Nedarim 75b (עה:) — the Talmud in English

And the Gemara explains:

For example, he attached another object to this vow —

he declared concerning a specific object that it should be like the object concerning which she made the vow.

And

if you say that they take effect —

the vows, then

there is an attachment [the attachment of the vow takes effect],

since the vow takes effect and it is possible to attach another vow to it.

And

if you say that they do not take effect —

the vows at all, then the attachment of the vow does not take effect, since

there is no substance

to her vow, as it does not take effect at all, and it is not possible to attach another vow to it.

What is the ruling?

And we resolve it from the Mishna:

Come and hear:

Rabbi Eliezer said: If he annuls vows that have entered into the category of prohibition, he should not annul vows that have not entered into the category of prohibition.

And from the fact that Rabbi Eliezer said that these vows are easier to annul because they have not entered into the category of prohibition —

Conclude from this

that

they do not take effect

the vows at all.

For if they did take effect and were then annulled, in what way would they be easier than any vow that takes effect and is annulled, and what would be the basis for the kal va-chomer?

And we reject this:

Is it so [does the Mishna]

say,

“that do not enter

the category of prohibition”?

It actually

states: “that have not entered.”

And according to your assertion, that they do not take effect at all, it should have said, “that do not enter.”

Rather, certainly, the intention is that at the time of the annulment they

have not yet entered

the category of prohibition; but when she makes the vow, the vows take effect and are immediately annulled.

And although they take effect, they are still easier than other vows, since at the moment they took effect, their annulment already existed in the world.

And we resolve it from a beraita:

Come and hear:

As it was taught:

Rabbi Eliezer said to them

to the Sages [a kal va-chomer to prove his position]:

And if, in a case [with regard to one’s own vows]

where the person who makes the vow

does not

the person who makes the vow

annul

his

own vows once he has made the vow [after he has made the vow], and nevertheless

[after he has made the vow], nevertheless

he annuls

his

own vows before he makes the vow [before he makes the vow], by issuing a declaration beforehand that he does not want his vows to take effect,

[before he makes the vow], by declaring beforehand that he does not want his vows to take effect,

in a case [with regard to his wife’s vows]

where

the husband annuls his wife’s vows once she makes them, is it not logically necessary that he should annul his wife’s vows

even

before she makes the vow?

And the Gemara proves from the fact that Rabbi Eliezer derives the annulment of his wife’s vows before she made them from issuing a declaration before making a vow —

Is it not

that the law concerning the annulment of

his wife’s vows is analogous to his own [vows]?

[similar to his own vows]?

Just as

he

[with regard to his own vows]

that

the vows

do not take effect

at all after he issued this declaration,

so too

with regard to

his wife’s vows, that

the vows

do not take effect

at all after he annulled them.

And if so, this is proof concerning the Gemara’s uncertainty.

We reject this:

No.

Although it is possible to derive from one case to the other that nullifying a vow is effective even before the vow takes effect, nevertheless the two laws should not be considered analogous. Rather,

each follows its own law, and each follows its own law.

With regard to his own vows, the vows do not take effect at all after he issued a declaration; whereas with regard to his wife’s vows, the vows take effect, and only afterward does the annulment take effect and nullify the vow.

And we resolve it from a beraita:

Introduction:

The following beraitot explain that Rabbi Eliezer and the Sages disagree as to whether the fact that one can nullify something that has already taken effect is a stringency, from which one can derive by a kal va-chomer that it should be possible to nullify even something that has not yet taken effect, or not.

Rabbi Eliezer’s view is that this kal va-chomer may be stated, whereas the Sages’ view is that it may not be stated, because sometimes it is more reasonable that something can be nullified only after it has already taken effect.

Come and hear:

The Sages said to

the Sages

Rabbi Eliezer —

the Sages responded to Rabbi Eliezer’s derivation by kal va-chomer from his own vows, with regard to which self-nullification is effective only before he makes the vow, to his wife’s vows, arguing that all the more so annulment should be effective before she makes the vow:

For if so, let us state a kal va-chomer of this sort as well:

And if a ritual bath, which elevates

[purifies]

the impure from their impurity

after they have become impure, nevertheless

does not

the ritual bath

protect

[preserve]

the pure from becoming impure

when they come into contact with impurity while in the ritual bath,

A person, who

has an additional stringency, in that if a pure person swallowed impure rings,

does not

he

elevate

the swallowing of the rings within the pure person does not purify

the

rings

that are impure from their impurity —

is it not the case

that this is a kal va-chomer that we can derive from a ritual bath: If a person swallowed pure rings and entered with them, while they were inside his intestines, into a tent containing a corpse, and the person became impure,

would he not protect

the person

against

the rings

that are pure becoming impure

because they are inside his intestines; rather, the rings too should become impure?

But that is not the law.

Rather, if a person swallowed a pure ring and entered a tent containing a corpse, and upon leaving the tent containing the corpse he vomited out the ring, the ring does not become impure, since this is “an absorbed purification.”

And necessarily, one must say that this kal va-chomer cannot be argued, because it is more reasonable that there should be a possibility of nullifying impurity only after it has taken effect. Therefore, no proof can be brought from a ritual bath, since immersion in it is effective to purify only after the impurity has already taken effect.

If so, also with regard to the annulment of vows, this kal va-chomer cannot be stated, to establish that annulment is effective even before the woman makes the vow.

And the Gemara proves from this beraita concerning our uncertainty —

It follows from the Sages’ argument to Rabbi Eliezer that they compare the law of protection from impurity to Rabbi Eliezer’s law. They understood from his words that the vow does not take effect at all, because with regard to pure rings that are absorbed within a person, certainly the impurity does not take effect at all; therefore, they brought their proof from there.

Rather,

Rather,

Conclude from this

that according to Rabbi Eliezer

the vows do not take effect

at all, and therefore the Sages brought this kal va-chomer as a proof against him.