Nedarim 84b (פד:) — the Talmud in English

And the Sages say: He designates it by name [

applying the designation of poor man’s tithe to one-tenth of the demai produce],

and he need not separate it

physically set the tithe aside; rather, he leaves it in its place and uses it for himself, since in a case of monetary uncertainty, the lenient ruling applies.

The explanation of the dispute is as follows: According to Rabbi Eliezer, “its uncertainty does not render the produce tevel.” That is, the produce is not prohibited for consumption if he did not separate poor man’s tithe from it; therefore, because of the uncertainty, it is not necessary to tithe it.

And according to the Rabbis, “its uncertainty renders the produce tevel”; that is, the produce is prohibited for consumption as long as poor man’s tithe has not yet been separated from it. Therefore, because of the uncertainty, one is obligated to separate it.

And the Gemara links the issue of whether a woman prohibited by vow from deriving benefit from people is permitted to receive poor man’s tithe from them to this dispute:

Is it not the case that, according to the one who says, “its uncertainty renders the produce tevel”

according to the Rabbis, poor man’s tithe is included among the other terumot and maasrot, with regard to which the wording “giving” is used, and the mitzva is incumbent upon the owner of the produce to give the terumot and maasrot to the kohen, the Levite, and the poor person?

And

he holds that the owner has a benefit-right—

the owner’s right is to distribute the poor man’s tithe as he sees fit, and no poor person may take the tithe himself against the will of the owner of the produce. If so, the owner of the produce has a “benefit-right” in the produce.

And since he has a benefit-right, it is not beneficial—

it is prohibited for a woman who vowed not to derive benefit from people to benefit from the owner of the produce who gives her the poor man’s tithe, since she benefits from one who possesses a certain “benefit-right” in the produce.

And according to the one who says

he does not

designate it by name

according to Rabbi Eliezer,

he holds: “its uncertainty does not render the produce tevel.”

And anything whose uncertainty does not render the produce tevel

is not included among the other terumot and maasrot. In its regard, the wording “giving” was not stated; rather, the wording “leaving” was used. That is, the owners were commanded to leave the poor man’s tithe and allow any poor person in the marketplace to take the tithe himself; the owners have no right to distribute the tithe as they see fit.

And according to his view,

he does not have

the owner of the produce

a benefit-right

in poor man’s tithe,

and it is permitted for her to derive benefit—

the woman who vowed not to derive benefit from people is permitted to benefit from the poor man’s tithe, since she does not benefit from the owner of the produce, as she can take the tithe against his will.

Abaye said

to Rav Yosef: The explanation of the dispute is not as you said, that they disagree over whether poor man’s tithe renders the produce tevel.

Rather,

everyone

holds that

its uncertainty renders the produce tevel,

and without separating poor man’s tithe, the produce is prohibited by the prohibition of consuming tevel.

And Rabbi Eliezer and the Rabbis—

they disagree about this:

Rabbi Eliezer holds: The ignoramuses were not suspected with regard to poor man’s tithe

the ignoramuses are not suspected of failing to separate poor man’s tithe.

Therefore, it is unnecessary to separate poor man’s tithe from demai produce, since we do not fear that the produce was not tithed and is therefore subject to poor man’s tithe.

And the reason that they are not suspected of failing to separate poor man’s tithe is:

Since, if he renounced ownership of his property and became poor, and he himself took it—

he would suffer no loss—

because the ignoramus does not lose by tithing the produce: He can renounce ownership of his property, thereby become poor, and then take the poor man’s tithe for himself.

And the Rabbis hold: A person does not renounce ownership of his property, because he is afraid that perhaps another person will acquire it—

a person does not renounce ownership of his property, out of concern that someone else might precede him and acquire all his property.

Therefore, they were suspected

of failing to tithe their produce.

Accordingly, it is necessary to separate poor man’s tithe from demai produce, because there is concern that it was not tithed.

And according to this, the issue of whether a woman prohibited by vow from deriving benefit may benefit from poor man’s tithe does not depend on the dispute between Rabbi Eliezer and the Rabbis.

Rava says:

This is how the contradiction between the statement of the Mishna and the statement of the beraita should be resolved:

Here

in the Mishna, it is referring

to poor man’s tithe that is distributed in the house.

After he has already brought his produce into his house, he separates poor man’s tithe from it,

as it is written with regard to it: “giving”—“And you shall give it to the Levite, to the stranger,” and so forth.

In this poor man’s tithe, the owner of the produce has a benefit-right, since he can distribute the tithe as he sees fit.

For this reason, it is prohibited for her

the woman who vowed not to derive benefit from people

to derive benefit

from the tithe, since she benefits from the owner of the produce who gives her the tithe.

Here

in the beraita, it is referring

to poor man’s tithe that is distributed

within the threshing floors,

before he brings his produce into his house. In this manner, the owner of the produce does not distribute the tithe as he sees fit; rather, he leaves it in the threshing floor, and any poor person may take the tithe,

since it is written with regard to it: “And you shall leave it within your gates.”

In that case, the owners have no benefit-right in it, and

it is permitted for her

the woman who vowed not to derive benefit from people

to derive benefit

from the poor man’s tithe, since she does not benefit from the owners, as she can take it against their will:

We learned in the Mishna:

“The kohanim and Levites are prohibited to me; they may take,” and so forth;

And the Gemara proves from this law:

Apparently, a benefit-right is not monetary property—

this benefit-right is not considered a monetary right. Therefore, although he prohibited himself from deriving benefit from kohanim and Levites, they may take terumot and maasrot from him, since this is not considered monetary benefit that they derive from him.

And we raise an objection:

Come and hear the latter clause—

the latter clause proves the opposite, since we learned in it: If he vowed and said: “It is forbidden as a sacrifice for me that

these kohanim and these Levites derive benefit from me; they may take

kohanim and Levites

other

than these his terumot and maasrot,”

but these

kohanim and Levites from whom he prohibited himself from deriving benefit,

may not,

and it is prohibited for him to give them terumot and maasrot.

And it may be proven from this:

Apparently, a benefit-right is monetary property—

this benefit-right is considered a monetary right. Therefore, these kohanim and Levites whom he prohibited himself from benefiting from are prohibited from benefiting from his giving them the terumot and maasrot.

If so, the first clause presents a difficulty for the latter clause.

And we answer:

Rav Hoshaya said:

It is not difficult. This one is Rabbi, and that one is Rabbi Yosei ben Rabbi Yehuda.

As it was taught in a beraita: One who steals another’s tevel and eats it,

must pay him the value of his tevel.

That is, the value of all the tevel,

the words of Rabbi.

Rabbi Yosei ben Rabbi Yehuda says: He pays only the value of the non-sacred produce in it,

but he is not required to pay the value of the teruma that the owner of the produce was obligated to separate from the tevel and give to a kohen.

Is it not the case that they disagree about this—