Nedarim 64a (סד.) — the Talmud in English

Mishna:

Rabbi Eliezer says: We open for a person

a basis for regret concerning his vow

through the honor of his father and mother.

And they say to him: Had you known that when you made the vow you were causing your parents disgrace, because people see you as someone who treats vows lightly and attribute your defect to your parents, would you have made the vow?

If he answers that, because of the honor of his parents, he would not have made the vow then, they may dissolve his vow.

But the Sages prohibit

opening for him a basis for regret concerning his vow by invoking the honor of his father and mother. For perhaps he does not truly regret it because of the honor of his parents, but merely says so verbally before us—that he regrets it because of their honor—while he does not think so in his heart.

For if he were now to answer the Sage’s question that he would not have cared about their honor, but would have made the vow despite the fact that it was not to their honor, by making that statement he would in fact be affronting the honor of his parents. Perhaps, therefore, he would lie before us rather than make a statement that affronts their honor.

The explanation of the Gemara below follows the version of the Ran, together with his explanation:

Rabbi Tzadok said:

According to Rabbi Eliezer, who holds that one may open with the honor of his parents,

since they open for him with the honor of his father and mother—

let them open for him

they may also open for him

with the honor of the Omnipresent.

And they say to him: Had you known that when you made a vow you were treating lightly the honor of the Omnipresent—for since one who makes a vow makes it as though he were vowing by the King Himself, this constitutes a slight to the honor of the King—would you have made the vow?

If he answers that he would not have made the vow, the Sage dissolves his vow.

They said to him

the Sages said to Rabbi Tzadok:

If so,

according to your words, that according to Rabbi Eliezer one may open for every person who made a vow, even with the honor of the Omnipresent,

there are no vows.

Abaye and Rava disagreed in explaining these statements of the Mishna.

According to Abaye, the meaning is that vows will not be properly dissolved!

For whenever any person is asked whether he would have made the vow even had he known that by doing so he was treating lightly the honor of the Omnipresent, he would not dare answer that he indeed would have made the vow. If so, we must be concerned that he is not now telling the truth.

It necessarily follows that even according to Rabbi Eliezer one may not open with the honor of the Omnipresent. Rabbi Eliezer permitted opening only with the honor of his father and mother, because in his view there is no concern that the one who made the vow might lie and not tell the truth out of regard for his parents’ honor.

Rava, however, explained the statements of the Mishna differently, as will be explained in the Gemara.

And the Sages concede to Rabbi Eliezer

with regard to one who made a vow

concerning something between himself and his father and mother,

for example, he prohibited them from deriving benefit from him,

that one may open for him with the honor of his father and mother.

For here he certainly will not lie out of regard for their honor by saying that he would not have made the vow even though he does not regret it in his heart. For the very substance of this vow is an affront to their honor, demonstrating that this person is not careful concerning their honor.

Rabbi Eliezer further said: One may open with “

a nolad,”

a matter that occurred unexpectedly, as the Mishna will immediately explain.

But the Sages prohibit

opening with a nolad.

The Mishna explains:

How

is the opening based on a nolad, concerning which the Sages and Rabbi Eliezer disagree?

He said: “It is forbidden to me as a konam to benefit from a certain person”

for a particular period of time.

And

afterward

that

certain person

became a sofer

a Torah scholar or the town’s scribe—and the one who made the vow now needs his services constantly.

Or that

certain person

was marrying off his son,

and all his friends customarily participate in the wedding feast.

And

the one who made the vow then said:

Had I known

at the time I made the vow

that he would become a sofer

a Torah scholar or the town’s scribe—and that I would need his services—

or that he would soon marry off his son

and that I would need to participate in his celebration—

I would not have made the vow!

Since this occurred unexpectedly, it is a nolad.

The Mishna gives another example of their dispute over whether one may open with a nolad:

The one who made the vow said:

“It is forbidden to me as a konam to enter this house.”

And

afterward

this

house

became a synagogue.

Then

the one who made the vow

said:

Had I known

at the time I made the vow

that it would become a synagogue—

I would not have made the vow!

Rabbi Eliezer permits

opening with such a nolad.

But the Sages prohibit

opening with a nolad.

Gemara:

We learned in the Mishna that the Sages said to Rabbi Tzadok: If one may open with the honor of the Omnipresent, there are no vows!

The Gemara asks:

What

is the explanation of the Sages’ statement—“

there are no vows”?

Abaye said,

this is what the Sages said to Rabbi Tzadok:

If so,

that one may open with the honor of the Omnipresent,

vows will not be properly dissolved,

because a person does not dare say in his presence that he made a vow despite the fact that it was not to the honor of the Omnipresent, and there is concern that the dissolution of vows, which depends on a person’s genuine regret, will not be carried out properly.