Nedarim 72a — the Talmud in English

ta shma

from that which was taught in a beraita:

At what time did

the Sages say in the Mishna [above 70a] “

The husband died —

the husband’s authority was emptied for the father” —

When the husband had still not heard before he died, or when he heard and annulled, or when he heard and remained silent and died on that same day.

And the Gemara brings proof from here for our uncertainty:

And if you say

that

divorce is like silence,

and not like confirmation,

let it also teach

in this beraita:

or

that he

heard

and divorced,

for this too is considered like his having heard and remained silent, and the father would be able to return and annul.

But

from the fact that it did not teach so —

infer from it: divorce is like confirmation.

And since the vow is considered confirmed, the father cannot return and annul.

Rather, the Gemara raises an objection from the latter clause:

Let us say the latter clause —

there is an opposite proof from the latter clause of the beraita, in which it was stated:

But if he heard

the husband heard the vow before his death

and confirmed it, or

that he

heard and remained silent and died on the following day,

so that there was silence throughout the day on which he heard — once again

is not

the father

able to annul,

since the husband confirmed the vow through confirmation or silence.

And if you say

[and as you sought to prove from the opening clause of the beraita], that

divorce is like confirmation,

then

let it teach

in the latter clause of the beraita:

or he heard and divorced,

for this too is considered confirmation, and the father cannot annul.

Rather,

necessarily,

from the fact that it did not teach so, infer from it

from the latter clause, opposite to the opening clause, that

divorce is like silence,

and the father can return and annul the husband’s portion.

And we conclude:

Rather, from this

beraita,

there is nothing to infer from it —

no proof can be brought from it, because the tan­ny stated in the opening clause and in the latter clause only cases that are opposite to one another.

And therefore,

if

it is said that in the

opening clause

it is

specifically

not written a case of divorce, and because this is considered confirmation, we will explain that

the latter clause was stated on account of the opening clause

[that the latter clause was written in accordance with the opening clause], and in the latter clause only cases opposite to those in the opening clause were stated. And since a case of divorce is not written in the opening clause, it is therefore not applicable to write this case in the latter clause.

And

if

it is said that in the

latter clause specifically

a case of divorce is not written, because this is not considered confirmation, but silence, then we will explain that

the opening clause was stated on account of the latter clause

[that the opening clause was written in accordance with the latter clause]. And in the opening clause only the cases opposite to those in the latter clause were written. And since in the latter clause it is impossible to write a case of divorce, this case is not written in the opening clause.

And there is no proof from this beraita for either side of the uncertainty.

And we resolve it from another place:

ta shma

from our Mishna [71a]:

She vowed while betrothed, and she was divorced. And she became betrothed on that same day. Even if she again was divorced and became betrothed, and even to one hundred men —

Her father and her last husband annul her vows.

Infer from it,

it is proven from our Mishna that

divorce is like silence —

For if

divorce

were like confirmation, could the last betrothed husband annul vows that the first betrothed husband confirmed?

But once the vow was confirmed through the divorce of her first husband, it is already impossible to annul the vow.

And we reject this, that there is no proof from here. For —

Here, with what are we dealing? With

a case

that

still

the first betrothed husband had not heard

the vow, and in such a case the divorce is considered neither like silence nor like confirmation. And it cannot be proven from our Mishna how divorce is considered after the husband heard the vow.

And the Gemara raises an objection to the rejection:

If so,

that our Mishna is speaking of a case in which the betrothed husband did not hear,

why specifically —

why did the tan­ny state the case in which she was divorced and became betrothed

on that same day?

Was it not

even if

she was divorced

after one hundred days

from the day on which she vowed,

also,

since the husband did not hear, the last betrothed husband would be able to annul her vows?

And the Gemara answers that the words of our Mishna are

when the betrothed husband did not hear

the first one

, and the father heard.

For

in such a case, only

on that same day

that the father heard

is he able to annul

the last betrothed husband.

But from that point onward,

for the day on which the father heard has already passed, and the vow was not annulled, once again

he is not able to annul

the last betrothed husband.

ta shma

from that which we learned: [below 89a]

She vowed on the day on which she was married,

and

he divorced

her husband

and took her back on that same day, he is unable

the husband

to annul.

Infer from it: divorce is like confirmation.

For if divorce were like silence, the law should have been that he could annul if he took her back on that same day.

And the Gemara rejects this:

They said: here we are dealing with a married woman —

this Mishna is not dealing with a betrothed woman, but with a married woman.

And this is the reason he is unable to annul, because

after he divorced her, he no longer had authority over the vows that she vowed before the divorce. And even after the husband took her back as his wife, he could not annul these vows, since they are considered prior vows, and

a husband does not annul prior vows.