Nedarim 84b — the Talmud in English

And the Sages say: He designates by name

[he applies the designation of the tithe for the poor to a tenth of the produce of demai],

and he need not separate it

in practice to the side, but rather leaves it in its place and uses it for himself, since in a case of doubtful ownership, one is lenient.

And the explanation of the dispute is: according to Rabbi Eliezer, “its doubt does not make [the produce] tevel.” That is, the produce is not forbidden for eating if he did not separate from it the tithe for the poor, and therefore there is no need, because of the doubt, to tithe it.

And according to the Rabbis, “its doubt does make [the produce] tevel,” that is, the produce is forbidden for eating so long as he has not yet tithed the tithe for the poor from the produce, and therefore he is obligated, because of the doubt, to tithe it.

And the Gemara makes the question of whether a woman prohibited by a vow from deriving benefit from people is permitted to receive from them the tithe for the poor dependent upon this dispute:

Is it not that, according to the one who says that its doubt makes [the produce] tevel

[according to the Rabbis], the tithe for the poor is included in the category of the other terumot and tithes, concerning which the language “giving” was stated, and the mitzva is upon the owner of the produce to give the terumot and tithes to the priest, the Levite, and the poor person?

And

he holds that he has a benefit-right—

the right of the householder is to distribute the tithe for the poor according to what he sees fit, and every poor person cannot take the tithe himself against the will of the owner of the produce. And if so, the owner of the produce has a “benefit-right” in the produce.

And since he has a benefit-right, it does not benefit her—

it is forbidden for the woman who vowed not to derive benefit from people to benefit from the owner of the produce who gives her the tithe for the poor, since she benefits from one who has a certain right of “benefit” in the produce.

And according to the one who says

he does not

designate by name

[according to Rabbi Eliezer],

he holds: “its doubt does not make [the produce] tevel.”

And everything whose doubt does not make [the produce] tevel

is not included in the category of the other terumot and tithes, and the language “giving” was not said concerning it, but rather the language “leaving,” that is, the owners were commanded to leave the tithe for the poor and to allow every poor person in the marketplace to take the tithe himself, and the owners have no right to distribute the tithe according to what they see fit.

And according to his view,

he does not have

the owner of the produce

a benefit-right

in the tithe for the poor,

and it is permitted for her to benefit—

the woman who vowed not to derive benefit from people is permitted to benefit from the tithe for the poor, since she does not benefit from the owner of the produce, for she can take the tithe against his will.

Abaye said to

Rav Yosef: The explanation of the dispute is not as you said, that they disputed whether the tithe for the poor makes the produce tevel.

Rather,

everyone

holds that

its doubt does make [the produce] tevel,

and without separating the tithe for the poor, the produce is forbidden with the prohibition of eating tevel.

And Rabbi Eliezer and the Rabbis—

it is in this that they disagree:

Rabbi Eliezer holds: The common people were not suspected concerning the tithe for the poor

[the common people are not suspected of failing to separate the tithe for the poor].

And therefore there is no need to tithe the tithe for the poor in produce of demai, since we do not fear that perhaps the produce is not tithed, but rather that it is tevel with regard to the tithe for the poor.

And the reason that they are not suspected of failing to separate the tithe for the poor is:

since, if he declares his property ownerless, and becomes poor, and he himself takes it—

he has no loss—

because the common person does not lose by tithing the produce, since he can declare his property ownerless, and then he will be considered poor and will be able to take the tithe for the poor for himself.

And the Rabbis hold: A person does not declare his property ownerless, because he is afraid lest another person acquire it—

a person does not declare his property ownerless, out of fear that perhaps another person will precede him and acquire all his property.

Therefore, they were suspected

the common people, of failing to tithe their produce.

And therefore it is necessary to tithe the tithe for the poor in produce of demai, because one must be concerned that perhaps it is not tithed.

And according to this, the question of whether a woman prohibited by a vow from deriving benefit can benefit from the tithe for the poor is not dependent upon the dispute between Rabbi Eliezer and the Rabbis.

Rava says:

This is how the contradiction between the words of the Mishna and the words of the beraita is to be resolved:

Here

in the Mishna, it is speaking

of the tithe for the poor that is distributed within the house.

After he has already brought his produce into his house and separates from it the tithe for the poor,

for it is written concerning it, “giving”: “And you shall give to the Levite, to the convert,” and so on.

And with this tithe for the poor, the owner of the produce has a benefit-right, in that he can distribute the tithe according to what he sees fit. And

because of that it is forbidden for her

[the woman who vowed not to derive benefit from people]

to benefit

from the tithe, for she benefits from the owner of the produce who gives her the tithe.

Here

in the beraita, it is speaking

of the tithe for the poor that is distributed

within the threshing floors,

before he brings his produce into his house, for in this manner the owner of the produce does not distribute the tithe according to what he sees fit, but rather leaves it on the threshing floor, and every poor person can take the tithe,

since it is written concerning it, “And you shall leave it within your gates.”

And then the owners have no benefit-right from this, and

it is permitted for her

[the woman who vowed not to derive benefit from people]

to benefit

from the tithe for the poor, since she does not benefit from the owners, for she can take it against their will:

We learned in the Mishna:

“Priests and Levites are prohibited to me, they may take,” and so on;

And the Gemara proves from this law:

It follows that a benefit-right is not money—

this right of a benefit-right is not considered a monetary right. Therefore, although he prohibited his benefit to priests and Levites, they can take terumot and tithes from him, because this is not considered that they derive monetary benefit from him.

And we raise an objection:

Say the latter clause—

from the latter clause the opposite is proven, since we learned in it: If he vowed and said: konam,

“These priests and these Levites are prohibited to me, they may take,”

priests and Levites

other

may take his terumot and tithes,

but these

priests and Levites whom he prohibited from deriving benefit from him,

no,

and it is forbidden for him to give them terumot and tithes.

And this proves:

It follows that a benefit-right is money—

this right of a benefit-right is considered a monetary right, and therefore these priests and Levites whom he prohibited from deriving benefit from him are forbidden to benefit from the fact that he gives them the terumot and tithes.

And if so, the first clause is difficult against the latter clause.

And we answer:

Rav Hoshaya said:

It is not difficult. This one is Rabbi, and that one is Rabbi Yosei bar Rabbi Yehuda.

For it was taught: One who steals his fellow’s tevel and eats it,

pays him the value of his tevel.

That is, the value of all the tevel,

the words of Rabbi.

Rabbi Yosei bar Rabbi Yehuda says: He pays only the value of the non-sacred produce in it,

but he is not obligated to pay the monetary value of the teruma that the owner of the produce was obligated to separate from the tevel and give to a priest.

Is it not that it is in this that they disagree—