Nedarim 63b (סג:) — the Talmud in English

And the Gemara supports Abaye’s statement:

And it was taught

(as an affirmative statement):

If he said, “

Until the first of Adar,”

he is prohibited

until the first of the first Adar.

And

if it was

an

intercalated year,

he is prohibited

until the first of the second Adar.

But the wording of the latter clause of the beraita presents a difficulty: “And if the year was intercalated”:

Does this imply that in the first clause

(is it possible that the first clause)

does not deal with an intercalated year?

Yet we are dealing with a year that has two Adars!?

Rather,

conclude from it:

This—

the latter clause of the beraita—

is obvious

to him that the year is intercalated

[that it is obvious to him that the year will be intercalated], and therefore he is prohibited until the unspecified Adar, which is the second Adar, in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Meir.

This

first clause

is referring to one who did not know

that the year would be intercalated, and therefore he is prohibited only until the first Adar.

Mishna:

Rabbi Yehuda says:

One who said:

“A konam: Wine that I taste is forbidden to me until Passover arrives.”

We do not say that it is prohibited to him until Passover has ended, despite his saying “until Passover arrives”—

Rather,

he is prohibited only until the night of Passover,

because we assess his intention as

not having intended

to prohibit wine to himself

except until the time when people customarily drink wine.

That is, on the nights of Passover, for the four cups.

And likewise, if

he said: “A konam: Meat that I taste is forbidden to me until the fast arrives”

[Yom Kippur]—

We do not say that it is prohibited to him until the fast has ended.

Rather,

he is prohibited only until

the meal before the fast of

the night

of

the fast, for he intended only until the time when people customarily eat meat,

and on the eve of Yom Kippur, at the meal before the fast, people customarily eat meat.

Rabbi Yosei, his son—

of Rabbi Yehuda—

says:

Even one who said:

“A konam: Garlic that I taste is forbidden to me until

Shabbat arrives”—

he is prohibited only until the night of Shabbat.

Because

he intended only until the time when people customarily eat garlic,

and on the night of Shabbat Ezra instituted that people eat garlic.

One who says

to another: “A konam: I will derive no benefit from you”

[a konam against whatever I might receive benefit from you],

“if you do not come and take for your sons

[on behalf of your sons]

one kor of wheat and two jugs of wine”—

This—

the other person, the vow-taker’s fellow—

may annul his vow without the authorization of a Sage, and say to him

the vow-taker:

“Did you say this for any reason other than my honor,”

so that I would be honored through you before people who would see that I am important in your eyes, since you wish to give me a gift—and if so,

“this is my honor,”

for I will be honored even more when they see that you wish to give it and I do not wish to accept it.

And likewise, one who says to another: “A konam: You may not derive benefit from me, if you do not come and give my son one kor of wheat and two jugs of wine”:

Rabbi Meir says:

the person subject to the vow

is prohibited

from deriving benefit from the one who imposed the vow

until he gives it.

And the Sages say: This one also—

the one who imposed the vow—

may annul his vow without the authorization of a Sage and say to him: “It is as though I had received it.”

And if

Reuben

was

pressing

[urging]

him,

Shimon,

to marry his sister’s daughter,

whom it is a mitzva to marry,

and

Shimon said:

“A konam: She may derive no benefit from me forever”—

And likewise, one who divorces his wife and says: “A konam: My wife” \-

whom I am divorcing now—

may derive no benefit from me forever—

these women are permitted to derive benefit from him.

Because

he intended this only with regard to marriage,

meaning that he would not marry her or remarry her.

And likewise, if

he was pressing his fellow to eat at his home,

and

said

his fellow:

“A konam: I will not enter your house.”

Or he said: “

A konam: I will not taste cold water because of you”—

he

is permitted to enter his house and drink cold water there.

Because

he intended this only with regard to eating and drinking.

We have completed the chapter “A Konam: Wine.”

Introduction

This chapter explains the laws of the dissolution of vows.

In tractate Chagigah [10a], the Mishna says that the dissolution of vows is among the matters that “float in the air” and have nothing substantial upon which to rely, since they are not explicitly stated in Scripture; rather, they are derived through exposition of the verses.

The Gemara cites several expositions, including the exposition of the verse, “He shall not profane his word”: He himself may not annul his word, but others may annul it for him.

From this, the Sages learned that one who has made a vow and wishes to have it dissolved must come before a Sage and ask about his vow, so that the Sage may dissolve it.

We find in the words of the Rishonim two methods by which a Sage can dissolve his vow:

a. Through

regret,

where the one who made the vow regrets having made it.

b. Through a

basis for regret,

where the Sage finds a mistaken premise underlying the vow: had he known of it, he would not have made the vow.

Some maintain that the regret itself constitutes a mistaken premise underlying the vow: had the one who made the vow known that he would come to regret it, he would not have made it.

The Mishna below explains that Rabbi Eliezer and the Sages disagree as to whether a Sage may dissolve a vow even on the basis of an unforeseen circumstance, called a nolad, as will be explained in the Mishna.