Nedarim 71b — the Talmud in English

Beit Shammai hold: Vows that had come before the betrothed during his lifetime, and he died

and died —

the authority is emptied

of the betrothed

to the father.

Since the husband had heard the vow before his death and revoked it, the father acquires the husband’s share after his death.

And since we already explained above that Beit Shammai hold that the vow is as though it were divided in two,

and

each one [the father and the husband

cuts off

half a vow, then when the husband revoked it before his death, the husband’s authority to revoke the vow was removed, since he had already revoked his share; therefore, the later betrothed cannot come in place of the first. And the father can revoke it alone.

And

Beit Hillel hold

that

her father and her last husband revoke her vows.

And their reason is that they hold that the vow is not divided in two,

and

the revocation by one

does not cut off

half a vow, but weakens the entire vow. And this is not considered a complete act with regard to the vow, but merely a weakening.

Therefore, the husband does not lose his authority over the vow after he revoked it, and the last husband can come in place of the first husband. Therefore, the father and her last husband revoke her vows.

And there is a proof from this dispute for Shmuel’s words.

For it is evident that according to both Beit Hillel and Beit Shammai, the last betrothed can revoke vows that had come before the first betrothed. And their entire dispute is only in a case where the first betrothed had already revoked it. In that case, Beit Shammai hold that after his revocation his authority was lost, and it is impossible for the other betrothed to come in his place.

But in a case where the first betrothed merely heard the vow, and had not yet revoked it, he did not lose his authority, as in the first law, and the last betrothed can come in place of the first betrothed and revoke her vows together with the father.

It was raised before them:

A betrothed woman who made a vow, and her betrothed divorced her on the day that he heard her vow —

Does

divorce

resemble silence,

and the matter is considered like a vow that was not revoked on the day he heard it?

Or

divorce

resembles upholding!

For by divorcing his wife, and knowing that after the divorce he can no longer revoke it for her, this is like one who upheld the vow, since from now on he has no possibility of revoking it.

And the Gemara explains:

What practical difference does it make? —

For example, she made a vow, and her husband heard it,

the betrothed,

and he divorced her, and took her back on that very day —

and took her back on that very day [and the same הדין applies if she became betrothed to another betrothed on that very day].

If the Master says

divorce

resembles silence,

and there is still a possibility of revoking it,

he can revoke it

for her, since the day on which he heard it has still not passed.

And if the Master says it resembles upholding,

then

he can no longer revoke it for her.

For through the divorce the vow is considered upheld.

And the entire question is when he divorced her while she was betrothed, for then the second betrothed has the power to revoke, together with the father, earlier vows. But once she married and left the authority of the father, the second betrothed does not have the power to revoke earlier vows by himself. Ran

And we resolve it from a beraita: