated

that have not yet been separated—

the dispute between Rabbi Yosei bar Rabbi Yehuda and Rabbi concerns how gifts of the priesthood are to be regarded monetarily before they are separated from the tevel.

Rabbi Yosei bar Rabbi Yehuda holds that the terumot and tithes are considered, from a monetary perspective, as though they had already been separated and already exist. If so, a portion belonging to the priests and Levites is mixed into the tevel, and it does not belong to the owner of the produce. Therefore, the thief is not required to pay the owner of the produce for the portion of terumot and tithes.

Rabbi holds that as long as the terumot and tithes have not yet been separated, all the produce is considered mere tevel, and there is no portion here belonging to the priests. Therefore, the thief must pay the full value of the tevel to the person from whom he stole it.

And we challenge this rejection:

But if

according to everyone

the benefit of possession does not have monetary value,

then

what difference is there whether they have been separated or whether they have not been separated [מה לי אם נחשבים התרומות ומעשרות כאילו הופרשו כבר, מה לי אם אינם נחשבים כך]. הלא בכל אופן אין סיבה לחייב את הגנב לשלם כנגד שיווי התרומות ומעשרות, שהרי לבעל הפירות אין לו מזה כלום]][What difference is it whether the terumot and tithes are considered as though they have already been separated, or whether they are not considered so?] In either case, there is no reason to require the thief to pay for the value of the terumot and tithes, since the owner of the produce derives nothing from them.

In either case, there is no reason to require the thief to pay for the value of the teruma and tithes, since the owner of the produce has no monetary benefit from them.

We explain the matter differently:

rather, this is the reason for Rabbi’s opinion:

even if the benefit of possession does not have monetary value, the thief must nevertheless pay the full value, because

[in order]

the Sages penalized the thief so that he would not steal.

And Rabbi Yosei bar Rabbi Yehuda holds that

even if the benefit of possession has monetary value, the thief nevertheless pays only the value of the non-sacred produce contained in it, because

the Sages penalized the owner of the house, so that he would not delay separating terumot and tithes from his tevel—

so that he would not leave his tevel for a long time without separating terumot and tithes.

If so, the contradiction between the first and latter clauses of the Mishna has not been resolved.

Rava said,

to resolve this contradiction:

Actually, the benefit of possession does have monetary value. Therefore, when he prohibits specific priests and Levites from deriving benefit from his terumot and tithes, they are prohibited from his terumot and tithes.

And

the first clause is different,

But

, when he prohibits teruma

to all priests.

This is the reason that they may take it against his will: Since teruma is fit only for priests, and since he has come to prohibit it to them, he has rendered it mere dust.

That is to say: When he prohibits all priests from deriving benefit from it, he has no use for the terumot and tithes. This is considered as though he does not regard the benefit of possession that he has in them, and it is therefore as though he rendered them ownerless. Consequently, the priests may take the terumot and tithes against his will, since he does not benefit from them, having rendered his benefit of possession ownerless.

Mishna:

If I prohibit by vow the products of my labor to my father, to your father, to my brother, or to your brother—

if the woman prohibited the products of her labor to her father, her husband’s father, her brother, or her husband’s brother,

he cannot annul the vow,

he cannot nullify the vow, since this is neither self-affliction nor a vow between him and her.

If I prohibit by vow the products of my labor to you—

and if she prohibited the products of her labor to her husband,

he need not nullify the vow.

This is because the vow does not take effect, since the products of her labor are encumbered to her husband, and she cannot prohibit them to him.

Rabbi Akiva says: He should nullify it,

and the reason is

lest she produce more than he is entitled to—

perhaps the products of her labor will exceed the amount needed by her husband; this surplus is not encumbered to the husband, and the vow takes effect upon it.

Therefore, he should nullify the vow, so that the husband will not become prohibited from the surplus of the products of her labor.

Rabbi Yohanan ben Nuri says: He should nullify it;

the husband should nullify it for another reason:

lest he divorce her,

in which case the vow will take effect, since at that time she will no longer be encumbered to him,

and she will be prohibited to him,

and the husband will be unable to remarry her, since the products of her labor will be prohibited to him.

Therefore, he should nullify the vow so that it will not take effect after the divorce.

Gemara:

Shmuel said: The halakha is in accordance with Rabbi Yohanan ben Nuri.

[מוכיחה הגמרא מדברי שמואל אלו]Does this indicate [The Gemara infers from these words of Shmuel]:

[the Gemara proves from these words of Shmuel],

that Shmuel holds that a person can consecrate something that does not yet exist?

For if we say that a person cannot consecrate something that does not yet exist, the vow cannot take effect upon the products of her labor that she will produce only after she is divorced, and the husband need not nullify it for her.

But we raise a contradiction—

and we challenge this from another statement of Shmuel himself:

As we learned in the Mishna:

One who consecrates the products of his wife’s labor,