Nedarim 86a (פו.) — the Talmud in English

And we answer:

Rabbi Ila said:

Indeed, it is possible to prohibit something in such a manner that the prohibition takes effect only later.

The proof for this is:

What would you say if

a person

says to his fellow: “This field that I am selling you, when I buy it back from you”

[when I purchase it from you],

“consecrate it”

[it shall be consecrated],

would

[is it possible that]

it not become consecrated?

Surely, it is logical to say that a person can consecrate his field at the time that he sells it, in such a manner that the consecration takes effect only afterward. And if so, the same is true in the case under discussion: the woman can prohibit her hands’ labor in such a manner that the prohibition takes effect after she is divorced.

And we challenge this:

Rabbi Yirmeya raised an objection against this:

Are the cases comparable—

how can you compare these two laws?

Surely, when he consecrated a field and said:

“This field that I am selling you,”

the consecration takes effect

because it is presently in his possession.

The field is still in his possession, and he has the ability to consecrate it now; therefore, this is not considered something that has not yet come into the world.

But

a woman—

can she

consecrate

her

hands’ labor now?

Surely, she cannot consecrate it now, since she is subordinated to her husband; and if so, the vow cannot take effect after the divorce, since that is something that has not yet come into the world.

And he brings proof to resolve this issue from elsewhere.

This is not comparable—

the case under discussion cannot be compared

except to

a person who

says to his fellow: “This field that I have already sold you, when I purchase it back from you, consecrate it”

already

“it shall be consecrated”

[it shall be consecrated],

for in such a case,

would

[is it possible that]

it become consecrated?

Surely, this is certainly something that has not yet come into the world, since the field is not in his possession,

and the same is true in the case under discussion: the woman cannot prohibit her hands’ labor after she is divorced, since at present her hands’ labor is not in her possession, and this is something that has not yet come into the world.

Rav Pappa raised an objection against this—

Rav Pappa rejects Rabbi Yirmeya’s reasoning.

Are the cases comparable—

how can you compare these two laws?

It is specifically

with regard to a sale

[a sale] that we say that the consecration does not take effect,

because

the matter is conclusive—

when he consecrates this field, it is not entirely in his possession, and he has no right in it whatsoever; therefore, it is considered something that has not yet come into the world.

But

with regard to a woman, would

[is it possible that]

the matter be conclusive?—

Surely, the woman does not belong entirely to her husband; rather, she is subordinated to her husband. Therefore, her hands’ labor is not considered something that has not yet come into the world, since it is in her possession. It is only that throughout the marriage it is subordinated to her husband; but after she is divorced, the prohibition of the vow takes effect upon it.

And he brings proof to resolve this issue from elsewhere.

This is not comparable—

the case under discussion cannot be compared

except to

a person who

says to his fellow: “This field that I mortgaged to you”

[that I subordinated to you as security for my debt]

, when I redeem it from you, consecrate it

[it shall be consecrated],

for in such a case,

would

[is it possible that]

it not become consecrated?

Surely, this is certainly considered something that has already come into the world, since in essence the field is already his now; it is merely subordinated. Therefore, the owner of the field can consecrate it now in such a manner that the consecration takes effect after the subordination ends.

And the same is true in the case under discussion: the woman can prohibit her hands’ labor now in such a manner that the prohibition takes effect after she is divorced, since it is already hers now, although it is subordinated to her husband; and this is considered something that has come into the world.

Rav Shisha, son of Rav Idi, raised an objection against this—

Rav Shisha rejects Rav Pappa’s reasoning.

Are the cases comparable—

how can you compare these two laws?

It is specifically with regard to a

field

that has been mortgaged that we say that the consecration takes effect,

because

it is in his power—

the field’s owner has the ability

to redeem it

and return the field to his possession,

and therefore this is not considered something that has not yet come into the world.

But

a woman—

can she

divorce herself?

And if so, the divorce is considered something that has not yet come into the world.

And he brings proof to resolve this issue from elsewhere.

This is not comparable—

this case cannot be compared

except to one who says to his fellow: “This field that I mortgaged to you for ten years, when I redeem it from you, consecrate it”

[it shall be consecrated],

for in such a case,

would

[is it possible that]

it not become consecrated?

This law is comparable to the case under discussion. Just as we see with regard to the field that although he cannot redeem the field, nevertheless, since the field itself is his, he can consecrate it, and this is considered something that exists in the world; so too, a woman can consecrate and prohibit her hands’ labor, since it is hers, and it is considered to exist in the world.

Rav Ashi raised an objection against this—

Rav Ashi rejects Rav Shisha’s reasoning.

Are the cases comparable—

how can you compare these two laws?

Surely, it is specifically with regard to a mortgaged field that the consecration takes effect,

because

there, there is a fixed term—

the subordination has a defined duration, and after the stipulated ten years the field will return to him; therefore, he can consecrate it.

But

a woman, would

[is it possible that]

she have a fixed term?—

Surely, there is no fixed term to her marriage; and if so, the divorce is considered something that has not yet come into the world.