Nedarim 85a — the Talmud in English

Rabbi [Yehuda HaNasi] held: the benefit of disposition is property -

this right of the benefit of disposition in terumot and tithes is considered a property right, and by virtue of this property right the owner of the produce has ownership of the terumot and tithes in the produce; therefore, the thief must pay their value to the owner of the produce.

And Rabbi Yosei bar Rabbi Yehuda held: the benefit of disposition is not property -

this right of the benefit of disposition is not considered a property right, and the terumot and tithes are not considered to belong to the owner of the produce; therefore, the thief is not obligated to pay the owner of the produce the value of the terumot and tithes contained in the tevel.

And it emerges that this law is the subject of a dispute among tannaim; therefore, Rav Hoshaya explains that the first clause of the Mishna is according to Rabbi Yosei bar Rabbi Yehuda, and the latter clause of the Mishna is according to Rabbi [Yehuda HaNasi].

And we reject this:

No; everyone holds that the benefit of disposition is not property.

Rather, here they dispute

priestly

gifts that have not been separated

.

- Their dispute, that of Rabbi Yosei bar Rabbi Yehuda and Rabbi [Yehuda HaNasi], is how the priestly gifts must be regarded from a property perspective before their separation from the tevel.

The view of Rabbi Yosei bar Rabbi Yehuda is that the terumot and tithes are considered as though they have already been separated, and they exist from a property perspective. If so, a portion belonging to the priests and Levites is mixed into the tevel, and it does not belong to the owner of the produce. Therefore, the thief is not obligated to pay the owner of the produce the portion of the terumot and tithes.

And Rabbi’s view is that as long as the terumot and tithes have not yet been separated, all the produce is considered mere tevel, and there is no portion here belonging to priests; therefore, the thief is obligated to pay the value of all the tevel to the one from whom he stole it.

And we raise an objection against this rejection:

But if

according to everyone

the benefit of disposition is not property,

then

what difference is there whether they have been separated or whether they have not been separated

[what difference is there whether the terumot and tithes are considered as though they have already been separated, or whether they are not considered so]? In any event, there is no reason to obligate the thief to pay against the value of the terumot and tithes, for the owner of the produce has nothing from them.

And we explain another explanation:

Rather, this is Rabbi’s reason:

even if the benefit of disposition is not property, nevertheless the thief is obligated to pay the value of all of it, because

the Sages penalized the thief, so that

[in order]

he should not steal.

And Rabbi Yosei bar Rabbi Yehuda held

that even if the benefit of disposition is property, nevertheless the thief pays only the value of the unconsecrated produce contained in it, because

the Sages penalized the householder, so that he should not delay his tevel -

so that he should not leave his tevel for a long time without separating the terumot and tithes.

If so, the contradiction between the first clause and the latter clause of the Mishna has not been resolved.

Rava said

to resolve this contradiction.

The benefit of disposition is indeed property always; therefore, when he forbids his benefit to particular priests and Levites, they are forbidden to his terumot and tithes.

But

different

is the first clause, when he forbids

teruma

to all the priests.

This is the reason that they take it against his will: because teruma is fit only for priests, and since he is coming to forbid it to them, he has made it mere dust.

That is to say: when he forbids all the priests to derive benefit from it, he has nothing to do with the terumot and tithes, and this is considered as though he does not regard the benefit of disposition that he has from them; it is therefore as though he has declared them ownerless. Consequently, the priests may take the terumot and tithes against his will, since he does not derive benefit from them, for he has declared his benefit of disposition ownerless.

Mishna:

“Konam that I do not perform according to my father, according to your father, according to my brother, or according to your brother” -

if the woman forbade the work of her hands to her father, to her husband’s father, to her brother, or to her husband’s brother,

he cannot annul

it, since this is neither self-affliction nor vows between him and her.

“That I do not perform according to your mouth” -

and if she forbade the work of her hands to her husband,

he need not annul it.

For the vow does not take effect, since the work of her hands is subordinated to her husband, and she cannot forbid it to him.

Rabbi Akiva says: He should annul it,

and the reason is

“lest she produce more for him than what is appropriate for him” -

lest the work of her hands be greater than the husband’s needs, and this surplus is not subordinated to the husband, so the vow takes effect upon it.

Therefore, he should annul it, so that the husband should not be forbidden the surplus of the work of her hands.

Rabbi Yohanan ben Nuri says: He should annul it;

the husband should annul it for another reason:

“Lest he divorce her,”

and then the vow will take effect, since at that time she is no longer subordinated to him,

“and she will become forbidden to him,”

and the husband will not be able to return and marry her, since the work of her hands is forbidden to him.

Therefore, he should annul it, so that the vow should not take effect after the divorce.

Gemara:

Shmuel said: The halakha is according to Rabbi Yohanan ben Nuri.

Does this imply

[the Gemara proves from these words of Shmuel],

that Shmuel holds: a person consecrates something that has not yet come into the world?

For if we say that a person does not consecrate something that has not yet come into the world, the vow can take effect only upon the work of her hands that she will perform after she is divorced, and the husband need not annul it for her.

And we raise a contradiction -

and we raise a contradiction to this from Shmuel’s own words:

For we learned:

“One who consecrates the work of his wife’s hands,”