Nedarim 72a (עב.) — the Talmud in English

Come and hear

from that which was taught in a beraita:

When did the Sages say

that in the Mishna [above, 70a]

“The husband died—

the husband’s authority was transferred to the father”?—

When the husband had still not heard the vow before he died; or when he heard and nullified it; or when he heard, remained silent, and died on that same day.

The Gemara brings proof from here concerning our dilemma:

And if you say

that

divorce is considered like silence,

and not like upholding the vow,

let it also teach

in this beraita:

or

that he

heard

and divorced her,

as this, too, is considered like hearing and remaining silent, and the father could subsequently nullify the vow.

And

from the fact that it did not teach this—

infer from it that divorce is considered like upholding the vow.

And since the vow is considered upheld, the father cannot subsequently nullify it.

However, the Gemara raises an objection from the latter clause:

Consider the latter clause—

there is an opposite proof from the latter clause of the beraita, where it is stated:

But if he heard

the vow before his death

and upheld it, or

he

heard and remained silent and died on the following day,

so that there was silence throughout the day on which he heard it—again

the

father

cannot nullify it,

since the husband upheld the vow either by explicitly upholding it or through his silence.

And if you say [as you sought to prove from the first clause of the beraita] that

[and as you sought to prove from the opening clause of the beraita], that

divorce is considered like upholding the vow,

then

let it teach

in the latter clause of the beraita:

or he heard and divorced her,

as this, too, is considered upholding the vow, and the father cannot nullify it.

Rather,

it is necessarily the case that

from the fact that it did not teach this, infer from it

from the latter clause, in opposition to the first clause, that

divorce is considered like silence,

and the father can subsequently nullify the husband’s portion of the vow.

And we conclude:

Rather, from this

beraita

nothing can be inferred—

no proof can be brought from it, because the tanna mentioned in the first and latter clauses only cases that are opposites of one another.

Therefore,

if

in the

first clause

it is

specifically

that no case of divorce is mentioned, because it is considered upholding the vow, we will explain that

the latter clause was stated because of the first clause [that the latter clause was formulated in accordance with the first clause], and only cases opposite to those in the first clause were stated in the latter clause. Since no case of divorce is mentioned in the first clause, it is consequently not appropriate to mention that case in the latter clause.

[that the latter clause was written in accordance with the opening clause], and in the latter clause only cases opposite to those in the opening clause were stated. And since a case of divorce is not written in the opening clause, it is therefore not applicable to write this case in the latter clause.

And

if

in the

latter clause specifically

no case of divorce is mentioned because it is not considered upholding the vow, but rather silence, then we will explain that

the first clause was stated because of the latter clause [that the first clause was formulated in accordance with the latter clause]. Only cases opposite to those in the latter clause were stated in the first clause. Since a case of divorce cannot be mentioned in the latter clause, that case is not mentioned in the first clause either.

[that the opening clause was written in accordance with the latter clause]. And in the opening clause only the cases opposite to those in the latter clause were written. And since in the latter clause it is impossible to write a case of divorce, this case is not written in the opening clause.

Thus, this beraita provides no proof for either side of the dilemma.

And we resolve it from another source:

Come and hear

from our Mishna [71a]:

If she took a vow while betrothed, and she was divorced, and she became betrothed again on that same day—even if she was again divorced and became betrothed again, even to one hundred men—

her father and her last betrothed husband may nullify her vows.

Infer from it:

it is evident from our Mishna that

divorce is considered like silence—

For if

divorce

is considered like upholding the vow, can the last betrothed husband nullify vows that the first betrothed husband upheld?

Once the vow was upheld through the divorce by her first husband, surely it can no longer be nullified.

And we reject this proof. For—

Here, with what are we dealing? With

a case

where

the first betrothed husband

had still not heard

the vow. In such a case, divorce is considered neither like silence nor like upholding the vow. Therefore, nothing can be proved from our Mishna concerning the status of divorce after the husband has heard the vow.

The Gemara objects to this rejection:

If so,

that our Mishna is referring to a case where the betrothed husband did not hear the vow,

why specifically

did the tanna state the case in which she was divorced and became betrothed again

on that same day?

After all,

even if

she was divorced

after one hundred days

from the day on which she took the vow,

also,

since the husband had not heard it, her last betrothed husband would be able to nullify her vows.

The Gemara answers that the case in our Mishna is

when the first betrothed husband did not hear

the vow

, but the father heard it.

For

in such a case, only

on that same day

on which the father heard the vow

can the last betrothed husband nullify it.

the last betrothed husband annul it.

But from that point onward,

once the day on which the father heard it has passed and the vow was not nullified,

the last betrothed husband can no longer nullify it.

.

Come and hear

from that which we learned: [below, 89a]

If she took a vow on the day on which she married, and her husband

that she married, and

divorced

her,

and took her back on that same day, he cannot

the husband

nullify the vow.

Infer from it that divorce is considered like upholding the vow.

For if divorce were considered like silence, the law should be that he could nullify the vow if he took her back on that same day.

The Gemara rejects this proof:

They said: Here we are dealing with a married woman—

this Mishna is not discussing a betrothed woman, but a married woman.

And this is the reason that he cannot nullify the vow: because

after he divorced her, he no longer had authority over vows that she had taken before the divorce. Even after he took her as his wife again, the husband cannot nullify these vows, since they are considered earlier vows, and

a husband cannot nullify earlier vows.